

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Southern (Over) Exposure? Quebec and the Evolution of Canada's Grand Strategy, 2002–2012

David G. Haglund

articulation and promotion of the "national" interest. "[I]f … it is bad policy to let Canadian Jews or Canadian Muslims have undue influence on Canada's policy to Israel, for example, it is similarly bad policy to let French Canada determine Canadian foreign and defence policy."

To this manner of framing the question, Quebec sovereigntists reply that nothing could be further from the truth. To them, the shaping of Canadian grand strategy has all along been an enterprise that fundamentally contradicts and challenges the values and interests of the Quebec "nation." Consider the 2011 electoral platform of the Parti Québécois, with its insistence that for more than 40 years, the federal government has been systematically undercutting Quebec on the international stage, handicapping its ability to defend core principles. "The most important foreign policy decisions, such as the military engagement in Afghanistan or the Canadian position on climate change,

it is claimed Quebec influences Canada's overall policy stances: (1) its direct political representation at the federal level and (2) its ability to exploit to its advantage concerns over "national unity." Again, we place these vectors of influence within the context of our pair of case studies. To get slightly ahead of our story, we will conclude that while there something to the claim that Quebec can and does boast of a certain "specificity" in the matter of Canada's grand-strategic preferences, it is hardly the same thing as

commonalities, as well as political (viz., liberalism) ones, and say some, even strategic ones (viz., a propensity to utilize, or at least not shy away from, the application of military force) (Vucetic 2011; Haglund 2005, 179–98). Yet another explanation is offered by those who hold that it is Quebeckers' religious traditions and sense of civic responsibility that account for their differing views on matters of strategy (Gow 1970, 8–122). Finally, the historical dimension is invoked, with some analysts remarking on the consistency with which Quebeckers refused to flock to the colors on behalf of causes earlier associated with British imperialism—a consistency, they say, that has given rise to the society's culture of pacifism (Mongeau 1993, 81–9; Robitaille 2007, 1–5; Roussel and Boucher 2008).

Now, it really is not necessary for us to establish the precise "cause(s)" of Quebeckers' orientations toward matters relating to war and peace in order to be able to assess the relevance of the main contention under examination, namely that Quebeckers demonstrate greater passivity in respect of external threats than other Canadians. On this latter point, all that needs to be done is to canvas the historical record regarding the so-called "specificity" of Quebec. We need to have this record speak to the existence of a "distinct society," otherwise the counterfactual approach we propose to undertake here collapses under the weight of its internal contradictions, for if Quebec cannot be argued to be different from the ROC in important ways, of what value would be the counterfactual test? So we will accept the existence of difference, even if321(accept)-32httheremarki9272hore

participation in combat operations in Afghanistan—the support shown in 2005 was for a different deployment, peacekeeping in Kabul—whereas outside of Quebec majorities did support the combat mission from the autumn of 2006 to the winter of 2008, and then again between February and August 2010. In sum, by simply confining our inquiry to the level of public opinion and going no further, it is hard to see how, in the absence of Quebec from the federation, Canadian policies related to international security could have remained identical to those adopted with Quebec a part of Canada. Let us now turn to our second case study, the 2003 invasion of Iraq.

Quebeckers and the invasion of Iraq

Quebeckers again stood out from their fellow Canadians in responding to the attack on Iraq launched by the US and UK in March 2003, and would do so in a way that mirrored their response to Canada's Afghanistan policy over the period we covered in the preceding section of this article. Figure 2 illustrates the evolution in Canadian attitudes toward the use of force in Iraq between 2002 and 2004, both before and after the toppling of the Saddam Hussein regime.

Once again, Canadian opinion would fluctuate in response to external stimuli, but at all times between September 2002 and April 2003, save , those attitudinal shifts would run along parallel tracks, with the direction of change in Quebec mirroring that in the ROC (above, we have split the data for some months into three roughly equal parts, viz. for February and March 2003). That one exceptional moment, when the curve for Quebec deviated from that of the ROC, came in the immediate aftermath of Jean Chrétien's announcement that Canada would not take BJ113/2UEI-tc59

however, Canadian support for military action would once more rise, notwithstanding (or perhaps) Ottawa's decision to deploy nearly 2,000 soldiers to Afghanistan —a decision that would have led attentive observers to conclude that the country had no troops to spare for combat in Iraq. Thus, Canadians could have supported, in theory, participation in a war in which, in practice, it would have been impossible for their soldiers to partake. This rise in support for an Iraq campaign occurred even though it was growing extremely likely that France or Russia, or both, would use Security Council vetoes to block any UN endorsement of an attack. It should be recalled that Prime Minister Chrétien had consistently maintained throughout the crisis months of late 2002 and early 2003 that any Canadian participation in the war would be contingent upon the Security Council's authorization, after the pattern established with the Persian Gulf war more than a decade earlier (though , we hasten to add, the model followed for the Kosovo war in 1999) (Massie and Roussel 2005, 69–87).

Figure 2 shows that immediately after Ottawa announced it would not take part in the military campaign against Saddam Hussein, more than a third of Albertans continued to

Free Trade Agreement. As well, Cellucci expressed understanding for a long-standing antiwar sentiment in the province, and he made a point of noting that in the embassy's reports to Washington, care was always taken to distinguish between antiwar attitudes and anti-American ones.

The ambassador'

its inspiration from opposition to policies not people.

mid-February 2003, Duceppe declared that the Bloc would oppose Canadian participation in any unsanctioned (i.e., by the UN) war against Iraq, and he expressed his conviction that Saddam Hussein could be made to disarm through peaceful means. Besides, no one had yet proved that the Iraqi leader WMD in quantities sufficient to justify a preventive strike. Therefore, he continued, it would be against international law for the war advocated by the Bush administration to take place without UN blessing. It would, in effect, be the first step on a slippery and dangerous slope. Duceppe was worried that, at this point in the crisis, there were too many ambiguities surrounding Canada's own position on the Iraq crisis, and he urged Prime Minister Chrétien to "categorically reject any Canadian participation in action against Iraq orchestrated by the American government outside of a UN framework" (Bloc Québécois 2003).

The sovereigntist leader hardly limited his exertions to speeches in the House; between January and March 2003 he participated in four antiwar demonstrations, including one on February 15 that brought 150,000 protesters into the streets of Montréal, in what was the largest such demonstration in the province's history. By comparison, antiwar demonstrations in other Canadian cities at the time were more modest, 12,000 marching in Edmonton, 10,000 in Toronto, and only 2,000 in Ottawa (Cauchy 2003, A1; Lachapelle 2003, 911–27). Continuing its antiwar mobilization efforts in the House, the BQ introduced a motion on February 10 demanding that Canada "consider the sending of troops to Iraq by the government only after the United Nations Security Council has passed a resolution explicitly authorizing a military intervention in Iraq" (House of Commons Debates 2003b, 3335). The motion was defeated by the Liberal government and the Conservative opposition, 195 to 54, with the New Democratic Party and four dissenting Liberals voting alongside the Bloc. In reacting to the vote, Duceppe let slip some anti-American verbiage, basically accusing those who voted against his motion of being cowards who were simply dancing to a tune played by an American piper (Buzzetti 2003, A16).

The Liberal government was indeed leaving the door open to possible Canadian participation in the war against Iraq, something that would almost certainly have transpired had France chosen to throw its support behind the US, even in the absence of a Security Council authorization (as had happened just a few years earlier, in the Kosovo war) (see Massie 2008a; Haglund 2005, 180). Lacking any green light from France, Prime Minister Chrétien announced on March 17 that Canada was refusing to take part in the US–UK invasion of Iraq. The announcement was applauded by the BQ, which nonetheless criticized the Liberals for permitting some 180 members of the CF who were deployed with American and British units to accompany their comrades into combat (Toupin 2003, A7). The lesson Duceppe (2004) drew from all of this was apparent: It was that in making Ottawa cognizant of Quebeckers' near-universal condemnation of the war, the Bloc had "played a determining role in preventing Canadian participation."

In the case of the Afghan war, things were different, with the BQ taking much longer to mobilize opposition from within the province, signifying that the latter's "influence" (along with that of the party) would bethings were di

request that Canada deploy troops to Kabul in February 2003, which would free up American forces for service in Iraq, the Bloc leader changed his tune. Now, the Afghan mission began to reek of duplicity, as he accused Ottawa of being hypocritical in refusing to do openly what it was ready to do through subterfuge, namely to support the US effort in Iraq by means of Afghanistan (House of Commons Debates 2003a, 2884). Even so, his rhetoric did not prevent Duceppe from supporting Canada's military engagement in that Central Asian country. For instance, he took the trouble, in June

Afghanistan in a training role until 2014. For its part, the Bloc insisted that Ottawa

"specificities" regarding the perception of, and response to, threat? Not necessarily, and this for a few good reasons. First, the presence of a prime minister from Quebec, along with other members of cabinet from the province, certainly would seem to convey, de facto, a degree of sway over decision-making. This has been precisely what so riled the political scientist, Ted Morton, a decade ago, when he observed that "[n]ine of the past 10 federal elections have been won by a party with a Quebec leader. These Quebec prime ministers have consolidated all real power in the Montreal-dominated offices of the PMO and PCO." As a result, he continued, the "once-proud Canadian military, historically an irritant in French–English relations, has been deliberately reduced to Boy Scout status. As the Iraqi war reminded us, Canadian foreign policy is set by public opinion in Quebec, which has meant abandoning our historical allies

the national interest. So much for the theory. What of the reality? Notwithstanding the

importance of the difference. Public opinion, of course, does matter in any democracy (how could it not?), but it is far from the only determinant of strategy. In our article's second section, we sought to assess how the Quebec difference might get translated into policy outputs, directly in the first instance, subsequently more indirectly. First, we looked at how federal politicians from the province, both in the BQ and the Liberal government of Jean Chrétien, might be said to have affected policymaking so as to reflect, and give advantage to, interests within the province. Here we found, not surprisingly, that the Bloc's "influence" was hard to detect, but that, of course, of the cabinet of Jean Chrétien was a horse of a different color altogether. Obviously, the cabinet had to matter in a way the Bloc did . But did its decision-making accord "undue" weight to Quebec preferences? Here, we basically opted out of providing a definitive answer, arguing that only the archives can possibly tell us whether federal decision-making was importantly influenced by perceptions of the impact in Quebec of policy choices that the province would deem to have been ill-advised.

This in turn led us to our investigation of a second possible vector of influence: The worry that failure to appease Quebec might fuel dangerous tensions for national unity. We do not take this concern lightly, as in the past it was obvious how grand strategy could and did serve as a wedge separating the two "founding peoples" of Cana334(led)-332(u7c5cuind

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No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

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