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It is not difficult to caricature International Relations (IR) realism, regarded by many scholars (and not just in Canada) as representing the closest brush that any member of the academy might ever have with devil worship.[1] Judging from a recent authoritative survey of political scientists in the IR/Canadian Foreign Policy (CFP) community, realism—no matter how it happens to be packaged[2]—is in a distinctly minoritarian position when it comes to the stated paradigmatic orientations of this country's professors. Data periodically assembled by the Teaching, Research, and International Policy (TRIP) survey testify to the non-dominance of what, not so long ago, was believed by some to be a ''hegemonic'' if not totemic fixture on the international (though never the Canadian) epistemological scene.[3] The most recent TRIP data, from 2014, reveal slightly more than 12 percent of Canadian respondents self-identifying as realist, a figure substantially lower than the share (more than 25 percent) professing to be constructivists. Nor is it only in Canada that constructivism beats out realism as paradigm of choice for scholarly practitioners; even in the US, the erstwhile hearthstead of realism, its adherents (at 17.7 percent) have been in retreat, and are now in the clear minority, albeit not as far behind constructivists as they are in Canada.[4] This is nothing new; a decade or so ago, TRIP analysts found only 15 percent of self-identified realists teaching in Canada's universities, and not that much greater a percentage at US universities.[5]

This retreat from realism also shows up when Canada-based scholars are asked to list names of those they consider to be ''influential world scholars'': only two of the 10 names reported by IR professors in Canada, and this irrespective of whether one samples the so-called ''BMT'' cohort alone (for UBC, McGill, and Toronto) or the entire set of the country's universities, are known to be realists of one stripe or other: for the BMT cohort, the selected pair were Stephen Walt and Kenneth Waltz, while for their ''non-BMT'' colleagues, the duo were John Mearsheimer

of someone prepared to embrace realism, other than that he (in my case) was born into the cult, and could no more resist its malign blandishments than any self-respecting ''pure laine'' Canadian academic could be found to disparage multi-lateralism or the UN.

The problem, however, with attempting to root my preference for realism in the

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It is with structural realism that the pages in this section are concerned—structural realism that is properly understood as an attempt to invest the international "system" with superordinate ability to constrain states and to structure interstate relationships. This system's wonder-working properties were to be found in both its ordering principle (of anarchy) and its abiding concern for the relative distribution of capability. It turns out that structural realism à la Kenneth Waltz has had a longer and more distinguished career in the Canadian academy than many realize, and this notwithstanding that few if any of its adherents would choose to call themselves realists, much less structural realists. You could even say that in Canada, structural realism predated Waltz. And what exactly was the sin that

Soviet Union that motivated the counterweighters; rather it was the US, which they believed needed a good dose of "soft balancing," that served to animate their scholarly and policy-oriented work.

To achieve such soft balancing, Canadian counterweighters emphasized Western Europe, seen for a few decades as being somehow capable of lessening Canadian dependence on the United States at a time when Canada (and other allies) were, paradoxically perhaps, becoming more militarily engaged than they had ever been with the US. So the "balance" sought by the counterweighters was less to be found in the realm of physical security than it was in that of either (or both of) economic security and "ontological" security (viz. "identity" preservation and enhancement). But it was balancing of a kind, nonetheless, that motivated these undeclared structural realists.

In the end, counterweight logic proved to be extremely difficult to operationalize, all the more so precisely because its main theatre of operation was Western Europe during the Cold War. Indeed, to the extent that making the counterweight work required Canada to increase its military contributions to the defence of the Western Europeans (and the latter regularly implored Canada to do more "for them" during those years), it became hard for many sentient observers to see how Ottawa's doing exactly what Washington, Bonn, and other Cold War NATO capitals were urging it to do could possibly constitute balancing of the US in anything other than the most Pickwickian sense.

Nor were things very different with the economic aspect of counterweight advocacy. For a time, seeking greater involvement with the Europeans did seem to be an attractive and even easy economic option, insofar as policy analysts and those policymakers who had the counterweight bug were concerned. Again, though, the problem was how to scratch this particular itch in an effective way. Dealing with the Europeans in matters relating to trade and investment was never a frictionless pastime, not even during the Cold War. The vaunted "Third Option" of Pierre Trudeau was probably doomed from the start, because as one analyst pithily observed during that era, it constituted "an attempt to secure the triumph of politics over geography."[14] Geography won this tussle, with the creation of, first, the Canada–US Free Trade Agreement and, subsequently, NAFTA. Additionally, there was the

Packed as it was with logical contradictions, middle power's empirical dimension was to prove less controversial than its normative one. Ethical garments could be made to hang only in a most slovenly manner on structural mannequins, for reasons to which I now turn.

The embedded case for "middle power"

Realists who are knowledgeable about Canadian Foreign Policy have been known to gnash their teeth (or worse) when they contemplate the behaviour of a country

Council, with its coveted veto), Canadian o cials made a determined e ort to position the country as near to the big powers and as far away from the small powers as could be arranged. For their argument to gain traction, it was helpful to have a persuasive device to bolster its validity. Thus was born the concept of the middle power, which in its infancy was very much a structural-realist contrivance, even though no one could possibly have so advertised it at the time.

The concept might have been brand-new following the Second World War, but it rendered homage to an older tradition in International Relations, known as the ''functional principle.'' There was absolutely nothing especially Canadian about the functional principle, which had its roots in nineteenth-century international-organizational theoretical seedbeds; but the principle did begin to assume a Canadian flower-age during the first half of the twentieth century, initially in the early interwar years, when governments in Ottawa (and not only those presided by Liberals) would invoke

As the Royal Military College of Canada's Tony Miller explained, the functional principle was distinct conceptually from the doctrine of functionalism, with the former expressive of possession goals of policy, and the latter milieu goals.[21] The former appealed to the aggrandizing of Canadian interests and thus to the enhancing of Canadian influence, while the latter constituted a path toward the construction of a more peaceful world, in the event through international economic and social cooperation—helpful to Canada, to be sure, but only in the most di use way:

> In 1945 two functionalist traditions, analytically distinct, coexisted in Canada. They subsequently merged, so that the functional principle acquired a connotation of disinterested internationalism that it has not subsequently shed . . . The fusion of the functional principle with functionalism helps sustain the conviction that what is good for Canada is good for humanity.[22]

Canada, it transpired, could do well by doing good. And although functionalism as a doctrine may have emphasized first and foremost social and economic cooperation, it was in the military sphere of peacekeeping that Canada would, for a time, earn its highest accolades in functionalism, as a good international citizen.

The peacekeeping tradition, in its turn, led quite a few observers to assume that Canada was more or less a ''neutral'' country, committed to the peaceful and judicious (the ''impartial'') resolution of conflict, and thus very unlike certain countries unnecessary to be named, which were possessed of more hawkish proclivities—countries said to be in thrall to realism and all its perversions.[23] Thus did the ''middle'' get invested in Canada with a significant normative content, to the extent of connoting a degree of rectitude held to be lacking in the diplomacy of ''greater'' (and therefore axiomatically debased) powers, such that what John Holmes lampooned as ''middlepowermanship'' could to its adherents bespeak a blissfully selfless, and decidedly superior, orientation toward the world, founded on the assertion that virtue and power could be and were inversely related.[24] For those embracing middlepowermanship, Canada's natural allies and the target of its diplomacy should be those similarly ''sized'' countries who, by dint of their power

Copp Clark Pitman, 1992); and especially Adam Chapnick, The Middle Power Project: Canada and the Founding of the United Nations (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2005).

21. Here the reference is to Wolfers' familiar distinction between the two kinds of self-interested ends, ''possession goals'' being explicitly self-serving, and ''milieu goals'' rather less so; the distinction

standing, constituted a priori what one wag labelled the ''GGG,'' or the ''group of good guys.''[25]

Middlepowermanship did not just exercise the ire (and irony) of critics who sensed in it an advanced degree of sanctimoniousness that reeked much more of

sport of judo does not mean it has promise for the more metaphysical arts of scholarly jujitsu. Nevertheless, there could be potential for the synergy I am implying here, although I am certainly not the first person to suggest points of commonality between at least one variant of realism (the classical one) and constructivism.[28] Whether one prefers calling this epistemological hybrid ''constructivist-realism'' or ''realist-constructivism''[29] should not be allowed to obscure the way in which constructivism can invigorate classical realism. For however much the latter might part company from constructivism, there is one element on which they could be said to be welded at the hip, and that is the importance of ''identity'' to ''interest.'' After all, no less a realist than the comparativist Samuel Huntington himself paid tribute to the constructivists' core structuring principle when, in the last book he ever wrote, he insisted that ''[w]e have to know who we are before we can know what our interests are.''[30]

Recent trends in CFP analysis, stimulated in no small measure by a research program mounted a dozen or so years ago by Stéphane Roussel, have included attempts to employ ''strategic culture'' in a bid to understand and possibly even explain Canadian foreign and security policy.[31] While it is probably safe to say that most ''strategic culturalists'' take their epistemological nourishment more from constructivism than from realism, it is apparent that at least a few (classical) realist sheep have been known to graze alongside the constructivist horses in this conceptual paddock. And why should they not, in light of the growing scholarly interest that foreign policy analysts everywhere have been evincing in identity? This latter concept may not be particularly compelling from the point of view of structural realists (unless, of course, they seek, as did their Canadian ''predecessors'' discussed earlier, to extract social-psychological significance from assessments of relative power),[32] but it certainly has its appeal to realists who find second-image analyses to be much more revealing than third-image ones, when it comes to the business of trying to make sense of a country's foreign policy.[33]

Given that identity can be and is a category held by constructivist and classical realist alike to endow meaning to ''interest,'' including and especially (for the realists) the ''national interest,'' it is hardly a surprise to discover that theoretical trends in IR subsequent to the ending of the Cold War—and with it, the demise of the much-commented ''bipolar'' era that had provided such sustenance to Waltz's

28. See especially J. Samuel Barkin, Realist Constructivism: Rethinking International Relations Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
29. See Patrick Thaddeus Jackson and Daniel H. Nexon, ''Constructivist Realism or Realist-Constructivism?'' International Studies Review 6, no. 2 (June 2004): 337-41.
30. Samuel P. Huntington, Who Are We? The Challenges to America's National Identity (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004), 8.
31. See the special theme issue Roussel guest-edited on ''Canada's Grand Strategy and Strategic Culture,'' International Journal 49, no. 2 (Summer 2004): 481–595.
32. As is done so skilfully in William C. Wohlforth, ''Unipolarity, status competition, and Great Power war,'' World Politics 61, no. 1 (January 2009): 28–57.

own structural-realist theorizing—should have led many scholars of an avowedly realist kidney to concentrate more on second- and even first-image levels of analysis than on the structuralists' nepenthe of the third image. Whether or not the field of IR is becoming more congenial to ''post-structuralism'' than it used to be, it is hard to deny that for the subfield of Foreign Policy Analysis, trends certainly look to be heading in a post-structural direction, and in the process doing so to the advantage of classical realism over structural realism.[34]

What the post-structural ''turn'' has done is to give a fillip to the use of history by political scientists working in foreign policy analysis. It is not that analysis in this area of IR has ever been profoundly ''ahistorical,'' but there are some recent developments worth highlighting here, as they do suggest a continuing presence of realism in CFP. Historians have been known to look askance at political scientists who dare to encroach on their chasse gardée, all the more so if these historians are adherents to a Rankean tradition that regards the archives as the one and only repository of truth. And it is fair to say that some political scientists have been known to act like marauding Vikings when they devoted their energies to historical research, particularly those whose quantitative appetite could and did at times lead them to ''ransack'' the past for useful ''data points,'' and little else.[35] It is probably, and regrettably, true that for an earlier generation of IR scholars steeped in a political science epistemology patterned too closely on some ''hard'' sciences like physics and not enough on other sciences like geology,[36] ransacking did figure as a principal modus operandi. But times have changed, and increasingly scholars of international security have been turning to history for different philosophical, epistemological, and methodological purposes.[37] Especially is this true for security analysts whose focus is on foreign policy, and who are said to be working from a perspective dubbed ''neoclassical realism.''[38]

It is, of course, far from obvious what ''neoclassical realism'' is supposed to mean. Some scholars will tell you that it is a kissing cousin of structural realism, and this because its theoretical and analytical starting point is, for both, the same third (systemic) image.[39] Others, however, see this newest blossom on the realist plant

34. As has been argued in Adrian Hyde-Price and Lisbeth Aggestam, ''Conclusion: Exploring the new agenda,'' in Lisbeth Aggestam and Adrian Hyde-Price, eds., Security and Identity in Europe: Exploring the New Agenda, 234–262 (New York: St. Martin's, 2000).
35. See Paul Gordon Lauren, ''Diplomacy, theory, and policy,'' in Gordon Lauren, ed., Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory, and Policy, 3–18, at 5 (New York: Free Press, 1979).
36. For this criticism, see John Lewis Gaddis, ''History, theory, and common ground,'' International Security 22, no. 1 (Summer 1997): 75–85, citing from 78–79.
37. See Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman, ''Diplomatic history and international relations theory: Respecting difference and crossing boundaries,'' International Security 22, no. 1 (Summer 1997): 5–21.
38. See Steven Lobell, Norrin Ripsman, and Jeffrey Taliaferro,