recall Churchill as the originator of this ,gure of speech, others had in fact used it before him (Ryan , –).

Before we proceed to that demonstration, we need to de,ne "special," for if we fail to specify what we take this adjective to imply, we will not get terribly far in our bid to determine the impact (if any) of - upon the Canada–US defence and security relationship. International relations (¢) scholars have long tended to give a wide berth to the supposition that states might actually be, or become, "frieands,d" since it is friendship that many take routinely to be the most relevant marker of "specialness," it follows that there is a natural basis for the skepticism expressed by many, in Canada and elsewhere, as to the•utility of the term special relationship. We ,nd this skepticism about the term's utility to be misguided, for while it may indeed be the case that friendship is a somewhat anomalous category in world politics, it hardly follows that for a relationship to be deemed a special one it must also be a regularly amicable one. Wegrly tahls o

one. In the case of the ,rst usage, special conveys a normative judgment, usually a positive such judgment (as in the assertion that people or states can be each other's "best" friend). In the case of the latter usage, special can be understood as referring to a particular quality that sets whatever is being assessed apart descriptively from other cases, especially from those that can, at ,rst glance, be taken to be so comparable as to be virtually identical. e emphasis here gets placed upon observable behavioural diƒerences among comparable cases. In the words of a leading British expert on this kind of relationship, "'special' is an obvious marker of something beyond the ordinary; the mundane is elevated discursively to a higher signi,cance" (Marsh , ž).

It is the behavioural, or empirical, sense of special that guides our analysis in this chapter, although we do not deny or intend to minimize the idea that "history" might have made Canada and the US the kind of friends that President John F. Kennedy's words quoted in this volume's title suggest they have become. Still, Canada and the US have their own rosters of other friends, with these days Germany looming more and more, in some minds, as Canada's very own partner in leadership.œ So to heed the implied injunction of Steve Marsh, we needv92003 T40.2 (n1(le s)4el

risk their reputation (or sanity) worrying out loud about a war erupting between the two countries (Adler and Barnett ; Deutsch) Even

e norm dates from the August ž Sudetenland crisis, which presaged the imminent outbreak of another European war. During this crisis atmosphere, President Roosevelt told an audience at Queen's University in Kingston, Ontario, that America would "not stand idly by" were the physical security of Canada threatened by a European adversary as a consequence of the country's participation in a European war. is was

dominated the headlines, for several reasons. First and foremost was the news that the US had agreed to share its nuclear submarine technology with Australia so that it could possess and operate nuclear-powered attack submarines for the Royal Australian Navy (¢). Nuclear-powered attack submarines, or s in American military classi,cation, constitute a formidable military platform, even though they are not intended to carry nuclear weaponry (and thus should never be confused with a related acronym, , standing for nuclear-propelled ballistic missile submarine).

What distinguishes s from conventionally powered submarines is that the latter are propelled by a more ,nite energy supply (diesel), which limits their operational capabilities and rangess, by contrast, are powered by nuclear reactors that do not require refuelling for years (possibly as many as twenty-,ve), which allows them to stay on station for a greater length of time (US Environmental Protection Agency). Furthermore, s are far stealthier than diesel-electric submarines, whose combustion engines generate more noise because they make signi,cant demands on air intake, associated with their frequent need to recharge batteries. s are also faster than diesel-electric submarines. is means that s contribute to deterrence even though they do not deploy weapons of mass destruction, by dint of their ability greatly to complicate the decisions and calculations of a foe. And should deterrence fail and ,ghting break out, they can attack enemy targets at sea and even, in some cases, on shore (if equipped with cruise missiles) (Szondy).

Granting Australia access to this military technology is politically signi,cant, for two important reasons. e ,rst is that the US has only shared this type of technology with one other country. at country is the UK, starting in , when Washington amended the Atomic Energy Act and gave Britain, in the words of two scholars, “what had been refused almost a decade earlier: a free exchange of nuclear information” (Dawson and Rosecrance œœ, –). For this reason alone, - represents a highly exclusive club•– one whose membership doubled overnight, with two American allies now being deemed worthy of such cooperation and technology sharing.

Second, prior to the announcement of - Australia had agreed to buy from France some ³œœ billion worth of conventionally powered submarines, in what would have been France’s largest-ever sale of military equipment. e sudden and abrupt cancellation04 Tc 0.09

the Banquo's ghost lurking in the background of this pact. e White House's a™rmation, in April , of - as re†ecting a commitment to a "free and open Indo-Paci,c, and more broadly to an international system that respects human rights, the rule of law, and the peaceful resolution of disputes free from coercion," may not have singled out Taiwan, but one would have had to have been extremely obtuse to miss the a™rmation's meaning (White House). Yet, it was not just Taiwan that - was intended to safeguard. e agreement is aimed at strengthening an American bulwark against Chinese military power more generally in the Indo-Paci,c; as such, it marks a major step in the "pivot to Asia" strategy ,rst introduced during the administration of Barack Obama.While China, to no one's surprise, condemned the announcement of - in its customary bombastic manner (Girard), other countries in the Indo-Paci,c region, including some Amer- ican allies, had concerns of their own.

ose concerns tended to be focused on two possibilities. e ,rst is the prospect that - might trigger a regional arms race. e second, related to the ,rst, adds nuclear weaponry to the mix, the argument being that somehow Australia's acquisition of s will encourage nuclear proliferation. According to those who fret about this second possibility, it is unrealistic to imagine that Australia will long remain the only country in the world to operate s without at the same time possessing nuclear weapons of its own. ose entertaining this

of acquiring s, a desire that had been showcased with the publication of the white paper on defence (Government of Canada , –). In the end, Canada never did purchase the s, which, in an ironic twist on the - imbroglio, would likely have been French boats of the Améthyste/Rubis class, because the US Navy ( ) did not at the time look with favour upon Canada's acquiring s, thus it could veto, and likely would have vetoed, any British transfer of Trafalgar-class s to Canada (Haglund). Yet neither the nor the disarmament community managed to accomplish what budgetary realities, coupled with the fortuitous ending of the Cold War, were able to do, which was to convince Ottawa to scupper the project altogether.

Still, the - announcement is not without implications. We have already noted China's displeasure with the pact, as well as that of France. Each of these countries could not reasonably have been expected to be pleased with - . But what of those two allies who, along with the - trio, constitute the exclusive intelligence sharing club known as the Five Eyes? Presumably, they might feel a bit annoyed at having been cut out of the action? ose countries are New Zealand and Canada. Since it is only the latter that is of interest to us in this chapter, we will simply note apropos of the former that, from where we sit, there does not seem to have been any palpable wringing of hands and gnashing of teeth on the part of the Kiwis. Besides, Wellington has had a long-standing and well-publicized allergy to anyone's using nuclear technology for military purposes, so it cannot be imagined that policy-makers in the capital have lost too much sleep about the apparent "snub," if that is what it is (see McClure).

e case of Canada, however, is different. In theory, - 's formation should concern Ottawa, not least because Canada is much more of a Pacific Rim country than the UK and shares with the latter an interest in salvaging as much as possible of what remains of the American-led liberal international order in our current era of "deglobalization" (see Ripsman). Moreover, any great power war that arises in this region would almost certainly place Canada in a bind, even if it were not directly involved, because it is so closely aligned with the US. China's "wolf warrior" (and self-defeating) diplomacy of recent years has certainly not made a practice of sparing Canadian sensibilities, with the country being disparaged for being "America's lapdog" (Hopper) as well as being castigated for a host of other failings.

So, it might have been supposed that Justin Trudeau's government would have taken umbrage not just at Beijing for its insulting behaviour

relationship in security and defence, at least when that category is measured in accordance with its empirically observable, behavioural attributes, as these have been made manifest in the two coun tries' security community, their alliance, and their embrace of the Kingston dispensation.

But, in closing, we could well ask whether Canada's non-involve ment in - suggests that the US has, in the a ective sense, "better" relations with both the UK and Australia than it does with Canada. In particular, we might wonder whether Australia has somehow outdis-tanced Canada in the category of a "good" ally, and we could note that if so, - would be the proof of that pudding. is focus on Australia rather than on the UK would be all the more relevant given that Canada and Australia, being more or less "equally" sized countries, make a more useful comparative dyad than Canada and the UK, for obvious reasons. To cite a leading work on the topic of Canada–Australia relations in security and defence, the two countries are nothing less than "strategic cousins" (Blaxland œ), having more in common with each other than either has with anyone else.

To those who measure Canada against Australia, and ,nd that the comparison does not †atter Canada, the problem exempli,ed by - is that Canada's not being part of the arrangement testi,es to two apparent realities. e ,rst is that Australia takes security more seriously than Canada does, a criticism made recently in a hard-hitting report on Canadian national security produced by the University of Ottawa, whose authors worry that Canada is basically asleep at the wheel in the current darkening global security environment (Task Force on National Security). e second apparent reality, and the one of greater relevance for the theme of this volume and our chapter, is that Canadian non-involvement in - puts the lie to claims about the solidity of Canada–US defence and security, held to be special no more•– if indeed it ever had been!

We have already stated our views on the Canada–US special relationship. In closing, two observations require being made about Canada–Australia comparison(s). e ,rst is simply that - is a regional-security undertaking, and while Canada certainly does have security interests in the Indo-Paci,c, these are not as signi,cant as its interests in other regions of more immediate concern to it, namely North America and Europe, nor can they hold a candle to Australia's

own security interest in Asian regional security. Canada, yes, has some interests in the Asia-Pacific; Australia, by contrast, lives there. It makes a difference. Seen in this way, the surprise is not so much that Canada is outside of - as it is that anyone should have imagined it to have been an obvious candidate for inclusion. And while a case can be made that the non- aspects of - suggest reasons for Canadian participation, the reality is that Ottawa is already involved with the US in a variety of those other spheres of defence technology identified

minimally required to satisfy the Americans that Canada is pulling its weight (national dignity, on the other hand, might demand more than this minimum, but that is a diƒerent matter).

Joel Sokolsky has cogently summarized the ongoing challenge faced by Canadian leaders pondering which level of commitment is su™cient to keep Washington minimally satis,ed: “ e current policy,” he wrote at the start of the twenty-,rst century, “is very much in the Canadian tradition of asking not ¨How much is enough?’ but rather, ¨How much is just enough?”’ (Sokolsky , ž). at amount is easier to determine when it concerns North American security, harder to assess when global security is in question, for the good reason that Canadians, unlike geographically distant US allies, do not have to ask themselves, in the way for instance that Austraur 0 1 Tf -0..9 (n)19 (t8.7 (t A)409.8 91410u d E)0

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