Immigration Regimes and Immigrant Conflict in Great Britain and Germany

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1. Introduction: The Study of Immigrant Conflict

Why do some countries experience more conflict involving immigrants than others? And why, within countries, do we observe clashes between immigrants and natives in some cities and not in others? Finally, when are we likely to observe confrontations between immigrants and state actors, rather than struggles between the native population and immigrant newcomers? In recent years, the high political salience of issues surrounding immigrant integration and the intensity of the immigration debate give rise to the impression that conflicts involving immigrant populations are both ubiquitous and inexorable. Riots involving second and third generation immigrant youths in France, an upsurge in racist violence in Belgium, a fiercely anti-immigrant political campaign in Switzerland, and local successes of the xenophobic British National Party in Britain are only some of the more publicized phenomena that have made headlines across Europe in the last few years. Even in the United States, where immigrant integration has often been more favorably compared to developments in European countries, publics and policymakers have grown increasingly concerned about the consequences of large-scale illegal migration.

The issue of immigrant integration has not escaped scholarly attention, but there have been remarkably few attempts to systematically and comparatively study conflict involving immigrants as they unfold on ground. While there is a vast literature covering the incidence of ethnic conflict across the globe, relatively few comparative works study the occurrence of conflict in localities of immigrant settlement.[1] Countless local single-case histories provide interesting and rich accounts of the immigrant experience. But these narratives generally do not aim for generalizable explanations. Even in the context of ethnic minority relations in the United States, a widely-studied topic, "there have been remarkably few comparative studies that bring...locally specific work together" (Jones-Correa 2001a: 2).

In contrast to case studies, cross-national research shows how macro-level variables such

involving immigrants are the same. Rather, immigrant conflict can be disaggregated into two types: i. immigrant-native conflict, or sustained confrontations between immigrants and natives, and ii. immigrant-state conflict, or the sustained confrontations between immigrants and state actors. What, then, explains the incidence of immigrant conflict in the localities of immigrant settlement?

I argue that this article suggests an answer by investigating the incidence of immigrant conflict in Great Britain and Germany, two countries that have received large inflows of immigrants, but that have witnessed remarkably different patterns of immigrant conflict over the past half century. First, local immigrant conflict in Germany has been much less pronounced than in Great Britain. By the mid-1980s, when large-scale immigration had occurred in both countries for three decades, Britain had witnessed local successes of anti-immigrant parties, riots between immigrants and natives as well as major instances of urban unrest involving immigrants. Germany had experienced none of these. Second, within Great Britain, the occurrence of immigrant conflict has differed strikingly across groups. Whereas immigrant-native conflict has tended to occur between South Asians and Whites, such conflict has been much rarer between Blacks[5] and Whites. Conversely, Blacks have been predominantly engaged in anti-state behavior, but South Asians have been less likely to have done so.

I argue that differences in the ways in which the British and German immigration regimes allocated economic goods and political rights across immigrants and natives and how these differences in turn played themselves out in the local areas of immigrant settlement account for the two countries' varied experiences with immigrant conflict. In short, immigrant conflict occurs when there is a shortage of resources desired by both natives and immigrants. When immigrants can back up their claims for scarce economic goods with pivotal votes, incumbents will allocate these resources to this new constituency. Natives are in turn likely to protest such distribution by turning against immigrants. Conversely, in the absence of political leverage, immigrants are left with few resources during times of economic shortage. This state of affairs may leave natives content, but is more likely to cause immigrants to engage in conflictual relations with the state. In Great Britain, the legacy of the country's colonial past, rather than careful economic planning, facilitated the settlement of millions. While these settlers had access to full political rights, few steps were taken to guide their economic integration. The inadequate supply of economic resources has been the root cause of immigrant conflict here. In Germany, the pattern is reversed. Here, economic considerations dictated the nature of postwar guestworker immigration; economic integration into the country's labor market institutions occurred by design while political exclusion of labor migrants was the norm. Turning to differences within Britain across groups, I maintain that variation in groups' local electoral power accounts for the type of immigrant conflict we observe when resources are scarce.

The article is organized as follows. In the next section I will provide evidence of variation in immigrant conflict across Britain and Germany, as well as within Great Britain across immigrant groups. Section three proposes an analytical framework that explains the incidence of both types of immigrant conflict by stressing the causal importance of the

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[5] I follow the now common British usage and employ the term "Black" to refer to first or later generation immigrants who originate from the West Indies or Africa. This group is also sometimes labeled "Afro-Caribbean." The term "South Asian" refers to immigrants and their descendants from India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. These two groups constitute the majority of Britain's nonwhite immigrants. Note that from the 1960s through the 1980s, many accounts refer to all nonwhite immigrants in Britain as "Blacks." This term was often used to express the shared immigrant experience of racism and discrimination in Great Britain.

interaction between the economic design of immigration regimes, their impacts on the localities of settlement, and the political behavior of immigrant groups. I next demonstrate how the causal logic applies to patterns of immigrant conflict in Great Britain and Germany, drawing on a host of sources, including archival research. The final section concludes by highlighting the tradeoffs involved in designing immigration regimes by discussing the consequences of unplanned migration in the case of political (rather than economic) migrants in Germany.

2. Empirical Patterns of Immigrant Conflict

After half a century of mass immigration, Great Britain and Germany are today home to large numbers of first and later generation immigrants.[6] In Britain, migrants and their descendants hail mostly from former colonies (especially from the Indian subcontinent, the West Indies and Africa). The majority of immigrants in Germany have traditionally arrived as guestworkers or as their descendents (originating predominantly from Turkey and Southern Europe). Over the years, Britain and Germany also received inflows of political refugees and, more recently, migrants from the newly joined EU member states, but the present paper is concerned with the integration of post-colonial and guestworker migrants, as well as their descendants.[7]

Specifically, I seek to understand the manifestation of two phenomena across these groups, immigrant-native and immigrant-state conff-28.-or-28.715 -1.1004 Tc-0. 0.00ps, im009.8(i)-7.2(g5 in de

and religious diversity to these traditionally White Christian societies. Turks, the majority of whom are Muslim, constitute the largest single nationality group among Germany's guestworker population and Islam is today the second largest religion in both countries.

Turning to Great Britain, data from the 1970s and 1980s, when most of the riots took place, show that West Indians, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis were predominantly employed in manual jobs. While a larger share of Indians was found in white-collar employment, this group is quite polarized and also contains substantial numbers of low-skilled manual workers (Smith 1977: 73, Brown 1984: 197). By the late 1970s, unemployment rates among Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi and West Indian males were at approximately the same levels (Field et al. 1981: 23). Moreover, both South Asian and West Indian enclaves were

larger share of respondents blamed West Indians' disadvantaged position in British society on their allegedly inferior cultural and racial backgrounds (see Figure 2b).

To summarize, despite broad similarities among postcolonial and guestworker immigrants – their arrival as economic migrants, their concentration in urban areas, their relatively low socioeconomic status, their ethnic distinctiveness, and the attitudinal prejudice they have encountered – we observe remarkable differences in immigrant conflict across Great Britain and Germany and, within Britain, across groups. The local manifestation of immigrant-native and immigrant-state conflict involving guestworkers in Germany has been much less pronounced than such confrontations involving postcolonial migrants in Britain. Moreover, within Great Britain, South Asians have been disproportionately involved in immigrant-native conflict, but much less in confrontations with state actors, while the pattern among West Indian migrants is reversed. What accounts for these differences?

3. Explaining Immigrant Conflict: National and Local Variation in Economic Scarcity and Immigrant Political Power

The main focus of this paper is the study of immigrant conflict as it occurs in the localities where immigrants settle. Local immigrant integration does, however, not occur in a vacuum. National institutions crucially impact the recruitment and settlement of immigrants, shape immigrant incorporation into domestic economic structures and define the limits and opportunities for immigrant political participation in the host countries. Immigration regimes vary in all of these dimensions. Some countries deliberately follow economic rationales and carefully plan and execute the immigration and settlement of foreign labor by integrating this workforce into their labor market institutions and welfare states. Others might also open their borders to economic migrants, but take few measures to assist these workers in their search for housing or emploTucnt on nr bra43fim thgra2also pay inuuso dnn templ(workf)3 also open their (i)-1tw0.50021

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action) than the market. The availability of material goods that are in demand among both immigrants and natives, such as housing, employment and public services varies across countries based on their immigration regimes. Furthermore, it also varies across local immigrant destinations, especially in settings where national immigration regimes do not take steps to guide immigrant settlement. Immigrants often locate in cities where opportunities for employment are initially abundant, but municipal infrastructures might otherwise not be well equipped to handle large inflows of newcomers. Over time, changes in the availability of employment will also affect overall demand for public services and economic scarcity; all else equal, immigrants (and natives) put greater strains on public services as their incomes decline.

Second, we also observe differences in the potential for *immigrant political power*. An immigrant group is considered to be politically powerful if its vote is influential in deciding the outcomes of elections. Several institutional and behavioral features determine immigrant political power. While access to citizenship and the ballot box are necessary preconditions for political power, the competitiveness of elections and/or the extent to which parties rely on the immigrant vote to keep them in power also determine whether a given immigrant voting bloc will be pivotal. My definition of immigrant political power thus privileges formal political participation of immigrants that can vote in local and/or national elections over informal, pressure group activity by immigrants who are barred from casting ballots in these electoral contests. Socio-demographic characteristics of immigrant groups interact with these formal laws to determine immigrant political power.

My theory of *immigrant-native conflict* is based on the following propositions. I begin with the assumption that the native population will only engage in anti-immigrant behavior if such actions are believed to deter immigrants from acquiring scarce resources. This in turn implies that the actor who controls the disbursement of these goods is sensitive to anti-immigrant agitation, or that the costs that such confrontations inflict on immigrants themselves are sufficiently high to discourage them from accepting these scarce goods, or both. A corollary of this implication is that immigrant-native conflict is more likely if the state, rather than the market, allocates scarce resources. In settings where the state distributes goods, deserting ruling parties in favor of candidates that advocate anti-immigrant policies is intended to increase the costs associated with pro-immigrant resource allocation borne by the governing party. Anti-immigrant organizations and rallies are meant to bring attention to the grievances caused by immigration to a wider audience, some of whom will also abandon incumbents unless policies that appear to favor immigrants are changed. Additionally, anti-immigrant violence and ensuing cycles of reprisals also cause some voters to seek out parties who advocate repatriating immigrants, which, these parties claim, would decrease the incidence of violence.

In settings where the market allocates resources, the scope for *effective* anti-immigrant activity is more limited. Not only are market actors less sensitive to local voting patterns, during times of economic recession they also generally face few incentives to give into demands for resource allocations that favor natives. Harassment and violence directed against migrant settlers would have to supplant an electoral backlash and impose sufficiently high burdens on immigrants for them to refrain from taking up market-based resources, mainly jobs, which may in turn threaten their livelihoods as well. Given these assumptions, I expect that competition over scarce resources that are allocated by the state will be more likely to lead to sustained immigrant-native conflict than competition over scarce resources allocated by market actors.[16] It

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[16] It appears that debates about *immigration* policy thus tend to focus on jobs and wages, whose distribution is generally directly affected by a state's immigration laws. Debates about immigrant *integration* more often appear to

form of social instability. Incumbents fear a reduction of the local tax base caused by property

five and fifteen percent of the resident populations in only eight percent of Britain's parliamentary constituencies, but in more than half, these settlers made up less than one percent of the population (Patterson 1969: 194-196, Layton-Henry 1992: 14, Money 1997: 700-701).

When it became clear in the mid-1950s that immigration was indeed occurring at a fast pace, politicians took few steps to restrict, guide or assist this inflow of labor. Indeed, archival records confirm that immigration was conceived of mostly as a political matter and illustrate just how uninvolved economic planners were in guiding postwar migration to Britain; the Minister of Labour was not even consulted in the British government's initial deliberations on the country's slowly developing immigration policy. It was not until the Minister requested "to be added to the Committee of Ministers to consider the problem of Colonial Immigrants, since he is much concerned departmentally with this question" that he was included in talks about new immigration legislation.[21] In sum, early immigrant settlement occurred without much coordination or assistance from state authorities; variation in local political and economic conditions thus greatly impacted the ease of integration of the incoming migrant population.[22]

Over the course of the 1950s, labor migration into Britain continued unabated as political deadlock across and within parties on the issue paralyzed effective policymaking.[23] The measures that were eventually implemented to curb the inflow of foreign labor were taken partly in response to the local repercussions of unplanned immigration (Money 1997), but also failed to guide migrant settlement in ways that would alleviate strains on public resources in the areas of concentration. The 1962 Immigration Act, for example, made immigration contingent on specific employment contracts in the case of unskilled labor, but it contained no procedures for registration or dispersal and no settlement assistance, even though many local authorities struggled with overcrowding and housing shortages and local social services tended to be overloaded in areas of concentration (Patterson 1969: 19-20). Later pieces of immigration legislation in fact probably exacerbated these problems. By restricting employment-based migration successive governments inadvertently encouraged a disproportionate inflow of dependents; between 1963 and 1967, the number of dependents as a share of all New Common-wealth immigrants rose from 31.0 to 72.7 percent (Gish 1968: 26, 31, author's calculations). Pressures on local services such as housing, education, and health care would thus only intensify, while immigrant taxpayers declined as a proportion of the total migrant population.

This lack of state intervention meant that local authorities themselves sometimes took the imitative. In the early years, this took the form of Voluntary Liaison Committees, which essentially consisted of groups of well-meaning native residents, often including members of the local clergy, who helped immigrants become familiar with their new environment and specifically with the provision of local services. The Labour government under Wilson later institutionalized these committees into community relations councils (CRCs) as part of its efforts to integrate the resident immigrant population while at the same time restricting new inflows.[24] These efforts included the enactment of anti-discrimination legislation in the form of several Race Relations Acts (Ben-Tovim 1986: 29-30). While this legislation appears quite remarkable when viewed in comparative European perspective, its remit was initially rather limited and many observers have dismissed the CRCs as well as the anti-discrimination laws as paternalistic

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[21] Note to the Prime Minister (author unclear), December 3, 1955, PREM 11/2920.
[22] See also Garbaye (2005) on the unplanned nature of British immigration and the ensuing focus on locally-directed integration.
[23] See Foot (1965) on the within and cross-party deadlock.
[24] See Gish (1968: 29), Hansen (2000: 214), and Hussain (2001: 24, 27) on such legislation.

attempts by the British establishment to maintain "racial buffers" between itself and immigrant newcomers, created to prevent the national politicization of immigration.[25] When it came to financial assistance related to the settlement of immigrants, local authorities could apply for limited funds under the 1966 Local Government Act or could petition the center for monies under the Urban Programme (see below).

What the British immigration regime lacked in economic concessions, it made up for in political rights. As British citizens, New Commonwealth migrants were entitled to participate in local and national elections and their settlement in working class areas aroused the interest and concern of Labour Party strategists. While the newcomers represented considerable electoral potential, a sound party strategy would have to balance the votes delivered by this new constituency with the adverse native reactions it might provoke. Labour strategists were thus concerned with evaluating the dynamics of immigrant conflict, constantly calculating how they could gain "votes from coloured people to an extent equal to prospective losses from white Labour supporters due to this colour-clash."[26] As "whole streets which used to contain a solid Labour vote [had] now been repopulated with a coloured population almost entirely non-voting,"[27] getting out the immigrant vote while reducing the "colour-clash" would become a top priority for Labour. But a reduction in such intergroup tensions would first require an understanding of its causes.

The Economic Basis of Immigrant Conflict

Starting in the late 1950s, the Conservative government and the Labour Party began inquiring into the dynamics of immigrant-native conflict. According to government ministers and Labour officials, the central forces driving intergroup confrontations were of an economic nature. Competition was especially acute in the housing sector, which had been overburdened even before immigrants had arrived, thanks to a combination of poor planning and war-time bombings, which decimated 100,000 dwellings in London alone (Senior 1957: 305). When the Labour Party sent out a circular in 1957 to establish "a more comprehensive and factual picture of the colour question in the United Kingdom," the responses of those districts that had experienced inter-ethnic tensions all stressed the problems arising from battles over scarce housing, particularly in the Greater London area. In the working-class Vauxhall constituency, South London, for example, there had initially "never been any question of colour discrimination or prejudice… [but] there [had] undoubtedly been a change…due, among other things, to the appalling housing situation."[28] Conservative politicians, who were generally less likely to fault economic conditions for racial conflict than their Labour counterparts, tended to agree: "The immigration problem is 10 per cent prejudice,

situation.[30] Housing was the main, but not the only source of contention. Writing about the 1958 riots, "The information available to [the Home Secretary] indicated that the recent disturbances had not been deliberately instigated by an organized body. The clashes appeared to have arisen through competition for limited housing accommodation, a declining number of jobs, and women."[31] Indeed, by the early 1960s, increasing economic competition in several high-immigration areas ultimately led the Conservative government to impose immigration restrictions, legislation which had been so difficult to agree on only a few years earlier.

The notion that White resentment towards nonwhite immigrants flared up only when newcomers were perceived to be advantaged in the distribution of resources informed much of the government's policymaking. Under Wilson's Labour government, the Urban Programme was instituted to assist areas whose social services were overstretched due to large inflows of immigrants. But its design and implementation was very much shaped, and ultimately crippled, by political considerations, for officials were concerned that "It would be difficult to disguise the fact that the urban programme was really designed to help areas of immigration concentration rather than of urban areas of social need" more generally.[32] In the design stage of the program, policymakers deliberated at length how financial aid could be disbursed within the existing legal framework that guided fiscal relations between the center and the regions – for additional legislation would call unwelcome attention to the issue – while still delivering resources to the areas that needed it most.[33] In the end, only relatively small sums were freed up in an arrangement whereby community groups and voluntary organizations submitted grant proposals to their local councils, who then applied for matching funds under the program. Soon after its inception, it was generally agreed within the government itself that the Urban Programme was "really irrelevant to the problems of race relations," hamstrung by its designers' desire to keep the policy away from the public's eye.[34]

In spite of this recognition, policymakers continued to follow the principle that "The aim of race relations policy should be to maximise the benefits given to the blacks [i.e., nonwhites] while minimising provocation to the whites."[35] This calculation was not only based on fears of a political backlash, but also intended to protect immigrants: policymakers felt they had to "ensure that in the process they [immigrants] do not and are not popularly thought to get an unduly large share of the national cake (or any particular element in it), thus occasioning disaffection and political or physical protest among the remaining white population."[36] By the late 1960s, however, competition over housing had in fact intensified since many immigrants had now fulfilled the minimum residency requirements that would allow them to apply for government-subsidized council housing. This type of housing comprised nearly a third of the nation's

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[30] Letter from London District Organizer of the Labour Party, J. W. Raisin, to Mr. Morgan Phillips, Labour Party Secretary, September 11, 1958.
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residential dwellings in 1975 (Ravetz 2001: 2) and supplied more than sixty percent of the housing stock in several inner city areas.[37] Having toured many areas with high concentrations of immigrants, a government-appointed Select Committee on Race Relations and Immigration concluded that "race relations in the places…visited [were] reasonably good, in view of the conditions under which members of the communit

and elsewhere in the country (Birmingham and Manchester) in which West Indian youths would clash with the police years later, belying Thatcher's assessment of opportunistic rioting.[48]

(Indians, Pakistanis, and Bangladeshis), and take group share averages of the wards within these

Asian settlers have been conducive to both geographic concentration and mobilization, features that have endowed this group with considerable local political power.

The history of Black political behavior in Britain has indeed been quite different. In addition to their less concentrated settlement, Blacks encountered difficulties when attempting to organize their fellow migrants locally. As one close observer of immigration politics and race relations in Britain noted, "The West Indians by and large vote Labour, if they vote at all—but their organizations are weak…The Asians, on the other hand, both Indians and Pakistanis, are closely organized, and many of them look towards the leaders of Indian Workers' Association for a guide to voting" (Foot, cited in John (1969: 2)). Similarly, Glass questions the potential for mobilization among London's West Indian newcomers on the grounds of the group's social heterogeneity and geographic dispersion, even within London, which prevented their associations from having a discernable local impact. Moreover, West Indians were "on the whole not yet used to being 'organisation men'" (Glass 1961: 200-201). The Secretary of the West Hampstead (London) Labour Party also reported that "Quite a few Indians are members of the Party and attend Ward meetings… [but we] have met with less success with West Indians."[57] Examining the potential West Indian vote in the 1964 general election in Birmingham, a researcher concluded that the absence of community representatives made it "very difficult for anyone, whether West Indian or English, to try to speak to or influence the West Indian community as a whole. The canvassers were very disheartened by their attempts" (Shuttleworth 1965: 73).

In a survey of Nottingham's immigrant population, Lawrence (1974: 150-154) observes that Blacks not only lacked the organizational resources displayed by their South Asian counterparts; they were also less likely to approve of using ethnic membership for political purposes. Lawrence found that even though West Indians formed the largest nonwhite ethnic group in Nottingham, only two percent of West Indian respondents were members of immigrant organizations and a full 90 percent were not aware of any such local associations. By contrast, 47 percent of Indians and 36 percent of Pakistanis were members of organizations catering to immigrants and only 37 and 18 percent of Indians and Pakistanis, respectively, had not heard of any immigrant associations. Moreover, Indians and Pakistanis were more than twice as likely as West Indian migrants to agree with the idea of casting their ballots as a bloc vote to further the cause of their ethnic group in the political realm.[58] Others have also noted that West Indians in Britain are "ill-equipped by tradition and disposition to provide an exclusively 'ethnic' leadership. This is so because, whilst drawing much inspiration from the symbols and history of the ethnic group, West Indians are disinclined to base social and political action on ethnicity" (Goulbourne 1990: 297). Resistance to such calculated moves may have been less driven by objections to instrumental voting behavior, but might have had more to do with divisions within their own ranks. Several accounts have stressed that the internal fissures among Britain's West Indian population routinely paralyzed concerted political action (cf. Heineman 1972: 76-77). While some have argued that class divisions have stunted collective action and deprived West Indians of group leaders (Patterson 1963: 378-379, Sharpe 1965: 29-30), others have pointed to

[57] Letter by Hon. Secretary Roy Shaw, West Hampstead, to Eric Whittle, Asst. Commonwealth Officer, February 5, 1957.
[58] The exact question wording is as follows: "Some people have suggested that it would help Indian immigrants (or Pakistani, etc., as appropriate) if they got together and decided to vote for the same party. What do you think of this view?" (Lawrence 1974: 150). Only 18 percent of West Indians agreed with this statement, compared to 37 percent of Indians and 45 percent of Pakistanis.

rivalries that existed between immigrants from different islands, some of which were attributed to the divisive policies of their former colonial rulers (Pilkington 1988: 141). Regardless of the underlying mechanism, turnout rates have been and remain lower among Blacks than among South Asians. According to a recent survey, only 42.1 (58.6) percent of Black immigrants, compared to 66.9 (81.8) percent of South Asians reported having voted in recent local (general) elections.[59]

The mobilization of the ethnic vote at the local level has of course important distributional consequences in settings where local politicians allocate valued resources. As archival sources have revealed, scarcity of resources controlled by the state has resulted in immigrant conflict – but it is the political power of immigrant groups at the local level that decides whether natives will turn against immigrants or whether immigrants will turn against the state. Ironically, while policymakers did not recognize the political bases of immigrant conflict, the measures that they proposed to help West Indians acquire economic goods effectively substituted for this group's lacking political power at the local level. Specifically, the Home Office was urged to give "sympathetic consideration" to applications for grant aid submitted under the Urban Programme;[60] "it was agreed that the highest priority should go to self-help groups aiming to reach disaffected West Indian youth" and the Home Office also acquiesced when asked "not [to] necessarily insist on the same standards of accountability in these cases as in the general run of the Urban Programme."[61] After the 1981 riots, additional funds directed at "disaffected West Indians" were made available, and it had "become received wisdom that certain projects [had] been funded under the Urban Programme either because those who proposed them threatened that there would be riots if funding was not made available, or promised a reduction in local crime if it was" (Fitzgerald 1988: 393). While the central government had to cajole local authorities to fund projects aimed at groups whose voting power fell short, local councilors cooperated – sometimes reluctantly, other times eagerly – with politically influential immigrant groups to ensure access to such government funds.[62] As we will see next, the German state pursued a different strategy in its approach to immigrant conflict.

5. Explaining Immigrant Conflict in Germany:
The Economic Logic of Guestworker Immigration

Whereas initial mass-scale migration occurred almost by accident in Britain, in Germany, employers, unions and the state designed the temporary worker program in ways that would benefit each of their constituencies. Employers faced tight labor markets and regional labor imbalances that threatened to push up wages and impede production. Unions, although initially skeptical, were not averse to immigration either, for in exchange for the inflow of low-skilled labor, German workers received a shorter work week, more extensive education and training and upward mobility. In addition to facilitating the smooth functioning of the German economy, the state valued the employment of immigrant labor for its anticipated beneficial fiscal impact. Guestworkers, especially if they were young and living without dependents, were expected to

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[59] These figures apply to those born outside of the UK, since much of the previous discussion is based on the political behavior of this group. Similar patterns emerge when I include later generation immigrants. See Home Office (2005).

[60] "Disaffected Young West Indians," Memorandum by the Home Office to the Official Committee on Immigration and Community Race Relations, May 6, 1974, CAB 134/3772.

[61] "Grant-aiding Projects which Benefit Ethnic Minorities," Draft submission for Mr. Howard-Drake's signature, February 7, 1977, HO 390/7.

[62] See Dancygier (2007) for detailed accounts of such cooperation.

contribute more to unemployment, pension and health insurance systems than they would take out, would put little pressure on public resources such as schools and social services, and offered the additional benefit of helping to stave off inflationary pressures, due to their tendency to save and send money home.[63]

With interests aligned in this fashion, Germany signed its first recruitment treaty with Italy in 1955. Treaties with Spain and Greece (1960), Turkey (1961), Portugal (1964), Tunisia and Morocco (1965) and Yugoslavia (1968) followed. The planning and execution of guestworker migration was quite extensive. The Federal Employment Office (*Bundesanstalt für Arbeit*) and employers set up recruitment centers in the sending countries, offered language and job training and arranged for the trip to Germany. In contrast to Great Britain, labor migration was only possible within the confines of a tightly governed system of rules and regulations. Recruitment of individual workers was contingent upon the allocation of specific jobs which were subject to social insurance contributions (*sozialversicherungspflichtig*). Migrants who had been granted work permits were also legally required to receive treatment in the employment and welfare fields that was equal to their German counterparts (*sozialrechtliche Gleichstellung*) and thus were employed under the same labor laws and collective bargaining agreements.[64] During the early years of recruitment, economic integration of immigrants thus occurred by design. Equality of treatment not only provided guestworkers with a guaranteed level of compensation and benefits, it also reassured natives that the importation of low-skilled foreign labor would not put downward pressure on wages and working conditions.

While guestworkers were embedded in an already existing set of economic and social welfare laws, additional measures had to be taken to find accommodation for the hundreds of thousands of incoming workers. The recruitment treaties specified from the very beginning that employers would have to provide housing, subsidized by the state, for the workers they had brought in from abroad and the Federal Employment Office only placed foreign workers in a job, once it could be verified that they could be housed. Living conditions were, however, quite modest as employers were only asked to comply with housing laws dating back to the 1930s. Over the course of the 1960s, pressure from sending countries, the Federal Employment Office, as well as guestworkers themselves led to successive improvements in these facilities and the Ministry of Labor spelled out the minimum standards that these lodgings would have to meet in order to ensure "adequate and humane" accommodation for both Germans and foreigners.[65] In reality, guestworkers who were housed in employer-provided hostels did generally not enjoy the same standards as their German counterparts. Government planners and employers justified this discrepancy by referring to the temporary nature of migrants' stay, their intention to save and ensuing preference for cheap housing, and the lower standards that foreign workers were used to in their home countries (von Oswald and Schmidt 1999: 184-191, Herbert 2001: 214-216).

The rules governing guestworker immigration thus ensured that in the early years of immigrant arrival, competition with natives over of housing, which had been so contentious in some British cities, generally did not take place. Additionally, the fact that guestworkers' stay in the host country was contingent on holding a job, which in turn was subject to Germany's

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[63] See Herbert (2001), Schönwälder (2001), and Steinert (1995) for a more detailed discussion of the origins of Germany's guestworker program. Schönwälder (2001) also argues that in addition to economic factors, foreign policy considerations played an important role in shaping Germany's immigration regime.

only if native labor was unavailable. [69] In 1974, when the national unemployment rate had more than doubled in the span of one year, the president of the Federal Employment Office sent a letter to all local offices to make sure that the guidelines were indeed being implemented by "applying strict standards in every single case." German part-time and older workers, ex-convicts, and *Aussiedler*

short supply during the initial period of guestworker recruitment when the German economy flourished and families had not yet reunited, local, state and federal officials increasingly favored natives in the allocation of economic goods once conditions deteriorated and the immigrant population expanded to include spouses and children. At the federal level, the preferential treatment of Germans was quite deliberately seen as a means to keep hostility against immigrants in check. When policymakers and organizations dealing with guestworker questions proposed expanding special housing programs for guestworker households in the early 1970s, officials were wary of allocating increased funds to these newcomers. "In light of the scarce housing supply among natives," a government official noted that, "any special program for guestworkers would not appeal to the native population and could possibly even lead to increased hostility

developments" in this area and commissioned research projects to investigate the causes of potential hostility directed against immigrants.[85]

Between Integration and Exit: State Responses to Immigrant Economic Disadvantage

I have argued that organized mobilization against immigrants did not occur in Germany because natives did not lose out in the competition for material resources. When economic conditions deteriorated, the government refrained from implementing programs that were seen to target immigrants directly with benefits, gave Germans priority in the allocation of jobs and prevented migrant workers from settling in areas where public services were stretched thin. The question that arises, then, is: why did disenfranchised immigrants not turn against the state when their economic situation worsened and state policies effectively discriminated against them?

As noted above, conflicts between immigrants and state actors did generally not take place in Germany. Official reports of smaller-scale clashes or peaceful resistance that the secondary literature might have missed failed to turn up as well in archival materials, in spite of the numerous documented occasions of discussions concentrating on the nature and effects of immigrant settlement in Germany.[86] This was not for lack of surveillance; at the National Archives an entire folder is dedicated to the monitoring of immigrants' political activities by the Ministry of the Interior.

issue in the early 1970s. Having surveyed the generally unfavorable educational and economic performance of guestworker children, government officials and politicians began to contemplate the potential law-and-order implications of an entrenched immigrant underclass. Similar to Great Britain, officials in Germany looked to the "grave instances of civil strife" in the United States with great concern and concluded that Germany would also have to face "serious social conflicts" if migrants were to be permanently disadvantaged economically.[94] The Bavarian Ministry of the Interior likened the continuation of immigration and the associated emergence of an underprivileged, low-skilled second generation underclass to the "import of social explosives," that would eventually threaten the state.[95]

Voices outside of government had also recognized the potential social costs that could arise if immigrant youth were not integrated economically. In a letter to the Ministry of Labor, the Federation of German Trade Unions (DGB) urged the government to institute policies that would allow immigrant youth greater access to the labor market. The "dangers" associated with a failure to do so, not only "for immigrants themselves, but for the state and society as a whole," the DGB warned, would far outweigh the perceived labor market benefits that resulted from the exclusion of the second generation.[96] In 1978, the Christian Democratic Party (CDU/CSU) also called on the government to make the improvement of the economic opportunities of immigrant youth a policy priority. Children of guestworkers, now numbering close to one million, lagged behind their German counterparts in education, employment and occupational mobility. If no significant changes occurred, immigrant youth would "one day organize and rebel against their approaching fate."[97] Local officials similarly perceived the "masses of school dropouts as a 'ticking time bomb'" and press coverage spoke of the danger to domestic security if immigrant ghettos and "Harlem-like" conditions were allowed to develop (cf. Pagenstecher 1994: 45-46). Several years later, a government committee charged with the investigation of youth violence in Germany stated that immigrant youth had thus far refrained from engaging in violent demonstrations against the state. But it nevertheless warned that "if growing numbers of second generation immigrant youth find themselves in a hopeless situation at the margins of our society, the probability that they will react with protest rises."[98]

In view of these alarming forecasts, the federal government made the economic and social incorporation of the second generation the "overriding goal" of its overall integration framework in the late 1970s.[99] Under the leadership of Social Democratic (SPD) Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, more liberal rules in the area of youth employment were enacted[100] and the government also encouraged the *Länder* to institute integration measures in the area of schooling and youth supervision. Starting in 1976, the Ministry for Youth, Family and Health ran additional programs that aimed to prepare immigrant youth for their entry into the German labor market and also promoted the supervision and support of youth in inner cities. Social support centers were expanded and reoriented from helping to meet migrants' initial settlement needs towards assisting in their children's occupational integration. Such measures were considered

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[94] This was the assessment of a 1972 study based on conditions in Munich. Its findings were summarized by the Federal Ministry of the Interior in an undated document; see B106/45167.

[95] B119/5135: undated letter is undated (most likely from late 1972 or early 1973).

[96] B149/54452: Letter from the DGB, national executive board (*Bundesvorstand*) to the Ministry of Labor, February 2, 1976.

[97] BT Drs 8/811, Mai 17, 1978.

[98] BT Drs 9/2390 January 17, 1983, p. 29.

[99] BT Drs 8/2716, March 29, 1979.

[100] See Meier-Braun (1988: 13) and BT Drs 8/2875, June 13, 1979.

Federal Employment Office attributed the reduction in the unemployment rate among immigrants in 1984 (then estimated at one percentage point overall, and 2.3 percentage points among Turkish workers, compared to the previous year) directly to its legislation.[108] Indeed, fifteen percent of all Turkish citizens residing in Germany, the group who had been hardest hit by unemployment, left the country that year. Far from being a sustainable solution, return migration – voluntary, induced, or coerced – only temporarily reduced economic disadvantage among immigrants in Germany by simply exporting it. In the coming decades, as the number of second and third generation immigrants who, in many cases, had never been to their parents' home countries rose steadily, fewer guestworkers pursued the exit option and would instead have to be integrated into German labor market institutions. Improvements in the residential status of immigrants who had long resided in Germany – an integrative measure that had indeed been implemented – also meant that coercive return would no longer apply to the majority of guestworkers in the coming years. Political exclusion, however, remained the norm and attempts to introduce local voting rights for immigrants failed repeatedly.[109]

Comparing Great Britain and Germany

A comparative look at developments over time as well as across countries illustrates the initial effectiveness of the guestworker regime in keeping economic disadvantage in check (especially when contrasted with Great Britain) and also depicts the effects of this system's demise. Figure 4a plots the unemployment rates of immigrants in Germany and ethnic minorities in Great Britain, while Figure 4b charts the ratio of these groups' unemployment rates to overall unemployment rates. One immediately notices the very low initial levels of unemployment among immigrants in Germany, which were even below German rates. Over time, the number of jobless immigrants in Germany increased, as did the unemployment gap between natives and immigrants. The large-scale exit of many guestworkers during the difficult 1980s led to a temporary reduction in immigrant unemployment and brought rates closer to those of their native counterparts. Since the late 1980s, unemployment rates of immigrants in Germany have tracked those of the German workforce, albeit at considerably higher levels. Turning to Great Britain, we observe considerably higher unemployment rates among ethnic minorities during the 1980s as well as a much larger gap between ethnic minority and overall unemployment. In 1984, for example, when overall unemployment rates in Germany and Britain were 9.1 and 11.7 percent, respectively, the difference between immigrant and native unemployment rates was 4.9 percentage points in Germany, compared to 10.3 points in Britain, illustrating that the labor market effects of the recession were disproportionately experienced by Britain's ethnic minorities. Economic integration and large-scale return had resulted in a smaller gap in Germany. Figure 4a illustrates these trends; the ratio of immigrant unemployment to overall unemployment in Britain almost always exceeds the ratio we observe in Germany. Finally, the decision to open up German labor market institutions, including vocational training, to descendants of guestworkers also had comparatively favorable effects on youth unemployment. In both countries, ethnic minority youth unemployment rates have been

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[108] BT Drs 10/2497, November 26, 1984. While the number of returnees is not in dispute, some have challenged the government's assertion that the legislation was the immediate cause for the rise in out-migration (cf. Motte 1999).
[109] On migrants' political rights, see, for example, Huber and Unger (1982: 172), Kühne (2000: 48-49) and Meier-Braun (1988: 15-16).

approximately twice as high as overall youth rates; but in Germany, this rate was 15.4 percent among immigrant youth, compared to 28.1 percent among ethnic minority youth in Britain.[110]

6. Immigration Regimes and Tradeoffs

In sum, during times of overall economic decline, Germany's immigration regime performed better in reducing levels of economic disadvantage among immigrants than did its British counterpart, where immigration had largely eluded state and economic planners. For the first three decades of guestworker immigration, the twin logics of integration and exit worked to ensure a minimum standard of economic well-being among guestworkers and their descendants in Germany. Today, however, the initial rules and regulations that governed guestworker migration no longer apply and the labor market position of many former guestworkers and their descendants, now in their third and fourth generation, reflects their often lower skill profile. When economic conditions deteriorate, as they did starting in the mid-1990s, this group, and particularly its younger members, tends to be especially vulnerable. Similar to their counterparts in Great Britain, then, first and later generation migrants in Germany today are increasingly exposed to economic downturns and gradual advancements in education, employment and housing are often overshadowed by disadvantage.[111] Lacking local or national political clout, they also are in no position to make credible demands for improved economic incorporation. In this sense, immigrant economic integration and its implications for immigrant conflict in Germany today show some resemblance to developments among West Indians in Great Britain during the 1970s and 1980s. Even though major riots directed against the state have not characterized the overall situation in Germany, smaller-scale events have occurred and follow familiar patterns. In Berlin, for example (where immigrant unemployment rates reached over 30 percent in the late 1990s) several violent confrontations between police officers and the areas' Turkish residents have taken place, often following the arrest of ethnic minority youths.[112] The recent liberalization of Germany's citizenship laws and the ensuing rise in naturalizations could counteract these developments, but, depending on local economic conditions and migrants' political behavior, could also provoke resistance on the part of the remaining population.

The argument presented here thus produces a set of unattractive tradeoffs. On the one hand, the treatment of migrants as cogs in a greater economic machine that are easily replaced, restricted and returned reduces the incidence of immigrant conflict by shielding both natives and the state from the potentially unsettling local consequences of immigrant settlement. On the other hand, the extension of political rights to migrants and the application of less draconian and more humane economic guidelines in settings where resources are scarce are associated with a higher degree of immigrant-native conflict. The solution to both types of conflict – resource abundance – is often difficult to achieve in practice, especially when immigration is already unfolding.

This paper has focused its attention on the fate of postcolonial migrants and guestworkers in Great Britain and Germany. But the main argument advanced here also applies to other

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[110] These figures refer to 1987 (for Germany) and to 1991 (for Great Britain). In 1987, the unemployment rate of non-British (as opposed to ethnic minority) youth was 15.9 percent. This figure is less useful for our purposes, however, since the great majority of immigrants and their descendants in Britain are British citizens. For 1987 figures, see Werner and König (2001: 12-13); 1991 figures are derived from the National Statistics (2006), author's calculations ("Table L09 Economic position and ethnic group 16 and over").

[111] See Beauftragte (2005) and BMBF (2006) for recent educational, occupational and housing data.

[112] See, for example, Gesemann (2001: 364) and *DDP Basisdienst*, "'Frust und Hass' – Polizisten in Berlin bei

groups and settings. Indeed, in the case of Germany, the experience of political migrants puts in

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Appendix

<u>National Archives – Great Britain</u>
The following abbreviations indicate files held at the National Archives (London):
CAB:	Records of the Cabinet Office
HLG:	Records created or inherited by the Ministry of Housing and Local Government, and of successor and related bodies, including those of the Local Government Board and Ministry of Health, relating to the administration of local government, housing and town and country planning.
HO:	Records created or inherited by the Home Office, Ministry of Home Security, and related bodies
PREM:	Records of the Prime Minister's Office

<u>The Labour History Archive and Study Centre (Manchester)</u>
Unless otherwise noted, all correspondence between Labour Party members is drawn from files held at The Labour History Archive and Study Centre (Manchester).

<u>National Archives Germany (Bundesarchiv Koblenz)</u>
The following abbreviations indicate files held at the National Archives (Koblenz):
|	
B106:	Ministry of the Interior (*Bundesministerium des Innern*)
B119:	Federal Employment Office (*Bundesanstalt für Arbeit*)
B134:	Ministry of Land Use Planning, Building Industry and Urban Development (*Bundesministerium für Raumordnung, Bauwesen und Städtebau*)
B136:	Office of the Chancellor (*Bundeskanzleramt*)
B149:	Ministry of Labor (*Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Sozialordnung*)

<u>Parliamentary Documentation Germany</u>
BT Drs:	Lower House of German Parliament, printed matter (*Bundestag Drucksachen*)
BR Drs:	Upper House of German Parliament, printed matter (*Bundesrat Drucksachen*)

Table 1: Five British Local Authorities with Highest Share of Each Ethnic Group

Fig. 1: Large-Scale Immigrant Conflict in Great Britain, 1950-2006

Fig. 2a: Feelings toward Outgroup - Germany and Great Britain

	West Indians	Asians	Turks
Admiration	1.7	1.8	1.6
Irritation	2.0	2.1	1.8
Afraid	1.5	1.4	1.6
Sympathy	2.0	2.1	2.2

Mean Score
(1) never, (2) not too often, (3) fairly often, (4) very often

☐ Outgroup: West Indians ■ Outgroup: Asians ☐ Outgroup: Turks

Question wording:
Now, I would like to ask whether you have ever felt the following ways about (outgroup) and their families living here. For each feeling that I ask you about, please tell me whether you have felt that way very often, fairly often, not too often, or never.

Admiration	How often have you felt admiration for (outgroup) living here?
Irritation	How often have you felt irritation at (outgroup) living here?
Afraid	How often have you felt afraid of (outgroup) living here?
Sympathy	How often have you felt sympathy for (outgroup) living here?

**Fig. 2b: Reasons why Immigrants Don't Do as Well -
Germany and Great Britain**

Category	West Indians	Asians	Turks
Need to try harder	2.7	2.3	2.5
Different values	2.7	2.8	3.0
Race	2.1	1.9	1.7
Culture	2.8	2.5	2.2
Discrimination	2.8	2.8	2.7

Mean Score

(1) Disagree strongly, (2) Disagree somewhat, (3) Agree somewhat, (4) Agree strongly

☐ Outgroup: West Indians ■ Outgroup: Asians ☐ Outgroup: Turks

Question wording:
Please tell me whether you agree strongly, agree somewhat, disagree somewhat, or disagree strongly with each of the following reasons why (outgroup) living here may not do as well as the German/British people in Germany/Great Britain.

|	
Need to try harder	It is just a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if (outgroup) would only try harder they could be as well off as German/British people.
Different values	(Outgroup) living here teach their children values and skills different from those required to be successful in Germany/Great Britain.
Race	(Outgroup) come from less able races and this explains why they are not as well off as most German/British people.
Culture	The cultures of the home countries of (outgroup) are less well developed than that of Germany/Great Britain.
Discrimination	There is a great deal of discrimination against (outgroup) living here today that limits their chances to get ahead.

Fig. 2c: Policy Options - Presence of Immigrants - Germany and Great Britain

	Percent Agreeing
All	9.2 / 8.8 / 5.1
Born abroad	16.4 / 11.8 / 10.2
Not contributing	19.0 / 19.1 / 23.2
Criminals	55.3 / 41.6 / 43.2
No documents	43.4 / 51.2 / 51.8
No one	10.6 / 17.5 / 16.8

Fig. 2d: Opinions about Outgroup - Germany and Great Britain

Question wording:

Now, I would like to ask you a few more questions about (outgroup) and their families living here. Tell me as I read each of the following statements whether you agree strongly, agree somewhat, disagree somewhat, or disagree strongly.

Government effort	The government should make every effort to improve the social and economic position of (outgroup) living in Germany/Great Britain.
Marrying in own family	I would not mind if an (outgroup) person who had a similar family economic background as mine joined my close family by marriage.
Outgroup as my boss	I would not mind if a suitably qualified (outgroup) person was appointed as my boss.
Job discrimination	(Outgroup) get the worst jobs and are underpaid in Germany/Great Britain largely because of discrimination.
Politicians' attention	Most politicians in Germany/Great Britain care too much about (outgroup) and not enough about the average British person.
Sexual relationship	I would be willing to have sexual relationships with a (outgroup) person.
Comfortable relations	German/British people and (outgroup) can never be really comfortable with each other, even if they are close friends.
Work their way up	Many other groups have come to Germany/Great Britain and overcome prejudice and worked their way up. (Outgroup) should do the same without

Outgroup as boss	Most German/British people would not mind if a suitably qualified (outgroup) person was appointed as their boss.
German/British jobs	(Outgroup) have jobs that the German/British should have.

Source: Figures 4a-4d are based on survey data contained in *Eurobarometer* 30 (see Reif and Melich 1992).

Fig. 3: Immigration and Conflict

**Immigrants Possess
Local Political Power**

	no	**yes**
no	No conflict	No conflict
yes	Immigrant-State Conflict	Immigrant-Native Conflict

Economic Scarcity

Fig. 4a: Immigrant/Ethnic Minority Unemployment Rates in Germany and Great Brtain, 1965-2000