

The Triumph of Ethnos Over Demos in the Nouvelle Droite's Worldview

**Immigration, Minorities and Multiculturalism
In Democracies Conference**
Ethnicity and Democratic Governance MCRI project
October 25-27, 2007
Montreal, QC, Canada

Tamir Bar-On

IMMD Conference (October 25-27, 2007): “The Triumph of Ethnos Over Demos in the Nouvelle Droite’s Worldview,” Dr. Tamir Bar-On, George Brown College, Toronto, Canada

“It wasn't a matter of tender heart, but a morbid, contagious excess of sentiment...the human race no longer formed one great fraternal whole--as the popes, philosophers, intellectuals, politicians, and priests of the West had been claiming for much too long. Man never has really loved humanity all of a piece--all its races, its peoples, its religions--but only those creatures he feels are his kin, a part of his clan, no matter how vast.” – Jean Raspail, *The Camp of the Saints*, 1973

1. Introduction

The nouvelle droite (ND) or European New Right (ENR) generally, if not idiosyncratically, rejects immigration, multiculturalism, minority rights, and liberal democracy as negative phenomena that undermine the richness and diversity of the world as embodied by rooted cultural or ethnic communities. Like Raspail, the ND holds the “popes, philosophers, intellectuals, politicians, and priests of the West” partially responsible for opening the doors to uncontrolled immigration and choosing humanity, the masses of poor humanity, above their “own” European ethnic groups. In the long run, Raspail, like ND leader Alain de Benoist, argues that immigration and demographic trends will mean the steady demise of white European cultures to more demographically assertive Arab, African, Indian, and Chinese cultures. And as Raspail argued in a controversial politically incorrect piece entitled “The Fatherland Betrayed by the Republic” in *Le Figaro* in 2004, the “tender heart” of Christianity or liberalism will not save white Europeans from a “cruel” period of possible cultural extinction at some period in the future (*Le Figaro*, June 17, 2004).

Like numerous revolutionary forces of the interwar era, including Fascists, the ND’s list of negations from anti-capitalism to anti-communism and anti-conservatism to

anti-liberalism is indeed encyclopaedic. Yet, born in France in the wake of the student and worker protests in May 1968, the ND sought to escape the ghetto status of a revolutionary Right battered by Nazi and Fascist excesses by working strictly on the cultural terrain in order to outflank the liberal-left. By the 1990s, as I argued elsewhere and in *Where Have All The Fascists Gone?* (2007), its positions were a unique synthesis of the ideas of the New Left and revolutionary (especially conservative revolutionary) Right (Bar-On 2001, 333-351; 2007).

Instead of delving into whether ENR is fascist or not, which I tackle in *Where Have All The Fascists Gone?* (2007), suffice it to say that with minimal definitions like those proposed by Roger Griffin of fascism as “a palingenetic form of populist ultra-nationalism,” (Griffin 1995, 9; 2003, 5) the ND approximately fits the criteria of fascism as do other non-fascist right-wing movements. Yet, with maximalist definitions like those proposed by Stanley Payne along the lines of

multicultural model of identity, which are seen as “false” communities imposed by New Class administrators from politicians to cultural institutions on recalcitrant ordinary people and communities worldwide. In a Gramscian mould from the Right, the goals of the ND are to cause a rupture between people and leaders and cultural elites on questions related to cultural identity, immigration, and notions of belonging, as well as to undermine liberal multicultural notions of community and assist in the fall of what they consider a blocked, “totalitarian” system (De Benoist 1977, 456-60; 1979, 250-9; Griffin 1998, 5-6).

2. Basic Definitions: Ethnos vs. Demos

I will now turn to highlighting some basic terms, namely, the distinction between ethnos and demos. I will also underscore the relationship between the ethnos and demos in the ND’s worldview. Ethnos connotes people of the same race or nationality who share a distinctive culture. The ethnos can be constituted in biological or cultural formulations. The demos, on the other hand, is the personification of the populace, especially in a democracy, and comes from the Greek word the people. Demos can then mean: 1. The common people or the populace or 2. The common people in an ancient Greek state.

For the ND, hierarchical, elite, “organic” aristocratic rule is generally favoured over the rule of the demos, or the common people, as evidenced by de Benoist’s affinity for elitist thinkers such as Lenin, Le Bon, Carrell, Spengler, Junger, Schmitt, and Evola in his major work *Vu de droite* (De Benoist 1977). In this way, the ND’s call for organic, hierarchical societies mimics conservative revolutionary, fascist, and non-conformist forces of the inter-war era. Yet, in the 1980s and 1990s in conjunction with the rise of far right-wing political parties like the *Front National* in France and the Freedom Party in Austria, as well as its debates with the French Greens, anti-utilitarians, and left-leaning *Telos* in North America (e.g., see the special double issue on the ND in 1993-4 entitled “The French New Right: New Right-New Left-New Paradigm?”), the ND became fascinated with the “new populism” and North American neo-communitarians like Charles Taylor (e.g., see the June 1994 issue of French ND journal *Krisis* entitled “Community”). In this context, the ND realized that that in light of a post-war anti-fascist

consensus calling oneself a democrat scored you political points and that liberal democracies were themselves sensitive to internal critiques of democracy. In his assault on liberal democracy, the Anglo-American New Right, and the excesses of capitalist globalization, the ND leader Alain de Benoist almost sounded like a leftist of the 1968 generation (e.g., see De Benoist's "Hayek: A Critique," *Telos* 110, Winter 1998; "Confronting Globalization," *Telos* 108, Summer 1996).

Yet, there was a hitch in de Benoist's thinking for the liberal-left. It was not based on 8

“heterogeneous world”. The ND might long for a more “heterogeneous world” to counter what they consider the “one-world” civilizational project of Pax Americana, yet internal homogenization is a necessary prerequisite and internal cultural heterogeneity is strongly valorised (e.g., De Benoist and Champetier 1999, “The French New Right In the Year 2000”).

3. The Reconstituted Ethnos: From Race to Biology to Culture

ND theorists like Alain de Benoist in France or Marco Tarchi in Italy, who no doubt have

theorists. Along with the ND's dedication to the cultural terrain as opposed to revolutionary Right parliamentary politics or extra-parliamentary violence, a defense of ethnic identities has been central to the ND's worldview since its founding in 1968. In a *Telos* interview in the mid-1990s, ND expert Taguieff said this about the ND: "Roots, identities: These are the new absolutes" (Taguieff 1993-4c, 172). In the same *Telos* issue, de Benoist stated the following in an interview: "National identity is a real problem and so is immigration" (De Benoist 1993-4a).

For the ND, the demos discourse in the context of valorising the "new populism" in the 1990s was certainly part of a survival strategy, as well as *equivalent* with the ethnos in the ancient Athenian sense. That is, a demos that did not represent a rooted ethnos in a homogeneous mode did not deserve the ND's support. The implicit argument was that elite political and cultural classes, unlike the popular classes, did not have sufficient love for the ethnos and were hijacking democracy by splitting it from its connection to the common destiny of particular, rooted ethnic communities.

Born in 1968, it was no accident that the ND focused on the ethnos and, to a lesser extent, the demos. In the wake of the 1968 protests, we witnessed a return to ethnic and democratic appeals against both liberal and dogmatic Marxist ideologies: the rise of black separatism, radical nationalist anti-colonialism, regionalism, and calls for democratic participation in institutions from the state to workers' councils. Moreover, ND leader de Benoist was especially indebted to the German thinker Johan Gottfried von Herder (1744-1803) and the tradition of radical cultural heterogeneity as beneficial for the evolution of humanity, which was far more important to de Benoist than a concern for democracy (Bar-On 2007, 132). This Herderian tradition stressed "the flowering of the world's cultural diversity and uniqueness; the inherent beauty and value and beauty of all world cultures; and the duty to preserve these cultural differences because they entail a rich multiplicity of different ways of feeling, seeing and living in the world." (Bar-On 2007, 132)

In a celebrated passage from de Benoist's magnum opus *Vu de droite*, which won him the *Academie francaise* prize in 1978, he echoes the Herderian tradition: "What is the greatest threat today. It is the progressive disappearance of diversity from the world. The levelling-down of people, the reduction of all *cultures* to a *world civilization* (De

and dubbed “The Ethnopluralist Manifesto” has definite ND affinities (see Appendix). The manifesto highlights the pan-European flavour of the ND. For the purpose of our

7. The ND's Ambiguities: Multiculturalism in Practice

I have already pointed out that a major ambiguity in the ND worldview is that it combines revolutionary Right and Left and New Left ideas. Yet, there also remain

capitalism, immigration or demographic trends, and the impact of American films.

This was not a new stance. In 1990, de Benoist and GRECE President Jacques Marlaud publicly critiqued the FN for its “sickening” and “disheartening” scapegoating of immigrants and pro-neo-liberal stances (De Benoist, *Le Choc du mois* 31, July-August 1990; Bar-On 2007, 169) As pointed out earlier, de Benoist also valorised the federal idea of a “Europe of a Hundred Flags,” as well as defended the right to cultural particularism of Jewish and Vietnamese communities in France – presumably successful, law-abiding communities in France in contrast to Arab and African communities (De Benoist 1993-4, *Telos*, 98-99).

At the same time, we should not assume that de Benoist has all of a sudden embraced immigration, minorities, multiculturalism, or democracy. In 2004, de Benoist explicitly rejected the Rights of Man, a key aspect of liberal democracies, arguing that its universality was a threat to particular cultures (De Benoist 2004, “Interview in *Present*”). He continues to recycle and defend conservative revolutionary authors like Evola and Schmitt that were so close to fascism and Nazism ideologically (not to mention concrete collaboration of these scholars with Fascist and Nazi regimes) because he essentially laments the plebeian nature of those regimes. In a 2001 conference paper he said that the key struggle of the century was of defending cultural *communities* and called for the *right* of people to work in their country of origin (Bar-On 2007, 201). In a *Telos* piece, he essentially called for the erection of a “heterogeneous world of homogeneous communities,” a key slogan of the German New Right (Woods 2007). Some of his personnel, perhaps tired of the long metapolitical march through the wilderness, jumped ship to the FN in the 1980s (Bar-On 2007, 50). More ominously, in another multiculturalism (or anti-multiculturalism) moment in practice, in 1999 the ND’s anti-war manifesto was put out at the height of NATO’s war in the former Yugoslavia, which decried the “American war” and never once expressed solidarity with one of the victims of ethnic cleansing, the Kosovar Albanians (Bar-On 2007, 82). Numerous left-wing and liberal scholars signed the manifesto, some no doubt aware of the ND’s anti-multicultural orientation and others perhaps less so.

8. Ethnic Cleansing By Other Means?

In *The Seduction of Unreason*, Richard Wolin argues that in the ND worldview cultural belonging supersedes rights, with the ultimate goal being that European New Right politicians seek “to advance a type of *parliamentary ethnic cleansing*.” (Wolin 2004, 22) Wolin is not shy to link the ND cultural project to historical fascism: “As with the proponents of interwar fascism, today's antidemocrats seek to exploit the openness of the constitutional state to undermine democratic norms.” (Wolin 2004, 22) In short, no longer content with older right-wing tactics such as extra-parliamentary violence or even political parties, democratic structures are utilized by the ND to shift attitudes and policies on immigration, identity, and cultural belonging across the political spectrum. Unfortunately, since the mid-1980s both established political forces on the right and left have been willing to co-opt the call of far right-wing political parties for a more restrictive immigration regime, particularly towards non-EU citizens, as well as to join coalition governments with far right-wing parties as in Austria and Italy in the 1990s (Schain 1987). From the ND’s perspective, the ethnos might still be saved by a more awakened demos, which has steadily been sold the lies of universalism, the brotherhood and sisterhood of humanity, and multiculturalism.

For the ND, the defense of rooted ethnic communities through the cultural terrain is in Clausewitzian language, a war by other means. The ND insinuates what Jean Raspail in his novel *The Camp of the Saints* and Enoch Powell in a 1968 speech “rivers of blood” spelled out unambiguously, namely, the coming, cruel “total ethnic war” between Europeans and non-Europeans from the impoverished south. For the ND, this war can be averted through a sort of “parliamentary ethnic cleansing,” thus uniting the demos with the homogeneous ethnos in a pan-European context. If the anti-immigrant discourse and disdain for democracy spreads across the heart of the body politic, reasons the ND, then immigrants might choose a return to their country of origins; a “civil war” between immigrants and hosts ensues (thus fulfilling far right-wing prophecies); or more restrictive immigration programs are gradually implemented with a decided slant towards what the FN calls “national preference” in respect of government programs (e.g., the

either endemic to ethnic groups, or a reaction to the liberal universalist state, and can only be reduced through radical ethnic separatism (thus making a mockery of the “right to difference” slogan):

Ethnic groups can be compared to the inmates of large American prisons, who usually begin to respect each other only when their turf is staked out and when their cells are separated by massive stone walls. Thrown into one cell they are likely to devour each other in a perpetual conflict over ‘territorial imperative.’ (Sunic, “A Global Village and the Rights of the Peoples?”)

For Sunic, the ethnos connotes that “a people has a common heritage and a will to a common destiny” (Sunic, “A Global Village and the Rights of the Peoples?”). This ethnos, he adds, “exists despite superficial cleavages such as parties, interest groups, and passing trends in ideologies” (Sunic, “A Global Village and the Rights of the Peoples?”). Most importantly, echoing Dumezil, Eliade, and Jung, Sunic argues that a people needs a collective, founding myth that gives birth to its cultural goals and political destiny. For liberal states, Sunic implies that multiculturalism is that myth. This myth must be destroyed by the myth of homogeneous cultural belonging within a regional or national European framework. This would restore Europeans to their particular rooted cultures and would constitute an “authentic” freedom based on “the right to live with those with whom you share a common bond” (Roger Pearson, “The Misuse of the Term Nation State,” *The Mankind Quarterly*, <http://es.geocities.com/sucellus23/896.htm>).

10. The ND’s Ethnically-Centred Vision for the New Millennium: “The French New Right in the Year 2000”

As mentioned earlier, in 1999 the ND traced its social, political and philosophical vision for the new millennium in an *Elements* manifesto called “The French New Right in the Year 2000” (De Benoist and Champetier 1999). The manifesto is split into three sections: 1. Predicaments (a critical analysis of the contemporary period); 2. Foundations (outlining the ND’s view of man and the world); and 3. Outlooks (positions on current issues and debates). In the manifesto, the ND claims that it is a metapolitical force

seeking to represent “the excluded middle” in relation to dichotomies such as tribalism and globalism, nationalism and internationalism, liberalism and Marxism, individualism and collectivism, progressivism and conservatism (“Introduction”). The ND allegedly seeks to create a new, unique political synthesis beyond “outmoded” categories such as left and right (“Introduction”). It anticipates resistance to such a project because they argue that it is threatening for “the guardians of thought” wedded to outdated ideological orthodoxies (“Introduction”).

What is most striking about the ND manifesto is the overwhelming and disproportionate concern with the preservation of rooted ethnic communities, as well as the linkage between the ethnos and demos. There is hardly a section that does not directly or indirectly express this preference for rooted, homogeneous communities. I would now like to more thoroughly examine the manifesto and show how it privileges ethnic belonging above democracy, as well as how it argues that the only authentic demos is one that is representative of the majority ethnos within a given state or region.

In section 1, part 1, “Modernity,” the authors attack the Judeo-Christian tradition and its liberal, universal offshoot that “attempts by every available means to uproot individuals from their individual communities”

Champetier attack the “abstract” notion of humanity:

From the sociohistorical viewpoint, man as such does not exist, because his membership within humanity is always mediated by a particular cultural belonging. This observation does not stem from relativism. All men have in common their human nature, without which they would not be able to understand each other, but their common membership in the species always expresses itself in a single *context*.

The authors then move towards a radical Herderian cultural ethnopluralism: “All cultures have their own “center of gravity (Herder): different cultures provide different responses to essential questions. This is why all attempts to unify them end up by destroying them. Man is rooted by nature in his culture.”

In section 2, part 3, “Society: A Body of Communities,” the authors argue that “Membership in the collective does not destroy individual identity; rather, it is the basis for it.” For the ND, the most important collective form of belonging is the *ethnos*.

Section 2, part 8, “The World: A Pluriversum,” is a key section for our discussion related to the *ethnos*. In this section, the ND valorises diversity and is not even afraid to use the politically incorrect notion of “race”: “Diversity is inherent in the very movement of life, which flourishes as it becomes more complex. The plurality and variety of races, ethnic groups, languages, customs, even religions has characterized the development of humanity since the very beginning.” Note the use of race, as biology before, which is not completely omitted in the new cultural understanding of the *ethnos*.

In a key passage from the same section, de Benoist and Champetier claim to reject the proselytizing, ethnocentric zeal of the West, which de Benoist once radically defended in the notion of French Algeria:

The West’s conversion to universalism has been the main cause of its subsequent attempts to *convert* the rest of the world: in the past, to its religion (the Crusades); yesterday, to its political principles (colonialism); and today, to its economic and social model (development) or its moral

principles (human rights). Undertaken under the aegis of missionaries, armies and merchants, the Westernization of the planet has represented an imperialist movement fed by the desire to erase all otherness by imposing on the world a supposedly superior model invariably presented as "progress." Homogenizing universalism is only the projection and the mask of an ethnocentrism extended over the whole planet.

De Benoist and Champetier then reject Fukuyama's notion of the "end of history," endorse Huntington's idea of a "clash of civilizations," and attack the US superpower indirectly as a danger for cultural and civilizational pluralism:

issues, seven of the thirteen positions are directly related to a concern for ethnic, cultural or regional communities.

In section 3, part 1, "Against Indiffere

the same conclusions as does the racism it denounces. As opposed to differences as is racism, universalist anti-racism only acknowledges in people their common belonging to species and it tends to consider their specific identities as transitory or of secondary importance.

For the ND, race should not be jettisoned as a concept and both racism and anti-racism should be rejected:

For the New Right, the struggle against racism is not won by negating the concept of races, nor by the desire to blend all races into an undifferentiated whole. Rather, the struggle against racism is waged by the refusal of both exclusion and assimilation: neither apartheid nor the melting pot; rather, acceptance of the other as Other through a dialogic perspective of mutual enrichment.

In section 3, part 3, “Against Immigration; For Cooperation,” we see the ND repairing its ties with the traditional, far right-wing milieu, which in the 1980s thought it was becoming crypto-communist as it had been critical of Le Pen’s FN and flirted with the Left and New Left. Immigration is seen as a negative process for Europe today, in line with most radical right-wing populist parties from the FN to Freedom Party and Vlaams Blok to People’s Party: “[By reason of its rapid growth and its massive proportions, immigration such as one sees today in Europe constitutes an undeniably negative phenomenon.” The anti-capitalist mantra is different from the FN position that directly blames immigrants for all of France’s ills:

The responsibility for current immigration lies primarily, not with the immigrants, but with the industrialized nations which have reduced man to the level of merchandise that can be relocated anywhere. Immigration is not desirable for the immigrants, who are forced to abandon their native country for another where they are received as back-ups for economic needs. Nor is immigration beneficial for the host population receiving the immigrants, who are confronted, against their will, with sometimes brutal modifications in their human and urban environments. It is obvious that the problems of the Third World countries will not be resolved by major population shifts.

Yet, the restrictive immigration calls in the manifesto are similar to the FN. Both

FN and ND argue that restricting immigration will benefit immigrant and host societies alike since both will be able to maintain homogeneous ethnic communities: “Thus the New Right favors policies restrictive of immigration, coupled with increased cooperation with Third World countries where organic interdependence and traditional ways of life still survive, in order to overcome imbalances resulting from globalization.”

Immigrants will not all of a sudden leave, thus citizenship should be connected to nationality, in an ultimate triumph of the *ethnos* over *demos*:

As regards the immigrant populations which reside today in France, it would be illusory to expect their departure *en masse*. The Jacobin national state has always upheld a model of assimilation in which only the individual is absorbed into a citizenship, which is purely abstract. The state holds no interest in the collective identities nor in the cultural differences of these individuals. This model becomes less and less credible in view of the following factors: the sheer number of immigrants, the cultural differences which sometimes separate them from the populations receiving them, and especially the profound crises which affect all the channels of traditional integration (parties, unions, religions, schools, the army, etc.). The New Right believes that ethnocultural identity should no longer be relegated to the private domain, but should be acknowledged and recognized in the public sphere. The New Right proposes, then, a communitarian model which would spare individuals from being cut off from their cultural roots and which would permit them to keep alive the structures of their collective cultural lives. They should be able to observe necessary general and common laws without abandoning the culture which is their very own. This communitarian politic could, in the long run, lead to a dissociation of citizenship from nationality.

In section 3, part 6, “Against Jacobinism; For a Federal Europe,” the nation-state so dear to Fascists and the far Right in general is rejected as outmoded: “The nation-state is now too big to manage little problems and too small to address big ones.” Belonging will be more European in nature, as well as federal and regional:

In a globalized world, *the future belongs to large cultures and civilizations* capable of organizing themselves into autonomous entities and of acquiring enough power to resist outside interference. Europe must organize itself into a federal structure, while recognizing the autonomy of all the

power of industrialists. De Gaulle utilized the referendum to end French colonialism in Algeria. On 8 January 1961, de Gaulle organised a referendum on self-determination for Algeria, which gained acceptance of 75.2% of the voters. The Evian accords, signed on 18 March 1962, brought an end to the hostilities and officially gave independence to Algeria. In the referendum of April 8, 1962, the Evian accords were approved by 90.7% of the population of mainland France. The implicit argument by the ND is that in the new millennium France has become the colony of uncontrolled immigration, the new Algeria is mainland France, and perhaps the “common sense” of the people united in the framework of an ethnos can vote to democratically reverse this “ethnocidal” project.

11. Conclusion

To reiterate, this paper has sought to argue that in the ND worldview ethnic belonging trumps concern for democracy. Or, if democracy is invoked, it is the Athenian model rather than representative liberal democracy. Moreover, if democracy is invoked it is to revive that notion of homogeneous ethnic belonging. For the ND, a “real” demos would be based on a homogeneous ethnos within the context of a heterogeneous, pluralistic world. The Italian *Lega Nord* (Northern League), a federalist, anti-immigrant party, which has participated in national coalitions, might be one concrete model of a political outfit that closely mimics ND ideas.

Two eminent historians, the late Stanly Payne and Roger Griffin, disagree about whether the ND is a fascist movement. Griffin says that its “palingenetic ultra-nationalism” is fascist, while Payne says that it does not strictly operate from the fascist tradition and thus cannot be fascist. Yet, Maurice Bardeche, the key neo-fascist thinker in France in the post-war era, said that fascism would be reborn under new names (Bardeche 1961), thus not excluding the ND, which sought to get rid of sterile and outdated vocabulary linked to the Fascist era. In Payne’s 13 interpretations for the rise of fascism in his magisterial *A History of Fascism: 1914-1945*, one is a unique metapolitical explanation that certainly might include that ND under its ambit. (Payne 1995, 441-486; 459-61) Diverse non-Marxist scholars from Ernst Nolte and George Mosse to Roger

Griffin and Eric Vogelin have viewed fascism not in simple political or socio-economic formulations, but as “a unique historical phenomenon that attempted to synthesize or symbolize the special features of a distinct early twentieth-century historical trend.” (Payne 1995, 459) Nolte argued that fascism’s metapolitical project was based on a “resistance to transcendence” of either liberal or communist Bolshevik ideologies, which nonetheless recuperated some of the forms and techniques of the latter (Nolte 1966). Mosse, the leading historian of Nazi and pre-Nazi culture, interprets fascism as a revolution of the right with “positive” goals of its own beyond a mere opportunistic rise to power (Mosse 1978). Griffin also stresses the “positive” goals of fascism in that it was not an agent of a specific class, its epochal framework, and the palingenetic ultra-nationalism that united fascists (Griffin 1991, 182-237). It is this metapolitical interpretation that can best be utilized to highlight the framework of the ND and the mutation of its discourse in a decidedly anti-fascist era. Yet, if we take Payne’s separation of Right into fascist, radical Right, and conservative Right, the ND is indebted to all of them yet does not fit into any of the three categories. Or, if we take Payne’s exhaustive checklist definition of fascism along the lines of ideology and goals, fascist negations, and style and organization (Payne 1995, 7), the ND meets some but not all the prerequisites of fascism.

In short, the discourse of the ENR, in conjunction with far right-wing populist parties, poses challenges for the liberal-left related to the struggle over different notions of community and the ability of far right-wi

was the ND. This raises questions of definitional issues over what constitutes fascism, whether it was epochal, and whether fascism is about core ideological goals and tactical and organizational framework. Fifth, the ND in combination with anti-immigrant parties like the FN, has been instrumental in shifting the European discourse against immigration, immigrants, minorities, and multiculturalism. It has sought to create a new rights framework in which the collective rights of the ethnic group trumps individual rights, as well as the rights of the demos as a whole.

Appendix A: "The Ethnopluralist Manifesto," Jaroslaw Tomasiewicz, *Zakorzenie Magazine*

I.

A Man has a natural need to identify himself with a group. Only a part of our personality can be created by ourselves. The rest is obtained from other people in the form of culture.

II.

An eradicated person - meaning thrown off from the culture typical for his community -

The group identity being the necessary binder of the social solidarity is an autonomous value. The unlimited freedom of changing someone's identity involves chaos for the group existence, weakens its unity, and facilitates the assimilation of small communities by big ones. The choice of the identity must not be dependent only on an individual, but it must be accepted by other members of the group.

V.

Group identities - cultures - may be created on different bases, but the most common form of the group identity is the ethnic (national, regional, tribal) identity. So these identities are not imagined or hypothetical but they are real.

VI.

Cultures which were created during the historical changes of natural communities are based on tradition. Breaking off with the tradition always leads to the loss of own cultural identity. This is tantamount to the alienation of individuals and to disintegration of the community. That's why while not wishing stagnation or petrification of the status quo we demand to reconsider our idolatrous relation to progress, which is not good by itself. Proven, traditional forms are better than the experiments made on living organisms. The society must develop, but changes must have an evolutionary and unconstrained character. They must not lead to the disruption of the cultural continuity.

VII.

The diversity of humankind is a fact beyond any discussion. It is manifested in all areas of human existence. The abundance of being is a crucial value and should be defended. Protecting this wealth we defend at the same time both: the richness, the diversity of the world around us and the real freedom of the group (the community can not be free without being conscious of its separateness). Furthermore, being rooted in a specific culture we are more sensitive to the uniqueness of other cultures. All cultures are equally alien and indifferent for the eradicated person. In such a situation we cannot talk about tolerance, but only about the lack of our own identity.

Bibliography

Anderson, Benedict. *Imagined Communities*. London: Verso, 1983.

Bar-On, Tamir. *Where Have All The Fascists Gone?* Aldershot, England: Ashgate, 2007.

----- . "The Ambiguities of the Nouvelle Droite, 1968-1999," *The European Legacy* 6 (3) (2001).

De Benoist, Alain. "Jihad vs. McWorld," *Padania* (19 September 2001).

----- . "What Is Racism?," *Telos* 114 (Winter 1999).

----- . "Hayek: A Critique," *Telos* 110 (Winter 1998).

----- . "Confronting Globalization," *Telos* 108 (Summer 1996).

----- . "Democracy Revisited," *Telos* 95 (Spring 1995).

----- . "Three Interviews with Alain de Benoist," *Telos* 98-99 (Winter 1993-Spring 1994).

----- . "Interview," *Le Choc du mois* 31 (July-August 1990).

----- . *La cause des peuples*. Paris: Le Labyrinthe, 1982.

----- . *Les idées a l'endroit*. Paris: Libres-Hallier, 1979.

----- . *Vu de droite*. Paris: Copernic, 1977.

----- (undated), "Schmitt in France," Alain de Benoist's Web site, <http://www.alaindebenoist.com/pdf>.

----- . "Immigration: le cas français," Alain de Benoist's Web site, <http://www.alaindebenoist.com/pdf>.

----- . "Sur le foulard islamique," Alain de Benoist's Web site, <http://www.alaindebenoist.com/pdf>.

----- . "Interview in *Présent*," Alain de Benoist's Web site, <http://www.alaindebenoist.com/pdf>.

De Benoist, Alain and Champetier, "The French New Right In the Year 2000," *Eléments* 94 (February 1999).

Duranton-Crabol, Anne-Marie. *Visages de la nouvelle droite: Le GRECE et son histoire.*

Paris: Presses de la fondation nationale des sciences politiques, 1988.

Faye, Guillaume. *Contre l'économisme.* Paris: Le Labyrinthe, 1983.

-----.

Schain, Martin. "The National Front and the Construction of Political Legitimacy," *West European Politics* 10 (2) (April 1987).

Sunic, Tomislav. *Against Democracy and Equality: The European New Right*. New York: Peter Lang, 1990.

----- . "A Global Village and the Rights of the Peoples?," Spanish New Right Web site, " <http://es.geocities.com/sucellus23/559.htm>.

Taguieff, Pierre-André. *Sur la nouvelle droite: jalons d'une analyse*. Paris: Descartes et Cie, 1994.

----- . "The New Right's View of European Identity," *Telos* 98-99 (Winter-Spring 1993-4).

----- . "An Interview With Pierre-André Taguieff," *Telos* 98-99 (Winter-Spring 1993-4).

----- . *Face au racisme*. Paris: La Découverte, 1991.

----- (ed.). "The New Cultural Racism in France," *Telos* 83 (Spring 1990).

----- . *Essai sur le racisme et ses doubles*. Paris: La Découverte, 1988.

Tomasiewicz, Jaroslaw. "The Ethnopluralist Manifesto," *Zakorzenienie Magazine*, Spanish New Right Web site, <http://foster.20megsfree.com/477.htm>.

Wolin, Richard. *The Seduction of Unreason: The Intellectual Romance with Fascism from Nietzsche to Postmodernism*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004.

Woods, Roger. *Germany's New Right as Culture and Politics*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.