



**The Making of the Non-Citizen:  
From Subjects to Immigrants in the French-Algerian Transpolitical Space**

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**The Making of the Non-Citizen: From Subjects to Immigrants in the French-Algerian Transpolitical Space**

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*Of the “non-us” in the “us,”  
of the nonindigenous in the indigenous,  
of the non-national in the national...*

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*creuset*<sup>3</sup> – the melting pot) by tracing the expansion and contraction of citizenship along the religious identity of colonial subjects. By examining the development and interaction of citizenship and immigration laws in the context of French-Algeria as a transpolitical<sup>4</sup> space, I pose a line of historiographical questioning regarding the shaping of modern French 'national identity' as it animates current debates. The approach taken here, then, would be to extend the narrative not of the making of 'the French citizen,' but the making of the non-citi

critique citizenship law organized around the primacy of the state. After a brief discussion of theory and historiography, the first section of this paper will look more closely at the evolution of immigration legislation and the notion of the *'immigre'* during the Third Republic, while the second is focused on the earlier and latter periods of Empire and settlement in Algeria; these sections are cohered by the argument that the making of non-citizens in the latter context directly influenced the construction of the immigrant in the former.

I am certainly not the first to suggest that the picture of contemporary French hostility to multiculturalism is clarified (or at least enhanced) by studying the continuity between colonial and postcolonial history, but I believe that inquiries thus far might benefit from pushing past 'Orientalism' (in the sense coined by Edward Said) and the 'othering' impulse of identity politics, and delving further into the ambiguities between and across the self/other dualisms. Finally, since research into French administration in Algeria and the impacts of empire on metropolitan politics has been done many times over, I do not propose to duplicate these findings here. What this paper aspires to present is a synthesis of such research, a critique of the various conclusions suggested thereof, and an analysis projected from a radically different epistemological setting.

### **Citizenship, immigration, and (post-colonial) memory in France: theoretical and historiographical considerations**

After Michel Foucault offered a theory of the state as a *process* of intense juridico-bureaucratic work (*etatisation*), many who followed suggested that citizenship must be considered in the same way; I find this theoretical basis of use here. *Etatisation*<sup>6</sup> refers to the the process of the irruption of the state into individual/social life; the development of the relationship between the state and society until one is indistinguishable from the other. I draw on this body of theory because the development of citizenship is not only congruent with but directly resultant of to the process of *etatisation*: without states there are no citizens, and without either, there are no immigrants. To this effect, s, sith



“the essential condition for the expansion of European civilization is the destruction of the Semitic thing *par excellence*”

was generally required of all immigrants, though with varying stringency over time. As Maghraoui and others have noted, assimilation was considered especially difficult for immigrants and colonial non-citizens with Islamic cultural roots,<sup>16</sup> who were thought incapable, by virtue of their barbarism, of absorbing republican values (especially secularism) and becoming full and respectable citizens.<sup>17</sup>

Todd Shepard employs parallel distinctions between naturalization policies, but uses the term 'associationism' – a policy that gained popularity in the late-nineteenth century – to refer to what Maghraoui calls 'insertion.'<sup>18</sup> Shepard carefully considers the interplay and contradictions of assimilationist and integrationist policy in the Algerian context in his book, *The Invention of Decolonization: The Algerian War and the Remaking of France*. In it, he calls for greater inquiry into the (remarkably) largely untold history of how decolonization matters not only to the 'Third World,' but to Europeans; his research thus represents a growing interest in investigating the impacts of the end of empire on those places to which empire retracted and not only from which it receded. For Shepard, French national identity was itself a notion applied retroactively upon the 'Algerian crisis' (better known in Algeria and elsewhere as the War of Independence) which culminated in the loss of the North African territory in 1962. This fiction, as Adrian Favell writes, set the stage, in the 1980s, for the “mysterious reinvention of the republican tradition,” trumpeting grand moments of modern French self-definition “and forgetting the rest.”<sup>19</sup> Algeria's independence from France signified the upheaval of a binaric system whereby 'Frenchness' was propped up by its imperial project. The events of 1954-1962 jeopardized the long-cherished belief in the ability of (linguistic) assimilation to collect myriad peoples within a uniform republican polity, and ushered an urgent rewriting of French history.

*The Invention of Decolonization* is a valuable resource for study in this area, and my own analysis is influenced by Shepard's insight that the end of empire marked the moment when debates on the “question of colonialism” ended and the “immigration question began.”<sup>20</sup> Still, the limits of his analysis represent the places where in fact much of the literature falls short. He offers a narrative of French citizenship to the exclusion of its Muslim alterity that would be rich were it not for his failure to account for immigration legislation. This discrepancy would be corrected by Gerard Noiriel's observation that “In the French case... immigration developed as a direct consequence of citizenship,

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<sup>16</sup> Maghraoui: 220-221.

<sup>17</sup> Similar condemnations were leveled against Lebanese, Syrian, and Turkish immigrants, though because of the particular

as the other side of the republican coin, so to speak.”<sup>21</sup> Noiriél's intervention is supported by the fact that in many ways immigration law regarded guest-workers (from the Algerian *departements*) as 'aliens' even though they were technically French nationals – a contradiction that betrays the imperative of French legal discourse to forestall the slippage of Empire into Nation.

Shepard is eager to remind his readers that unlike other imperial powers, France did not explicitly codify difference. As he writes, “[n]either racial, ethnic, nor religious criteria entered into official definitions of Algerians with local civil status, as they did in other colonies.”<sup>22</sup> Were he basing these assertions on *laïcité* (religious neutrality) and not secularism (more stridently anti-religious policy), his arguments would be more tenable. Certainly, by making religion a matter of jurisdiction, French law (as it was realized in the Maghrebian colonies) evaded the matter of drawing citizenship laws across religious – and by extension racial – lines, but it does not follow that this excuses religion from the discussion. The colonial project in France-Algeria was critically dependent on the employment of religious difference, even under the mantle – and in 'defense' – of republican legal unity. In this sense, religion enters the legal framework with a specific function, rather than substance, and assumes a legal and pedagogical role in the deployment of racial disparity.

Gerard Noiriél's *The French Melting Pot* offers further avenues for thinking of the making of non-citizens. Noiriél, like Shepard, prefaces his research by highlighting the contrived nature of the French national project: he writes to dismantle the processes by which intellectuals and politicians have “constructed a fable of primordial Frenchness disrupted only occasionally by external invasion.”<sup>23</sup> Noiriél puts French immigration law in the context of the oftentimes dire need for a domestic labour force: “A country whose fertility began to decline very early,” France came to rely more heavily on immigration than any other European country for its population increase, thereby becoming “Europe's greatest melting pot, with Poles, Italians, Belgians, Spaniards, and North Africans arriving by the millions.”<sup>24</sup>

Also like Shepard, Noiriél critiques French national memory for conspicuously omitting this long-standing dependency on immigration: land-marks and monuments to immigration in French history are ill-placed or erased altogether – the ports of Marseilles are reviled in comparison with, for instance, New York's celebrated Ellis Island; although a large portion of the French population

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<sup>21</sup> Noiriél: xv.

<sup>22</sup> Shepard: 33.

<sup>23</sup> Noiriél: vii. So, for instance, both Shepard and Noiriél consider the importance of the landmark June 1889 legislation, but through very different perspectives – Shepard notes the effect of this on  *pied noir*-indigenous Algerian relations – the widening of inequality that resulted; Noiriél, in a broader scope, includes European geopolitics and labour relations.

<sup>24</sup> Noiriél: vii. As 'Europe's greatest melting pot,' France is likened to the United States for having consumed myriad cultures and then subsuming them under the republican banner; contrary to his assertion, I argue later in this paper, the simple 'melting pot' analogy is not so easily applied to North Africans.



acknowledges 'foreign' ancestry, immigrants are not welcome in the national history. Shepard and Noiriel are joined by Hafid Gafaiti in working to repair the “historical amnesia” concerning the role of immigration in the development of French society.<sup>25</sup> Gafaiti responds critically to the republican myth of assimilation, uniformity, and universality – “la Republique une et indivisible” – in which the history of immigration has no place.

Noiriel applies theoretical analyses of statist projects to empirical data

directive bestowed all indigenous Algerians (including Muslims and Jews) French nationality. These nationals were distinguished, however, from the legal category of “Algerians with French civil status” (that is, full citizenship), which comprised immigrants from within Europe and a small number of more 'meriting' indigenous men and their descendants (called '*evolués*

structures. It also meant forsaking their rights and obligations under Koranic law – practices integral to their religious practice and to their identity as Muslims.<sup>35</sup> As such, between 1865 and 1899, only 1,309 Muslim men applied out of about four million eligible, with only 178 applications rejected.<sup>36</sup>

Just before the end of the Second Empire, in 1870, Napoleon III briefly installed military rule. Among a number of other changes that Algeria experienced with the advent of the Third Republic was the re-installation of a civilian administration. Concurrently, the French government directed one of its ministers, Adolphe Crémieux, to completely assimila

commonly celebrated as a 'golden age' for human rights, and indeed, with it came quantitative and qualitative improvements in individual and social conditions as citizens were recognized as possessors of rights as well as duties to the state. However, as the rights allocated to citizens were improved, the restrictions around who could access these rights were tightened – immigration law was reassessed and citizenship became ever more exclusive.<sup>40</sup> As French borders closed and citizenship law reflected this closure, the institutions of immigration were also coming under scrutiny.

The legislation around the policing of foreigners within the hexagon was formed in the heat of virulent debates among differing interests. At one end were merchants keen to protect market autonomy and secure cheap labour; at the other were politicians who considered immigration a security issue and cited the war scare and fear of foreigners conducting espionage. Even within the latter camp, the Interior Ministry and War Ministry squabbled over control of foreign presence in France. Despite their differences they did succeed in legislating requirements for documentation proving place of birth and citizenship (birth certificates and passports) in the form of the 1893 decree stipulating measures for the protection of 'French jobs' from 'foreign competition.'<sup>41</sup> The bill was a compromise: foreign workers (which would come to represent most Algerians in France) were allowed entrance, but only on a seasonal basis,<sup>42</sup> and were required to present proof of registration each year. “From that point onward, 'immigrant' became a specific category within the foreign population”<sup>43</sup> unlike, for instance, tourists, idlers, or other non-wage-earners, because immigrants had to obtain a residency permit to practice trade on French territory. Noirielle describes the gravity of these changes: “In five years, a new era had been ushered in. For the first time, as Janine Ponty has noted, a distinction was made between laboring and nonlaboring immigrants.”<sup>44</sup>

the taxation of foreigners: in less than thirty years, a total of about forty bills related to this issue were brought before the Chamber.<sup>45</sup> These were unprecedented attempts by the state to intercede in migrant-worker quotas and the regulation of persons entering the country seeking employment. The government now held some prerogative to direct migrant flow towards areas with the greatest labour deficit.<sup>46</sup>

As a result of all of this, writes Noiriel, “[i]mmigration had become both complementary and antithetical to citizenship.” Laws such as these institutionalized “an increasingly pronounced differentiation between citizenship and nationality,” reflected best by the adoption of the 26 June 1889 law on French nationality.<sup>47</sup> In 1889 law, The Third Republic affirmed the principle of *jus soli* (though not at the expense of a *jus sanguinis* premise) by granting automatic French citizenship to all children born of French fathers (defined by having been born on French soil), unless rejected upon reaching the age of majority. This option was granted also to “children born in Algeria or France to a foreign-born father, if they were still residing in France.”<sup>48</sup> Another outcome of the law was the elimination of any

essay.

*'Foreign' Soldiers and 'Immigrant' Workers: Algeria in France between the wars*

General anxiety around national survival and the chronically frail French birth-rate was not helped by the drastic mortalities of the two World Wars; the fear of 'invaders,' not surprisingly, was a cultural obsession. This was compounded by the need for a domestic labour force during the economic recession of the 1890s and military personnel in anticipation of German hostility. These soldiers and labourers (especially the latter) would eventually be comprised largely of 'Muslims' from the North African *departements*.

At the end of the First World War, France had suffered the loss of 1,400,000 of its people.<sup>51</sup> Within that same period (between 1921-1926), it had absorbed about one million immigrants.<sup>52</sup> Between 1851 and 1921, the proportion of foreigners to French nationals climbed from about 1 per cent to 3.9 per cent.<sup>53</sup> By the mid-1930s that number had nearly doubled, to about 7 per cent of the total population. Subsequent to the edifice of legislation erected around the movement of peoples in and out of France, that number has since plateaued: the amount of registered immigrants in France still constitute roughly 7 per cent of the population – what *has* changed is the racial demographic of those immigrants.

Algerian migrants only began flowing *en masse* to France around the beginning of the First World War. The first waves of Algerian immigration were prompted by calls to military service (and the promise of benefits for loyal soldiers) and guest-worker employment opportunities (low-paid, but still better than those available in Algeria). The need for soldiers and unskilled labourers worked in tandem: Algerians were needed to replace both soldiers in the field and Frenchmen who left factories empty to enlist.<sup>54</sup> Paradoxically, immigrants were both desperately needed to fill in the labour gaps and despised for 'stealing French jobs.' In the post-war period, as the reconstruction effort put higher demands on cheap, seasonal labour, politicians heeded academic warnings of the impending immigrant invasion. The French extreme right profited from this climate, even, at times, gaining support from former Leftist-socialist labour unions in a united front to 'save French jobs' and keep "France for the French."<sup>55</sup>

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<sup>51</sup> Ralph Schor, *Français et immigrés en temps de crise (1930-1980)*, Paris : Harmattan, (2004): 5. An additional 600 000 were lost in the Second World War.

<sup>52</sup> Marcel Paon, *L'immigration en France: Consequence et limitation de l'immigration, Legislation et reglementations francaises concernant les etrangeres, Reglementations etrangeres de l'immigration*, Paris: Bibliotheque Politique et Economique (1926): 10; Silverman: 38.

<sup>53</sup> Paon: 22.

<sup>54</sup> Stora: 14.

<sup>55</sup> Schor: 15.

What is striking about immigra

naturalization laws, and centralize such operations, as had been done in other countries (the US, Italy, Germany).<sup>61</sup> This would require not only the greater securitization of borders



tertiary/service sector.<sup>67</sup> Ralph Schor verifies Noiriel's findings and concludes that:

These proved the ideal circumstances in which the extreme right could thrive: in the 1930s, emanating from the Algerian colonies, and by the 1980s from the *Front National* (then still a peripheral party preparing to assume a central place among in 'mainstream' of electoral politics).<sup>73</sup> The pervasive xenophobia of the 1930s and 40s, by which the political right was successful in pushing legislation that would further tighten French borders and expel 'illegal immigrants,' was resurgent into the 1990s wherein legislation such as the Pasqua laws of 1993 found tens of thousands of immigrants expelled, French-born 'second-generation' immigrants stigmatized, and citizenship and naturalization laws put under further restrictions. A key difference, however, is that by the 1990s, the 'immigrant question' was quietly (and sometimes not so quietly) refocused to specifically target North Africans (and other Muslims) within French borders.

With Algerian colons effectively incorporated into the polity by the July 1889 law, conservatives were thereafter openly vehement against legalizing any process of citizenship other than *jus sanguinis*. "Generally," writes Schor, "the most conservative, arch-supporters of *jus sanguinis* ("droit du sang") [citizenship], were hostile to naturalization and the automatic acquisition of nationality, a process that created a category already known as 'French on paper,' or 'Français d'alluve.' [According to these pundits,] these artificial procedures would never give true citizenship, formed from an atavistic secularism",<sup>74</sup>

Meanwhile, reformists, found mostly in left-leaning parties, raised questions concerning immigrant rights and protection from exploitation at the hands of employers. For instance, in 1927 the French Communist Party was the first to demand independence for Algeria, citing colonial abuses.<sup>75</sup> The same parties raised for the first time the notion of autonomy for indigenous Algerians (the *colons* had toyed with separation from France in past years, effectively subdued as their citizenship rights were expanded). These concerns were also expressed by groups such as *l'Etoile nord-africaine*, an organization which emerged in June of 1926 and was composed of leftists and other pro-independence supporters. The political left's major victory in this area came with the passage of the law of 10 August 1927 that enlarged the possibilities of access to nationality for all men entering the country.<sup>76</sup>

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<sup>73</sup> When Jean-Marie Le Pen declared "I am French, I prefer French people" ("Je suis Français, j'aime mieux les français") he might have been reading directly from a statement from right-wing parliamentarian Lionel le Taste: "I have not particular quarrel with foreigners. I am not, however, ashamed to proclaim my infinitely greater liking of French people, and that, if there were only a piece of bread to give, I would prefer to give it to the Frenchman than the foreigner." *Journal Officiel*, Chambre des députés, 13 novembre 1931. My translation .

<sup>74</sup> Schor: 73. ("D'une manière générale, les plus conservateurs, arc-boutés sur le droit du sang, se méfiaient de la naturalisation et de l'acquisition automatique de la nationalité, processus qui créaient une catégorie déjà appelée 'Français de papier' ou 'Français d'alluvions.' Ces opérations artificielles ne donneraient jamais de vrais citoyens, formés par un atavisme séculaire." My translation )

<sup>75</sup> Shepard: 39.

<sup>76</sup> Schor: 73. The debate around this law, nonetheless, continued until WWII. In the meantime, the law of 18 August 1929

Still, in 1931, the newly-elected moderate government instituted what Schor calls “more subtle” controls over French borders to reduce the number of entrances.<sup>77</sup> Confidential memos were issued to principle unions asking them to organize repatriations.<sup>78</sup> The law of 11 March 1931 (applied to Algerians as 'non-nationals') limited the child and family benefits of foreign workers – funding was given to children of Algerians born in France but not in Algeria. Since family migration was practically nonexistent then, workers were deprived of parts of their sa

### *Making amends: Redefining citizenship in the Fourth Republic*

At the end of the Second World War, the nature of French citizenship was structurally and procedurally re-imagined. Under the Fourth Republic, the imperial project was reconfigured into the *Union française*. In an effort to keep the empire – more fragile than ever – together, the Union was meant to renovate the relationship between France and its colonies into a sort of federation (by which the colonies gained partial autonomy). The October 1946 Constitution of Fourth Republic also created 'French Union citizenship,' which was extended to all French citizens and subjects, thereby eliminating the latter from official language.<sup>84</sup>

Unsurprisingly, at this time state also felt pressure to maintain greater control of the recruitment and placement of immigrants. A regime for this purpose was inaugurated, more institutionally-stable and wide-reaching than any before it; the National Immigration Office (ONI) was formed in an ordinance of 2 November 1945. This government agency was charged with the mandate to “protect the national community through an effective selection process based on considerations of health, employment, and moral conduct; - to protect the immigrants against diverse forms of exploitation...; - to guarantee as far as possible a distribution of foreigners in France.”<sup>85</sup> Contrary to the objectives of national preservation, instead of attracting immigrants, the numbers coming into France actually fell: ironically, writes Silverman, the only substantial increase in this period was in Algerian immigration.<sup>86</sup> In 1946, France had absorbed 20,000 Algerian immigrants; by 1954, 210,000 had crossed the Mediterranean.<sup>87</sup>

Although Algeria had long been technically part of the republic and not the empire, this re-conception of French citizenship would affect the the non-citizen/semi-subjects of Algeria as well. The logic of this synthesis was initially laid out in 7 March 1944 Ordinance of the Provisional Government of the French Republic which decreed that in the question of civil or personal status, French, Koranic, and local laws were theoretically considered equal. Subsequently, 65,000 elite men were offered French citizenship and also allowed to keep local status – about half turned it down.<sup>88</sup> The Law of 7 May 1946 and Constitution of the Fourth Republic (Article 80) affirmed that all other Algerians with local civil status were French citizens. Thus, at last, Muslims could (it was reaffirmed) receive French citizenship and still retain their *statut personnel*. This leveling of citizenship status was reiterated in

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<sup>84</sup> Shepard: 41.

<sup>85</sup> Quoted in Silverman: 39.

<sup>86</sup> Silverman: 41.

<sup>87</sup> Silverman: 41.

<sup>88</sup> Silverman: 41. Despite the Ordinance of 2 August 1945 that guaranteed French women the vote, “Muslim” Algerian women were still denied suffrage. See also Shepard: 43.

various pieces of legislation until and through the Algerian War of Independence (1954-62).<sup>89</sup>

All of this, in effect, meant allowing indigenous Algerians to be 'Muslim' in order to keep them 'French.' However, by the time politicians began to seriously consider measures for entering Muslims into the French polity as citizens, native Algerians were beyond metropolitan rhetoric of republican equality and brotherhood: indeed, the threat of outright independence was looming as early as the 1920s. Islamists and nationalists were unenthusiastic, to say the least, about the new citizenship codes; so to were Algerian 'Europeans', who took them as a betrayal by the metropole and an assault on their colonial privilege.<sup>90</sup>

Upon the eruption of the 'Algerian crisis' in 1954, the integrationist enterprise was resumed in full force. In continental France, the pressure to assimilate was lessened for immigrants, and the metropole would no longer countenance Algerian settler populations' demands for institutionalized class stratification. This came with a recognition that “[d]ecades of applied assimilationist theory – which worked to eliminate group 'particularisms' in order to create individuals who could be French citizens – had pushed most Algerian 'Muslims' farther away from other French people, not closer”<sup>91</sup> For a brief period, difference was not considered antithetical to political unity. A 1956 government memo, for instance, delineated a new subset of French people: “Muslim French from Algeria,” thereby introducing a notion of 'ethnic' difference/recognition into legal language.<sup>92</sup> Adjacent to the brutality of the military action was an extension of political rights and economic assistance unparalleled in other Western empires. According to Shepard, this about-face amounted to a redefinition of the nation-state in an attempt “to reconcile republican values and imperial conquest.” At the same time, the novel federal-imperial structure of the French Union fell out of favour as France began to reterritorialize its functions after the decolonization of Algeria.

Nation. As the French birth-rate fell, the successive governments were compelled to adopt both wider immigration policy *and* stricter criteria for allocating citizenship status. To this effect, it became necessary to protect 'Frenchness' by putting it in 'danger': to put Empire within perilous range of Nation. The logical dilemma would be finding a suitably 'republican' separation between non-citizens and citizens while also working to attract those on the 'non' side to Frenchness. This dilemma was superficially assuaged by 'assimilationist' policy, which would have kept 'Frenchness' safe while

In the North African colonies and subsequent to 'decolonization' in the metropole, this “cultural racism” took the particular form of membership within a Catholic mythology. The remainder of this essay will examine more closely the impact of this mythology on the tension between Empire and Nation that marked colonial-metropolitan relations and the body of legislation just portrayed.

### **The Pieds-noirs and (post-)colonial conundrums: from centre to periphery and back again**

*Quant a ce pauvre Alger, c'es un salmigondis  
C'est la Rome naissante ou la foule importune  
Des gens de trop chez eux vient tenter la fortune.  
Mais, ainsi que dans Rome au temps des deux jumeaux,  
Ces elements divers, ces germes anormaux  
Sont tombes dans le sein d'un mere geante  
Et, comme Rome, Alger accouchera d'un monde<sup>97</sup>*

To this point, we have considered the corollary crises of national identity and immigration and how non-citizenship was defined in an effort to assuage anxieties over national survival. Stoler summarizes the various factors compounding these crises:

Historians commonly attribute French anxieties over national identity to the loss of Alsace-Lorraine in 1870, but of perhaps equal import was the collective assimilation of more than 100,000 Algerian Jews under the Cremieux Decree of the same year. Debates over who was really French and who was not intensified over the next twenty years as increasing numbers of working-class Italians, Spanish, and Maltese in Algeria were acco

but in which both centre and periphery ar



the decades around the turn of the century proved to be the high-point of colonial migration to Algeria.<sup>105</sup> Between 1872 and 1927, the number of Europeans residing in Algeria's *departements* soared from roughly 220,000 to 833,000. This increase had little to do with fertility, but with high migration and settlement.<sup>106</sup> In fact, the colonial settler population had turned over several times in its first years due to disease and low birth rates; the indigenous populations of Algeria were also resistant to the settlers and attempted to repel them in several uprisings. It is perhaps unsurprising, then, that metropolitans themselves were generally reluctant to undertake the untidy business of settling in North Africa.

The first notable wave of continental French to settle in the Algerian colonies were the 20,000 Parisian political undesirables who were deported to Algeria by the Second Republic in 1851. They were referred to alternatively as 'les sans-travail,' 'les revoltes,' and 'les deracines.'"<sup>107</sup> They were followed some years later by another large migration of peoples recently displaced from Alsace and Lorraine following defeat in the Franco-Prussian War (1870-71), a loss that stripped France of two important industrial provinces, and sent it in search of “new areas of prestige, markets, and raw materials.”<sup>108</sup> To supplement the relocated Alsacians and Lorrainians, the government launched campaigns encouraging citizens of other southern European countries to occupy Algeria, as it were, on their behalf. The *colons* of Algeria, at first a disparate hodge-podge of peoples from Alsace, Lorraine, Italy, Malta, and Spain, would eventually solidify a novel identity distinct from both their metropolitan and colonial counterparts.

Were it not for the successful mobilization of a Mediterranean Latin/Catholic identity to inspire cohesion among the *pieds-noirs*, colonialism in Algeria would have failed. The assimilation of at first antagonistic Italians, Maltese, Spanish, and Alsace-Lorrainian French into a single '*pied-noir*' community was a feat accomplished through the efforts of expansionist politicians, clergymen, and polemicists, with varying themes on the same 'Latin unification' agenda. Echoing Noiriel, Andrea Smith calls the sum of this enterprise the 'Algerian Melting Pot' 109: a long and concerted juridical and pedagogical effort to naturalize the colons into French nationals.<sup>110</sup> Smith asserts that the colonial presence has been so taken for granted in the historiography that scholars tend to mention only in

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<sup>105</sup> Prior to this, Napoleon's vision of the Maghreb as a pristine “Arab Kingdom” (with him as their self-styled “Arab King”), kept colonial advances to a minimum. Cooke: 40.

<sup>106</sup> Prochaska: 11.

<sup>107</sup> Translated as “without work,” “rebels,” and, “uprooted” – to the humiliation of exile was added the stripping of their

passing the orchestration of settler *francisation*, a process not completed (and then only imperfectly) until the end of the Great War. Meanwhile, following the tradition begun with the 1865 Senatus-Consulte, Muslims were effectively excluded from the symbolic order underlining the Algerian Melting Pot<sup>111</sup> – an observation that rings with modern parallels. While it was crucial that the colons were successfully assimilated and 'French-icized,' it became equally critical to see that the indigenous population of Algeria was never allowed to do the same.

The work required to contrive and consolidate the settlers' (necessarily superior) 'race' was demanding, if not excessive. Ian Glegg has observed that this mix of backgrounds created a “desperate need for identity.” They developed a “basic unity in defence of the privileges accorded them by the French administration and their hostility to the Muslims. This appeared in an assertion of their basic Frenchness, in a fervour for things that far surpassed its equivalent in the metropolis. In this vision... they became the true guardians of French civilization.”<sup>112</sup> It became imperative for the survival of the colony to, as Pierre Bourdieu put it, create the colony in the image of the *colons*. In his sociological study of European-Algerians Bourdieu explains that “The European gradually created an environment that reflected his own image..., a world in which he no longer felt himself to be a stranger and in which, by a natural reversal, the Algerian was finally considered to be the stranger.”<sup>113</sup> For a number of historical and political reasons, no-where was the drama of French national anxiety more evident than in the Algerian territories. The *colons* absorbed and dramatically reproduced the Crisis of Nation, and in turn projected this fantasy onto the metropole.

#### *France in Algeria: Making the settlers 'French'*

The colonization of Algeria was complicated by conflicts and the power struggles between the various 'Catholic' ethnic groups that formed the 'French' settler population. Much of the legislation surrounding immigration within France was written with this matter in mind. The July 1889 law (which instituted diluted *jus soli* principles into *jus sanguinis* citizenship criteria) was accompanied by a report stating that the goal of assimilation was to maintain the 'French character' of the colony. Andrea Smith considers arguments for *jus soli* in the name of French dominance in the Algerian territory, lest non-French *colons*, by virtue of their greater number, overtake the colony. They – and their loyalties – would be French, whether they wanted to or not:

In his report to the Senate on June 3, 1889, Senator Delsol presented figures from the Algerian censuses of 1865 and 1886, and stated that the

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<sup>111</sup> Smith: 107.

<sup>112</sup> Clegg, *Workers' Self-Management*, Quoted in Naylor: 14.

<sup>113</sup> Pierre Bourdieu, *The Algerians*, Boston: Beacon Press (1962): 131.

foreign population had been increasing there at the faster rate than the French due to higher birth and migration rates. He predicted that soon it would surpass that of the French, and added, 'In such circumstances, isn't *jus soli* imperative, and doesn't it even become the only way to assure the predominance of the French over the non-French population in the future?'<sup>114</sup>

The higher fertility rates of the Maltese, Italian, and Spanish<sup>115</sup> *colons* put French hegemony in Algeria at risk. As the writers of the report warned:

Today, foreign emigration makes up approximately one half of the

mythology was marriage, the primary area whereby individuals might eventually (and even, depending on the legislation at the time, automatically) gain entrance into French citizenship. Baroli documents the significance of inter-marriage of Europeans: “The most important element in this regard [assimilation] was racial mixing. Between 1830 to 1877, there were seven-thousand marriages between French and foreigners, fourteen-thousand marriages between foreigners, and twenty-three million between Frenchmen and women.”<sup>120</sup> Unfortunately, these numbers do not reflect the nationalities of those foreigners who were married, though according to Baroli, more often than not, the husband was French and the wife foreign. Inter-religious/racial marriage, on the other hand, was remarkably uncommon (when compared, for instance, with other French colonies). Baroli counts only 700 marriages between Muslims and non-Muslims between 1830 and 1877, and even fewer between Jews and non-Jews in that time. School and military service were two other important factors in the naturalization process – both of which Muslims and Jews were expected to take part in, though seldom willingly. Though Baroli remarks on occasional quarrels between European settlers across ethnic lines (latent during fasting seasons; manifest during, for instance, the Tour de France), overall, he writes “the force of movement towards *francisation* was irresistible, because foreigners who migrated to Algeria had good reason to not resist.”<sup>121</sup>

The triangular relation between Muslims, settlers, and the metropole was hardened by status anxiety: the uneasy relationship between the Algerian *colons* and the metropole in turn made for hostility between the *colons* and the natives upon whose land they lived. “Ironically,” writes Yedes, “the more they felt distant from and inferior to the Metropolitan French, the more they felt the Arab/Berber people should be inferior to them.”<sup>122</sup> Besides religion, there was little to distinguish those 'underachieving' Europeans from their 'overachieving' counterparts – that is, those 'Muslim' *evolues* who, according to a metropolitan assimilationist vision, would have become perfect Frenchmen<sup>123</sup> In the eyes of the metropolitan French, meanwhile, the European-Algerians were even more reviled for sharing North Africa with its indigenous inhabitants, the *bougnouls* – making them *bougnoulises* (a pejorative, even until today, for all Africans from erstwhile French colonies). Yedes illustrates with a linguistic example the malaise passed between the native Muslims, European colons, and the French metropole:

Endless frustration marked the European-Algerian relation with the 'Francaoui,'

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<sup>120</sup> Baroli: 254. My translation.

<sup>121</sup> Baroli: 259. My translation.

<sup>122</sup> Ali Yedes, “Social Dynamics in Colonial Algeria: The Question of Pieds-Noirs Identity,” in *French Civilization and its Discontents*: 238.

<sup>123</sup> Prochaska, *Making Algeria French*: 10. “It is not surprising then,” writes David Prochaska, “that in the case of colonial Algeria it was the French-educated Algerian elite, the *evolues*, and the European 'poor white trash,' the *petits blancs*, who experienced the greatest status anxiety.”

their nickname for the Metropolitan French, who could not possibly understand their Algerian side. It is interesting to note that the word *Francaoui* was a North African Arabic word meaning a French person. As a matter of fact, indigenous Algerian used this word indifferently for the Metropolitan French as well as the European-Algerians... The European-Algerians, in turn, bounced back onto the Metropolitan French the very name the indigenous Arab/Berbers employed in order to identify the colonizer as belonging to a separate community.<sup>124</sup>

Yedes concludes that “The European-Algerians were caught therefore in an insuperable dilemma: on one hand wishing to be distanced sociopolitically from the indigenous Arab/Berbers in order to mark their superiority; on the other hand, affectively grounded in the reality of an adopted culture that was significantly assimilated to the Arab/Berber lifestyle.”<sup>125</sup>

This schematic is complicated by the fact of Jewish citizenship, granted by the famed Cremieux Decree of 24 Oct 1870. I say “complicated,” but not contradicted: the naturalization of all Jews (and not just exceptional *evolves*) into citizenship only further demonstrates the fiction of a non-racist citizenship policy that the exclusion of 'Muslim' Arabs and Berbers, *despite* Jewish inclusion, belies.<sup>126</sup> The adoption of the Cremieux laws over the strong objections of the *colons* – who made little distinction between indigenous Muslims and Jews – represented a major victory for its designer, Adolphe Cremieux; still, compared with those who “proposed collective naturalization of the Muslims, he met with little opposition.”<sup>127</sup> Further, as Patricia Lorcin writes, “[t]hat the Jews, who were also bound by civil and family law within their religion, should renounce their rights to Mosaic Law was never even raised.”<sup>128</sup>

Notably, just as the Muslim *evolves* of Algeria were less than eager to apply for citizenship, few indigenous Jews took advantage of similar opportunities to do so based on the Senatus-Consulte of 1865.<sup>129</sup> The Cremieux decree was among many efforts to increase the legally French population in relation to colonial non-citizens. Upon the passage of the bill, Algerian Jews who would not otherwise have obtained citizenship were forcedly inducted into the body politic: the decree had the effect of increasing the 'French' presence in Algeria by 34,500 (at a time when 95,500 French-born faced

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<sup>124</sup> Yedes: 239-240.

<sup>125</sup> Yedes: 238.

<sup>126</sup> A full analysis of the complexity of the class stratification of colonial Algeria could occupy another essay. Briefly, Prochaska offers a fitting observation of the necessarily marginal position of Jews among colonial Algerian society: “Unlike Algerians, the Jews were nominally French citizens; unlike the French socially and culturally, the Europeans considered the Jews more like the Algerians. The Jews occupied, therefore, a liminal social position: detached from the Muslim community, they had not been welcomed into the European community” (153-54).

<sup>127</sup> Lorcin, *Imperial Identities*: 172.

<sup>128</sup> Lorcin, *Imperial Identities*: 172.

<sup>129</sup> Smith: 105.

115,000 non-French-born European settlers).<sup>130</sup> Prochaska writes that “the veneer of French citizenship could not hide the fact that the Jews resembled the Muslims more than the Christians”<sup>131</sup>; still, the decree effectively set Algerian Jews apart from Muslims, for whom they were thereafter identified with the *colons*.

It might be proposed that the *pied-noir* aversion to metropolitan-styled assimilationist policy, based on universalism, had less to do with barring Arabs and Berbers from entrance into their own culture (itself only nominally 'French,' by most accounts) than allowing their own identity to melt into the indigenous Algerian pot by which it was already marked. The line between citizen and non-citizen held the exteriority of non-Europeans in place and the *colons* (especially after the passage of the Cremieux decrees) were surely aware of how thin and porous this line actually was.

*Keeping the Muslims out: 'politichiennerie' from Algiers to Paris*

To decipher the management of subversively racist policies toward Arabs and Berbers in Algeria, it is instructive to consider the dilemma surrounding the codification of the religious criteria

*colons* had been placed, the question is by nature limiting: had Muslims been granted full citizenship, they would have outnumbered (and outvoted) the *pieds-noirs*, and the colony would have ceased to exist in any case.

The *colons* were strongly alert to this possibility, and their representatives in the chambers of parliament worked tirelessly to see that the *colons'* superior position was never jeopardized. Through a reading of colonial periodicals and other documentary publications, Smith concludes that Algerian settlers were “all too aware that their own enjoyment of political and economic domination in Algeria would quickly come to an end if even a tenth of the Muslim population was granted full and equal voting rights”<sup>133</sup>, since settlers only ever made up about 20-30 per cent of the total population. This was compounded by the more dramatic threat of indigenous uprising.<sup>134</sup>

In Paris, senators and deputies from the the Algerian *departements* were particularly hostile to the opening up of citizenship whenever the issue was raised in either chamber by metropolitan counterparts,<sup>135</sup> and they led a powerful lobby against the extension of political and civil rights beyond the colonial population. Even when passed in the chambers, attempts to implement even the most modest reforms in citizenship/immigration laws were blocked or delayed by th

such reform necessary.<sup>137</sup> They claimed to argue in defense of *laïcité* (religious neutrality), but demonstrated a secularist position (hostile to [certain] religious identification), knowing that the offer of citizenship at the expense of Muslim was half-handed. In other words, as Smith observes, “The offering of French citizenship to Muslims only when coupled with a denial of their personal status may have been presented as a compromise solution, but it was a 'compromise' designed to fail.”<sup>138</sup>

The fight to maintain colonial privilege was fought as much in discrete back-rooms as august displays of patriotism. Nora writes about how European-Algerians became “experts in political manipulation, what they themselves called 'politichiennerie'.”<sup>139</sup> Privately, parliamentarians from the Algerian *departement* developed close relationships with the Ministry of the Interior, and were thus assured governors general who shared their expansionist politics. Publicly, they fashioned themselves as the guardians of French culture and Christian civilization against the barbarian usurpers and bearers of the “tradition and the flag.”<sup>140</sup> As such, they were adamant that the enfranchisement of indigenous Algerians was “dangerous not only for the *colons* but also for imperialism in general.”<sup>141</sup> Perhaps more substantial, their support was important to any government's survival: the 27 *colon* representatives in the National Assembly – six deputies and three senators from each *departement* – formed a critical voting bloc. Moreover, once elected to the National Assembly, those *colons* became permanent fixtures, and because of their seniority, they exercised disproportionate influence.<sup>142</sup> As such, “Not only were European settlers politically out of control, but there seemed to be no limit to their claims and demands,”<sup>143</sup> to which the metropole frequently relented.

James Cooke explores the life of one such colonial representative, Eugene Etienne of Oran, a “fact of political life” in North Africa for over seventy years. He dedicated his career to alerting metropolitans of the *pieds-noirs'* sacrifices for the empire, “champions of French culture and defenders of patriotism, [guarding] a European outpost in a hostile Muslim land.”<sup>144</sup> In 1884, he urged the Chamber of Deputies to revoke assimilation, assuring them that “the natives do not regiment themselves well nor sucor sucor sucor sucor su-1.72gFsn6 the mey fashioned the.72gFsn6srgFsn6srwell norTc-0.28



Etienne, explained at length why the Muslims were unfit for the franchise. They further explained that the Muslim vote would mean the end of the colo

Algerians,' to near starvation.<sup>151</sup> Finally, in the case of Algerian non-citizens, the issue of labour was strongly related to the regulation of the movement of people between France and Algeria. Algerian labourers in metropolitan France could be more easily controlled as 'foreigners' or 'immigrants' by the Ministry of the Interior than as French citizens, in which case their movement would have been (and by the 1940s was) deregulated, though not unpoliced.

When reformers did succeed at pushing their legislation through, their victories were often tempered or wholly sabotaged in the colonies. Such legislation took the form of two bills whose efficacy (and sincerity) at extending citizenship to 'Muslim' Algerians remain contested: the Jonnart reforms of 1919 and the Blum-Violette bill of 1936. Some scholars have attributed the push for reform, at least in part, to the rise in Algerian nationalism; again (this time preemptively) allowing indigenous Algerians to 'remain Muslim' so that Algeria could 'remain French.'<sup>152</sup>

The reforms of governor general Charles Jonnart of Feb 4, 1919 opened more civil service posts to Algerian men with local status and established a 'double college' for local, municipal, and cantonal elections, but also further entrenched these restrictive and theoretically 'transitory' legal regimes. Overall, Jonnart's reforms offered a simpler and more widely accessible means for men who had sacrificed on the battlefield to become full citizens. Jonnart's own ties to expansionist *colons* like Etienne and the lack of political will on the part of the *colons* to actually implement Jonnart's laws meant that the much-celebrated reforms ultimately did little to improve the lives of indigenous Algerians. As well, under the reforms, 'Muslims' were still required to renounce their local civil status.<sup>153</sup>

The slightly more ambitious Blum-Violette Project was installed in 1936 under Leon Blum, head of ministry of Colonies, and Maurice Violette, the governor general of Algeria, in response to mass strikes and growing sense of Algerian uprising. According to Stora, "The Blum-Violette project was to accord political equality to a small portion of the Algerian population, to be extended at a later date to a greater number. Without abandoning their Muslim status, a minority could obtain the same political rights as French citizens. In this way, thought Violette, they might settle the old incompatibility between loyalty to Islam and participation in the political community of France."<sup>154</sup> Thus about 21,000 people – a fraction of the total male population – received French citizenship; still, the the bill failed to diminish the demand for independence. The *colons* regarded the reforms as a

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<sup>151</sup> Baroli: 199.

<sup>152</sup> For more on political and civil reform in this period, as well as developments leading to the Jonnart Reforms, see Confer, *France and Algeria: the problem of civil and political reform, 1870-1920*. Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press (1966).

<sup>153</sup> Shepard: 37.

<sup>154</sup> Stora: 42.

major betrayal on the part of the metropole. In the journal *l'Echo d'Alger* Violette responded by warning the *colons*





It was not only Catholic activists and their anti-Muslim allies who lobbied to maintain *jus sanguinis* policies for regulating citizenship. Robert de Caix, for instance, an '*indigenophile*' and

Islamic land.”<sup>171</sup> Instead, this was *his* land and the people on it invaders. Alongside the usurping Arab and the the indigenous Berber, refashioned by Islam into a slave society, the settlers were “the descendants of ancient Africa, the real masters of the land.”<sup>172</sup>

Bertrand claimed great admiration for Lavignerie and described him as a major influence on his own ideas about a fabled Christian-Latin Africa. But Bertrand went beyond Lavignerie. His was not a religious vision but, “appreciating the potency of the symbols and stereotypes present in religious rhetoric, he put religion to use in conveying his message that France was merely repossessing what was hers by hereditary right.”<sup>173</sup> Bertrand's writing reterritorialized 'Latin Africa' as French and, in a way strongly reminiscent of Etienne and his parliamentary counterparts, he worked to elevate the settlers to their 'rightful' position as the lost heirs of Rome. Through this fantastic re-ordering of events, the Algerian *colons* developed a self-styled identity that made them even *more* French than the metropolitans, who wallowed in their decadence and suffered social and political paralysis. As such, the *colons* were France's saviour (recall, a favourite point for Etienne), having been exposed to a more “natural lifestyle,” and, more importantly, having been “obliged to live next to people who were rough and often troubled, for it aroused an awareness of the Barbarian and of the Enemy.”<sup>174</sup> The settlers were attuned to an innate sense of the enemy within” which Bertrand believed to be essential to the preservation of any civilization.<sup>175</sup> As Lorcin concludes, “Bertrand's strength lay in his capacity to synthesize a number of theories attractive to protocolonialists, thus creating an ideology perfectly suited to the settlers of Algeria. Into the basic concept of Latin Africa he wove the themes of civilization opposing barbarity, the apprehension of Islam and the creation of a new Latin race.”<sup>176</sup>

Symbolic elevation of the Berbers was a critical element of this thesis: they provided racial 'proof' of the legitimacy of Catholic renewal in North Africa. The famed 'Kabyle Myth' held that the Berbers of Algeria shared ancestry, by virtue of their pre-Islamic history of Roman occupation, with the Gaulois/es of France. The irony of this lies in the non-Gallic origin of the majority of the *pied-noir* population itself; evidently, the delusion had run so deep that the *pieds-noirs* were convinced otherwise. By the time the assimilationist policy of the Third Republic wound its way to the indigenous populations of Algeria, it was realized as a preference for Berber assimilation over Arab. Rachid Tlemceni notes the reasoning behind this policy, as explained by Viscount Caix de St. Aymour, who claimed that while the Arabs were “lazy,” “slow,” “sad,” and “fanatical,” Berbers were considered

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<sup>171</sup> population of France. [1 - Tw( )]TJ-251 refBT12L id8w( )c-51 refBT1,D0.0003 Tc-0.00ty0lieved tc0.0001 eviden2ly, theImp)-4T1eTJ-21





self-image and colonial-metropolitan relations.<sup>181</sup> Another important supporter of the *Peres Blancs* was Charles de Foucault, founder of the fascist and pro-imperialist Algerian organization *Croix de Feu* (Cross of Fire). This group, as well as the ultra-conservative *Action Francaise*, were both prominent during the interwar period.<sup>182</sup> Upon French withdrawal from Algeria, former colonial administrators and members of groups like the O.A.S.<sup>183</sup> and *Croix de Feu* entered French politics. The *Croix de Feu* was succeeded through the post-war era by the more electable *Parti Social Francais* (the first right-wing party in France). Former members of the *Croix de Feu*, moreover, provided support for the conservative anti-immigrant party *Front National* as it emerged as a force in French politics. Even if it is not as celebrated, the French Right has a history as embedded and influential as any moments of gallant Liberal progression. Moreover, both the right and left wings of modern French politics share a republican lineage – more national mythology than history – that underpins and bridges their respective approaches to French citizenship.

#### *The pieds-noirs and 'Catholaicite' in post-colonial transpolitics*

The Fourth Republic is known as much for its demise following Algerian independence as the somewhat rushed legislation, meant to quell Algerian indigenous nationalism, that finally expanded citizenship throughout the empire and terminated the legal distinction between 'Muslims' and 'Europeans.' When the War of Independence broke out, the *colons* remained doggedly attached to Algeria and considered de Gaulle's treaty with the indigenous nationalists an unforgivable betrayal. By the end of the war (1962), over one million *pieds-noirs* were 'repatriated' – a word that is basically meaningless in this case – to continental France.<sup>184</sup> Ironically, when the dust had settled, the *pieds-noirs* found themselves exiled from a land they had come to think of as their own to a nation that considered them outsiders and into which, even until today, they have never fully assimilated.<sup>185</sup> 'Back' in the metropole their peculiar/'true' Frenchness was a symbol of their estrangement and foreignness.

Upon Algerian independence, the terms of legal categorization were resumed with new signification as citizenship was fundamentally restructured around the loss of a major part of France.<sup>186</sup>

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The French *colons*

group *Action Catholique*.) Much of this backlash to the 'brief period of multiculturalism' was a reaction to what has been regarded as the solidification of extremist Islamic identities. Right-wing nationalists took to the fortification not of Roman-Gallic republican secularism, but of France's Catholic-Christian heritage. In light of the discussion presented here, it is worth asking if this resumption of Catholic identity is a manifestation of religious-identity politics that had been latent for decades.

The parallels that Schor draws between the politics of immigration in the 1930s and 1980s helps illustrate the ideological continuity between the French right-wings of past and present. For Schor, the difference between the 'extreme right' and its mainstream counterparts (in the right as well as left wings) is a matter of degree and not nature.

reconceptualize this identity by bringing to light ce

project of historical resuscitation of classical republicanism, French unity, and the coincident forgetting of France's long dependency on immigrants. As the demographic omens of Alfred Sauvy and Philippe Gautier continue to be reprinted for new audiences, it is no wonder, too, that (falling) numbers still haunt social scientists, politicians, and voters. It matters little that the percentage of immigrants compared with the national population has remained the same since the 1930s until today<sup>201</sup>; what has changes is how the '*immigre*' has been constructed in popular imagination, what has not changed is the position of the immigrant as a necessary evil. The immigrant signifies the nation in danger, both because she must save it, and because she represents its potential demise.

The rise and popularization of the right wing involves a complex assortment of events and actors and was precipitated by the vast project of *etatisation* during the Third Republic, then only accelerated and expanded in the post-war era. Recognizing this, anti-statist (though not necessarily anarchist) groups have sprung up in protest. For instance, the *Organisation Politique*, which eschews what it calls 'parliamentary politics' and claims a sort of

Empire in Algeria. By this account, the end of the 'colonial' question and the beginning of the 'immigrant' one turn out to be not as discrete as Shepard describes. These questions are commonly reinforced by the “distinction between nationality and citizenship that is at the centre of France's ideological and institutional edifice.”<sup>205</sup> The 'immigrant question' is historically and epistemologically tied up with what I have called the Crisis of Nation,' by which the Nation wa

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## **Appendix: Selected chronology of citizenship and immigration laws and decrees affecting 'immigrants' from the North African territories, 1848-1962.**

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French Revolution (1789-1792)

First Republic (1792-1804)

The Empire (1804-1814)

Restoration (1814-1830)

July Monarchy (1830-1848)

- † April 1841 Ordinance: halts local Mosaic courts in Algeria.

Revolution of 1848

Second Republic (1848-1852)

- † The new government of the Second Republic ends Algeria's status as colony and declares the occupied lands an integral part of France.
- † Three "civil territories" — Algiers, Oran, and Constantine — organized as French *departements* (local administrative units) under a civilian government.
- † For the first time, French citizens in the civil territories elect their own councils and mayors; Muslims had to be appointed, could not hold more than one-third of council seats, and could not serve as mayors or assistant mayors.
- † The administration of territories outside the zones settled by *colons* remain under a *régime du sabre*. Theoretically, these areas are closed to European colonization. European migration, encouraged during the Second Republic, stimulated the civilian administration to open new land

for settlement against the advice of the army.

- † Local Muslim administration allowed to continue under the supervision of French military commanders, charged with maintaining order in newly pacified regions, and the *bureaux d'arabes*.

### Second Empire (1852-1870)

- † Napoleon III returns Algeria to military control.
- † 1858: separate Ministry of Algerian Affairs created to supervise administration of the country through a military governor general assisted by a civil minister.
- † Under military rule of Napoleon III: preservation of the “Arab Kingdom”
- † 14 July 1865 : Senatus-Consulte asserts that every “indigenous Muslim is French” (thus recognizing their French nationality) and extended French citizenship to a small number of “indigenous” men and their descendants. In exchange for full citizenship, these men abandon their “local civil status” (the right, in personal and civil matters, to be governed by local [religious] laws, within what the text termed “Muslim law” for “Muslim natives” and “personal status” for “Israelite natives”). This policy diverges greatly from that employed in, for instance, West African colonies.
- † Creation of legal category “Algerians with French civil status” comprising immigrants from Europe along with a very small number of people who had abandoned their “local civil status” to obtain full citizenship

### Third Republic (1870-1919/20)

- † Civilian administration restored when the *colons* in Algiers topple military government (after fall of Napoleon III in Battle of Sedan, ending the Second Empire)
- † Adolph Cremieux commissioned by civilian government to assist in this uprising and “completely assimilate Algeria into France.”
- † Cremieux issues a series of decrees providing for representation of the Algerian *départements* in the National Assembly of France and confirming *colon* anoldo ofernlocal en stration . A

German threat (Germans boasted many more naturalized citizens).

t 1884: bill sent to Senate, stripped of all clauses deemed contrary to rule of *jus sanguinis*

t 1886: bill returned to Senate completely reworded; causes public uproar

l l October 1888: First discussion in Chamber on restriction of non-citizen employment; officially decreed.

l Law of 8 August 1893: stated goal to ascribe an

regulated by the State since decrees of 10 August 1889

ı Law of 26 July 1935: naturalized citizens who had completed thei