THE TRANSATLANTIC LINK IN EVOLUTION

Report of the Second Canada-Netherlands Seminar on Security

Ottawa

28 February – 1 March 2002

1. *The Transatlantic Link in Evolution: What Has Changed Since 11 September 2001*

David G. Haglund

Introduction

This seminar was a follow-up to one held at the Netherlands Institute of International Relations (Clingendael) in mid-April 2000, sponsored by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) in collaboration with the Canadian Department of For-

took place over two working days rather than one. They were organized into five substantive panels. This report conveys the important points made by the principal speakers of each panel (i.e., one presenter and at least one respondent, with duties alternating between Dutch and Canadian speakers). As well, a sense of the ensuing discussion is provided, although those who participated in the debate are named. Panels one through three were held on the first day, and panels four and five on the second day.

PANEL ONE: Global Security and Foreign Policy

The lead presenter, as well as moderator, of this panel was **Prof. Alfred van Staden** (Clingendael), who began by noting that at least one major aspect of the Canada-Dutch special relationship stemmed from the part played by the Canadian Army in the liberation of the Netherlands in 1945, but the ties went beyond that historical legacy. Not so long ago, it was common for many in the Netherlands to conceive of "like-minded" groups and countries as constituting a pillar of Dutch foreign policy, and in this category Canada regularly figured. However, continued Prof. van Staden, one no longer hears much reference to the "like-minded," leading him to ask whether it might be possible and worthwhile to resuscitate the category.

He went on to observe that the theme of this seminar, namely "security," could not have been more well-chosen given the events of 11 September 2001 and their aftermath. More than ever it was necessary to develop a "comprehensive" understanding of security, including and especially the sources of contemporary terrorism. Prof. van Staden confessed to subscribing to the "root-causes" theory

On the transatlantic level, the terrorist attacks and their aftermath have also had a differential impact, resulting from America's decision to "go it alone" in the prosecution of the war in Afghanistan, notwithstanding the offers of European allies to join in the struggle as full participants. NATO allies' invocation of Article 5 commitments, coupled with NATO's assigning AWACS planes and crews to North America, had only marginal import (with the latter being described by Prof. van Staden as a "side show"). The US decision to minimize reliance upon the NATO allies was argued to be a function of the US desire to minimize constraints of coalition warfare as were evident during the 1999 Kosovo campaign, and second, the conviction in the US that the European allies fundamentally lacked the capability to play a useful military role. Prof. van Staden detected a trend within the alliance, whereby it would become more of a "political" and less of a military grouping. One implication of the trend would be to make it easier for Russia to accept the alliance's enlargement into the Baltic republics.

On the level of the European Union, the "good news" was to be found in the greater unity of purpose displayed by Western Europeans in the current crisis as compared with their disunity a decade ago, when Yugoslavia started to tear itself apart. That said, the responses of major countries in the EU betrayed a growing preference for *bilateralism*, as one European leader after another demonstrated "unseemly" haste to get to Washington to meet President Bush. The UK's role as linchpin was not something likely to enhance the EU's own influence, nor did Prof. van Staden detect anything in the Afghanistan war as having enhanced the credentials of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), notwithstanding its having been "declared operational" as a result of the current crisis. Still, should the US "backfill" militarily by reducing its presence in the Balkans, the impact may turn out to be positive for the ESDP, forced as the Europeans would be to assume more of the burden of conflict management in the former Yugoslavia. However, Prof. van Staden cautioned a deu1(e).eg
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Fourthly, Ms. Sinclair thought the expression “military apartheid” a bit unfair.

the lesser powers. Institutional structures (i.e., NATO and the EU) provided the Netherlands with a "seat at the table," something that could not be said for the UN. However, recent talk within the EU of bestowing greater leadership functions upon a three-power "directory" was disturbing from the Dutch perspective.

From the above analysis, Mr. Schaper inferred a set of four political objectives for his country: (i) maintain the transatlantic link; (ii) support the process of Euro-

Washington and New York. The effect of those attacks had been to render obsolete certain policy options that just a few years ago seemed worthwhile (as for instance the proposal to integrate military planning between NATO and the EU, which Prof. Moens himself once advocated but has now abandoned as being beside the point).

He added that 11 September had brought "a sudden end to the drifting 1990s," and in so doing had provided a glimpse of future security environment. Beyond dispute, he argued, was the transformation wrought by the attacks upon America's foreign policy, which had turned decisively away from recent "Wilsonian" and multilateral formulations in favour of a reconcentration upon American security and power. Prof. Moens reminded the group that the rise in American power should not necessarily be conceived as being detrimental to the interests of America's partners, even if it was likely to make Washington take its European allies less seriously than heretofore. (As for Canada, geography would oblige Washington to take it seriously, indeed.)

Fundamentally, the US seemed to be abandoning the security order it had created in the aftermath of the Second World War. Less than ever before would it be interested in being entangled by alliances, and while the term "unilateralism" might not accurately capture the new American dispensation, it was obvious that for the Bush administration the current perceived threat from terrorism left little time or inclination for reflection upon "root causes" of the phenomenon.

What was to be done? Prof. Moens imparted some advice he gave to his students: throw out your old text books, and learn to "think outside the box." Insofar as initiatives that Canada and the Netherlands might develop in common, he urged that we "do something radical" together, perhaps by developing some capacity to actually make a difference in the struggle against terrorism.

Discussion (of panels one and two)

- The "root-causes" thesis may be based on a fallacious assumption that development and peace are directly correlated, which flies in the face of at least one theory of political change associated with the "revolution of rising expectations" (i.e., that instability initially increases as objective conditions improve).
- If we take Afghanistan as the model for future conflict against terrorism, we may be making the mistake of "preparing to fight the last war"; in this respect, military institutions may be less relevant to the campaign against terrorism than police and intelligence assets.
- The military will, notwithstanding the comment immediately above, continue to have a vital counter-terrorism function in respect of the challenge posed from weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and, while the US may be losing interest in NATO, it will still want to build coalitions.

- Even though the "root-causes" thesis may be problematical in some respects, Afghanistan demonstrates the danger to our security if we ignore the problem of "failed states."
- It may be misleading to assume that the shock of 11 September has dissipated in the Netherlands, and that there has been a return to the *status quo ante*; after all, the Dutch are now debating in a vigorous and novel manner their refugee and immigration policies.
- The "marginalization-of-NATO" thesis may need to be qualified, for not only does the organization remain vital for a variety of reasons not directly related to terrorism, but the upcoming Prague summit may demonstrate a new resolve to enhance capabilities.
- A curious diplomatic paradox looks to be emerging: the extension of multilateral structures is placing a growing premium on bilateralism.
- The attack on America has resolved, for Canada, the Herman Kahn puzzle (i.e., of Canada's being a "regional power without a region") — Canada has now been unequivocally given its region and it is called North America.

PANEL THREE: Current Peace Operations Challenges

Both the moderator and the lead presenter were Canadians, respectively **MGen Michel Maisonneuve** (Canadian Forces) and **Prof. Joel Sokolsky** (Royal Military College). Gen. Maisonneuve provided context for the discussion by drawing attention to how much the nature of peace operations had been changing even before 11 September 2001. Specifically, he suggested that peace operations had evolved through three stages: first, the so-called "golden age" of classical peacekeeping of the pre-1989 period, second, the "New World Order" burst of enthusiasm of the years 1989 to 1993; and third, the profoundly more complex "gray zone" peace operations since 1993.

Prof. Sokolsky began by stressing that, in parallel with the evolution in peace operations, Canadian defence policy was becoming more closely integrated with American policy than ever before. This was not something caused by 11 September, but the attacks of that day would accelerate the trend. Yet this did not mean Canada would be focused militarily on North America. To the contrary, "if there is anything big going on in the world, we expect to participate in it." Canada had some 4,500 military personnel deployed in overseas operations, with the bulk of the latter being led by the US.

A second important aspect of Canadian defence policy concerned Europe. As did Washington, Ottawa too saw value in enlarging the alliance, and working with

the end of the 1990s there were almost as many Canadian military personnel in Europe (in ex-Yugoslavia) as there had been in Germany at the start of the 1990s.

What was new was the emphasis now being given in Washington to "homeland security." This, said Prof. Sokolsky, had led decisionmakers in Ottawa to seek to strengthen bilateral ties with the US, *inter alia* so as to reassure Americans that Canada would not become a "security liability" to them. In this regard, it bore noting that the most recent Quadrennial Defense Review in the US had identified the defence of the homeland as the country's top security priority. The new agenda suggested both sovereignty and budgetary implications for Canada, and with respect to the latter it was clear, from the most recent federal budget (of December

the Netherlands, intended to render more effective such operations. These were prompted by difficulties experienced with the UNPROFOR deployment to Bosnia, especially those associated with the "Srebrenica debacle." Among the objectives of the reform initiative had been to clarify command and control arrangements, and to render as "robust" as possible the rules of engagement.

The second respondent was **Dr. Dick Leurdijk** (Clingendael), who observed that there were also less positive experiences shared by the two countries (viz., Bosnia and the tragic events of Srebrenica). The experience of the past decade in the Balkans, especially since NATO had become a central player there, demonstrated that a part of Europe that was once considered "out of area" for the alliance had now emphatically come to be regarded as very much "in area."

Turning to the alliance and 11 September, Dr. Leurdijk remarked that NATO invoked Article 5 only after receiving clear evidence of a linkage between external (to the US) terrorist groups and the attacks on Washington and New York; ironically, he observed, the support given to the US by the EU was more forthcoming, as well as less conditional, than that accorded by NATO.

Discussion

- One should not underestimate the impact of the prime minister on Canada's propensity to be part of significant peace operations, for Jean Chrétien is very much an activist.
- Should Canadian military participation in Afghanistan even be conceptualized in terms of "peacekeeping," and is there a risk that sustaining its involvement there will mean that Canada, too, might consider ending its deployment in Bosnia?
- Apropos the comment immediately above, Ottawa accepts that Canadian participation in Operation Enduring Freedom means we are "in a state of armed conflict, we are at war" with the Taliban and Al-Qaeda; thus we are not there in a peacekeeping role.
- As for Bosnia, the view from Ottawa is that we would like to reduce the size of our deployment, but we are not likely to announce any large-scale withdrawal by a specified date, and in this respect Canada's position on Bosnia differs from that of the US.
- Tony Blair may have stolen the Canadian terminology, given that Ottawa's announced doctrine on peace operations is "early-in, early-out," but the reality is "we don't have the capacity to be early, unless it happens a couple of miles outside of Petawawa"; sometimes we do leave early (e.g., Ethiopia, East Timor), but usually we are "end-staters."
- So, too, are the Dutch end-staters by preference, but regarding Bosnia they worry that a culture of dependency — both economic and military — has been fostered, and that this will militate against any solution ever being found.

- In Afghanistan, "ad hoccery" governed where the Canadian Forces would be deployed; there was no deliberate choice to go with the US as opposed to ISAF and the Europeans.

PANEL FOUR: Future of Arms Control and Disarmament

This panel, the first on day two of the seminar, was moderated by **Prof. Jan Geert Siccama** (Dutch MOD), and featured as lead presenter **Mr. Robert McDougall** (DFAIT), who began by referring to a "pervasive sense of crisis in the field of non-proliferation, arms control, and disarmament" (NACD). Part of the problem resided in the fundamental tension between NACD, held to be "inherently international" in nature, and national security, which by definition put a premium on the efforts of single states, at least in the first instance. The tension mattered, because a sound national security strategy was one in which there was, or should be, close complementarity with NACD regimes; *mutatis mutandis*, the

For Canada, Mr. McDougall listed a set of near-term priorities, including: (i) promoting compliance with commitments to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT); (ii) working with "like-minded" states (see the comments by Prof. van Staden, above) to strengthen efforts to stanch bio-weapons proliferation; (iii) establishing a dialogue on outer space, with a prospect of achieving a weaponization ban; and (iv) furthering efforts to reduce the levels of small arms in circulation worldwide. These were all areas in which Mr. McDougall foresaw much scope for enhanced bilateral cooperation between Canada and the Netherlands.

There were again two Dutch respondents to a Canadian presenter. The first was **Prof. Paul Rusman** (University of Groningen), who gave what he called an "outsider's" perspective. He began by echoing a theme set out in the Canadian presentation: the current war had indeed provided impetus to non-proliferation efforts linked to counter-terrorism. But no such impetus had been witnessed in respect of arms control, of which the US in particular took a dim view. To some degree, said Prof. Rusman, US misgivings with multilateral arms control regimes were well-founded, at least if the experience of the NPT inspection regime provided guidance: "for any bio-weapons verification regime is likely to repeat the NPT inspection regime, in which most inspection resources are spent in checking on the most unlikely proliferators (Germany and Japan), while left much more dangerous offenders off the hook."

Regarding the control of chemical weapons, here the major source of concern seemed to be the "chaotic manner in which Russia is proceeding with its mandatory ... destruction effort." Likewise in the nuclear area Russia figured as a worry, given the quantity and geographic dispersion of its sizable holdings of fissile materials. Also disquieting was the US decision to abrogate the ABM Treaty, although its doing so was not expected to jeopardize arms reduction talks between Moscow and Washington, as had once been thought. More worrisome, from the arms control perspective, had been the US decision to withhold ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which had the added demerit of eliminating America as "the world's arms control beacon."

The second Dutch respondent was **MGen (Ret) C. Homan** (Clingendael), who commenced on an upbeat note by remarking that the impending enlargements of NATO and the EU should bode well for cooperative security in Europe. Similarly uplifting was the record of arms control in Europe, starting with the CFE Treaty, and continuing through the Open Skies Treaty. Gen. Homan suggested that the key to remedying the defects associated with global NACD efforts might be found by trying to learn from, and apply, the lessons of the European experience, which had been replete with positive results in the area of conventional weapons systems. Gen. Homan suggested two avenues of possible Dutch-Canadian cooperation: first, control of small arms, and second, resistance to the weaponization of space. In particular, he stated that should the US succeed in achieving space dominance, it would be a "destabilizing and dangerous development."

Discussion

- Can it be said that the ending of the Cold War has led to the current "malaise" in NACD, and that absent the bipolar contest of yore, there no longer exists any coherent strategic rationale for arms control? In this regard, can one really generalize from the record of the European experi-

- Arms controllers should go after "irresponsible" regimes, but more than that, they should also seek to establish greater predictability and thus help to resolve the security dilemma.
- Why, exactly, is the weaponization of space thought to be dangerous?

PANEL FIVE: The Transatlantic Link and Bilateral Relations

In many ways this panel was the capstone session of the seminar, with the principal speakers being the ambassadors from the two countries, and the moderator being Ms. Cartwright. The presenter was **His Excellency Como van Hellenberg Hubar** (Ambassador of the Netherlands to Canada). The respondent was **His Excellency Serge April** (Ambassador of Canada to the Netherlands).

Amb. van Hellenberg Hubar began by stating how central transatlantic links are for the Europeans and emphasized that these connections could not and should not be reduced to those between Europe and the US, as seems often to be the case. Canada had an important role to play as a "political force-multiplier," helping in the process to minimize the pressures that would drive the Atlantic allies apart. But the bilateral (Canada-Netherlands) relationship had to be understood as one between countries each of which was growing ever more integrated with its own continental partners. This trend, while necessary to recognize, did not need to be deplored.

Indeed, according to Amb. van Hellenberg Hubar, there was much wisdom in Canada's aligning itself more closely with the US, just as there had been great benefit derived by the Netherlands from its decision to integrate more fully with Germany and other European countries. "I do believe," he said, "that a country locked into a cooperative setting, be it in Europe or in North America, has more chance to uphold the essence of its views on cooperation than in isolation." That is why the ambassador rejected the charges brought by some against John Manley, Canada's deputy prime minister, namely that he was too quick to sacrifice sovereignty in pursuit of closer integration with the US after 11 September. Just the opposite applied, accordingly to the ambassador, for Mr. Manley understood that

the European integration project, away from the federalist preferences of the Dutch and toward the kind of Europe of states envisioned by Charles de Gaulle. "We are now at a turning point, and De Gaulle's vision seems more up-to-date than I, for one, ever believed possible."

Amb. van Hellenberg Hubar acknowledged that there were major differences in the processes and norms of continental integration on the two sides of the Atlantic, stemming largely from the disproportionate weight enjoyed by the US within North America as compared with that of even the largest European country within the EU. Some things, however, were similar: Canada, like most of the EU countries, had been spending less than it should on defence. Canada and the European NATO members had allowed the capability gap separating them from the US to expand. Nor were matters helped by Canada's "regrettably ... falling behind" in the provision of non-military assistance to developing countries, particularly in light of the country's declaratory policy and its capacity to pay.

Neither the EU allies nor, by extension, Canada should have an interest in promoting a division of labour within the alliance that left the burden of military intervention ("hard power") to one ally or only a few allies; subscribing to such an idea would be the quickest way to self-marginalization for a country. It also constituted "an expression of defeatism, or at least of a complacent attitude." In fact, through the military support and other solidarity it had provided the US since 11 September, Canada had shown itself to be ahead of the other allies. There were, said the Ambassador, many explanations in addition to altruism that accounted for Canada's rapid rallying to America's side, and notwithstanding ongoing difficulties in certain sectors (e.g., softwood lumber) it was undeniable that Canada's standing with the US had been elevated, leaving it placed better than most if not all the others in the "competition among Allies [over] who reacted in the most appropriate way to the distress of the US."

As for the Canada-Netherlands bilateral relationship, it sometimes appeared as if the two kindred countries were saddled with "the problem that they have no problem standing in the way of their friendship." As a result, it was too easy, since there was nothing fundamental for the two to solve, for them to succumb to the temptation of not doing anything together. So to think would be wrong. More than ever after the events of 11 September was it incumbent upon the two to "make good use of the benefit we derive from our international orientation and ... act in a complementary manner on the world stage."

Amb. van Hellenberg Hubar concluded by sketching the outlines of a few items that could figure on a productive agenda for bilateral diplomacy. Foremost on his list was enhanced military cooperation between the two countries, including providing some role for Canada in decisionmaking within an evolving ESDP; this latter would also have the merit of contributing to Dutch efforts to solidify ties between NATO and the ESDP. Cooperation might also take the form of procurement of military equipment. Outside the military sphere, cooperative ventures could be mounted involving commercial and academic constituencies. The point

to stress was that the willingness was there, in both countries, to pursue important projects together for mutual benefit.

The Canadian responder, Ambassador April, commenced by acknowledging that the Dutch, more so perhaps than any other Europeans, realized that Canada was "more than just an additional dose of glue with which to bind the United States to Europe." Canada appreciated that the Netherlands had long accepted Canada as a "partner in its own right" in the transatlantic relationship. And while at times the overconcentration of Europeans (and Canadians) upon the US might be misplaced, such was not the situation after 11 September: in the early aftermath of that tragic day, it was assumed by many that US policy would demonstrate a recommitment to multilateralism. But this had not turned out to be the case, notwithstanding the initial expectation that NATO's invocation of Article 5 would reveal it to be an "Alliance of equals."

Instead, what had emerged was a reconfirmation of prior signs that America would practice, at best, a very selective "multilateralism," one in which the utility of international institutions would be assessed according to their usefulness for securing American objectives. As a result, "although we are convinced the Americans need us to preserve a stable international system, we are increasingly worried that the Americans do not realize this." What this implied, in turn, was nothing other than a reversal of the conventional manner in which transatlantic relations had been conceived. In the past, the challenge had been to maintain America's commitment to Europe; today, "the challenge is to ensure that we remain engaged with the United States and retain a capacity to influence its actions."

More than ever, preserving a healthy transatlantic relationship presupposes that the allies demonstrate an equal concern for American security. Ambassador April noted that Canada had for many decades played an integral part in America's "homeland security," even if no one actually employed that rubric until very recently. There could not be any question of Canada's choosing to be seen by the US as anything other than a reliable partner. All the same, Canada remained as concerned as any European ally about US unilateralism. As a result, he continued, a "redefined bridging role" was emerging for Canada, one in which the country's efforts would be bent to the task of showing Washington that Europe could make a worthwhile contribution to American security. "Rather than being the other 'outsider' encouraging them to commit to Europe, we will be the other 'insider' encouraging them to engage with Europe on issues of global security." And whoever said "global security" was often as not heard in the US to be saying "American security."

What had to be done, said Ambassador April, was for the allies to begin to make progress in shrinking the capabilities gap, and in this respect there was a danger that an overconcentration on ESDP would absorb energies that were needed for the urgent task of once again "reinventing" NATO. Here the Dutch could play a very important role, by "keeping NATO high on the European agenda." NATO remained needed, but it also was necessary for it to be reformed, so as to become

equipped to respond to the emergence of new and unconventional threats. Although he did not specifically mention Iraq, the ambassador clearly had that country in mind when he cautioned that the allies would have to develop a coherent policy to govern their response to the challenge of WMD programs in countries viewed with suspicion.

Another area in which they need to make progress concerned ESDP, not only in terms of endowing it with the capability to assume its self-assigned (yet ill-defined) "Petersberg" tasks, but also to move beyond those responsibilities, and in doing so continue to enable Canada to play a meaningful role in European security. Here the ambassador was frank in expressing his (and Canada's) dismay at what could appear to be the country's marginalization: "[Q]uite apart from our sense that after six decades of helping defend Europe it is a bit unfair to put us on

village"; if the last image is the most accurate one, then there is nothing really for Canada to be involved with.
- Canada was initially more supportive of ESDI/ESDP than the US, but began to have difficulty with the concept(s) in 1999, when it looked as if the European project would necessarily exclude Canada.
- Canadians will for some time be preoccupied with the implications of the new North American military command. There will likely be better opportunities for Dutch-Canadian initiatives outside Europe rather than inside it.
- From a Dutch perspective, cooperation with Canada outside Europe gets handicapped by Ottawa's habit of cutting spending on ODA.
- From a Canadian perspective, Canada's access to the EU, and hence its ability to cooperate fully with the Netherlands, is likely to be affected negatively by new visa requirements in the Schengen group, limiting Canadians to three-months maximum of visa-free entry; nevertheless, since 11 September, there may be more potential for bilateral efforts on Third Pillar items.
- Perhaps working together on a joint threat assessment, say on WMD, might prove worth doing.
- Another possible area for cooperation is the Caribbean region.

Closing Remarks

From the Dutch side, Prof. Siccama observed that much of the focus of the seminar over the two days had been the US in the aftermath of 11 September, which led him to remark upon a major difference between Canada and the Netherlands: the former was part of America's "strategic space," the latter was not. By implication, Canada's ability to influence US thinking had risen, while the Netherlands' had declined. Indeed, compared with the height of the Cold War, when all reinforcements destined for the Central Front would have had to pass through Belgian and Dutch ports, you could even say that Dutch strategic standing vis-à-vis the US had changed "drastically."

Less explicit as a focus of the discussion was a theme that intruded several times at the margins of the debate: the question of Europe's *finalité*. This, suggested Prof. Siccama, would have great bearing on the quality of Dutch-Canadian relations in the future. The EU's future constitutional order was more likely to reflect French and British, rather than German, preferences, in that it was doubtful that future constitutional order would much resemble "federalism." As for the Netherlands, "we have to admit that we have abandoned the supranational, federal position ourselves." Only Germany and Belgium appeared today still to be committed to a federal Europe.

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The Martello Papers

The Queen's University Centre for International Relations (QCIR) is pleased to present the latest in its series of security studies, the *Martello Papers*. Taking their name from the distinctive towers built during the nineteenth century to defend Kingston, Ontario, these papers cover a wide range of topics and issues relevant to contemporary international strategic relations.

This, the twenty-fifth *Martello Paper*, includes a report by David G. Haglund (Queen's University) on the proceedings of the Second Canada-Netherlands Seminar on Security, held in Ottawa on 28 February and 1 March 2002. Like its predecessor, held at the Netherlands Institute of International Relations (Clingendael) in

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Papers Presented to the Second Canada-Netherlands Seminar on Security

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2. *The Security Implications of 11 September 2001: A Dutch Perspective*

Alfred van Staden

I

My brief is to deal with the *security implications* of the September 2001 drama to underscore the fact that security is featuring prominently on the foreign-policy agenda again. It is interesting to remind you of many contentions made some ten years ago, suggesting a paradigm shift or some sort of Copernican revolution to occur on the world stage as regards the priorities and directions of foreign policy. Scholars and practitioners alike predicted that penetration of foreign markets rather than the control of territories would be the overriding goal of foreign policy. Economic competition was supposed to supersede military rivalry, and trade and finance, not security concerns, was to dominate the international arena, with the

as well as ecological sustainability. For zones of peace and stability to be extended outside the OECD area, these problems have to be dealt with by employing the full arsenal of foreign policy tools available, ranging from preventive diplomacy, economic and environmental assistance, to the use of military force as the final resort.

What are the sources of today's terrorism? It is useful to distinguish between the immediate and underlying causes. The so-called root-causes thesis was eloquently stated recently by Michael Ignatieff.[1] He pointed to "the coincidence of globalized prosperity in the western part of the world with disintegration in the states that achieved independence from the colonial empires of Europe in the 1960s" and before. The collapse of state institutions, Ignatieff held, "has been exacerbated by urbanization, by the relentless growth of lawless shantytowns that collect populations of unemployed or underemployed men who can see the promise of globalized prosperity on the TVs in every café, but cannot enjoy it themselves." A case in point is Pakistan, now the reluctant US partner of necessity, where the government fails to furnish basic services to the poorest people. As a result, Islamic parties, funded from Saudi Arabia, "step into the breach, providing clinics, schools and orphanages where the poor receive protection at the price of indoctrination in hatred."[2] Of course, the relationship between poverty and proneness to terrorism is less linear and direct than often is suggested.

the institutions of government, not least the presidency. Amazingly, this was only one year after the Florida imbroglio on vote counting.

A similar effect did not occur, however, in the Netherlands (and probably not in other European countries). The reason should be clear: after the immediate shock caused by the onslaught in New York and Washington the sense of insecurity soon faded away. A few months after the event there was only a faint awareness in the Netherlands that what had happened in the US might also occur in the Low Lands behind the dikes. Not surprisingly, there was a strong reluctance in Dutch society to give the state more power over individual citizens. Perhaps this attitude should also be attributed to the libertarian tradition of the Dutch nation. At any rate, civil liberties campaigners (with professors of criminal law in a leading position) voiced concern that anti-terrorist measures taken by the European Union would erode personal freedoms. I am referring especially to proposals for making it easier for governments to catch and prosecute terrorists, as well as to the new European search and arrest warrants, replacing extradition procedures between member states.

In Dutch society there was a rapid movement back to normal, that is to say, to the political situation as it was before the September events. This also explains why radical pleas for administrative restructuring in the security sector that had been heard in the Netherlands just after these events have fallen all but silent. One of these was the suggestion by a former minister of the interior to designate a super minister who would coordinate all policies pertaining to external and internal security, as well as all intelligence operations. One cannot fail to recognize that old bureaucratic habits die hard. The vested interests in the government apparatus easily survived sweeping reform proposals. To be sure, a task force, called "Counter-terrorism and Security," was established under the leadership of the prime minister. However, this was only a temporary venture and did not involve any administrative rearrangements. Similarly, an official panel headed by the permanent under-secretary of defence concluded that there was no reason to fundamentally reconsider the missions and overall structure of the Dutch armed forces.

The 11 September terrorist act called for the Dutch government to balance solidarity toward the United States with due regard for domestic concerns about the unintended effects of large-scale counter-violence on the civilian population. The government was forced to explain itself in order to stifle doubts about the firmness and scope of the Dutch commitment to back up the United States. Why had these doubts been raised? At a meeting of the North Atlantic Council, immediately after the terrorist attacks, the Netherlands had irritated the US because it had been the sole member of the alliance to ask questions about the legal implications of invoking Article 5 before the decision on the invocation could be taken. Perhaps the Dutch government was afraid, at the time, of criticism by the Dutch parliament for rushing into ill-conceived, hasty decisions. I should make clear

that the Dutch parliament has asserted itself on matters concerning the deployment of Dutch troops outside NATO's treaty area. It has gained the right of co-decision on participation in international peace support operations. By the end of November, when the Dutch parliament insisted on clarification of the intended missions of the relatively large package of military forces the Netherlands had offered to the US, it turned out that combat tasks had explicitly been ruled out. The government was not able to take away the public impression that it had sought "high political visibility" at "low military risk."

The Dutch self-image of being not an ordinary small country, but a small country writ large is crucial in this regard. The image closely correlates with the inclination of self-aggrandisement or, to put it more bluntly, the Dutch penchant for punching above one's weight. This was exemplified by Prime Minister Kok's enforcement of a last-minute invitation to attend the impromptu dinner for the larger EU members held by Tony Blair in early November. *The Economist* amusingly wrote: the "British beef had never seemed so appetising," although the Dutch prime minister arrived only in time for dessert. Afterwards there were proud

coalition warfare to the surface. If it is true that one cannot conduct war by committee, then the question should be addressed of how one can sustain the political legitimacy of military operations. There is no easy answer to that. The second reason concerns the American perception that European military forces, given their out-dated equipment, had little military value to add to what the Americans were able to deploy. But one wonders why the US had insisted on European participation in the air campaign against Milosevic, and why particularly the Dutch air force was praised by the Americans for the significance of its contribution almost three years ago. Finally, the presumption that NATO's own organization has little of specific military assets that might be useful help in the fight on terrorism can be seen as the third reason why the alliance was by-passed.

There are strong indications that the US now considers the 19-member NATO as some sort of political and military supermarket where it can shop for moral, political, and legal support.[3] The tendency on the part of the American administration to forge coalitions by posses of states for specific tasks will be strengthened the more the alliance expands its membership. Probably this development of building ad-hoc coalitions of the willing and able is inevitable but the case of Afghanistan shows that there are also significant risks in underutilizing and sidelining particular European allies. By excluding French and other European military forces from the campaign in Afghanistan, the US had become more vulnerable to criticism from European political elites who otherwise had felt a minimum sense of "ownership" regarding the American military strategy and political goals. Thus, European governments were embarrassed to find vocal segments of public opinion seemingly more worried about the US government's alleged maltreatment of captured members of Al-Qaeda than about the threat of terrorism itself.

I firmly believe that the past developments have highlighted the fact that NATO's value will lie increasingly in its function as a broader forum for common security concerns. Its relative military role has declined, while its relative political importance has grown: more Article 4, less Article 5. The more this trend is in evidence, the easier it will be for Russia to accept the Baltic states joining NATO, and for the alliance to engage Russia in discussions about common interests without giving Moscow a veto on vital decisions.

III

From NATO I now turn to the European Union: How did the fight against terrorism and particularly Washington's strategic priorities affect the EU's plans to develop a more cohesive and effective foreign, security, and defence policy? Has the momentum that made itself felt on issues of domestic security been matched by a similar movement forward in the domain of CFSP and ESDP? The picture, I would argue, is a bit confusing because the signals are mixed.

The good news is that European member states showed more unity in compari-

the Dutch government decided to increase expenditure for international and domestic security with a relatively small amount of about 90 million euro, mainly earmarked for the improvement of home surveillance and intelligence capabilities. As far as I can see, the increases (if there were any) in security spending in other European countries are also modest, at any rate nothing like the massive rise in the US budget that has been proposed.

IV

In conclusion, I would argue that the security implications of the September drama, as outlined in my analysis at the three levels, are most serious in the Atlantic context. NATO has been called the big loser in the Afghanistan war, and rightly so because in the course of the military campaign the alliance was pushed to the sidelines. It was *US* CENTCOM, not *NATO* SHAPE, which ran the show. In any case, the terrorist threat did not provide the new, magical glue that could fix the cracks in the Atlantic building. It certainly did not offer the recipe for a bright Atlantic future. On the contrary, the new threat had neither stopped unilateralist proclivities in American foreign policy nor had it put an end to American accusa-

and defence acts together. I do not believe in the attraction or wisdom of a division of labour between the two sides of the Atlantic where Americans take care of the so-called hard dimension of security whereas the Europeans and Canadians specialize in the soft parts thereof. Such a task differentiation would certainly sow the seeds of increasing political decoupling. Indeed, to cite Lord Robertson, the choice is between political marginalization or military modernization.

What must be done, therefore, is to persuade our governments to invest more in equipment and planes that can take off from the US. But, I realize, this is not very likely to happen as long as Europeans (and Canadians) do not feel threatened by enemies to the same degree as Americans do. So the only real option left for our countries to remedy deficiencies of military capabilities (lack of strategic lift and air surveillance capabilities, of unmanned aerial vehicles and precision-guided munitions) is to rationalize our defence spending and get rid of the shameful mismatch between military inputs and outputs on the European side. I am aware that this view is neither new nor revolutionary, but perhaps its implementation might save us from the frustrations of impotence.

Notes

1. Michael Ignatieff, "Barbarians at the Gate," in *The New York Review of Books*, 28 February 2002, pp. 4-6.
2. Ignatieff, "Barbarians at the Gate," p. 4.
3. I borrowed this formulation from Peter van Ham. See his chapter "Politics as Unusual: NATO and the EU after 9-11," in *Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Insights and Perspectives after September 11*, ed. Peter van Ham (The Hague: The Clingendael Institute, 2001), p. 50.
4. See Charles Grant, "A Stronger European Foreign and Defence Policy," in *Europe after September 11th*, ed. Edward Bannerman (London: Centre for European Reform, 2001), pp. 31-48.
5. Romano Prodi, President of the European Commission, "Time for Real Solidarity," speech to the European Parliament, 24 October 2001.

And, in its *Quadrennial Defence Review Report* (QDR) issued on 30 September 2001, which makes direct reference to the attacks, the US Department of Defense now declares that "homeland security" will be the "highest priority of the U.S. military."[2] This emphasis will provide additional impetus for the deployment of a National Missile Defense (NMD) system.

All three trends are related to policy of the government of the United States to preserve and enhance its dominant position. As Michael Mastanduno has argued, since the end of the Cold War, "US officials have in fact followed a consistent strategy in pursuit of a clear objective-the preservation of the United States' preeminent global position."[3]

The response of the Canadian military has been to stress the importance of

were 1,300 Canadian troops in Bosnia. According to the article, these forces did not count because they were "part of a NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] rather than UN force."[5]

In the following few years, the imbalance between Canada's UN and NATO peacekeeping commitments has become even more pronounced. As of 1 June 2000, there were some 2,756 CF personnel on overseas operations. Of these, 1,596 were with the NATO Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia-Herzegovnia and another 522 with Alliance's Kosovo Force (KFOR). In support of NATO operations in the Balkans, Canada had 118 personnel with the allied air forces at Aviano, Italy. If the ships company of the HMCS Fredericton (225) sailing with NATO's Standing Naval Force Atlantic (STANAVFORLANT) is added, it means that 93 percent of all CF personnel overseas were deployed in support of NATO and its new peacekeeping operations.[6] In addition, Canada has continued to maintain a naval presence in the Persian Gulf, with the HMCS Calgary now deployed there. Only about 220 personnel — 190 of these on the Golan Heights and the remainder, in small contingents of less than ten — were assigned to various UN activities.[7] Canada did send troops on a limited UN mission to Eritrea, but they only served for a limited time. Meanwhile, it also dispatched forces to serve with NATO in Macedonia in August 2001.

The imbalance between blue and green operations is even more telling when it is considered that the CF has deployed its most advanced equipment to the NATO operations, the CF-18 aircraft, the Coyote Reconnaissance Vehicles, Leopard Main Battle Tank and the Patrol Frigates. In comparison to NATO's other middle powers, such as Belgium and Spain, Canada has a higher percentage of its available forces outside its borders: 6 percent as opposed to an average of 2 percent.[8] While the prime minister might declare that generally speaking, "we are very reluctant to join an intervention that is not under the umbrella of the UN,"[9] the reality is otherwise.

The discrepancy between the UN blue helmet commitments and the United States organized and led NATO green helmet commitment, tells the whole story of international peacekeeping in the 1990s and what has happened to this quintessentially Canadian (and supposedly un-American) role for the CF. It also tells the story of what has happened to Canada's relationship to NATO and the American role in the alliance. In the 1990s, Canada was over there, the classic "over there," in Europe with Uncle Sam.

This is not how the future looked at the end of the Cold War. At the beginning of the 1990s, the "Canadianization" of US defence policy seemed to be at hand as the UN, with considerable American support, launched a series of peacekeeping operations which in a few years saw nearly 80,000 blue helmets deployed from Cambodia to the former Yugoslavia.[10] With American global security interests contracting and with the Security Council now able to reach a consensus more easily, peacekeeping offered Washington the prospect that the UN would be able to respond to regional crises and civil strife without the need to deploy US forces.

The UN also undertook to intervene in countries on humanitarian grounds in response to starvation or atrocities brought on by these internal struggles. Despite some early successes, it soon became clear that UN peacekeeping forces were not able to deal with all situations. In contrast to Cold War peacekeeping operations,

Defence White Paper stressed the importance of contributing to international security efforts and responding to humanitarian disasters. It stated that the CF would also maintain a global combat capability. With cuts to the defence budget and personnel, it became increasingly difficult to maintain that Canada had anywhere near such a capability. Indeed, the heavy peacekeeping demands of the early 1990s had greatly strained the CF.

Even as Canada was increasing its contribution to UN efforts in the early 1990s, it was also taking part in NATO efforts in the former Yugoslavia. From the begin-

The Kosovo operations also showed that given sufficient warning, the Army can move quickly overseas with vehicles and integrated helicopter units. The Edmonton-based Lord Strathcona's Horse was the second NATO force to enter Kosovo and the Pristina area after the British.

Less than 72 hours after rolling hundreds of military vehicles and containers off a

The significant trends in peacekeeping in the 1990s have highlighted in the post-Cold War era what has been a persistent duality in Canadian foreign and defence policy since the Second World War; the desire to play a more independent and distinct role through the UN and a strongly held instinct to join the US and other traditional allies when unified western action was organized.[16] Both are the result of Ottawa's determination to remain active in international security affairs. During the Cold War, when it came to having to choose between collective security under the UN or some other multilateral umbrella and collective defence under NATO, Ottawa invariably sided with its traditional allies in NATO. And this has been the case again in the post-Cold War era. In part, it is the result of the changing nature of peacekeeping. If Canada were to remain in the forefront of this activity then it would have no choice but to participate in the American-sponsored, NATO-based new peacekeeping. But it is also the result of the very fact that NATO, under continued American leadership, became what international political theorists say it cannot be, a collective defence organization and a collective security organization. And this is the direct result of a new international bargain which has come to characterize the alliance.

The United States and the "Trans-European Bargain"

Flexible response was not simply the official name given to NATO's strategy adopted in 1967; it was, in a profound sense, the way the alliance approached all its seemingly intractable and inherently contradictory problems of a strategic and, above all, political nature. True to the messy nature of democratic government itself, this collection of democracies managed to surprise and confound its critics and attain victory in the Cold War by adopting a series of initiatives that placed political compromise above military and strategic orthodoxy and intellectual rigour. The end result was that the allies stayed allied and in doing so, achieved ultimate victory in the Cold War. The same approach has been followed in the post-Cold War era, and this accounts for the continued centrality of the alliance in European and indeed global security.

The alliance was quick to respond to the breath-taking fall of the Warsaw Pact and then the Soviet Union itself. Beginning in the early 1990s, it revised its strategic concepts and then its very organization and structure. Most importantly, it immediately reached out eastward. A North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) was created to bring old adversaries (and neutrals) into the consultative process. Special agreements were concluded with Ukraine and with Russia. As discussed below, the alliance became involved in the new peacekeeping and peace enforcement of the 1990s. Most importantly, the push was to expand, culminating in the admission of three new members: Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary.

This is not to say all has gone smoothly, especially on the matter of enlargement. On the one hand it extends the alliance's efforts to promote stability in the

East while at the same time raising new concerns in Moscow. Then, there is the question of whether in extending its membership eastward the alliance has truly guaranteed the security of the new allies. And whether the United States has in fact extended its deterrent over these countries or whether it simply made more intractable its never-resolved nuclear dilemma. True to its historic methodology of flexibility, the alliance has not paused to resolve these complications but rather has adopted a range of other initiatives to cope with them in the hope that in the

hold in check Russian influence in the region. America's close relations with Ukraine, for example, are meant "to counter any expansion of Russian power."[18]

The second reason for Washington's eastward thrust is that the Americans do not fully trust the Western European governments, either individually or collectively, to manage European security in the East, especially in a manner fully consistent with American interests. The record of the 1990s in the Balkans speaks for itself. Only by involving itself directly in the affairs of the East, using NATO as a justification both externally and domestically (for the purposes of public and congressional opinion), can the US assure itself that further ethnic strife can be avoided. To this extent the new "trans-European" bargain can be seen as part of an American effort to sustain the relevance of the old transatlantic bargain. And the older NATO allies seem content with following Washington's lead. At the same time, the shift of America's focus to the east is having an impact on the character of the alliance.

For the older members, NATO remains a collective defence organization. But given the absence of any kind of threat to Western Europe and the inability of the Western Europeans to develop any common policy toward the east, it is not surprising that the links now binding America to Europe run over and around these countries. Even the admission to the alliance of Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic may be viewed as less the accession of these states to NATO and more the formalization of their security ties to the US. To be sure, the Western European allies and Canada are deeply engaged in the PfP process. Moreover, they are also concerned about the relationship between the countries of the east and the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) and the European Union (EU). But their governments have been more or less compelled to go along with Washington's eastward push, or else risk undoing what remains of the transatlantic bargain.

All of this points to what Coral Bell has called the "pretense of concert in American national security policy in the post-Cold War era. In the current international environment, America need only conform to the "pretense of concert." The Clinton administration has adopted the view that "the unipolar world should be run as if it were a concert of powers."

> In a sense, the post-World War II "institutionalization" of diplomacy — through the UN, NATO, the G-7, the WTO, the World Bank, the IMF, the OSCE and so on — has more or less imposed that strategy on policymakers. Resolutions must get through the Security Council and consensus must be sought in other organizations to "legitimate" the policies that fn EuJ 0 -160.5(-)]Trc0 -1ional7.2(e)0.2(r)-12.807 Twl163 TS5.4(A)1(ve3(e

With regard to the new trans-European alliance, Canada as always is in a somewhat different situation, but one that has nevertheless been affected by the new character of the alliance. For Ottawa, the old trans-Atlantic bargain provided the security in Europe it sought and did so without compelling Canadians to choose between their American and European allies. Although extended deterrence put Canada at risk, by bolstering the transatlantic ties, it nonetheless fostered a stable strategic environment where war seemed less likely and thus, Canada more secure. And it did so without placing high demands for conventional forces. Moreover, the politics of the alliance, with its formal equality of participation, offered Ottawa a seat at the most important international table, consistent with its aspirations toward middle powermanship. Finally, there was always the hoped-for, though not always achieved, counterweight objective. The Western European allies, especially the middle and small states, might be looked to to counter the influence of the US on Canadian defence policy.

The trans-European bargain also offers advantages to Canada. Its overwhelming political character accords with Ottawa's long-standing desire to obtain maximum participation at minimal cost in defence expenditure. Thus, while Canadian forces left Germany in 1993, Canadians have been active participants in the new NATO's eastward thrust and other political activities. As with the US, there is a sense now that Canada's ties to European security extend through West-

With NATO invoking Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty in the aftermath of 11 September, with the allies offering assistance to the campaign on terrorism "out of area," and with dispatch of NATO Airborne Warning and Control System (AWAC) planes to patrol American skies "over here," the alliance appears to have become even more central to Western European collective defence. Thus, the dispatch by Canada of a relatively substantial contribution to Afghanistan suggests that the western alliance has returned as a focus for Canadian defence policy.

At the same time, in view of trends in transatlantic relations and the way in which the US is conducting the war on terrorism, Canada may wish to distance itself from its traditional European allies, especially for an American audience. It is evident that while the United States is anxious to enlist NATO, this war, touching the very heart of American vital interests is one where Washington believes it has less military and political need to rely upon its traditional allies. The Balkans operations of the 1990s were not considered vital to American interests, Washington was therefore prepared to cultivate and accommodate coalition approaches. Today, America is prepared to act without waiting for others to follow or worrying about any pretensions of multilateralism. At an operational level the Kosovo campaign demonstrated how wide the military technological gap has become between the American armed forces and those of its major allies. In the war on terrorism, what the United States needs more than force contribution is countries

of the American homeland. As former US Under-Secretary of Defense John Hamre recently told a Canadian audience, "There is no longer a way to secure the United States without securing the United States and Canada simultaneously." This is nothing new: strategic defence has long been the essence of the bilateral Canada-US defence relationship.

In 1938, in Kingston, Ontario, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt declared that: "the Dominion of Canada is a part of the sisterhood of the British Empire: I give you an assurance that the people of the United States will not stand idly by if

In the early 1990s, the end of the Cold War brought about a marked scaling back of NORAD activities. To be sure, neither Washington nor Ottawa was prepared to dismantle the radar lines and disband the interceptor squadrons. Moreover, to the extent that NORAD's prime missions had become warning and assessment of missile attack and space surveillance, there was a continued role for the combined command. Thus, the agreement was renewed in 1991 and 1996. But the

A new concern with "homeland" defence was emerging in the United States, one not seen since the 1950s. Paradoxically, again, these fears arose at a time when America's relative military power had never been greater. While fears about homeland defence were being pushed most forcefully by Republicans in Congress, polls in the late 1990s conducted by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations found that while "Americans feel secure, prosperous and confident," with "fear of armed threats from a rival superpower diminished, they are, nevertheless ... alarmed by violence at home and abroad" and "support measures to thwart terrorists, prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and keep defense strong." Moreover, while the vast majority of Americans did not see vital threats to US interests abroad, fully 84 percent regard "international terrorism" as the number one "critical threat" to American interests.[25] Here at least, the supposedly "uniformed" and "disinterested" American public "know-nothings" knew something.

In what is now an eerily prophetic comment, the United States Commission on National Security in the 21st Century (the Hart-Rudman Commission), in a report titled *New World Coming*, predicted in 1999 that,

> America is becoming increasingly vulnerable to hostile attack on our homeland — and our military superiority will not protect us.... In fact there is a school of thought that American military superiority on the conventional battlefield push our adversaries towards unconventional alternatives. This school further postulates we are entering a period of "catastrophic terrorism" with terrorists gaining access to weapons of mass destruction including nuclear devices, germ dispensers, poison gas and computer viruses. States, terrorists, and other disaffected groups will acquire weapons of mass destruction, and some will use them. Americans will likely die on American soil, possibly in large numbers.[26]

Yet another important indication of growing American concern with homeland defence was the renaming of USACOM in October 1999 to become United States Joint Forces Command, (USJFCOM). In addition to its responsibility to prepare US forces for overseas deployment, USJFCOM responsibility for "homeland defence" included "providing military assistance to civil authorities for consequence management of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) incidents within the continental United States, its territories and possessions."[27] It will also "support the WMD consequence management efforts of the other combatant commands" throughout the world. In setting up CJFCOM, then Secretary of Defense William Cohen appointed an Army National Guard Brigadier General as the first commanding general of Joint Task Force-Civil Support (JTF-CS). "The JTF-CS will ensure Department of Defense assets are prepared to respond to requests for support from a lead Federal Agency such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency" (FEMA).[28]

In the wake of the events of 11 September 2001, the US military has made homeland security, the defence of the United States, "the highest priority." As the QDR notes:

> The United States will maintain sufficient military forces to protect the US domestic population, its territory, and its critical defense-related infrastructure against attack emanating from outside US borders, as appropriate under US law. US forces will provide strategic deterrence and air and missile defense and uphold US commitments under NORAD. In addition, DoD components have the responsibility to, as specified in US law, to support US civil authorities as directed in managing the consequences of natural and man-made disasters and CBRNE-related events on US territory. Finally, the US military will be prepared to respond in a decisive manner to acts of international terrorism committed on US territory or the territory of an ally.[29]

As part of this new emphasis, the US intends to again review the organization of its forces within the continental United States. The QDR called for a continued examination of the "roles and responsibilities" of the active and reserve forces "to ensure they are properly organized, trained and equipped, and postured." It is clear, the report went on, "that U.S. forces, including the United States Coast Guard, require more effective means, methods, and organizations to perform these missions. As part of this examination, DoD was to review the establishment of a new unified combatant commander to help address complex inter-agency issues and provide a single military commander to focus military support."[30] The United States Marines expanded the scope of their special units to deal with attacks that might take place in the United States. Senior administration officials were suggesting revision to the US *posse comitatus* laws that restrict the use of the regular armed forces in civilian law enforcement.

This rising concern with homeland defence was already affecting the bilateral defence relationship, and indeed, the character of overall relations between the two countries before 11 September. As noted above, the American strategic interest in Canada is that it not be a strategic liability for the United States. In the Cold War, with both countries accepting shared threat, the strategic unity of the continent ensured that this would not be the case. But the real defence of the continent lay in the deterrent capabilities of the US not in joint measures for direct defence.

In the wake of the attack on the United States, Canada has once again become a very important piece of real estate for Americans. This started minutes after the first attacks of 11 September as Canadian personnel at NORAD joined in the effort to prevent further attacks and secure North American air space. The air defence role, which had been in decline since the late 1950s, has taken on a new focus in order to prevent a repeat of those attacks. The "undefended" border now needs to be secure if trade is to continue to flow in a timely manner. Canada has been told to reform its immigration policies and augment its internal counter-intelligence efforts so as not to make itself a security liability.

In the war on terrorism, as in the Cold War, forward-deployed offensive forces will accompany the new emphasis on homeland defence. Indeed, despite statements regarding the priority now attached to homeland defence, the bulk of the mighty American military posture will still be focused upon the projection of force overseas. However, the relative importance of homeland security will

increase. This is already evident with regard to BMD where the events of 11 September gave President Bush all the justification he needed to finally do what his administration had promised to do — withdraw from the AMB Treaty and go forth with a BMD system. Along with the new emphasis upon air defence, this will again bring Canada's role in NORAD to the top of Ottawa's bilateral security agenda.

In the fall of 2001, USJFCOM established a new Homeland Security Directorate which was tasked with developing an organization, mission, roles, and doctrine for its new mission. The focus of the new directorate is given as being on land and maritime defence, while for aerospace defence, it is "partnered" with NORAD and US Space Command.[31] This, however, appears to be only a temporary measure.

In January 2002 it was announced that by 1 October the US would stand up a new unified command, Northern Command, whose Commander-in-Chief (CINC) will "have responsibility for homeland security for the United States." The specific tasks of the command and its relationship to other branches of the US government still need to be worked out. According to General Pace, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

> From our standpoint, this individual is going to have to take NORAD and ensure that the very, very long-standing close relationship with Canada is maintained and nurtured and taken properly into the future and to figure out, is there a way, then, to add to the air defense, the land and sea defenses? He's going to have to figure out, for starters, where is the best place to be? We want him near the Capital region, probably in the Capital region — maybe not, if homeland security is something that we want to be concerned about with some kind of an attack in and around Washington — and then building the staff and what types of functions do we want this CINC to be able to perform — posse comitatus, how much do we want our military to actually do or not do inside the United States?
>
> Right now we have folks who are going to be detailed to the borders of the United States in support of other government agencies, and how do we work all that? So I can't give you a precise answer yet, because we are just in the beginning of understanding the types of capabilities that we need this country to have. And then who best should perform those functions and provide those capabilities? Should it be the states? Should it be the federal government? And if it's the federal government, should it be FEMA? FBI? The military? We need to make all those determinations.
>
> So whoever this new CINC is going to be, come 1 October, he is going to be very busy just figuring out what questions to ask and then determining how to go about answering them.[32]

As noted above, in the US, responsibility for the maritime defence of the homeland is presently divided between USJFCOM in the Atlantic and PACOM in the Pacific. Traditionally, the USN has jealously guarded its dominance in the Pacific. Whatever the specific new arrangements, since terrorist are capable of making use of the seas to bring WMDs to America, it is likely that Northern Command will take renewed steps to secure its ocean approaches. This could include, as

proposed, making greater use of the US Coast Guard, perhaps bringing it under the new command. For Canada, this will mean that its traditional sovereignty protection roles, ones that will be directed against non-military threats, will now take on added meaning in terms of overall North American security. The Navy will still be tasked with protecting Canadian economic resources and enforcing Canadian law. But the relative importance of its other long-held tradition of collaboration with the USN in the maritime defence of the continent, is likely to become more important than it has been since the end of the Cold War.

Yet if the necessity for interoperability in overseas operations raises concerns about Canadian sovereignty and independence, how much more so does it when it comes to North America? To some extent, the fact that North America tended to be a strategic backwater for the United States during the Cold War eased Ottawa's apprehensions and the "defence against help" dilemma. Now, worries about how much bilateral defence cooperation will be required to assure Washington may yet emerge again, even more so given the scope and intensity of American concerns. And, here, there is little discretion available. Ottawa can choose not to deploy overseas, but it cannot ignore American efforts to secure the maritime approaches to the continent. In addition, overall sovereignty concerns will be exacerbated if NORAD is to be subsumed within the new Northern Command, thus depriving it of its distinctive bilateral character, so important to Canadian considerations of autonomy. Indeed, the prospect of a new overall American command, whether solely US or some continental or hemispheric "Americas" command has already generated controversy in Canada. Foreign Minister Paul Manley has raised concerns with former Foreign Affairs Minister Lloyd Axworthy and former Defence Minister Paul Hellyer recently, sounding the alarm by claiming that Canada is in danger surrendering sovereignty at home.[33]

Once again, Canada is in familiar waters, not just because they are its own. But with regard to North American security efforts, sovereignty concerns can be addressed without sacrificing autonomous interests. To be sure, Ottawa will have to take care to ensure that Canadian interests and laws are respected and any new command arrangements are put it place. This could be a difficult task if for no other reason than the sorting out of responsibilities within the US may be complex and confusing. (Indeed, it may be easier for Washington to reach agreement with Canada than amongst the American services and other federal agencies.)

While any new arrangements will tie Canada closer to the US in terms of continental security it needs to be remembered that interoperability in North America will allow the CF to make a contribution in the face of a direct threat to Canada. After all, here Canada has a vital national interest. The stark reality is that with 85 percent of Canadian trade now conducted with the US, Ottawa cannot afford American doubts about security to the North. The "undefended" border now needs to be secure if trade is to continue to flow in a timely manner. In the wake of the attacks, Ottawa announced that over a quarter of a billion dollars would be spent

measures to prevent terrorist organizations from raising funds in Canada. Increased collaboration with the US in the defence of North America must be a priority for

Pipes has compared the campaign against Islamic terrorists with the Cold War efforts to confront and contain communism wherever it existed.[34] And in this effort, there is to be more than just containment. Rollback of the "axis of evil" is to be the order of the day.

It was the global character of America's Cold War policies that made the seat at the table so important for Canada. Sharing Washington's appreciation of the pervasiveness of the threat and sharing a continent, it was essential that Ottawa also become concerned with its own "national" security and how its policies would be coordinated and adjusted to accommodate and support its closest ally. This approach carried on into the post-Cold War era as the US continued to be globally engaged.

After 11 September, Canada has once again been drawn into a global effort, one within even greater and more complex ramifications for bilateral security relations. Its response was to do what it has done in the past: to join in the campaign alongside America and its western allies. Along with its NATO partners, it invoked Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty declaring the attack on America to an attack on all alliance members. Ottawa dispatched forces overseas and turned anew to efforts to ensure that it did not become a security liability for the United States. Just as Canadians were glued to their television sets in early September 2001, so too have these events emphasized and reinforced the bonds of common strategic interests, concepts of world order and shared values that keep Canada firmly affixed to its seat at the table of the American-led and dominated western alliance.

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Parts of this paper have appeared in Joel J. Sokolsky,TJj /CtK52 -0.05lr-0.Tj 001,ity.IJ(9raa1()bI)s6ci00

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4. Factors in the Future of Arms Control and Disarmament

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In the field of non-proliferation, arms control, and disarmament (NACD) there is

National Security

NACD must always be situated as part of national and international security. The basis of its value is the fact that reduction in the number of weapons available and in the freedom of action of states (and other possessors) to use them makes conflict and consequent death and destruction less likely. When properly established, participation in the broad NACD regime acts as a complement to a well-maintained military establishment by reducing the threat it faces, but neither aspect should be regarded as replacing the other. The basic problem is that NACD is inherently international (bilateral, plurilateral, or multilateral) in nature with national implications, while security is inherently national with international linkages and ramifications. For the two aspects to balance and reinforce each other, their complementarity must be perceived by at least the major pertinent actors in the more influential states concerned; since one aspect is external and the other internal to a given national security system, this perception is not automatic.

A further problem is that, while NACD may well contribute to long-term collective security for all, it does not always contribute to the short-term security of any given state. Different countries see NACD as contributing to or challenging national security in different ways. A country that feels under increasing threat and therefore in need of enhancing its security by gaining additional or more advanced weapons systems will consider effective NACD restraints a problem to be avoided in terms of commitment or compliance. Other countries in a more favourable security situation may see NACD as positive where it restricts weapons systems from reaching other countries but negative where it restricts their own weapons development/deployment, transfer to favoured state or non-state supporters, or use in power projection abroad. A third group of states sees multilateral NACD restraints as beneficial to its interests, since they restrict both destabilizing weaponization by have-not powers and unrestricted development and use by the big establishment powers. This third group is generally capable of independent weapons development, but does not regard it as the best or most cost-effective means of reinforcing its own security.

The position of each of these three groups has its own consistent internal logic. The fact that one may disagree with others' analyses of the problem, or with the solutions they propose, does not make them necessarily wrong in their own terms. Even a strongly unilateralist position — characterized by a focus on national military strength, maximum freedom of action globally and the reduction of multilateral legal restrictions in NACD and other terms — can be logically sustained under certain geostrategic, geopolitical and economic conditions. The problem comes when the actions of one state or group of states infringes on the ability of one or more other states to protect and advance their own NACD interests. This infringement can range as far as willingness to prevent others from creating new initiatives or reluctance to allow a widely-supported agreement to enter into force. Given

the complex inter-linkage between bilateral and multilateral initiatives in the same field, it can also reflect simple disregard for the consequences of national action on the NACD interests of other states.

At the very least, the implications of the various national approaches to security result in different priorities and sensitivities as to which types of NACD initiatives (if any) to favour, affecting in turn the ease or difficulty in reaching international agreement in a given NACD field. The basic split is whether the best approach is to seek a common multilateral commitment and rules and then struggle to verify and enforce them, or to determine and set the rules nationally or with a "coalition of the willing" and then seek to influence international behaviour on that basis. The current international NACD system is a combination of the two

Institutions

Institutions are a factor in planning NACD initiatives insofar as they represent mechanisms for turning concepts into agreements, especially in terms of legal commitments and coordinated activities. While certain organizations, especially those with an independent staff, can play an independent role in this process, most are limited by the range of agreement among at least the major players among their members. This unfortunately means that circumstances such as those now current, with strong divisions both among national positions and more generally between the committed multilateralists and those less enamoured of global or regional NACD processes, often make for institutional deadlock or for lowest-common-denominator results.

This is especially so among consensus-based organizations such as the Conference on Disarmament, although it has also often held true with reference to the negotiating or review conferences of major NACD instruments or initiatives. The best example in the latter case is probably the recent collapse of the negotiations on the BTWC compliance protocol and of the subsequent BTWC Review Conference. The 2000 NPT Review Conference was arguably an exception in that it managed to adopt an ambitious final document by consensus, but the proof of that pudding will be in the eating: the April 2002 first session of the next review process, which will monitor the implementation of NPT commitments. The 2001 UN small arms conference illustrates another aspect of the institutional setting: the final document was significantly watered down in order to reach consensus *despite the fact that provisions for voting existed in the rules of procedure and that the hold-outs on many key issues were in a clear minority*. Even when abandoning consensus might be an advantage in a given situation, many countries fear to do so lest voting procedures be used to their own disadvantage elsewhere. Thus, while existing institutions have many advantages for promoting new NACD initiatives — especially established credibility, memberships, and mandates — there are also clearly problems with this approach, and careful consideration must be given to the likely reception of a given proposal, and to the tools available to opponents wishing to stall or derail the process.

That said, there are also existing bodies posing less danger to an NACD initiative. First, there exist certain intergovernmental arrangements through which activity other than negotiations can be pursued. These include, for example, the UN's Department of Disarmament Affairs (UNDDA), the OPCW, and the IAEA. One cannot expect such bodies to push the envelope too far (they answer to the same mixed collectivity of nations), but they can be helpful on issues such as research and implementation projects. Second, there are regional bodies where

an important impact on NACD issues, ranging recently from the formal adoption of negotiated texts and their opening for signature (e.g., the CTBT and the Firearms Protocol) to the direct establishment of important negotiating sessions (e.g., the 2001 small arms conference) to the establishment of influential experts groups with a global imprimatur (e.g., on small arms and missiles) and the establishment of voluntary regimes (e.g., transparency measures such as the UN Conventional Arms Register, UNCAR.

Another institutional approach essayed with some success has been the standalone negotiation. This was successful in the case of the landmines convention and is now the basis of work on the missile International Code of Conduct (ICOC). It can be successful in cases where the weapons systems concerned are widespread, allowing a "critical mass" of states to be assembled without necessitating universality. It also tends to work best when negotiations or pre-negotiations elsewhere reveal a wide base of support being blocked by a few strong opponents. The approach cannot, however, be used in all circumstances, but it nevertheless represents an approach that should be kept in the toolkit.

The caucus mechanism prominent in the UN and in many treaty negotiating or review sessions has proven to encompass both positive and negative aspects. Perhaps the most notable recent development in this regard has been the rise of

and an increased reliance on “stand-off” conventional weapons. The reality or

tion and clean-up activity in fields ranging from disposal of weapons-derived fissile material to destruction of small arms and landmines and other explosive remnants of war and to clean-up of weapons-related sites in terms of nuclear, chemical, and biological contamination.

that existing and proposed NACD can make to the counter-terrorist effort. This covers a wide range of possible actions, including the universalization, full implementation and strengthening of existing legal instruments restricting access to weapons; enhanced support for related national and international implementation bodies and export control regimes; improvements in physical security and management of production and storage facilities for sensitive weapons-related materials and their protection in transit; closer cooperation on intelligence-sharing, enforcement, and prosecution on weapons-related offences; destruction of excess weapons and related materials; and assistance to states lacking the expertise and financial resources to carry out such steps. This approach is being worked out as part of the international campaign against terrorism, becoming one of the most active areas in NACD work.

Another broad impact works in the opposite direction, that is, from the counter-terrorist effort to NACD. The most important result has been to shift the balance

the weaponry on opposing sides. As noted in the previous section, the RMA and its associated armaments pose their own special problems for arms controllers.

Finally, and linked with each of the previous aspects, is the evolution of military doctrine. This is an issue for arms controllers because doctrine can limit the

of classic non-proliferation. This will combine a strengthening of available tools (also applicable to traditional proliferation) and implementation of new approaches.

An active approach on multilateral NACD initiatives can also be taken in consultation with like-minded countries. Such states could be highly effective if they worked together in such areas as universalization, implementation, destruction, and verification relating to existing agreements, action plans and the like. Such a practically-oriented group could focus *inter alia* on contact with key "hold-outs," technical assistance, promotion of technological advance to support compliance mechanisms, and the funding of practical disarmament measures. Expanding confidence-building measures on a voluntary basis under treaties such as the NPT and BTWC, or other understandings, such as UNCAR, could also be beneficial. The common thread is to make existing arrangements work better toward the basic NACD goals of peace, security, and human life.

It is also worth noting that informal study and discussion have proven instrumental over the last decade in getting productive multilateral consideration underway on such issues as landmines, small arms, and missiles. Such pre-negotiating activity is particularly useful for raising awareness of the problems, gaining consensus on the need for governments to address them, and providing a forum for trying out various approaches to their resolution. It is especially pertinent in areas where NACD has not yet been applied to existing weapons systems (e.g., missiles), or where evolving technology is clearly moving to bring new systems on line (e.g., space weapons) and the option is present to deal with the problem before it arises.

Beyond the various alternative approaches identified above, it may still be desirable to move ahead on the negotiation of new initiatives. In these cases, it may be best to approach these negotiations on a piecemeal or "building-block" basis. Such an approach allows proponents to avoid direct confrontation with opponents and to build support and confidence gradually for a new idea. The ultimate option in this regard is creation of new negotiating forums, as was done for the landmines convention and for missile ICOC.

In dealing with specific existing agreements and other initiatives, the challenge will be to consider the most productive ways forward in the face of shifting and sometimes increasing opposition (ranging from secret non-compliance to outright defiance/retraction to foot-dragging and bureaucratic sabotage). In some cases, the challenge will be to choose the most important aspects on which to focus, from a field of many possibilities. The following are among Canada's near-term priorities in this regard:

- At the upcoming first Preparatory Committee meeting of the 2005 NPT review cycle, promote compliance and accountability for all NPT-related commitments by all member states.
- On the BTWC, work with like-minded states to promote strengthening of the multilateral preventative regime as part of an integrated and comprehensive approach to combatting bio-weapons proliferation.

- On missiles, focus on the successful negotiation and wide acceptance of the ICOC and on consideration of broader missile issues by the UN Experts Group.
- On outer space, put priority on establishing an open international dialogue on the issues, including the possibility of a weaponization ban.
- On small arms, focus on facilitating national and international implementation of the UN Programme of Action, including activity in practical areas such as brokering, marking/tracing, and collection/destruction.

I would note that there are a number of NACD areas in which Canada and the Netherlands might usefully work together. Some reflect shared interests and longtime activism, for example in small arms, in transparency regimes for armaments, and in missile non-proliferation (the original draft of the ICOC is a Dutch crea-