NATO Enlargement and the Politics of Identity

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analysis of NATO-Russian relations during and after enlargement lays bare those intra-alliance differences.

This study provides evidence, if more were needed, of NATO's histori-

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1. *On Alliances and Identity*

> *There are all kinds of devices invented for the protection and preservation of countries: defensive barriers, forts, trenches, and the like… But prudent minds have as a natural gift one safeguard which is the common possession of all, and this applies especially to the dealings of democracies. What is this safeguard? Skepticism. This you must preserve. This you must retain.*
>
> Demosthenes, *Second Philippic*

In terms of alliance longevity, NATO's survival into the 21st century and the organization's sixth decade, is remarkable. With the collapse of com-

Identity may be understood as a state of being that involves values, perceptions, symbols, and the distinctive character of an entity. In this chapter I will examine identity and the identity crisis in the alliance, and I will outline the methodology used in the analysis throughout this work. In the remaining chapters, I will assess the character of the discourse and the factors that have led to the crisis, the re-conceptualization of threats, the

congruent with the definitional criteria for individual or state identity. This is why studies of state identity are useful here as a way to continue to evaluate the alliance's identity.

It may be assumed that identity is imagined and mobilized, and thus humanly constructed, or it may possibly be assumed to be primordial. In part, how identity is characterized is driven by the theoretical approach that is brought to the analysis. Neorealists, for instance, relying on what they contend to be universal laws of international politics, suggest that identity is shaped by the *reality* of the structure and thus there is also a kind of immutability that characterizes identity (Waltz, 1979). Constructivists, by contrast, emphasize the intersubjectively shared ideas, norms and values held by actors, and thus identities are a variable, likely to depend on social, political and historical context (Katzenstein, 1996; Wendt, 1999; Wendt, 1994, 384-96). This is not to say that constructivists suggest that identities are easily malleable. Identities can be hard to change because they are reinforced by practice.

Perhaps the best way to look at a common identity in light of these different theoretical approaches is to employ the flexibility suggested by Valerie Bunce in her examination of what constitutes a nation and its identity (1999, 12-13). She contends that the best way to deal with the debate among primordialists, constructivists and instrumentalists is to look primarily at "density of shared experiences" and the communities of common feelings (Bunce, 1999, 12). Using such an approach, it is possible, I believe, to demonstrate that NATO has a collective identity.

Risse-Kappen, in a study that situates the evaluation of alliance interaction within a larger examination of ontological and epistemological concerns in the study of world politics, argues that the alliance is a community which has "deeply affected *the collective identity* of its members" (emphasis added) (1995, 4, 13-37). He further argues that NATO provides a unique institutional framework whereby Europeans, as noted, have an opportunity to "socialize" the US and affect American policies (Risse-Kappen, 1995, 6-25). Such socialization, which involves norms and values and helps shape discussion and physical structures, speaks to collective identity and very much to the density of shared experiences. Further, such socializing is also part of a larger vision of a community of states with institutionalized and interdependent relationships that reflect liberal theories of international relations that link domestic political structures systematically to the foreign policy of states and, in more recent iterations, speak of a community of democratic nations (Adler, 1992, 287-326).

This collective identity and the density of shared experiences were made

Third, more than just a dimension, collective defence reflected the character of the alliance and a deep long-term consensus during the Cold War. A parsimonious doctrine, collective defence was in line with the goals of traditional alliances that provided for the security of the members of the "club" against threats from the outside. This stood in contrast to collective security which is a far more diffuse concept that emphasizes universalism, the power of moral suasion, an automatic reaction by the entire community of nations against a potential or actual aggressor and underpins the United Nations' approach to preventing and suffocating military threats and aggressions. Containment infused NATO's collective defence with the requirement of longevity. Collective defence in this case had to operate over several decades and it could only do so effectively if it was based on and continued to shape a deep and wide consensus in the alliance. Such a

since a new identity, for instance as a glorified "discussion club" would hardly justify the efforts, expense and commitments of membership, or

was designed to stop the ethnic cleansing of Albanians in Kosovo, underway, the alliance formulated a more updated Strategic Concept that was meant to make the alliance command structure more efficient and allow it to better conduct non-Article 5 crisis response operations (Strategic Concept, 1999). NATO thus seemingly was moving toward building a new consensus on coping with threats that were different from those in the Cold War era. It was also developing an ability and a consensus-based willingness to act "out-of-area."

NATO in the first post Cold War decade also moved to adjust its structures to deal with the new strategic environment, sought to make its forces more mobile and efficient by organizing Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTFs) and encouraged greater European participation (Rearden, 2001, 75-86). As well, the alliance began to modernize some of the central command structures in order to make them more streamlined so as to be better able to cope with new missions, including aid for democracy – a publicly declared goal (Jordan, 2001, 87-99).

Significantly, the alliance began to explore enlargement early on and throughout the first post Cold War decade invested an enormous amount of energy and prestige into the process. At its Rome summit in 1991 the alliance created the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) as a framework for dialogue with the East and Central European states, in 1994 it formulated an outreach program, the Partnership for Peace (PfP) that quickly grew into a large and elaborate undertaking (Simon, 2001, 121-128) and in 1995 it put forth *The Study on Enlargement* which went beyond the "why" to the "how" and "when" of enlargement (Study on NATO Enlargement). In 1999 NATO launched the Membership Action Plan following the first post Cold War enlargement, to help aspiring NATO members focus their preparations for joining the alliance (MAP). NATO even reached out to Russia to reassure it about the alliance enlargement. In 1997 the alliance created the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (Founding Act; Khrushcheva, 2001, 236-41) and in 2002 upgraded this to a new NATO-Russia Council which essentially granted Russia a kind of "ante-chamber" in the alliance in order to enhance consultation (NATO Fact Sheets, 2002). Further vigorous debates among scholars and former policy makers, some favouring enlargement (Kugler, 1997; Larrabee, 1997) and others opposing it (Mandelbaum, 1996; Hyland, 1998; Eisenhower, 1998) not only reflected the concerns and the dilemmas of alliance members but seemed to suggest a healthy alliance discourse.

It would appear then that these alliance policies, processes, structural changes and discourses signalled a successful adaptation of identity. Yet, as recent events and the following chapters will show, alliance aspirations are not necessarily the same as reality. Even extensive discourse does not mean the absence of deep dissonance. This was made all too evident in the sharp disputes within the alliance over the war in Iraq.

. **?** During the fall of 2002 as Washington tried to rally support for the war in Iraq, difference with key West European allies transmogrified into truly harsh disputes. This stood in stark contrast not only to the seemingly smooth transformation of NATO into a viable post Cold War alliance that was able to act jointly and effectively in Yugoslavia, for instance, but also to the warm support for the US in Europe in the wake of 9/11. Following that attack, NATO invoked Article 5 of the alliance's charter, and the Europeans offered large-scale support against the war on terrorism – an offer that to the chagrin of its allies the US did not avail itself of (Cox, 2003, 527). Even when it went to war in Afghanistan, Washington emphasized instead self reliance and "a coalition of the willing." The dispute over Iraq, however, was not just a difference over one conflict. Rather, I believe, it involved a deep crisis that reflected if not an unravelling, then at least great problems with the processes that enabled and fostered mutual socializing within the alliance during the Cold War and played a vital role in creating the type of density of shared experiences that help create and sustain NATO's collective identity.

French President Jacques Chirac's decision to assume a leadership role, with German and Belgian support, to work against American efforts to gather support for war in Iraq in the UN's Security Council and elsewhere and Paris's opposition to Washington's plans to accede to Turkish requests

foreshadowed by America's unwillingness to ratify the Kyoto Protocol and the International Criminal Court (ICC). The depth of the differences is another matter. There are competing explanations as to causes and the motivations of various parties though that do shed considerable light on the character of the dispute. In terms of US motivations the more benign explanations have suggested certain Wilsonian motives and an attachment to universal principals (Gaddis, 2002, 56). Others have contended that much of the problem may be due to the diplomatic ineptitude of the Bush administration (Asmus, 2003, 22, 27). And given the Bush administration's emphasis on unilateralism and its ready disregard for European concerns, it is indeed not impossible to envision that it is pursuing the kind of *autistic power politics* that Christopher Hill wrote about – a foreign policy that is self-regarding and without concern for its impact on others (2003, 243).

For, as French analyst, Dominique Moisi said, "Europeans are asking themselves questions about their essence. The 'who are we?' question is now a very big one …" (Moisi, 2005). There is a risk thus in assuming monolithic responses. Yet, in ascribing to the Europeans (and Americans, for that matter) a monolithic character, Kagan's metaphor could be interpreted as a disincentive for the alliance to even try to find solutions. It follows, it seems, that if the differences are truly irreconcilable, then NATO, which is dependent on a common identity and a deeply shared consensus, is irredeemable.

Yet, even if Kagan is fundamentally mistaken (and I would suggest that he is), the deep divisions within NATO cannot just be papered over. When Bush declared in September 2002 that "if other governments do not act, America will" (*New York Times*, 2002) this could be construed as a strong warning. In introducing a doctrine of pre-emption, though, and in asserting that, "either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists" and that "at some point we [the US] may be the only ones left. That's okay with me. We are America" (Albright, 2003, 3), Washington was articulating a view of the world that is very much in contrast to the multilateral, collective security vision and approach of France or Germany (at least Germany under Gerhard Schroeder. It remains to be seen what changes the new, pro-American Chancellor Angela Merkel, who heads a coalition government that includes Schroeder's SPD, will bring). Moreover, the Bush administration was also signalling that the US would not be influenced and constrained by Europeans when it came to what it perceived as vital national interest. In a sense then, the US was suggesting that it was rejecting external influence, and thus the kind of transatlantic socializing that Risse-Kappen had shown that the Europeans had successfully pursued during the Cold War. Further, in opting for unilateralism and in its preference for ad hoc "coalitions of the willing" the US might have been indicating as well that it was no longer particularly interested in "socializing" its NATO allies in Europe.

For their part, the French also emphasized the deep division and different world views of Paris and Washington. In 2002, then French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin declared that "make no mistake about it: the choice for sure is between two visions of the world" (Albright, 2003, 2). This raised questions both about the ability and the willingness of the

states that entered the alliance in April 2004. These countries sided strongly with the US in the dispute over Iraq and they have very much emphasized collective defence and their readiness to act jointly with Washington in "out-of-area" missions. Poland, for example, has been rewarded with a significant command in Iraq, and the other East European states have been eager to demonstrate their support. As the conflict in Iraq yields evermore casualties, however, popular support in these states may well flag, and some states have, or are in the process of withdrawing their forces. Nevertheless, the East European governments continue to support the overall American policy in Iraq and are extremely anxious to make certain that the US is tied tightly to the alliance. They (governments and populations alike) continue to view America as the most credible source for ensuring their security. There is then, with enlargement, an emerging interacting triangular or triadic relationship within NATO – the US, some key West European states and the East European members. There may also be some new irony in Lord Ismay's famous quip about the purpose of NATO – keeping the Russians out, the Germans down and the Americans in (Cox, 2003, 524). The East Europeans definitely wish to keep the Americans in, but there are some questions as to whether France and some other Europeans basically want to keep the Americans "down" in NATO.

What seems rather clear, I believe, is that the alliance is suffering from a deep crisis that affects its very identity. This is not to suggest that because of this identity crisis it is bound to fail. As Philip Gordon points out, structure is not destiny and discourse can be changed (2003, 72-73). Moreover, as noted, NATO had experienced and overcome other types of crises in the past. This crisis, however, is in key respects qualitatively different. Even such an optimist about NATO and one of the most avid proponents of enlargement as Ronald Asmus has concluded that the current rift in the alliance is "unprecedented in its scope, intensity and at times, pettiness" (2003, 20). Further, it is quite unlikely that this deep division and NATO's identity crisis began only in 2002 as the United States moved to war in Iraq. If the identity crisis was masked earlier, it was no less real. To fully understand the depth and nature of the identity crisis, the possibilities for resolution, and the role of various processes and developments, especially enlargement, there is then a need to examine the post Cold War past in more detail, including the enlargement debates and the discourse within the alliance, the re-conceptualization of threats, and the attempts at adaptation. And though enlargement here is again not viewed as the cause of the alliance's identity crisis, it is worth asking whether the preoccupation

with and the complexity of enlargement and the accentuating of the differences of views within the alliance as new countries join, have masked and exacerbated the alliance's identity crisis, and may pose further dangers in the future.

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Given that this work examines the alliance's identity crisis and the role of NATO enlargement primarily in terms of ideas, norms, and impact of discursive practices on identity and behaviour, the constructivist approach seems most promising. Constructivism holds a number of advantages, for it looks to the role of shared ideas as an ideational structure constraining as well as shaping behaviour. Constructivists, unlike rationalists, do not hold identities or interests constant so that there is every possibility of successful change and adaptation. Moreover, these ideational structures have constitutive and not just regulative effects on actors, which means that they can lead such actors to redefine their interests in the process of interacting (Wendt, 1999; 1994, 384-96). Though constructivism does not suggest that change is easy, it always holds open possibilities for change. Since structures are not reified objects, and they exist only through the reciprocal interaction of the actors, constructivism thus rejects the stultifying determinism of neo-realism (Waltz, 1979).

It is important though not to overstate the differences between social constructivists and rationalists. In each school there can be moderate and hard line approaches (Motyl, 2002, 233-50). Moderate constructivists do not insist that the issues are exclusively about ideas – ideas all the way down (Wendt, 1999). As Risse-Kappen points out as well, it would be a mistake to oversimplify and to suggest that the difference between the two approaches is that constructivists focus on words and norms, whereas rationalists stress deeds and behaviour (1995, 7). Further, as Ted Hopf has contended, despite the vital benefits that constructivism offers in terms of assessing discourse, it is also important to appreciate the limitations of the approach (1998, 171, 177; 2002, 288).

One of the areas where constructivism especially encounters problems is with future uncertainty. Uncertainty is part of the security dilemma faced by an alliance, even if it were to move from collective defence to collectiveeeT*0.0031

remain concerned by some limitations. It does seem though that especially in light of the security dilemma, constructivism here could be supplemented productively by rationalism (and an examination of structures). As Peter Katzenstein shows, emphasizing ideas, norms, and ideational variables does not mean that one has to exclude national security interests (1996). He contends that looking at a set of constraints, certain kinds of interests, and the behaviour of actors as related to the constraining conditions is not entirely illegitimate – just inadequate by itself. Rather, he argues that since that identity and interest are constructed through a process of social interaction, this has to be at the center of the analysis (1996, 1-75). Therefore, physical structures and changes in them can still provide useful information. I will use realist and institutionalist theories (recognizing their limitations) as supplements to assess institutional changes and threats and threat perceptions. As Jeffrey Checkel shows, there may be routes for some productive bridging between constructivism and rationalism (1999, 83-114; 2003, 7-41) and this is worth pursuing here.

This work then will look not only at discursive practices within the alliance, but also at structures, strategies and policies. It will assess discursive practices as manifested in seminal scholarly debates on enlargement, in communications at the key 2002 Prague Summit, and in the interviews with the chief representatives to NATO of the seven new members in the months leading up to the 2004 enlargement. It will also evaluate past and ongoing structural changes, and attempts at re-conceptualization and adaptation. This study will draw on the rich documentation provided by NATO, including the agreements on enlargement and on structural changes, on military data provided by NATO and by independent sources, and on statements and policy formulations of various leaders that touch on enlargement and relations within the alliance and with neighbours. By assessing discourse and developments both prior to the crucial 2002 Prague Summit and since, by evaluating structural reform, and by employing some theoretical pluralism, it is the intent of this work to attempt to produce a 360 degree analysis of how enlargement affects the alliance's identity crisis.

2. The Enlargement Debate and Process

The alliance has been struggling to reinvent itself since the collapse of the Soviet Union. As NATO enlarges to 26 next year, I'm reminded of the Monty Python's "dead parrot" sketch. I feel a number of new members will be asking themselves whether they have bought into a dead organization. It seems clear that NATO will never fight another war. The Pentagon's experience was such that the idea of waging another campaign by a committee of 26 is out of the question. Moreover, Washington is unlikely to change its new doctrine whereby "the mission decides the coalition." NATO will not disappear overnight, but it is likely to continue withering away as it lacks both the glue to hold it together and an appropriate toolbox to tackle today's security threats.

Fraser Cameron, 2003

suggest that enlargement is the cause of the alliance identity crisis – other factors are responsible for precipitating the crisis. Rather, one of my concerns here is that there was insufficient appreciation among scholars and policymakers of the opportunity, or need that the start of post Cold War enlargements created to resolve the identity crisis, or of how enlargement could possibly mask, complicate, or exacerbate the crisis.

Further, this work bridges the constructivist and rationalist approaches. The latter helps with the problem of future uncertainty and the security dilemma by looking at structures and processes. Therefore, this chapter will look both at discursive practices prior to 1999 and at the decisive Prague Summit in 2002 and structural changes that might have helped address the alliance's identity crisis.

(even though the deployment was later finessed) in the transatlantic alliance (Daalder, 2003, 147-57). For the United States especially, if a collective

general, there was an emphasis on the idea of a historical opportunity, of building democracy, and extending the zone of stability and security. In that sense, the alliance was meant to serve as a vehicle for achieving these larger goals. In part, this was reflected in *The 1995 Study on NATO's Enlargement* which emphasized commitment to democratic norms and civilian control of the military, to economic liberty, and to the peaceful settlement of territorial disputes (*The 1995 Study*, Chapter 3).

Several of the proponents of enlargement strongly advocated similar themes and goals. Korb, for instance, offered the possibility to solidify democracy in central Europe as one of the key reasons for enlargement (Korb, 1998, 49-55). Asmus, one of the earliest proponents, characterized enlargement as a political, moral, and economic imperative for the democratic West (1997, 69-71). Brzezinski similarly stressed enhancement of democracy, among other benefits (1998, 13-17; 1995, 34-35). Stephen Larrabee also emphasized the consolidation of democracy in Eastern Europe and the need for a stable security framework (1993, 175-55). This was in addition to his other concerns such as a new transatlantic bargain that would enhance European defence contributions (and Europe's defence identity – though the latter is not the same as overall alliance identity) while reducing the American burden (Larrabee, 1993, 174; Asmus, Kugler and Larrabee, 1993, 2-14). Jeffrey Simon also emphasized support for democracy as a primary justification for enlargement though he did this through the narrower channel of stressing "effective" democratic control of the military and changes in civil military relations in Eastern Europe (Simon, 1995, 4, 45-67).

Other proponents focused more on the military dimensions such as possibilities for the better coordination of forces (Kelleher, 1995, 179-83). Some contended that the new members were not net consumers of security, that they would not become free-riders, and that the cost of their inclusion would not strain NATO's common budgets (Selden and Lis, 2002, 3, 10). Moreover, even among those who emphasized consolidation of democracy and the extension of the zone of stability, there were often narrower concerns which reflected leftover elements of a Cold War agenda. For instance, they stressed containing Russia, even if this was through a "special relationship" (Brzezinski, 1995, 34) or the need to move forward with enlargement lest the United States lose national prestige if it backed down on enlargement (Korb, 1998, 51). Further, as noted, American writers frequently emphasized the positive aspects in terms of the benefits for American interests and influence in NATO that would be derived from

enlargement (Korb, 1998, 51; Asmus, 1997, 61-72; Larrabee, 1993, 174-78).

Despite the wide-ranging justifications for enlargement that the proponents offered, they did not address in a meaningful way the issue of alliance identity, that in turn would ultimately determine how NATO operated and whether it remained relevant. The closest perhaps that we have is an indirect reference to the problem. It came from a European, Hans Jochen Peters, the Head of the Central and Eastern Europe and Liaison Section, Political Affairs Division at NATO, who wrote in 1995 that enlarging NATO would be an act of major political significance and that it differed from previous enlargements because those took place within the framework of a clearly and "rigorously defined European security architecture" (1995, 167, 173). Even Peters though did not elaborate on the need to address issues of alliance identity and how enlargement may relate to a NATO identity crisis.

If this latter omission was a failing of proponents, then it seems that opponents of enlargement did not do much better. Opponents or skeptics also focused on certain themes that may indeed be important but largely left out the essential issue of identity and what role enlargement may play in the case of an alliance identity crisis. Michael Mandelbaum, for instance, expressed his skepticism regarding NATO as an instrument that would help consolidate democracy in the East, suggested that domestic political motivations in the United States were a key but hidden determinant, and worried that enlargement would so poison relations with Russia in the longer term that overturning the post Cold War settlement could become a central aim of future Russian foreign policy (1996, 52-61). Ronald Steel argued that enlargement was driven by a fear in the United States that the alliance would become irrelevant and that American influence in NATO would diminish without Washington realizing that, ironically, expansion would contribute precisely to what America feared (1998, 243-51). In a similar vein, Charles Kupchan, who generally favoured helping the post-communist states in Eastern Europe, contended that enlarging NATO (and the EU), especially in the absence of an external threat to these states, would weaken the alliance (1997, 130-33). Others, such as Michael E. Brown, questioned the logic that enlargement was needed since in his view there was no direct threat to the alliance (1997, 123-25), while Philip Zelikow argued that an enlargement that was motivated by an attempt to save NATO made no sense since the alliance was not in trouble (1997, 84-85).

Both proponents and opponents then missed or did not adequately address the possibility, if not the reality, of an alliance identity crisis that

would emerge in light of the fundamental transformation of the Cold War system and the role that enlargement could play in ameliorating, masking, or complicating the problem. Though concerns about democratization, efficiency, relevance, and American influence may well have been justified, both opponents and proponents failed to assess enlargement in terms of the opportunity that it might present to help resolve an emerging or actual alliance identity crisis, to examine how important it would have been to resolve identity issues before enlargement, and to appreciate adequately how enlargement may complicate an alliance identity crisis. This is why it should be worthwhile to assess the discourse among alliance leaders as NATO embarked on its second (and much larger) post Cold War enlargement, and ascertain whether (following the experience of the first enlargement) they had developed a broader and deeper understanding of the relationship between the alliance identity crisis and enlargement.

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At one level, the great gathering of NATO leaders in Prague in November 2002 was a celebration of apparent post Cold War success. They claimed that joint alliance action had stopped genocidal ethnic cleansing in Kosovo and they issued invitations to seven new members to join NATO (while three additional states, Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and Albania, eagerly awaited their turn to join). Though the breakthrough on enlargement came earlier, with President Bill Clinton declaring back in 1994 that NATO enlargement is "no longer a question of whether, but when and how" (Dobbs, 1995), the fact that so many states continued to seek membership seemed to suggest to the leaders in Prague an affirmation of the relevance and validity of the alliance. At another level, though, there was also an opportunity to express a vision of the alliance as it became ever larger and confronted new challenges, and a chance to communicate and interact among the leaders. Discounting the expected enthusiasm and boosterism, certain tendencies and directions did become apparent in the speeches of alliance leaders.

For the three former Warsaw Pact states that had joined the alliance in 1999, this was indeed a celebration of rejoining Europe. Moreover, they had pushed hard for further enlargement. They expressed no concern with any alliance identity crisis, but rather unequivocally viewed enlargement as an affirmation of NATO's legitimacy and relevance. The Hungarian prime

minister, for instance, stressed that the alliance remained solid and effective, and that it was engaged in a process of robust enlargement (Medgyessy, 2002). The president of the Czech Republic interpreted enlargement as a signal to the world of a new era where countries could no longer be forced into spheres of influence or where the strong could subjugate the weak – a strong allusion to the end of Soviet hegemony and the safeguarding of future East European security (Havel, 2002). Similarly, the president of Poland referred to the ending of the legacy of Yalta and Potsdam that had divided Europe, and related enlargement to consolidating democracy (Kwasniewski, 2002). In emphasizing the benefits of enlargement, these East European leaders essentially focused on the importance of maintaining security (even when speaking of democracy) through collective defence as a way of ensuring their new-found freedoms. Though they spoke of peaceful external relations, their primary concern was safeguarding the members of the alliance, and this meant that they would want American assurances since the United States had not only fully backed enlargement,

Minister Berlusconi praised the United States for the economic burden

post Cold War era, there were vast differences among key members in the vision of what NATO was and what it ought to be.

Unfortunately though, the United States and Germany did not engage in the type of discourse that can change mindsets and build a new consensus. The type of positive discursive practices that Alexander Wendt, for instance, wrote about such as other-regarding approaches (Wendt, 1999, 249) that would be essential for change in this case, were not only absent but America and Germany seemed to be two solitudes that did not really communicate. Yet, spirals of hostility could be prevented, eliminated, or at least diminished by using better discursive practices which emphasize a commonality of interests among allies, willingness to compromise, and a strong commitment to building consensus. For example, during the difficult dispute within NATO over the deployment of Pershing and cruise missiles in Europe, the United States and West Germany were able to compromise. They emphasized consensus, and settled on a two-track approach that included the German desire to maintain constructive engagement with the Soviet Union by keeping the negotiation option open. Nevertheless, enlarging the alliance is such an important step that it should have and still could provide significant opportunities for NATO to restructure, if not entirely through better discursive and social practices, then partly via physical restructuring to meet the challenges it is confronting.

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Celeste Wallander, for instance, has argued that whether institutions adapt to change depends on having specific institutional assets for dealing with instability and mistrust, and general institutional assets to adapt to environments that have changed drastically (Wallander, 2000, 706-12). She suggested that alliances that have such institutional assets (and she suggests that NATO has some of these assets, Wallander, 2000, 723-31) could even adapt to situations that lack threats. Though this approach (that does acknowledge norms) may well understate ideational factors, it does point to certain *possibilities* for adaptation – including that of alliance identity – even if discursive practices have not changed sufficiently.

Some of the recent scholarly literature suggests further possibilities for exploring this alliance dimension. J. J. Suh, for example, looked at asset as well as discourse specificity, in part to broaden the theoretical approach to alliance identity and behaviour as compared to rationalistic theorizing (2003, 26-79). In his theoretical explanation of alliance persistence which he

defined as "a phenomenon characterized by an alliance which has outlived its original *raison d'être*" (2003, 30), he looked at the case of the U.S.-Republic of Korea (ROK) alliance. This alliance, like NATO, has also enjoyed remarkable longevity and may have moved beyond its original *raison d'être* (although there are some important differences, including the fact that, although the conventional military capacity of North Korea has declined, its domestic political system remains unaltered, and it may have acquired nuclear weapons, thus continuing to pose at least some threat). There are important lessons to be learned from the role that asset specificity can play in changing identity. As Suh shows, identity can change as states interact with one another, international alliance practices change state iden-

perhaps success should be defined as an adaptation that meets the alliance's vital needs. Therefore, the effectiveness of structural change has to be judged very much in terms of the challenges that the alliance confronts. And these range from enhancing the effectiveness of military procurement all the way to reconciling differences in fundamental visions on multilateralism, relations with international organizations, threat perceptions, and out-of-area operations. Again, the latter groups of challenges collectively create an identity crisis in an organization that was built on the notion of classical collective defence but now faces a push towards collective security (a far broader and fuzzier concept).

More specifically, there is a problem of reconciling the American vision (at least that of the Bush administration) of NATO as a global defence alliance with its missions frequently defined exclusively by Washington and that of European states like Germany and France which wish to see such key decisions first be taken before NATO. There, these European countries believe, they could then act as restraints if they deemed it necessary, and they could push more strongly for their preference of collective security (Donovan, 2003). It would be difficult to mesh such divergent goals under the best of circumstances, and especially hard to create physical structures and processes that would do so effectively. Matters are further complicated by enlargement as the number of members of NATO increases significantly to twenty six from ten in just five years. Additionally, as the European Union (EU) seeks to develop its military dimension, there is a problem of how to resolve the "complementarity" of NATO and EU developments (O'Rourke, 2003).

The alliance has in fact acted "out-of-area" not only in the former Yugoslavia, but now in Afghanistan, yet this has not entirely satisfied the Bush administration. Therefore, there is a concern not only about satisfying European states but also a worry whether the United States still views the alliance as strategically relevant and whether it remains committed to it. Add to this the large and complex task of promoting various partnership initiatives (an ongoing task together with maintaining the NATO-Russia Council) and of integrating three new members in 1999 and seven more in 2004, and it would seem that the prudent course would have been to make the structural changes that would try to reconcile the fundamental divisions in the alliance prior to or conjointly with such enlargements.

NATO did in fact embark on significant structural and procedural changes in 1999 and 2002. In April 1999, it launched the Membership Action Plan (MAP) designed to help countries which wished to join the alliance prepare

for possible membership (*Membership Action Plan*). It is meant to foster the compatibility of aspirants with NATO members in the political and economic, defence and military, resource, security, and legal realms. The problem is that in all these realms it is basically a matter of endorsing the status quo in NATO rather than developing a new vision that would generate the type of transatlantic consensus that would resolve the deep and dangerous chasm (an identity crisis) before the alliance becomes more preoccupied with and its decision-making process is further complicated by enlargement.

NATO did not adequately avail itself of such an opportunity with MAP. In 1999, for instance, it would have made sense at the very least to complement NATO's 1999 Strategic Concept by adding chapters to the plan that dealt with issues on which there was a possibility of transatlantic consensus (such as counter-terrorism) (Moroney, 2003, 24, 27-28). True, in 1999 the alliance did create the new Command Structure which was a significant improvement in efficiency (Vallance, 2003). Though it helped the

primarily concerned with improved public relations rather than altering alliance decision-making or helping reshape the discourse among NATO leaders.

Complicating matters further was the possibility, following the Prague Summit that France and Germany, dissatisfied with the direction of the alliance and their input in decision-making, would set up a separate EU military headquarters for operational planning (Lobjakas, 2003). This shows how the alliance, despite the seemingly positive affirmation of enlargement, risks becoming increasingly less relevant as key European members may be searching for an alternative. The gravity of the situation was made evident when Nicholas Burns, then U.S. Ambassador to NATO, warned that the French-German plan could cause a serious crisis within the alliance (Lobjakas, 2003a). Attempts to finesse such differences are likely to be made more difficult by enlargement since the new members, as noted, support the United States, insist on classical collective defence, and, perhaps ironically, several of them are also joined the EU in May 2004.

Thus, the structural changes following the first post Cold War enlargement and at the time the decision was made on the second, in 2002, though

status quo but that it could have destabilizing external effects (Burant, 2001, 25). Others, such as the former American Secretary of State James Baker, have argued that the alliance committed a grave mistake by not making Russia eligible for membership (provided that it met the enlargement cri-

problems. When problems are masked it is less likely that they will be addressed.

There are others though who suggest that something more deliberate was at work. It is easier at times to create an impression of success by dealing with certain seemingly manageable issues rather than address the more difficult ones. Some analysts have concluded that enlargement in fact involved a deliberate diversion from tough alliance problems and the much needed direct discussion of such matters as vital interests, regional policies, and military readiness (Zelikow, 1997, 78, 88). Some have even suggested that the eagerness to enlarge was so great that it masked the severe lack of readiness and the inability to fulfill NATO's own criteria for

eyes of its members) its continued relevance. Instead, the second round was used mainly as a celebration of enlargement and as a rhetorical

3. *Re-conceptualizing Threats and the Search for Consensus*

No alliance can function successfully in the absence of a common strategy, or in the presence of competing strategies.

Renewing the Atlantic Partnership, 2004, 10

Safeguarding citizens against external threats is one of the primary responsibilities of all governments. Traditionally, alliances have been a common means to help ensure such security. One of history's oldest power tools, an alliance is intended to strengthen a state by adding the power of allies to its own so that together they can more effectively confront common threats. During the Cold War, NATO, with its intricate structures and alliance consultative mechanisms, was largely successful in making certain that the members' key interests and threat perceptions remained compatible. It formed a common alliance identity which was influenced by external dangers, but this identity also shaped, as Ted Hopf suggested, NATO's understanding and classification of states as allies, adversaries or something in between (Hopf, 1998, 172-73). In other words, identity profoundly affected threat perception even as external threats helped shape alliance identity. It should not be surprising then that an alliance identity crisis would play a key role in helping to induce or, at the very least, widen diverging threat perceptions and risk assessments within the organization, just as new and different threats emerge in the international system.

Diverging threat perceptions in an alliance that has been characterized for decades by a deep consensus on grand strategy are not likely to produce

mild differences that could be easily overcome at summit meetings or, alternately, could be ignored while other important alliance functions operate normally. After all, identifying common threats, prioritizing them, and then using the hierarchy of threats to develop methods to deal with them has been traditionally the central function of NATO. Therefore, an inability to find common ground has a profoundly negative impact, only to be amplified as the alliance is undergoing a massive and open-ended enlargement process that within the short space of five years has increased membership to twenty six states. The new members have and are investing much of their hopes and aspirations, together with their desire for security, in the alliance. As Bronislav Geremek, the former minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland and a distinguished historian contended, for East Europeans, NATO is not only a military alliance but also "a community of values, a community of aspirations" (Atlantic Treaty Associations). There is thus a great deal to lose for these new members, especially if there were to be a breakdown in an alliance that in the past not only developed long-standing physical structures, but one that, because of common values and norms, and through discourse and shared ideas, created an ideational structure that reflected deep consensus and made the alliance effective.

This alliance consensus, however, is now breaking down or, at the very least, is under tremendous strain. A Council on Foreign Relations report by a twenty six member transatlantic task force (co-chaired by Lawrence H. Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and now president of Harvard, and former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger) that was released in March 2004 concluded that transatlantic relations were at a dangerously low ebb (Renewing the Atlantic Partnership, 2004). This chapter therefore, will examine the risks of diverging threat perceptions in NATO, and will assess the efforts at re-conceptualizing and finding a consensus. It is an assessment of the problems in transatlantic relations that recognizes the need to go beyond Robert Kagan's somewhat simplistic "Venus" versus "Mars" divisions (2003). There are at least three different worldviews that need to be and will be evaluated: that of the US; that of certain West European states; and that of the new East European members. The views of the latter perhaps have been the least well understood and the potential impact on the alliance has been inadequately appreciated. This chapter then will not only examine these three approaches but will have a special focus on Eastern Europe as NATO enlarges, and in particular, on the discursive practices as expressed in statements and interviews with the representatives of the newest members of NATO.

A ◤ P ◤ ◤◤

During the Cold War, tactical and specific policy differences in NATO did

risk of underestimating or misunderstanding the fears that a seemingly all powerful state may have. Changes in the structure of the international system can deeply affect the perceptions of even the most dominant powers.

Major structural changes have been taking place in the international system for some time and the contours were clear by the time of NATO's latest enlargements. Paul Bracken, for instance, has referred to a new era, the "the second nuclear age" (2003, 399-412). In contrast to the first nuclear age which he characterizes as a contest of "two internationalisms" – democracy and communism – one that involved a bilateral nuclear contest (despite the British and French nuclear arsenals which, in his view, did not change the Cold War dynamics), the new era, he contends, is that of an *n-player game* (2003, 403-06). Such an n-player game, which involves multiple-player situations, creates both greater complexity and far more uncertainty. New nuclear powers, countries seeking to gain nuclear weapons, and militant groups possibly attempting to acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMD), all interacting in such an n-player game situation would make planning more difficult and less predictable. Some analysts such as Tomas Valasek, therefore have argued that even though the existential threat that characterized the Cold War is gone, today's challenges may be even greater, precisely because of such uncertainties (Ortega versus Valasek, 2003).

American threat perceptions have been significantly affected by these uncertainties though such perceptions have also been filtered by how the

threats, both geographically and in terms of character. Though it did not give up on deterrence either as dissuasion or denial (Yost, 2003), it showed considerable impatience and frustration with the traditional strategies of containment and constructive engagement. By June 2002 President Bush, for instance, declared that "deterrence – the promise of massive retaliation against nations – means nothing against shadowy terrorist networks with no nation or citizens to defend… containment is not possible when unbalanced dictators with weapons of mass destruction can deliver those weapons on missiles or secretly provide them to terrorist allies" (Kim, 2003, 732).

More changes were forthcoming in Washington. During the Cold War the United States had rejected the notions of "preventive" or "pre-emptive" war (*NSC*, 68). Under the belief that the United States was facing nihilistic adversaries who in many cases could not be deterred by traditional means, the Bush administration, as a result of the way in which it categorized threats, moved to a strategy of pre-emption. Moreover, it appeared to blur the distinction between a pre-emptive attack, which consists of prompt actions on the basis of evidence that an enemy is about to strike and the preventive war which involves military operations undertaken to avert plausible risks in the future (Yost, 2003).

In September 2002 the United States introduced the new *National Security Strategy* which declared that "traditional concepts of deterrence will not work against a terrorist enemy whose avowed tactics are wanton destruction and the targeting of innocents; whose so-called soldiers seek martyrdom in death and whose most potent protection is statelessness. The overlap between states that sponsor terror and those that pursue WMDs compels us to action" (*The National Security Strategy*; Yost, 2003). Crucially, such an approach differed not only with previous American interpretations of threats and policies to address them, but also with the policies and perceptions of a number of key West European states such as France and Germany. The United States elevated pre-emptive action to the status of a doctrine and the shock of 9/11 seems to have helped persuade the Bush administration to enforce this doctrine regardless of the views of any of its allies. This inflexible approach, I would suggest, has had three major problematic effects that should have been foreseen and addressed at the Prague Summit.

First, given the way that the United States has defined the threats and formulated its strategy of response, it has signalled its NATO allies that it will not be constrained if it believes that its vital national interests are at stake. Therefore, the United States is essentially jettisoning one of the key

binding factors in the alliance during the Cold War, namely, the ability of the European allies to socialize and persuade Washington.

Second, the United States seems to be losing interest in NATO, at least in terms of its role as a traditional alliance. The notion of the "coalition of the willing" that the US Secretary of Defence, Donald Rumsfeld, has spoken of so frequently indicates that Washington is attaching considerably less importance to the alliance as a whole. There are increasing fears that the United States may view NATO as a "military 'chop shop' needed for spare parts that are to be cobbled into a US military operation" whenever needed (Flanagan, 2002). Though such fears may well be overstated, the cavalier attitude in Washington towards NATO, especially as expressed by Secretary Rumsfeld, has not been reassuring. For instance, in February 2004, despite the deep divisions in the alliance and the organization's identity crisis, he declared that he believed that the health of the alliance was good, as were the relations between the United States and the European countries (Rumsfeld, 2004). Moreover, he emphasized that seventeen of the twenty six of the NATO and invitees' countries have forces in Iraq as evidence of this "good alliance health," even though much of this allied presence is post-conflict and is largely symbolic.

Third, though it may be ironic that the United States, with its unmatched global power, has concluded that in so many cases containment, deterrence and constructive engagement cannot work, Washington's emphasis on hard power and the military instrument combined with its "all horizons" threat perception, is so starkly at odds with that of some of its key

limit the proliferation of WMDs. Moreover, as NATO's new Secretary General is fond of repeating, NATO invoked Article 5 in the wake of 9/11 and West European aircraft flew across the Atlantic to help protect American air space against potential new terrorist attacks (de Hoop Scheffer, 2004a). Further, West European allies have been willing to deal with out-of-area threats. France and Germany have fought jointly with NATO forces to stop the ethnic cleansing of Kosovar Albanians in 1999 and have provided peacekeeping troops for Kosovo. They are also making major contributions to the NATO force that took command in Afghanistan in the summer of 2003 – the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) – and that is attempting to bring peace to Afghanistan province by province (Lobjakas, 2004d). Finally, West European allies, including Germany, the Netherlands, France and Italy are even pursuing shorter-range missile defences and France and Italy plan to deploy the first ground-based versions of the Aster system sometimes in 2005 (Yost, 2003).

On the surface at least then, it does not appear that there are fundamental differences in threat perceptions between the United States on the one hand and some of its key West European allies on the other. Yet a more detailed examination of threat perceptions shows that differences, in fact, are deep. This in turn influences the policies of key West European states in coping with international dangers and in dealing with the United States and with other European nations, especially the new alliance members. France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg (and with the Zapatero government in Spain), and even some of the European states that supported the war in Iraq, clearly do not see the threat from terrorism and WMDs in the same way as the United States does. For instance, whereas the United States has defined the threat of international terrorism and WMDs as potentially catastrophic, made ever more dangerous, as noted, because (in Washington's view) it is nihilistic and geographically unlimited, key West European states view these threats as dangerous but containable and geographically limited (Ortega versus Valasek, 2003).

Since in the eyes of West European states such as France and Germany

than in engaging in pre-emptive strikes (Flanagan, 2002). The new Angela Merkel government may wish to move closer to the US stance, but since the Chancellor leads a fragile coalition with the rival SPD, there may be rather limited change in the German stance on this issue. These approaches tie in with the European emphasis on the use of soft power and thus a preference for employing discourse and constructive engagement to moderate the behaviour of threatening or unstable regimes. This is also congruent with grand European programs such as the gradual extension of international law and institutions to the global community modeled on the successes in post war Western Europe (Renewing the Atlantic Partnership,

Greater Middle East Initiative (GMEI) that is designed to bring democracy to the region, with some trepidation since they are concerned that NATO could be relegated to some relatively insignificant supporting role with little influence over Washington (Lobjakas, 2004d).

Not unexpectedly, with the disappearance of the perceived Soviet threat, the West European states do not any longer unquestioningly accept the legitimacy of American leadership or the use of American power (Csongos, 2004). Therefore, even European moderates can view US actions that marginalize them, that indicate an American rejection of European input and influence, as threats themselves that need to be contained. Hence, alliance members such as France and Germany may be addressing threats through a system of *double containment* – containing the threats of terrorism and WMDs on the one hand, and containing a unilateralist United States on the other.

Containing the United States though presents special problems for states such as France and Germany both in the way they relate to NATO and in how they handle alliance enlargement. For instance, if they are to build a counterweight to the United States, is it better to do it within NATO or outside the alliance? EU attempts to build a rapid reaction force cannot, at least in the foreseeable future, create a credible military alternativh as Fra0.0156 TwhpnO

and the Czech prime minister want insurance and have all stressed the security provided by NATO membership and the need to maintain firm and functional transatlantic ties (RFE/RL, Newsline a and b, 2004).

Third, staying close to the United States may be a matter of pragmatism. The East Europeans understand that as they are joining the EU, their strongest economic ties will be in Europe but that the security assurances that they seek could only be provided by the United States – at least in the near future. Adam Michnik, the Editor-in-Chief of Poland's most influential newspaper, *Gazeta Wyborcza*, and one of Poland's leading public intellectuals, contended that "Poland's future is in the EU, but its security is in the United States" (Kuzio, 2003).

Fourth, the East European states may also be reacting to perceived West European slights, humiliations and to disappointed expectations. West European states have not been particularly generous or sensitive with their East European partners. France and Germany have opposed giving Poland a larger voting weight (as agreed to previously in the Nice Treaty) in the European Parliament, have put the East Europeans through humiliating negotiations in their efforts to join the EU, greatly limited their access to agricultural subsidies for ten years after joining and imposed restrictions to keep eastern workers out for several years (Darnton, 2004; Cowell, 2004; Taras, 2004, 14-15). Further, French President Jacques Chirac in criticizing Poland for sending troops to Iraq denounced its "immaturity," while various European commentators labelled Poland as "America's Trojan horse" (Taras, 2004, 12).

Last, there are differences between East Europeans and West Europeans in terms of the strategy for dealing with threats that the former perceive. For East Europeans, continuing to enlarge NATO eastward is imperative because in their eyes expansion builds a buffer zone of democracy. Bronislav Geremek, for instance, has argued that Poland should be a "carrier of freedom" by bringing early NATO enlargement to Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova (Atlantic Treaty Association). The West Europeans by contrast are unenthusiastic about further enlargement. Olivier Duhamel, for example, suggested in March 2004 that in France people are concerned with French identity and consequently fear enlargement (Darnton, 2004). It is to the Americans then that the East Europeans need to go in order to gain support for enlargement, despite the significance of economic ties that they will have in the EU. The East Europeans therefore are very concerned about American abandonment and transatlantic divisions. Michnik, for example, warned that "we don't want an anti-American EU" (Darnton, 2004).

E E ◤ E ◤ NA O

East European threat perceptions, the impact of NATO enlargement, and their expectations of the alliance have been perhaps most clearly enunciated in a series of formal interviews with the heads of mission of the seven new states joining in 2004. The interviews were arranged and conducted by NATO. Each head of mission was specifically asked about his or her country's expectations of NATO as well as the contributions each wished to make and the type of influence each hoped to exert. Coming within months of enlargement, these extensive interviews revealed a rich picture of considerable diversity but also remarkable consensus on a number of key issues.

First, most of the interviewees made a special point of emphasizing that they viewed NATO foremost as a collective defence organization (Sinkovec, 2004; Liegis, 2004; Slobodnik, 2004; Valev, 2003). For example, Ambassador Imants Liegis of Latvia was quite specific when he responded that "essentially our expectations in receiving the invitation and becoming full members of the alliance really relate to the basis on which NATO was established back in 1949 and it was established as we know as a collective defence organization" (Liegis, 2004).

Second, the Heads of Mission of the new members also made it clear that they were looking for hard power support, and in this sense they were very much in line with American strategies in dealing with threats (Sinkovec, 2004; Damusis, 2004; Valev, 2003; Mazuru, 2004; Tiido, 2003). The representatives from the Baltic States which had only recently regained their independence following several decades of Soviet annexation were especially keen on such hard power or hard security guarantees. Estonia's Ambassador declared that "NATO is definitely the only hard security guarantee available" (Tiido, 2003). Ginte Damusis similarly saw NATO enlargement as providing such assurances when she stated that "we see this as the reinforcement of our national security interest, namely that we'll be receiving the hard security guarantees that we've worked for so long" (Damusis, 2004).

Other new members which had been formally independent of the Soviet Union (though members of the Socialist bloc) also insisted on hard security guarantees. Romania's Ambassador, Bogdan Mazuru, for example, contended that "NATO has been the most relevant, the most effective organization, the most successful alliance in the past 55 years. And the fact

NATO. We want NATO to remain what it is – this kind of pillar for defence and security in Europe" (Mazuru, 2004). The President of Romania, Traian Basescu, reinforced this interpretation when he declared that "The Washington-London-Bucharest axis will be a foreign policy priority for Romania's president" (Tomiuc, 2004b). He also demonstrated his insistence on hard security guarantees by finalizing negotiations for a US military base in Romania (RFE/RL Features, 2005a). Thus, the East European states in speaking to their West European allies (and the world) were (and are) arguing for traditional collective defence rather than collective security in order to deal with the threats that they perceive. And they made it abundantly clear that they expected hard power guarantees.

Third, the interviewees were also very keen to address the transatlantic divisions and to make it known how badly they wanted to make sure that American power remained committed to the alliance. Slovenia's Ambassador, Matjaz Sinkovec, started by saying that "security, especially in view of the new asymmetric threats, can best be provided for by an appropriate international organization. It had been demonstrated in the recent past that NATO is the only body that can successfully deal with such threats" (Sinkovec, 2004). Then he added, very pointedly that "We are strong supporters of the transatlantic link and hope that the United States will not reduce their commitment to Europe. As shown in recent history their involvement in the security of Europe is of utmost importance" (Sinkovec, 2004). In other words, Ambassador Sinkovec was suggesting that American hard power and commitment to collective defence is a *sine qua non* for effective alliance defence and a meaningful commitment to its members.

That the United States had to remain a member of the alliance was just as strongly emphasized by the other interviewees. Ambassador Emil Valev of Bulgaria went out of his way to stress the importance of the transatlantic link and reminded his audience that, "The security guarantees, embodied in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty bring together Europe and North America in upholding common values and fighting common threats" (Valev, 2003). For, as the Slovak Ambassador, Igor Slobodnik, declared, threats do not just disappear, "the feel-safe factor could be treacherous, as peoples of Central Europe know only too well" (Slobodnik, 2004). He added later, "… we will strive, therefore, to cultivate strong transatlantic links within the alliance" (Slobodnik, 2004). Romania's ambassador, Mazuru, was also absolutely insistent about the necessity of America's participation and military commitment to making NATO the effective collective defensive organization that his country expected it to be. He declared that " … the

presence of America in the security and defence of Europe in the past 55 years made NATO and Europe stronger and we believe that the relationship between NATO and the EU is very important" (Mazuru, 2004). Latvia's ambassador, Liegis, warned the EU about any attempts to supplant NATO. He stated that "we regard the success of European defence as being important, but not in competition to NATO" and restated Latvia's goal of making

more successful between the West Europeans and the East European on the one hand than between the Americans and key West European states on the other. For example, in October 2005, Poland's newly-elected President, Lech Kaczynski, indicated that he would take a harder line on relations with Germany and toward the EU (*The New York Times*, 2005). As security relations between Poland and Russia have worsened during the past year, Warsaw has been especially unhappy about a German-Russian plan to build a gas pipeline under the Baltic Sea that will bypass Poland (ibid.) President Kaczynski also indicated that he intended to take a tough line on Russia (in contrast to Germany and France) and that he would place top priority on strengthening transatlantic friendship with the United States

4. Rethinking Institutions and Attempts at Adaptation

Wallander, as noted in Chapter 2, successful alliances that persist, possess specific institutional assets for dealing with instability and mistrust, and general assets that are capable of adapting to new environments (2000, 705-35). Suh, in turn, argues that asset specificity can play a strong role not only in binding the member states together but also in transcending the original security interests which bound the allies together (2003, 27). I have also argued, though, that prior to 2002 attempts at institutional adaptation in NATO were inadequate. The strong commitment that NATO made

Supporters of this reorganization may be right that this was significant "functional rationalization" (Vallance, 2003). What does the streamlining mean, though, in terms of the larger issues of adaptation, and in light of the aspirations of key West European members? The creation of one command may certainly be more efficient, but the Allied Command Operations (ACO) continues to be headed by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), and SACEUR has always been and is to remain an American officer. This hardly satisfies the desire of some of the West European states to have a larger input. Furthermore, the most vital decisions will continue to be made by the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and the processes in that body have remained unchanged. As well, even though the Allied Command Atlantic (SACLANT) in Norfolk, Virginia has been eliminated, it has been replaced by a new command – Allied Command Transformation (in Norfolk, Virginia) – designed to oversee the transformation of NATO's military capabilities.

Consequently, although it is not unreasonable to assume that once the alliance decides on a certain military action, this will be carried out more cost-effectively and operationally more efficiently, this streamlining of the command structure does not address the central decision-making issues for West European allies – input and influence. The reference to "functional rationalization," alluding to the Bauhaus architectural doctrine of "form follows function" in fact begs the question of what the "function" is in this case. The key battle is over what the function of the alliance is to be. Changing the command structure does not resolve the problem of determining more clearly and making equitable the *function* of the alliance. That is, the desired function is one that is determined by alliance consensus and is effective in addressing evolving threats, competing threat perceptions, and an alliance identity crisis.

◤NA O R◤ ◤F ◤(NRF)

NATO's decision to create a rapid reaction force, the other major institution reform, is congruent with the "Prague Capabilities Commitment" and the alliance's transformation agenda (Prague Summit Declaration). More than just adding flexibility and further capability to the alliance, the NRF is designed to be a "joint multinational force package" (The NATO Response Force I). When fully operational by the fall of 2006, it should have up to 21,000 troops, should be ready to deploy in five days, and should be able to sustain itself for 30 days (The NATO Response Force II). The

multinational approach is important here because it differs conceptually from the traditional NATO drawing of resources from individual states, as needed. By contrast, this multinational entity is expected to be at a high state of readiness, to be fully trained and certified, and to be capable of a wide spectrum of missions, including power projection. Command of the force moreover would rotate among NATO members. In October 2003 a British general was put in charge of the NRF as the force moved towards Initial Operational Capability by 2004, and Full Operational Capability by the fall of 2006 (SHAPE News, 2003).

Despite these multinational trappings, though, the NRF is less than it seems. First, even at its full complement of 21,000, this will be a limited

processes in the alliance as well as the limited military capabilities of the alliance members, especially those in Europe. Even an article in *NATO Review* that speaks favourably of alliance transformation could only claim as late as spring 2005 that the NATO Response Force will "*soon* provide transformed military assets …" (emphasis added) (Joyce, 2005).

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Allied worries over capabilities are not new. Throughout the Cold War there were severe concerns within the alliance over disparities in military capabilities. For decades there was a sense in the United States that there was insufficient burden-sharing by the increasingly prosperous West Europeans and that at least some Europeans were "free riders." Given the

(Jane's Defence Weekly, 2004b). And the actual and perceived gaps in capabilities have generated a great deal of friction and frustration within the alliance on both sides of the Atlantic.

Further, the gap in capabilities has widened. As Appathurai shows, the decline in military expenditures by non-US NATO states was quite pre-

Though these differences in vision greatly complicate gaps in capabilities, they do not rise to the level of a breakdown of a common ideology (in this case democracy). The risk, then, is not that there will be an alliance breakdown precipitated by ideological factors (Walt, 1987, 35-39). Nevertheless, significant differences in vision especially combined with frustrations engendered by capability gaps do speak to an identity crisis that can create very major risks for the alliance. Further, attempts to "unbundle" alliance military capabilities (and as some fear France's goal of creating a "pan-European" military force via the EU might do), that is to use some forces for non-alliance purposes, as a means to address alternate visions and gaps in capabilities can quickly and sharply magnify fissures. More specifically, moves by some West European states to create EU military forces and headquarters that are, or at the very least, are perceived as an alternative to NATO, can generate such risks.

It is true that the proponents of the common European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) which was launched in June 1999, in the wake of NATO's military campaign against Yugoslavia (Rontoyanni, 2002, 813-15), did not view or intend this as a challenge to NATO. Rather they envisioned ESDP a means to enhance European defence. Similarly, the 1999 Headline Goal which set out a requirement for the creation of a force of 50,000 to 60,000 troops that would be able to act rapidly on the authority of the Union was not meant as a challenge to NATO (Clarke and Cornish,

European success in building an independent European military capability. The European rapid reaction force is very much at an inchoate stage and France and Germany have largely abandoned their plans for a core defence (Grant, 2003). In terms of the proposed headquarters, the British now seem to acknowledge the possibility that the EU may need to do some of its own operational planning (which could evolve into a real headquarters) but this could be done only if everybody agreed to it (Grant, 2003).

though, against the need to adapt to multiple and more complex international threats, greater disparities in capabilities within the alliance, and the complications of enlargement. Physical asset specificity, therefore, could only play a pivotal role in adaptation and in allowing an alliance to transcend the original security interests that brought the members together if it is able to address adequately the new issues confronting the organization. Moreover, institutions that may have had the capacity to adapt in one epoch do not necessarily retain that capacity in another. The disappearance of the existential threat posed by the Soviet Union and its allies to NATO has yielded to more complex and urgent concerns, as Apparthurai has suggested, and these paradoxically may require far deeper institutional changes, or even the replacement of key bodies within NATO, as well as different decision-making processes.

There have been suggestions for greater institutional changes in NATO. For instance, Sean Kay has argued that NATO enlargement could present an opportunity for the Bush administration to develop a comprehensive strategy to redesign Europe's security institutions (in order to combat terrorism) and it could review the alliance's decision-making procedures (2003, 111-12). Such profound changes could involve adaptation of institutions that would induce successful transcendence. Given current divergent threat perceptions and discursive practices, however, it is highly unrealistic, it seems, to expect that the alliance could develop (even with a possible diminution of French dissent), at least in the near term, the type of deep consensus that would be needed in order to bring about such a fundamental institutional and procedural transformation.

Further, the prospects for adaptation have been greatly complicated by the largest enlargement in NATO history. This enlargement is producing, as we have seen, a new *interactive triadic relationship*. Though the focus has been on divisions between the United States on the one hand, and key West European allies on the other, there are two other relationships that are of growing importance in the alliance. American relations with the East European states and East European relations with the West European proponents of a NATO that is based much more on collective security, are not only important in terms of each dyad, but are increasingly defining the very environment within which institutional adaptation in NATO is occurring.

This triadic relationship has not only increased complexity but can greatly accentuate institutional failures to sufficiently adapt to new challenges and differences in capabilities and intent. An institutional design that was

successful in another era, may not only not be adequate in another but at a certain stage in the new era may be deemed unreformable and therefore, in need of replacement. Otherwise even reformed old institutions may generate increasing frustration and cynicism and, as forums for constant disputes, may have the perverse effect over time of undermining the very foundations of the alliance. That is, because of contradictions between what they appear to be and what they ought to be, they could become the kind of "subversive institutions" that according to Bunce played a pivotal role in the collapse of communism (especially 1999, 20-76). The institutional reforms that NATO has attempted in the past few years not only have not adequately addressed the central issues confronting the alliance, but this failing, in light of enlargement which accentuates differences, may make these even reformed institutions, sources of ever greater frustration and division – especially as reforms continue to raise expectations.

Seemingly major institutional reforms in NATO thus have done little to address the problems of the alliance's identity crisis, of responding effectively to external threats and internal divisions, of resolving the capabilities gaps and of dealing with the new triadic relationship that enlargement is creating. Enlargement cannot long hide the fact that NATO is an increasingly dysfunctional alliance (even if some of the frictions diminish for the time being). With both structures and discourse so much at variance with needs, inadequate institutions, again, could later well become subversive institutions. This is not to suggest that the alliance is necessarily doomed, for the allies may find many reasons why they need each other and could conceivably come to a deep consensus that will lead to fundamentally changed discursive practices and institutions. The *modus vivendi* of the moment perhaps will buy some time for the alliance but it would be an error to think that, especially given the pressures of the current enlargement and demands for future ones, this will be a very long period. In a sense then, the alliance's institutional changes in the past few years, far from resolving NATO's basic problems, illuminate instead the need to do much more.

5. *Implications and Conclusions*

> *My normally contentious colleagues seem to be in uncharacteristic agreement: it is that the NATO expansion initiative is ill-conceived, ill-timed, and above all, ill-suited to the realities of the post Cold War world … Indeed I can recall no other moment in my own experience as a practicing historian, at which there was in our community greater unanimity against, which is to say less support for, an official foreign policy proposition.*
>
> John Lewis Gaddis, 1997a

In 2004, as one watched the broadcasts of the magnificent and stirring ceremonies in Washington and Brussels welcoming the seven new members of NATO (CNN, 2004) it seemed hard to question the alliance's success. With several more states eagerly awaiting membership, this is an organization, moreover, whose unusual longevity and continued attraction suggest an unprecedented ability to cope with internal strains and external threats. This study, however, has raised questions about the alliance's viability. It is not suggested here that the alliance is facing imminent collapse. Nevertheless, in the post Cold War period NATO is facing major problems that not only remain unresolved, but have been masked, complicated and are likely to be further exacerbated. NATO has been preoccupied with enlargements and the latter has complicated the alliance's ability to address problems, thereby putting the alliance at greater future risk.

Wallander and Suh (Wallander, 2002, 706-12 and 723-31; Suh, 2003, 26-30) are right to point out that an alliance can persist for a considerable time, even after it has outlived its original *raison d'être* but it cannot do so

indefinitely without adapting to new environments. “Muddling through” is not only an ineffective long term strategy for any alliance but in the case of NATO, enlargement has introduced factors that make this unattractive even as a short or medium term option. As we have seen enlargement has created an interactive triangular or triadic relationship. There are major differences not only between the United States and key West European allies but also between the East European members and important West European allies. All three interact in a way that can quickly magnify differences and problems.

NATO’s identity crisis should have been evident with the end of the Cold War and enlargement has been a process that has been worked out over many years. Thus there should have been ample time to think through enlargement in terms of its impact 3002 onlyWwoer man

participating in the alliance's Mediterranean Dialogue to intensify relations, and the launching of the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative in the Middle East (Aybet, 2004). Though this was an improvement in atmospherics and one might argue that NATO was moving towards becoming more of a political alliance (Joyce, 2005), the Summit did not really address the continuing East European concerns about hard security guarantees or the American desire for greater help in Iraq. Thus, somewhat improved discursive practices should not be mistaken with ones that would address the substantive divisions and help create a deep and sustainable alliance consensus.

identity transformation and adaptation in an alliance such as NATO. Realists tend to assume that international institutions are merely intervening variables affecting security outcomes (Mearsheimer, 1995, 332-376). Institutions though are crucial because, in addition to rules, norms and principles, they also involve decision-making procedures (Keohane, 1989, 3-5). Moreover, as Charles Kupchan has shown, institutions are highly relevant since, among other things, they increase the likelihood of issue linkages and further interstate socialization (1994, 50-51). And, as noted in the previous chapters, Risse-Kappen has shown persuasively that the ability of the West Europeans to "socialize" the United States during the Cold War was an important element both in creating an alliance identity and in preserving NATO.

Further, general and specific assets that Wallander and Suh referred to in assessing the prospects for alliance persistence could not be adequately appreciated without looking at institutional structures and attempts at adaptation within NATO. Enlargement emphasized the urgency to deal with the fundamental problems. I have found, though, that despite some considerable efforts, the institutional changes in NATO in the past few years rather than resolving these problems, instead highlighted the need to do far more. So far institutional reforms have dealt with the symptoms of dysfunction that have been part of the alliance's identity crisis rather than address the basic problems and construct the kind of "bridges" within the alliance that would allow members to reconstruct the vital consensus, the deeply shared experiences, and the mutual socializing that were NATO's great strengths during the Cold War. This failure was made starkly evident when the alliance could not reach a consensus on how to deal with Iraq. The internal "bridges" that shaped and reflected an alliance identity that allowed 0spitecy thwedtlit

I will therefore assess the institutional aspects of NATO-Russia relations as well as Russian and NATO perceptions. In the case of perceptions I will especially focus on the period involving the latest alliance enlargement.

NA O-R I D

It is no mere coincidence that the two most significant institutional developments in NATO-Russia relations occurred at the time that the alliance embarked on enlargements in 1997 and in 2002. Certainly, NATO had sought to build institutional links with Russia earlier but these were more modest efforts. For instance, the alliance created the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) at the Rome Summit in 1991 (Kay, 1998, 65-67). It was meant to afford Russia (and the East European states) a potentially significant consultative forum. In terms of Russian goals though, it proved to be of little use both because the NACC had no decision-making function and it had no institutional framework to recognize Russia as a Great Power (MacFarlane, 2001, 287). NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, which in January 1994 supplemented the NACC, suffered from the same shortcomings in that it failed to provide a special status for Russia. Therefore, if NATO were to co-opt Russia into the alliance structures when it made the formal decision to enlarge the alliance in 1997, it had to devise

new states (Brzezinski and Lake, 1997). The PJC, though, certainly raised

2004 (NATO Update, 2004). Russia's new Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, participated in the NATO-Russia Council session on 2 April 2004 follow-

Though neither Russian elite nor popular perceptions are monolithic, in

that opinion polls may not track clearly. As NATO's enlargement is seen by the Russian public as something that is pursued by the democratic West to the detriment of Russian national security interests, this helps create a negative impression of all democrats, including Russia's own and likely contributes to an undermining of domestic democracy.

Russians, moreover, often perceive NATO actions in a way that the Allies do not always adequately appreciate. The differences between Russian and NATO perceptions were illustrated, for instance, in the sharply varied interpretations of NATO's decision at the end of March 2004 to deploy four Belgian F-16 fighters in Lithuania – together with about one hundred Belgian, Danish, and Norwegian ground support troops at a former Soviet air base in Lithuania (Myers, 2004). For NATO this minute deployment of four aircraft to police the skies over the three Baltic States was merely a symbol of commitment to the new members – a very low key attempt at reassurance. For Russia it was symptomatic of the risks of division and encirclement by NATO that it believes that it faces. The deployment even fuelled the suspicion in Moscow that the alliance, denials to the contrary, might be planning major troop deployments in the Baltics (Jane's Defence Weekly, 2004a).

Russia consequently reacted strongly to this deployment of NATO aircraft in Lithuania. As a none-too-subtle hint, in April 2004 Russian warships began to practice amphibious landings near the shores of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, and the Russian air force held joint drills with Ukraine and Belarus – just as NATO's Secretary-General was visiting Moscow (Page, 2004). Even more disturbingly, Russia's Defence minister suggested that Moscow might revise its defence policy unless the alliance revised its own military doctrine (CNN, 2004a). Further, Moscow raised its concerns about the fact that four of the new NATO states did not ratify the amended version of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, which limits the number of troops and weapons that can be stationed in certain geographical areas, and hinted that Russia would further drag its feet on pulling out its forces from Georgia and Moldova (Bransten, 2004).

. A ◤ ◤ . NATO perceptions of Russia and Russian policies are quite varied within the alliance. But at times these are no more sanguine than those that Moscow has of NATO. Alliance perceptions are shaped in part by what in Soviet days was called "objective reality" and by historical experience and political expediency. Objectively, Russia has had a difficult and uncertain transition from communism. The loss of empire and superpower status has been traumatic and Russia has had to deal with

its own identity crisis (MacFarlane, 2001, 284). Some, including Grigorii Yavlinskii, the leader of the democratic bloc *Yabloko*, have a very pessimistic view of Russia's progress towards democracy. Yavlinskii refused to participate in the March 2004 presidential race contending that Russia lacks the basic elements of democratic elections, including reliable courts, independent media, and independent financial sources (RFE/RL Newsline, 2004a).

Somewhat less pessimistically, others have suggested that Russia has become a "managed democracy" where society is in the middle (between the political extremes), with the population acquiescing to live with a quasi-democratic and quasi-autocratic order (Colton and McFaul, 2003, 12-21). Such a status though is hardly reassuring to the East European democracies that have joined NATO. These new NATO members tend to see strong links between successful democratic transformation and a peaceful foreign policy. Unfortunately, even the more optimistic assessments, which suggest that Russia is a normal middle-income country that is making progress and may soon join the ranks of "poor developed states like Hungary and Poland" (Shleifer and Treisman, 2004), are not entirely encouraging given some of the current negative trends in Russia's political institutions and civic freedoms. The proponents of the view of Russia as a "normal middle-income country" admit that such trends under Putin are worrying and could deteriorate further (Shleifer and Treisman, 2004).

There are, in fact, good reasons why there should be concerns about the state of Russian "democracy." The prosecution and imprisonment of Mikhail Khodorkovsky, one of the leading Russian oligarchs, could only have gone ahead with the direct approval of the Kremlin. This application of selective justice represented not only a negation of the rule of law but had a clear scent of political expediency and of settling of scores (*The Economist*, 2005). Economic authoritarianism and mismanagement are also making a democratic transformation more difficult in Russia. One of President Putin's key advisors, Andrei Illarionov, in 2005 condemned Russian re-nationalization of some vital companies and argued that "today, by our own decisions, we have done what is now regrettably clear to the outside world – we opted for the Third World" (Arvedlund, 2005). And President Putin's statement in 2005 that the dissolution of the Soviet Union was a historical catastrophe (CNN.com, 2005), was the kind of antidemocratic nostalgia that could hardly be comforting to the new democracies in Europe.

In assessing these developments in Russia in terms of potential threats or disruptions, the West and East Europeans come with considerable

historical baggage. For West Europeans it has been a history of containment, and in the last decades of the Cold War, also one of "constructive engagement" with Russia. By contrast, for the East Europeans the historical experience has been that of Soviet conquest. West European states, therefore, are less likely to see a threat from slow or difficult Russian democratization than the East European victims of Soviet control, and are more apt to see possibilities for productive engagement. Germany and France, for instance, have developed extensive economic and warm political ties with Russia. All three strongly, and at times jointly, opposed American military actions in Iraq. Germany has been consistently Russia's main economic partner and Russia is Germany's primary supplier of energy in the post Cold Wsa (Lamboschini, 203) Fovace has been]TJT*0.0031 Tc

in the Baltics, the new NATO members are fearful of possible Russian involvement with and manipulation of the large Russian ethnic minorities that continue to reside in these states (Lobjakos, 2004a). Last, in 2004 both Lithuania and Estonia complained about Russian spying on NATO activities and decided to expel several Russian diplomats for espionage (Myers, 2004).

Unlike Eastern Europe, the United States has not been concerned about a Russian threat but it has shown little sensitivity regarding Russian fears over NATO enlargement and scarce patience for Russian democratization. Both the Clinton and the Bush administrations have been eager to provide reassurance to the East Europeans but have not done much to build alliance bridges to Russia. The Bush administration has been particularly insensitive in its dealings with Russia, as manifested in Washington's unilateral withdrawal from the ABM Treaty and in its overall discursive practices. For instance, in January 2004, even a seasoned diplomat like the US Secretary of State Colin Powell employed a hectoring and patronizing tone in criticizing Russian progress in democratization (Weisman, 2004), a "lecture" that Moscow found particularly offensive.

At the Bratislava Summit with President Putin, George Bush tried to improve relations with Russia, but just days earlier the American President declared that "the Russian government must renew a commitment to democracy and the rule of law" (RFE/RL Features, 2005d). The American Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, was also harshly critical in April 2005 of the state of democracy in Russia and lectured Russia that it should not fear democracy (Weisman, 2005). President Putin did not take such lectures kindly. He countered by criticizing the electoral system in the US (CNN.com, 2005) and declared that Russia intended to pursue democracy independently and in its own way (Chivers, 2005).

Thus, NATO's interaction with Russia, in the instance of the US and the East European States, in a sense mirrors its inability to build bridges within NATO. The alliance identity crisis, the triadic relationship, the differing preferences for soft or hard power, for containment and constructive engagement or for deterrence, have all worked to shape different threat perceptions within NATO and have made it in turn difficult to build bridges to Russia. Further, enlargement is not only likely to complicate such efforts in the future but in fuelling suspicions in Russia. And in inducing Russian reactions that reinforce in Eastern Europe traditional fears of Moscow, NATO expansion may be creating a damaging negative cycle of action and reaction. In other words, despite French and German efforts

to strengthen relations with Russia, there is a risk that Russia will view continuing enlargement as building walls and in turn, may then try strenuously to encourage divisions within NATO in order to weaken an alliance that it perceives as threatening.

C

Timothy Garden observed recently that it is rather paradoxical that just as NATO has been downgraded as a fighting organization it is at the same time more in demand than it ever has been in its history (Bransten, 2004). He pointed out that in addition to operating in the Balkans and in Afghanistan, NATO is facing continuing requests to help in Iraq. Leaving aside for the moment the fact that the magnitude of the single military mission that NATO had in defending its members against a possible Soviet/Warsaw Pact threat may be equivalent to or even more important than the current multiple demands for alliance participation (that is, NATO traditionally has had a great deal of capacity as well as relevance), there is little doubt that there remain important functions that NATO can and could perform in

discursive practices that could help create real consensus and successfully address major identity problems. It is not possible then, to resolve NATO's identity crisis without fundamental changes, formal and informal, in the alliance's decision-making structures and processes. A wider alliance geo-

influence in the alliance and to restrict Washington's ability to use the East European states as proxies in NATO.

In such circumstances, institutional changes would have been especially useful as alternate or supplemental remedies but recent reforms have not addressed the fundamental issues. Enlargement, in fact, has shed a harsh light on NATO's institutional shortcomings and timid reforms. There is a risk therefore, as noted, that inadequately transformed or adapted institutions, confronting more complex tasks (in part because of enlargement) in a changed international environment, could become "subversive institutions" (Bunce, 1999) that would undermine the alliance. Further, NATO has not been able to build the kind of "bridges" within the alliance that would help it restore the deep consensus and the densely shared experiences that made for such a resilient alliance identity during the Cold War. Moreover, the inability to successfully build bridges within, as enlargement has proceeded, has also inhibited NATO's ability to build bridges with a crucial neighbour – Russia. That, in turn, is complicating not only NATO-Russia relations, but has the unintended consequence of working to make the resolution of alliance identity more difficult.

Ironically, enlargement, which was meant to provide greater reassurance to NATO members, may now be more deeply embedding and magnifying divisions within the alliance. Attempts at future enlargement may further complicate matters. Debates regarding hard power versus soft power are likely to be intensified as are divisions between the goals of collective defence of some of the members and of collective security of

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