

U a P a



U a P a  
C . , T , G c ,  
UK a EU

C a M a .

C I a a R a , Q ' U  
K , O a , Ca a a  
2006

## Librarian and Archivist Canada Cataloguing in Publication

Manitoba, Canada  
University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, Manitoba, R6T 2T6, Canada  
EU/UK  
CMA

(Manitoba, ISSN 1183-3661 ; 29)

International Cataloguing in Publication

ISBN 1-55339-096-2

1. Cataloguing in Publication, 1974-, I. Q. U  
(K. O.). C. I. a. R. a. II. T. III. S.

DS54.9.M443 2006 956.9304 C2006-900464-1

# *T e Ma e Pa e*

---

T Q ' U C I a a R a (QCIR) . a  
a c , Ma e Pa e .  
Ta a c b  
c K , O a , . a c a a

U a Pa

c c b . . . T ' a . a b . , a T  
ca ab c c  
C . . I G C . a  
A a Pa , a c c a a , c  
C . a a a a b EU a  
a c . A c . a a b , b  
M a . a b .  
W a , a a a , a S c a D c F  
D . a Na a D c , . . ab C -  
c c a a a c . a c a a  
a a a c . A ca a Ma e Pa e ,  
a a , a c a c  
c , QCIR, a . . a c .

C a C.P a  
D c , QCIR  
Ja a 2006

# C

---

1. I	1
2. R c C . H ca R c a I a a La	9
3. T Vc C . -EUR a	19
4. T ' S a c A b a E . a A Wa D c b 2004	31
5. G c ' F P c C	43
6. T A a P a a I D c	53
7. U a C c , A b I . ca	65
8. S c - a a C c	73
N	89





## 1. Introduction

---

The present monograph is, in a sense, a sequel to my earlier Martello, *Making Peace in Cyprus: Time for a Comprehensive Initiative* (1996). The main impetus of that publication – submitted in November 1995 – was a feared military clash between Turkey and Greece, and the desire to submit tangible proposals for Greek-Turkish détente and reconciliation. That work argued that, given the insanity of any military confrontation between the two NATO allies, and in view of the rich availability of rational and fair means of conflict resolution, both the Aegean dispute and the Cyprus problem should be settled through the employment of legal tools. Hence the monograph proposed that, while the Aegean dispute should be settled by the International Court of Justice, the Cyprus problem should be handled on the basis of the numerous legal/political pronouncements and decisions of such international organizations as the European Union and the United Nations. Therefore, the serious Greek-Turkish crisis of January 1996 around the Imia islets confirmed the fears expressed in my Martello. On the other hand, it was deeply gratifying that the December 1999 Helsinki European Council’s proposals about the Aegean and even Cyprus were, arguably, akin to my suggestions.<sup>1</sup>

In any event, a rare combination of rational policies and disastrous physical phenomena (the two earthquakes) led Greece and Turkey away from a military confrontation, after being at the brink at Imia. Beginning in 1999, they entered a period of partially substantial, if at times shaky, quasi-détente. As chapter 5 will show, the spring 1999 change of leadership in the Greek Foreign Ministry – when mild-mannered, “idealist” George A. Papandreou replaced tempestuous Theodoros Pangalos – in combination with the “seismic diplomacy” that followed the misery of the August-September

1999 earthquakes, ushered in a palpable easing of the two neighbours' pernicious tensions. In addition, the change of bilateral climate facilitated some important decisions, such as those contained in the Presidency Conclusions of Helsinki and the signing of a number of bilateral protocols and treaties.

Athens considers, and all Greek analysts agree, that Greece has worked diligently and consistently, especially after Helsinki, to support and promote Turkey's EU progress and bilateral *détente*. However, the aforementioned "climatic change" has not obliterated either Ankara's risky Aegean "revisionism" or its stubborn maximalism in Cyprus.<sup>2</sup> Thus, al-

both the referendum and the very making of the associated plan, it follows that the latter necessitates a closer reading and a brutally honest evaluation. Moreover, 18 months since the referendum, it has transpired that thorough knowledge of the Annan plan, and what it entailed, was entirely absent in most circles. Therefore, many explanations of why the Greek Cypriots' "No" reached a resounding 76%, whereas the Turkish Cypriots' "Yes" received 65%, were bound to be utterly defective.

The commonest "explanatory" generalization is disingenuous and simplistic; therefore, unfair and false. It asserts that the Greek Cypriots "rejected reunification" whereas the Turkish Cypriots "embraced" it.<sup>6</sup> Even worse, this false major premise has been widely used towards two unwarranted "deductions": first, that the Greek Cypriots had to be "punished" for their vote and, second, that the Turkish Cypriots ought now to be "rewarded". This grand *non sequitur* has been propagated by the very circles that inspired and "marketed" the Annan plan. Hence this essay aims to establish, among other things, that these circles had been eager only to *get rid of* the Cyprus problem as against solving it functionally and fairly. For, given that President Tassos Papadopoulos had already signed the Treaty of Accession in April 2003, it is manifest that any solution of Cyprus' political problem should uphold the principles of International and European law and should respect the norms and values on which the Union is founded. Therefore, it may seem incomprehensible to the uninitiated that the Annan plan was meant, in fact, to digress from, and even to violate, such principles, values and norms.

This thesis – which is central to this essay – becomes less astonishing once those propagating the Annan Plan are identified and their self-regarding interests articulated. Chapters 6 and 7 will elaborate on this issue. Here, however, we may just sketch who was meant to gain what from the "Annan plan" affair, to help explain the Greek Cypriots' bitterness, London and Washington's immense frustration, and the UN Secretariat's initial fury. It will also account for one of Ankara's major anxieties after 17 December 2004 while introducing the EU's Cyprus-related dilemmas.

London and Washington had participated openly, from the start, in the very formulation of the plan that carried the SG's name. The UK's interests centred primarily on retaining the two post-colonial "Sovereign Base Areas", entrenched in the Republic since Cyprus' 1960 independence.<sup>7</sup> Simultaneously, London extended unqualified support to Washington's eagerness to help Turkey get absolved from the legal condemnation and guilt flowing from the 1974 invasion and occupation of 37% of Cypriot

territory. Moreover, Washington has long been making abundantly clear its fervent interest in Turkey's EU accession. This accession, however, had

“punished” for their (democratic) decision while the Turkish Cypriots should be “rewarded”, even in ways undermining the Republic’s sovereignty and its established rights. In fact, I hope to show that the Greek Cypriots’ rejection of a plan contradicting the EU’s principles, values and norms, constitutes an act of dignity and courage and, therefore, *deserves praise and recognition*. Finally, the discussion will investigate the best *modus operandi* required by a responsible EU. To this end, I will submit that the Union’s direct engagement is required by its established legal culture and its declared political values and ethical norms. But this engagement also constitutes the Union’s unique opportunity to score a major diplomatic victory where countless other international actors have failed. Needless to say, the *European* resolution of the Cyprus problem would serve Turkey’s own best needs. By the same token, therefore, it will entail the satisfaction of most interests of London, Washington, and of the EU itself.

Thus, the motivation behind the present essay transcends the need to set the record straight on the Cyprus-Turkey-Greece-EU “quartet”. It aims also to explain intriguing developments and submit modest predictions on probable outcomes. But it also intends to pronounce on the case of Cyprus from *the ethical point of view*. That is to say, the manner in which the Cypriots have been treated by the “international community”, primarily in connection with the Annan plan, provides irresistible material for a case study in international ethics. This entails

Then, chapter 3 will recall the Republic of Cyprus' adventures on the way to accession since the publication of *Making Peace in Cyprus* and until the emergence of the "Annan plan". Chapter 4 will focus on Turkey, to address recent domestic developments in association with Ankara's foreign policy and strategic preoccupations, whereby the EU vocation emerged as the most rational goal. Chapter 5 will present Athens' sustained overtures to Turkey aiming at the establishment of new rules of conduct, for the immediate and ultimate benefit of the peoples of Turkey, Cyprus and Greece. Concentrating initially on what I have termed "the Simitis doctrine"<sup>12</sup>, it will be shown that, even before 1999 but especially since then, Athens laboured to establish détente and collaboration but failed to achieve Ankara's substantial reciprocity. Sadly, the same failure has marked Kostas Karamanlis' first 15 months in power, despite his adoption of his socialist predecessor's relevant policies. Then, chapter 6 will evaluate the Annan Plan and the April 2004 twin Cypriot referendum. Chapter 7 will demonstrate the further unethical involvement of some foreign powers, and some allied Greek Cypriot elites, in the aftermath of the referendum. The final chapter, after submitting insights into Turkey's *sui generis* political culture as a tool for deciphering Ankara's confusing policies towards Cyprus, Greece and the EU, will review proposals for the resolution of the Cyprus problem and the diffusion of the Greek-Turkish dispute. Here, the role of the European Union is expected to be salutary.

Methodologically, this work adopts the framework I introduced in *Making Peace in Cyprus*, that is, "Pragmatic Idealism". This framework combines the "Realist" preoccupation with the identification and comparison of various dimensions of power with the "Idealist" concerns for international law, international ethics, and the role and rules of international organizations. This synthesis further explains the work's "normative tone" which, I believe, is justified by the thesis that Realism typically abstains from the ethical evaluation of even grand political errors, just as it fails to condemn the serious ethical sins in IR.<sup>13</sup> Any authentic Realist study of the travails of a small state, such as Cyprus, and of the prolonged, deep suffering of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots is eager to remain "neutral" and "merely descriptive". Such neutrality is, of course, illusory. It is by now a methodological stereotype that, as a matter of fact and logic, Realism's "mere descriptiveness" masks a political *parti pris*. Indeed, Realism has failed – arrogantly and immorally – to take seriously the Cypriots' own point of view, their inalienable human rights, as well as the humane demands and expectations of the normative standpoint.

Contrariwise, “Idealist” studies of Cyprus and its problems tend to mesh with the post-modern school, as demonstrated by their excessive, if not exclusive, emphasis on “perceptions”, “narratives”, the “(mis-)understanding of the Other”, and so forth. The principal problem here, I submit, is this: their subjectivism entails the denial that the Cyprus problem is essentially an international relations issue and, for over three decades, a serious European Community/ Union problem as well. It follows that the Cyprus problem certainly involves “power-relations” and conflicting “geo-strategic interests”. Simultaneously, and beyond the European Union, it involves the United Nations, other international organizations (such as the Council of Europe), and international courts (such as the European Court of Human Rights). By implication, therefore, it involves both international ethics and international law.

Needless to say, the “pragmatic idealist” methodological synthesis should be judged by whether it ultimately avoids the sins and omissions of alternative methods and whether it helps pronounce on, and account for, most dimensions of the issues at hand.





## 2. *Recent Cypriot Historical Record and International Law*

---

A cardinal thesis of *Making Peace in Cyprus* (1996) was that, because any historical account of the Cyprus problem is generally affected by ideological, methodological, nationalistic, and other biases, it was wiser to rely primarily on the international community's consensual opinion on the problem, an opinion premised on the principles and norms of international law. It transpired that the "Hellenic" (i.e. Greek Cypriot and Greek) conception of the matter coincided with the international community's shared view, whereas the "Turkish" (i.e. Turkish Cypriot and the secessionist regime's) position was unique and isolated. To reach this conclusion it sufficed to review a succession of decisions and pronouncements by international organizations (primarily UN resolutions and EC/EU resolutions and decisions), by independent legal experts, and by the European Commission on Human Rights, which preceded the establishment of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR).

Now, remarkable changes have occurred during the last decade. On the one hand, Cyprus' legal case has been strengthened decisively by successive pronouncements of the ECHR and the Council of Europe. Turkey's condemnation for violating a host of fundamental human rights by the illegal occupation was reiterated in the *Loizidou v. Turkey* Case in 1996 and – as will be shown – has continued ever since. Moreover, the Republic of Cyprus' full accession to the EU on 1 May 2004 has profound political and legal implications. By verifying and confirming the validity of the Republic's legal and political argumentation, it exposed the prolonged, unethical sophistry of Ankara's anti-Republic campaigns. On the other hand,

the nexus of powerful – essentially geopolitical and geo-strategic – interests identified in chapter 1 was mobilized by 2002 via the Annan plan. These interests' twin goal was to “close”, instead of solving, the problem of Cyprus and to acquit Turkey in order to facilitate its EU prospects.

*Inter alia*, the identified circles disseminated notions and cultivated perceptions that favoured the anti-international law interpretations and rationalizations of the “Turkish side”. It should not be supposed, however, that this campaign was sparked by the Annan plan; it has been ongoing for years. Under the pretext of “citizens’ diplomacy”, “bi-communal rapprochement”, and “conflict resolution seminars and meetings”, it has long been

For one thing, there is a serious problem of time, since it is nearly impossible to decide *objectively* when historical responsibility should begin. In addition, disturbing further questions arise: Precisely how far goes the responsibility of numerous foreign centres? What is Britain's share of guilt? Should we start our historical account with the EOKA liberation struggle – when London populated the security forces by Turkish Cypriots so as to obtain an inter-communal conflict<sup>-15</sup> or extend our hermeneutic horizon to decades of Britain's colonial rule and the centuries of Ottoman occupation? Next, could one ignore the incontrovertible fact that, before the EOKA uprising, the Greeks and Turks of Cyprus were living in conditions of harmony and friendship? And as regards the externally imposed 1960 Cypriot Constitution, shall we agree that it was inherently dysfunctional (as the Greek Cypriots and most serious analysts attest) or adopt the contrary Turkish view? But the latter view cultivates the myth that the Greek Cypriots wanted the entire island to themselves. In truth, they only desired constitutional revisions for a workable state, whereas Ankara was always seeking opportunities to realize partition. One of them was provided by the crisis of 1964 that almost led to a military invasion but was prevented by Lyndon Johnson's well-known epistle to Ankara. The crisis, however, revealed Washington's own perception of Cyprus at that time. For in his 1982 memoir, former undersecretary of State, George Ball, was disarmingly honest: "Viewed from Washington, the issues were clear enough. Cyprus was a strategically important piece of real estate at issue between two NATO partners: Greece and Turkey. *We needed to keep it under NATO control.*"<sup>16</sup>

To be sure, from a crude *Realpolitik* standpoint, the golden opportunity for intervention was provided by the insane anti-Makarios coup engineered by the Greek Colonels in July 1974. Therefore, inescapable questions arise here regarding responsibility for (a) the rise of the Junta to power; (b) Washington's unmitigated and morally inexcusable support to the Colonels' dictatorship;<sup>17</sup> and (c) for American and British inaction regarding both the forthcoming coup and the under-preparation-invasion.<sup>18</sup> Evidently, this account need not be repeated here.<sup>19</sup> Instead, it is important to familiarise the reader with historic apologies expressed in the late 90s to Cyprus and Greece by distinguished Americans. Thus, Richard Holbrooke's November 1997 statement, while visiting Cyprus, included the following: "American history in this area is not entirely clean. There are some things that previous American Administrations did in this area, particularly between the mid-1960s and 1974, which I think were shameful... There are

certain things that happened, that the United States should not have done". Holbrooke's honourable apology was later repeated almost verbatim: first, by US ambassador to Athens, Nicholas Burns; and second, by President Bill Clinton during his 1999 Athens visit.<sup>20</sup>

Finally, *even if* we granted for the sake of argument, that the Greek majority was more responsible for the inter-communal fighting of the 1960s; and even add the acknowledged guilt of the Athens junta's coup that preceded Ankara's July-August 1974 "response", *it certainly does not follow* that Turkey's 1974 double invasion and the 31-year-long occupation can be justified and should be excused.

That is why, until the November 2002 emergence of the first Annan plan, the international community's cardinal institutions and organizations had rejected unanimously Turkey's rationalizations, as we see below. Telling were also typical responses to the second (August 1974) invasion by distinguished international media. They all knew that, following the first Turkish military intervention of 20-22 July, both the Athens junta and the Nicosia mini-junta had collapsed; that democracy had returned to both countries; and two rounds of negotiations had taken place among the interested parties.<sup>21</sup> *The Times* of London and *The Economist* could not contain their anger at Turkey's resort to bloody war before exhausting the available political and legal means of crisis resolution. Thus, the British daily proposed two types of action which "the United States and the rest of the international community" should take against Turkey:

First, Turkey should be told that if she does not immediately accept the cease-fire proposed by the UN Security Council she will be regarded as the aggressor and will be denied any supply of arms or spare parts so long as her troops remain in Cyprus... Secondly, it must be made quite clear to the Turks that there is no question of their obtaining international recognition for any kind of de facto partition of Cyprus, still less for the annexation of it... and they must be told that international support for the rights of Greek Cypriots (including the right to the independence and unity of their country) will not be changed by any Turkish military victory. In the last resort the threat that faces Turkey is that of becoming an international outcast.<sup>22</sup>

Equally austere was the *Economist's* editorial, under the title "Smash and Grab": "Somebody thought the Turks would be more reasonable, more willing to go on spinning words, more Anglo-American than they turned out to be. But then the chief lesson of this week's events is that when a country thinks its army can pull off a quick smash-and-grab it is liable to

leave the diplomats, and their fine adjustments, standing on the sidelines. It is the same lesson as the Russian occupation of Czechoslovakia.”<sup>23</sup>

*Making Peace in Cyprus* contains useful information on the tragedy of 1974. A few figures suffice to indicate the misery it caused. Next to far fewer Turkish Cypriot refugees, the cost of the operation on the Greek Cypriot side included: 6,000 dead; 180,000 refugees; 3,000 missing persons; and the appropriation by Turkey of around 70% of Cyprus’ productive resources.<sup>24</sup>

For reasons such as the above, the interested reader is urged to familiarise herself or himself with alternative “narratives” of recent Cypriot history. Here, then, we may turn to the resolutions and pronouncements of the relevant international organizations and to the Cyprus-related decisions of international courts. This record and its implications demonstrate why Turkey’s attempted rationalizations of the invasion and the occupation collapsed.

### **International Law on the “Cyprus Problem”**

In view of the international community’s anger at Turkey’s bloody invasion, Ankara resorted to rationalizations. However, the solid prohibition of the threat and use of force in inter-state relations is crystallized in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. Moreover, no exception to this cardinal principle could absolve Turkey from transparent responsibility and guilt. Hence, Ankara was forced to employ “legal” sophistry and, to this end, mobilize foreign apologists or nationalist Turkish analysts. Turkey’s defence, then, has been premised primarily on (a) the 1959 Treaty of Guarantee, but also (b) individual self-defence, and (c) humanitarian intervention.

*Treaty of Guarantee.* Bulent Ecevit, Turkish prime minister at the time of the invasion, called it a “peacekeeping operation”. Despite its banality, this statement has been used frequently by Turkish officials as a cliché in Ankara’s rationalizations. It was, however, rather astonishing to hear Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul employ the cliché on CyBC TV, as late as February 2005. Asked by a Cypriot journalist, “When will your occupation troops leave Cyprus?” he replied: “What occupation troops? Our troops are there because of international treaties.”<sup>25</sup>

Mr Gul could only have referred to the Treaty of Guarantee, which was attached to the Republic’s Constitution. But, in truth, Article 4 of this treaty stipulated that, in case of a constitutional breach, consultations among the

three guarantors (UK, Turkey and Greece) should lead to concerted action. Failing this, each guarantor reserved the right “to take action *with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the present Treaty.*” It follows immediately that Turkey’s violation of Cypriot territorial integrity and full sovereignty for 31 years renders Turkey’s rationalization null and void. Moreover, the assertion that by “taking action” the treaty envisaged the use of *armed force* is fatally flawed. For if this were the case, the treaty itself would have been illicit *ab initio*. For Article 103 of the UN Charter states explicitly that, in case of conflict between UN Members’ obligations under the Charter and obligations under other agreements, “their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.” In fact, this is a principal reason why distinguished Canadian law professor, R. St. J. Macdonald, has evaluated Ankara’s actions as clearly violating international law. He added that the present interpretation (i.e. the *ab initio* inapplicability of Article 4 of the Treaty of Guarantee) is also “preferred by Guggenheim, Lauterpacht, Fitzmaurice, McNair, and Schwarzenberger”.<sup>26</sup>

Article 51 only allows the use of force in self-defence. Is rescuing one's nationals abroad really what is meant by self-defence? The case law indicates that to be rather doubtful...The case of Entebbe is on its own facts very much clearer...In those circumstances it seems to me there is at least a case to be made that an "in-and-out action" by a foreign state is lawful, and does not use force, and

It is inappropriate to invoke the right of humanitarian intervention in regard to the 1974 invasion: as an anticipatory action, the intervention was premature and of a nature and duration in excess of what might have been necessary







### 3. *The Vicissitudes of Cyprus-EU Relations*

---

The Republic of Cyprus' relationship with the EC/EU dates from the 1970s: in 1972, it signed an association agreement with the EEC and, in 1987, a Customs Union Protocol. On 4 July 1990, Nicosia submitted a formal application for membership. Three years later (30 June 1993), the Republic of Cyprus received the Commission's favourable Opinion. Following the confirmation of its "eligibility" by successive European Councils, the Council's meeting of 6 March 1995 proved historic. With Athens now abandoning its commitment to a veto until Turkey removed its troops from Cyprus, the Council approved Turkey's own Customs Union; in addition, it committed the Union to begin membership negotiations with Cyprus (and Malta) six months after the completion of the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC). *Prima facie*, the trade-off could usher in serious potential for détente between Turkey and Greece by establishing Athens' strategy of "Europeanizing" both Greek-Turkish relations and the Cyprus problem. This impression was hyper-optimistic, as proven both immediately and in the subsequent years.<sup>40</sup>

In any event, the Council also invited the Commission to prepare proposals for a pre-accession strategy for the Republic and to organize "in consultation with the Government of Cyprus, the requisite contacts with the Turkish Cypriot Community, to inform it of the advantages of EU accession and allay its concerns about the prospect".<sup>41</sup> Two years later, *Agenda 2000* confirmed the start of accession negotiations with Nicosia. Demonstrating the Union's legal/political commitments to the Republic, the document reiterated "The Union is determined to play a positive role in

bringing about a just and lasting settlement in accordance with the relevant United Nations Resolutions. The status quo is at odds with international law, threatens the stability of the island, the region (sic) and has implications for security".<sup>42</sup>

Accession negotiations with Cyprus and five Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) began in March 1998. In November of that year, the first *Regular Report from the Commission on Cyprus' Progress towards Accession* painted an optimistic picture of Cyprus' preparations for membership. Cyprus soon began to lead its fellow-candidates in terms of speed and sophistication in adapting to EU policies and in adopting, chapter after chapter, the *acquis communautaire*.

And yet, Cyprus' road to eventual membership was bumpy and convoluted. The continuing occupation of 37% of Cypriot territory betrayed Ankara's blackmail: to keep the island hostage until it satisfied its own EU ambitions. As for the Turkish Cypriots, the international community had long assessed the leadership of Rauf Denktash as obstinate, provocative, and dependent entirely on Turkey and its troops of occupation. Therefore, the EU post-1998 intentions raised an intriguing question: was Brussels sharing Nicosia's conviction that the accession negotiations would act as a "catalyst" for the resolution of the problem? Or was the Union cultivating Cypriot illusions about accession without the prior resolution?

The indications supporting the "sympathetic" hypothesis were strong enough. First, the Community/Union had never deviated from supporting the Republic as the only legitimate entity on the Island. We have already seen the repeated EC/EU resolutions, statements and declarations condemning the occupation and the 1983 UDI and calling for respect for the UN Security Council resolutions. Second, Brussels had recognised the special needs and aspirations of the Turkish Cypriots living in the underprivileged occupied part. In fact, fully aware of Ankara's and Denktash's blackmail it was constantly calling the Turkish Cypriots themselves to "appreciate" the benefits of accession.<sup>43</sup> Third, fully appreciative of Ankara's eagerness to enhance its own EU prospects, the Union could not disregard Turkey's

fore, by adding the Union's own special Cyprus representatives to work with UN mediators, it could be concluded that the EU was now acting as an honest broker.

The "sceptical" hypothesis, however, was not bereft of supporters. Premised on hard-nosed and pessimistic *Realpolitik* foundations, it was predicting that Cyprus' accession would falter unless preceded by a settlement. Support was drawn from a set of Turkey-friendly assumptions and the claim that Cyprus' political problem suffered from an inherent impasse.<sup>45</sup> It was thus suggested, first, that the Cyprus problem was a veritable diplomatic headache which the Union would be unwise to "import". Second, France,

accession of the remaining candidates. To the Union's credit, the sceptical thesis was falsified and the Republic of Cyprus acceded formally on 1 May 2004. But the adventures surrounding this half-happy outcome need to be reviewed, in the rest of this chapter and in our discussion of the Annan plan (chapter 6).

Beginning with the Union's perception of the Republic's accession progress, we should note that the first (November 1998) Commission Report identified some sectors where further progress remained to be made in the alignment of Cypriot legislation with the *acquis* and in the Republic's capacity to apply it. But the Commission was amply satisfied regarding the small state's economic, administrative, and legislative commitment to handle the obligations associated with the first and the third Copenhagen criteria. On the issues of democratic institutions and human rights, it noted: "The institutions of the Republic of Cyprus, in the area controlled by its government, function smoothly."<sup>46</sup> On the judicial system, it stated: "Judges are generally of high quality and their integrity is high."<sup>47</sup> And the discussion on human rights began as follows: "The EU during the 52nd Session of the Commission on Human Rights in Geneva on 18 March-26 April 1996, stated that 'the status quo has a direct negative impact on the enjoyment of human rights. The division of the island is not acceptable and causes suffering to the population (...) We call for full respect of all human rights and fundamental freedoms of all Cypriots'."<sup>48</sup> This statement, which echoed the *leitmotiv* of the Republic's appeals to the international community since 1974, confirmed the validity of the sympathetic thesis, i.e. that the accession of the Republic should entail the fair and viable settlement for the benefit of all Cypriots.

As regards the Cypriot economy, the Report recognized its strength and sustained growth. It also noted that the occupied territory would be the major beneficiary: "Study of the economic situation of Cyprus confirms

third-party ship management centres with more than 100 ship management and ship owning companies”.<sup>50</sup> The final conclusion on the economy gratified Nicosia: “In the economic field, developments since 1993 confirm that the Cyprus economy possesses the ability to adapt to the challenges posed by the adoption of the *acquis*

The principal stumbling block to a settlement is Denktash. His thinking is set in the mould of three decades ago. He professes to believe that the Greek Cypriots still seek *enosis* and, while he pays lip-service to the idea of confederation, basically remains the separatist he was when he helped found TMT in the 1950s. The occasional strictures which his administration has imposed on political opponents suggest the mentality of the *pasha*, rather than the democrat he believes himself to be. His rhetoric harps on the past. There is no evidence that he has derived any personal advantage from his activities but he must also be prey to the psychological factor that he has nothing to gain from a settlement.<sup>53</sup>

This judgment was shared by both independent analysts and, increasingly, by the Turkish Cypriots themselves as we shall see. For instance, London's *Financial Times*, referring to the 1993 breakdown of UN-sponsored negotiations, concluded that Denktash was exclusively responsible: "The man who once campaigned under the slogan "partition or death" remains, in the eyes of the UK and other permanent members of the UN Security Council, the main obstacle to a settlement".<sup>54</sup> And on the occasion of the 1995 proposed trade-offs among EU-Greece-Turkey, the *Financial Times* was again blunt. Noting that the governments of the EU countries must listen to public opinion "which will not sympathize with Turkey when the news from there is mainly about human rights violations



sion on 13 April 2003, the Turkish Cypriots could only reach by endorsing the Annan plan over Denktash's fervent opposition. This was their first opportunity to break away from his regime and from Turkey's troops, and to enjoy the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the European Union. That is why their flags were exclusively the starred-blue EU flags, while their slogans consisted of "*Baris*" (Peace), "This land is Ours" (i.e. not Turkey's), and "Denktash Resign!".<sup>57</sup>

Until then, Denktash's pariah regime was doggedly attempting to solidify itself, to gain recognition, and to constitute a bargaining chip in Turkey's grand strategy of EU accession. *Pazarlik* (i.e. oriental bargaining), will be proposed later as a useful analytic tool for a broader

Denktash declined. So, in December 2001, a new diplomatic device was proposed: “dinner diplomacy” could bring the two old, and wily, negotiators around a different table. Hence they did exchange dinners at each other’s home and agreed to negotiate face-to-face by mid-January 2002. Mehmet Ali Birand, the high-profile Turkish journalist and author, visited Nicosia to cover this “dinner diplomacy”. Asked by his Greek Cypriot colleague, Costas Yennaris, to assess the development, Birand replied: “It is a great *pazarlik!*” And when Yennaris wondered why Denktash was refusing for over a year to negotiate, Birand retorted: “But *this, too, is part of pazarlik!*”<sup>59</sup>

In five rounds of direct talks between 16 January and 26 September 2002, no progress could be made. But the UN had now acquired new momentum within this labyrinth, for reasons soon to be revealed. Thus, on 11 November 2002, the UNSG’s special envoy to Cyprus submitted what later came to be known as “Annan I”. This “Basis for Agreement on a Comprehensive Settlement” was accepted by the Greek Cypriots as a basis for

Within days, Kofi Annan visited Cyprus again, 50 days before the Republic's signing of the Treaty of Accession, to submit yet another, or third, version of "his" plan. Once again, the new document was supposed to be "studied" by the parties and decided upon within days. For the negotiators of the two communities, accompanied by representatives from Ankara and Athens, would meet again for final talks – at The Hague, on 10-11 March – in order to agree that simultaneous referenda on approving the plan would be held on 30 March (i.e. 17 days before the Treaty of Accession). Needless to say, such haste to substitute a "United Cyprus Republic" for the universally recognised Republic of Cyprus, and such proximity (yet again) to another crucial EU date for the future of Cyprus, had rendered the entire affair even more disheartening and suspect.

In any event, the Hague meeting ended in another fiasco. The Greek Cypriot side was unhappy on many grounds. President Papadopoulos, elected on a platform of reservations vis-à-vis the plan, was now asked to approve it; all Greek Cypriot parties (except George Vassiliou's United Democrats) considered the plan as only a basis for negotiations, but negotiations had no chance of taking place; Denktash kept rejecting the plan even as a basis for negotiations, presumably expecting further changes in favour of his side; and Ankara, insisting that the plan was only a "reference document", had also objections on matters of security. And yet, the Greek Cypriot side – presumably counting on the declared Denktashian rejection – agreed, under certain conditions, to bring the Plan to a referendum. Denktash, again, disagreed. Hence Kofi Annan was forced to announce the collapse of the talks, blaming Denktash expressly for it.<sup>61</sup>

On 16 April 2003, President Papadopoulos, accompanied by Cypriot FM George Iakovou, signed in Athens the Treaty of Accession to the Union on behalf of the Republic. For all friends of Cyprus, this momentous event was well-deserved. Moreover, from now on, it had to be assumed that any revised Annan plan should be thoroughly overhauled to respect the Republic's new status. For Protocol 10 of the Treaty declared that the entire Republic of Cyprus will be a full EU member on 1 May 2004, while the

(albeit partially) the restrictions on crossing the “Green Line”. The decision was prompted by multiple motives: first, to show a more human face after the “bad press” he attracted following The Hague; second, to appease the Turkish Cypriot community which remained furious against him; and third, to inject welcome Greek Cypriot funds to the regime by persons eager to visit, after 29 years, their homes, birthplaces, and occupied properties.

One crucial implication was the complete falsification of one of Denktash’s central myths: viz., that Greeks and Turks of Cyprus cannot

unclear whether President Papadopoulos' decision was preceded by any secret discussions with other capitals as well as the UN. It is, however, certain that an avalanche of crucial bilateral meetings started taking place

Such was the Republic's excruciating voyage towards EU accession, helping to substantiate my thesis of an *Unfair Play*. Turkey's political blackmail, unceasing lawlessness and immorality were coupled with a few powers' unconscionable attempt to achieve the following: to dissolve the Republic of Cyprus, a UN and EU member state; to exculpate Turkey of its legal-political-economic obligations that follow from its human rights violations and associated actions; to serve, not the rights of the Cypriots, but the self-regarding interests of major powers and one superpower; and to do all this by *using* the United Nations, in violation of the organization's own values, principles and norms.

#### 4. *Turkey's Strategic Ambitions and European Adventures on the Way to December 2004*

---

Fluidity and experimentation may best characterize Turkey's post-Cold War strategic ambitions. While the European vocation retained pride of place in Ankara's long-term orientation, there was frustration at "Europe's" continuous rejections. Thus, the Caucasus and Central Asia inspired complementary visions. They were associated, first, with Turkey's self-perception as a major regional power, a "producer of security", and (later) even "a pivotal state"; and second, with rising energy needs and rich commercial designs. In addition, experimentation and fluidity were also forced upon it by the cosmogonic post-Cold War changes in the "Eurasian" space, where the roles of Russia, the US and even Iran could give rise to indeterminate outcomes. Finally, it should be stressed that Ankara's pre-Erdogan "Eurasian" policy was different in degree, if not in kind, from its current one, if only because the AKP government has been at pains to mend some fences and to seek cooperation with *most* neighbours. Thus, this chapter will try to show why, after the partial failure of the Eastern experiment and the ultimate irresistibility of "Europe", the EU option became Turkey's best strategic bet.

##### **The Grand Vision**

In the early 1990s, Ankara's political and military elites appeared eager to assume the role of a major power





political terms; Turkey the leader of the Turkic peoples in a Soviet Union now in disintegration".<sup>72</sup> From the perspective of 2005, such grandiose ambitions have not materialized, as the following sketch may help explain.

### **Turkey, the "Turkic Peoples", and Other Asian Ambitions**

Turkey's relations with *Azerbaijan* have been its most successful in the entire region. President Ebulfelz Elchibey, elected in June 1992, was "a strong advocate of the 'Turkish model' for Azerbaijan".<sup>73</sup> Beyond the political field, and as stated by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Turco-Azeri relations concern "the economy, trade, education, transportation, telecommunication, agriculture, social security, health, sports, culture, science, tourism, etc."<sup>74</sup>

Primarily, however, the two countries have focused on the military field and the energy sector. Turkey has undertaken to improve its neighbour's military education system and to train Azerbaijani officers.<sup>75</sup> As regards the political economy of oil and gas, Turkey's interests have been twofold: first, the acquisition of Azeri natural gas, in the effort to confront the country's massive needs;<sup>76</sup> and second, Ankara has long aspired to form a bridge for the transport of Caspian carbohydrates to the Mediterranean. Therefore, the pipeline that brought Caspian oil from Baku to the Turkish port of Ceyhan in spring 2005 is enriching Turkey's strategic assets.

And yet, courting Azerbaijan has not been an unmixed blessing. As Professor Bülent Aras has argued, Ankarrtipa'76w.2( er(rkish port oe556of 6w.Tw')53.5

accompanied the aforementioned activities by providing “humanitarian aid” to Georgia, although the sum total for the decade of 1992 to 2001 was confined to around \$25 million.<sup>80</sup> Turkey’s ties with Georgia, therefore, revealed Ankara’s goal to cultivate a regional political presence and enhance its share in the politics of oil and gas.

Concerning *Armenia*, Ankara has not even diplomatic relations with Yerevan. Given Armenia’s sustained campaign for recognition of the Ottoman genocide and Turkey’s extreme pro-Azeri stance in the Nagorno-Karabach conflict, their relations remain hostile and include the closing of Turkey’s border with Armenia. Besides the genocide – which Turkey adamantly denies – Ankara accuses Armenia of having territorial claims on Turkey.<sup>81</sup> Therefore, Ankara’s relations with Yerevan are victimized by Turkey’s nationalist denial in tandem with its criticised favouritism towards Azerbaijan. Improvement seems hard to envisage until both the Nagorno-Karabach dispute is resolved and the genocide issue is properly addressed. The latter, moreover, took new urgency with 3rd October 2005 approaching and the Armenian pressure groups re-energized worldwide but especially in Europe.

With the Central Asian Republics of *Kazakhstan*, *Kyrgyzstan*, *Tajikistan*, and *Turkmenistan*, Turkey tried to cultivate manifold interests. Establishing diplomatic relations immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ankara first embarked on developing cultural, educational and economic ties. The creation of the Turkish International Cooperation Agency (TICA) in January 1992 sought to coordinate Turkey’s penetration. In addition, emphasis was placed on providing scholarships to Central Asian students, so that around 7,000 persons from the region were recently studying in Turkey.<sup>82</sup> In trade, Turkey’s volume with the above-mentioned – plus  *Mongolia* and *Uzbekistan* – increased from \$145 million in 1992 to \$600 million in 2001. About 85% of this trade (around \$516 million) involved Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.<sup>83</sup> In addition, Turkish companies have been engaged in this vast area in numerous investment projects (primarily in construction).

However, Turkey’s ties with these former Soviet Republics could not match those they opted to maintain with the Russian Federation. The principal reasons appear as three: the substantial geographic distance separating them from Turkey; most of them have faced security threats, primarily from Islamic fundamentalists (hence only Russia has seemed capable to assist them); and substantial Russian minorities, constituting influential political-economic and socio-cultural bridges with Moscow, have remained in most Central Asian states.

Special difficulties were also encountered in Turkey's relations with post-soviet *Uzbekistan*. That these relations never flourished is explained in part by President Islam Karimov's own regional ambitions and his concomitant pro-Western stance. But as Shireen Hunter has recently noted, other reasons here at play included the fact that numerous Uzbek opposition figures sought refuge in Turkey in the early 90s, while panturkist Muhammad Salih was involved in the invasion of neighbouring Kyrgyzstan by Uzbek Islamic fundamentalists. As a consequence, "the Uzbek Government ordered the closing down of a number of Turkish schools and the relations between the two countries cooled substantially".<sup>84</sup>

In retrospect, the Russian factor was responsible for the apparent failure of "Ozal's vision" in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Arguably, however, the failure also arose from Turkey's hyperbolic sense of self-importance in association with its financial difficulties and economic weakness. Moreover, Bahri Yilmaz had intimated that Turkey's whole Central Asia project revealed that strategic intentions did not match role-fulfilment capabilities.

Thus, except for a substantial cultural-educational penetration,<sup>85</sup> pre-Erdogan Ankara had overestimated the real ability of its "model" to be applied to the vast and unsettled Central Asian space and exaggerated the model's actual attractiveness. Consequently, and in view of Turkey's bumpy socio-economic development, its bouts of political instability and its uneasy combination of secularism and Islam, these republics have rather declined politely Ankara's persistent offers. In addition, Bulent Aras has noted that in the late 1990s "the leaders of the new republics have begun to see Turkey as a source of instability".

80%.<sup>88</sup> In addition, Russia is currently Turkey's second-largest trading partner. And as Larrabee and Lesser noted, there is also a "vibrant 'suitcase trade'" between them, that "forms an important part of the unofficial Turkish economy..."<sup>89</sup> Simultaneously, Turkey has invested heavily in Russia, once again primarily in the construction sector.

And yet, both countries keep experiencing a number of "concerns". While Sabanci University Professor Ersin Kalaycioglu's statement, that Russia may still be "perceived as the historical foe" of Turkey,<sup>90</sup> seems hyperbolic, Ankara has felt uncomfortable with a number of recent Russian policies. They include its reassertion of influence in the Central Asian republics; its increasing ties with Iran; the broader Russo-Turkish competition in pipeline politics; and the Russian "intrusions" in the Transcaucasus. As

The potential for a dramatic reshaping of the geopolitical map of Transcaucasia and Central Asia after 9/11 emerged both because of global



Things were reversed again, however, in the months preceding Erdogan's second official encounter with George W. Bush in June 2005. The US administration's pro-Kurdish policy and the protracted Iraqi tragedy have caused rising anti-Americanism in Turkey. This anti-Americanism is communicated to Washington directly by the rhetoric of the country's ordinary people, the media and even politicians.<sup>100</sup> According to repeated Pew opinion research, Turkish anti-Americanism is now among the highest in the world.<sup>101</sup> Ankara's strategic options are confusing, especially after the "traumatic" French and Dutch referenda on the EU Constitutional Treaty. Hence, the question currently preoccupying Turkey is whether Ankara should keep its strategic eggs in the EU basket, asserting quasi-autonomy from Washington, or choose the cultivation of strong ties with both the EU and the US.<sup>102</sup> Especially after spring 2005 saw the surfacing of obstacles to Turkey's smooth EU sailing, Ankara's elites may well do their best to revitalize the "strategic partnership" in tandem with commitment to the EU trajectory.

## Turkey and Israel

Although long, the history of Turkey's ties with the Jewish state tends to be generally forgotten. As a Turkish analyst reminds us, "The foundation of Turkish-Israeli cooperation was laid during the visit of [...] Ben Gurion in the late fifties to Turkey, and a secret "Environment Pact" was signed between Israel, Iran and Turkey in 1958".<sup>103</sup>

But it was after the Gulf War and the collapse of the Soviet Union that Turkey and Israel strengthened their *sui generis* relationship, whose goals transcended Israel's wish to enjoy Turkey's abundant water resources and the latter's decision to treat Israel as another source of military hardware. In addition, Ankara perceives Israel as a crucial lobby-ally in Washington while Israel savours the Turkish airspace to train its air force pilots. Thus, with the inevitable exception of the Erbakan period – when the former Islamic prime minister's ideology and rhetoric undermined Ankara's links with the Jewish state – Turkey and Israel have been collaborating in economic, military, defence and intelligence matters.

Among other things, there is a yearly Israeli-Turkish political dialogue, as well as a constant flow of official visits. Defence cooperation, the acquisition of weapons systems by Turkey, technology transfer to Turkey's defence industry, joint military exercises (with occasional American and Jordanian participation), the training of Israeli air force pilots in Turkey's air space, and collaboration of their secret services have all sustained a

special bilateral relationship. Unsurprisingly, their Arab and Muslim neighbours have been suspicious and concerned. Israel and Turkey, however, have adamantly refused any wrongdoing.

Simultaneously, the Israeli goal to import Turkish water has long been on the agenda. Suleyman Demirel first offered to export it in July 1999 and, in January 2001, delegations from the two countries began appropriate discussions. On 6 August 2002, Israeli PM Ariel Sharon and Turkish Minister of Energy and Natural Resources, Zeki Cakan, agreed that Israel will purchase 50 million cubic metres per annum for a period of 20 years.

Although the Ankara-Tel Aviv entente suffered another blow with Tayyip Erdogan's explosive statement that Israel is a "terrorist state", it has returned to an even keel after Erdogan's visit to Ariel Sharon followed by Abdullah Gul's visit to both Israel and the Palestinian Authority. In any event, the Israeli connection could not satisfy most of Turkey's multifarious interests and idiosyncratic needs. Therefore, even a revitalized "strategic relationship" with the US together with the Turkey-Israel entente could



Turkish Cypriot regime (unilaterally declared in November 1983) and to exert its influence on Denktash to revoke the illicit UDI. The declaration, therefore, contradicted Ankara's assertion that the Cyprus conflict was "inter-communal". Third, in September 1986 EC-Turkey relations were reactivated, so Ankara decided to apply for full EEC membership. The application was submitted in April 1987 but the Commission's *Avis* (issued on 18 December 1989) frustrated Turkey's hopes. Among other things, the Opinion observed "the human rights situation" and "the respect for the identity of minorities" had "not yet reached the level required in a democracy". This Section of the Opinion concluded:<sup>104</sup>

Examination of the political aspects of the accession of Turkey would be incomplete if it did not consider the negative effects of the dispute between Turkey and one Member State of the Community, and also the situation in Cyprus, on which the European Council has just expressed its concern once again. At issue are the unity, independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cyprus, in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the United Nations.

Fourth, while the EC-Turkey Customs Union came into effect on 1 January 1996, the Dublin European Council of July 1996 urged Turkey once again to observe the highest standards of human rights and to contribute to the solution of the Cyprus problem in accordance with the UN resolutions. Fifth, the European Council of December 1997 in Luxembourg excluded Turkey from the list of candidates that were to start accession negotiations in March 1998. Angry and frustrated, Ankara responded by the partial suspension of its dialogue with the Union. It also announced that it would proceed to integrate the regime of occupied Cyprus if the EU were to start accession negotiations with the Republic. Sixth, the Helsinki summit of



## 5. *Greece's Foreign Policy Conundrums*

---

The publication of *Making Peace in Cyprus* (1996) coincided with the assumption of Greek premiership by Costas Simitis. The successor to Andreas Papandreu was immediately confronted with the Imia crisis, as we have seen. Hence, he inherited the Cyprus problem in a sensitive phase and the Aegean dispute in a dramatic moment. In a short while, his particular foreign policy “philosophy” crystallised as distinct, at least in degree, from that of his distinguished predecessor. What I have called “Simitis’ doctrine” will be presented below together with its major successes and its cardinal weakness, after which we inquire whether the Karamanlis administration’s foreign policy during its early months in power has digressed from the Simitis line.

Greece’s major foreign policy interests and preoccupations from 1996 to 2005 will be discussed through questions such as the following: How rational was Greece’s handling of Turkey’s challenges in the Aegean and in Cyprus? Did the “Simitis doctrine” perhaps approximate appeasement? Is Kostas Karamanlis’ foreign policy conducted essentially along “Simitian” lines? And what have been the roles of Washington and the European Union in Greece’s handling of the affairs of the triangle, Cyprus-Turkey-Greece?

### **Turkey’s Twofold Challenge**

Ankara’s manifold challenge to Greek sovereignty in the Aegean exploded *in tandem* with the invasion of Cyprus. The Aegean issues have caused



Turkish academic analysts have overwhelmingly supported Ankara's official line in the Aegean. Typical is Professor Suha Bölükbaşı's admission on the continental shelf: "The Greeks would like to take the dispute to the International Court of Justice, but the Turks feel that the Court might fail to pay adequate attention to the complexities of the issues and thus ignore Turkey's view that the dispute be treated as a special case".<sup>107</sup> Moreover, Bölükbaşı is quite revealing on Ankara's rejection of a judicial resolution:

For the Turks, the delimitation of the continental shelf through adjudication by the ICJ, and the settlement of the Cyprus dispute through an international conference are both undesirable; *they feel that the outcome in either case would be disadvantageous for Turkey*. Although Turkish public opinion is not as preoccupied with Turco-Greek issues as its Greek counterpart, Ankara would still have a hard time in selling to public opinion unfavourable continental shelf and Cyprus settlements reached through international conferences and adjudication.<sup>108</sup>

Such arguments provide significant insights into essential differences in Greek and Turkish political culture. To be sure, Professor Bölükbaşı's essay was written in the early 1990s; since then, Turkey is becoming entangled in the EU's web of legal principles and associated norms which require Ankara's reorientation on the peaceful and legal resolution of border disputes. Therefore, this essay will not endorse a pessimistic outlook on the potential employment of legal/political tools for the resolution of both the Aegean dispute and Cyprus' own problem.

And yet, it is not surprising that most Greek political elites and opinion-makers have perceived Ankara's post-1974 Aegean "revisionism" as a euphemism for maximalist expansionism. To be sure, a minority of analysts opt for a low-key handling of these issues. They seem to be motivated either by (a) the sense that an EU-aspiring Turkey will soon be forced to adopt European norms and values or (b) the expectation that the domestic Turkish struggle between the militant "deep state" and modernizing elites will ultimately be won by the latter, or (c) both.<sup>109</sup> The trouble is that, in fact, Turkey intensified its provocative challenges after the Athens Olympics and even after receiving strong Greek support during the crucial December 2004 European Council. Moreover, beyond unannounced daily flights within the Athens FIR, Ankara sent, in spring 2005, armed military aircraft *over Greek islands* in the Central Aegean and has returned to stubborn violations of Greek territorial waters (again around Imia). Simultaneously, Ankara's attitude towards the Republic of Cyprus and the

resolution of its problem can be regarded as worsening as well. In addition to regular claims that the recent “Yes” of the Turkish Cypriots has presently absolved it of any further obligations to Cyprus, Turkey is continuing its campaign to “upgrade the status of the TRNC”. Most disturbing, it condones the commitment of further illicit acts in the occupied territory: from the uninterrupted arrival of thousands of illegal settlers to the massive building of new homes on the occupied Greek Cypriot properties. Meanwhile, all these data keep raising an intriguing question: Who are, in fact, making Ankara’s crucial foreign policy decisions? An answer will be provided in chapter 8.

Therefore, despite the progress in certain bilateral ties and a perceptible change of bilateral “climate” as against the pre-1999 Greek-Turkish Cold War, the Karamanlis government’s disappointment and frustration at Turkish behaviour in the Aegean and Cyprus surfaced in recent months. Thus, to appreciate the labyrinthine nature of current Greek-Turkish relations, we should survey briefly their recent evolution.

### **The “Simitis Doctrine”**

The January 1996 episode at Imia islets prompted Athens’ decision to cultivate rapprochement with Turkey. Convinced that Ankara’s ongoing challenges and provocations could get out of control, the Simitis government pursued a tension-reducing and détente-building course. Coining the term “Simitis doctrine”<sup>110</sup> seemed justified after Simitis’ *Weltanschauung* became evident. It was a rational synthesis akin to “pragmatic idealism”: on the one hand, international law, international ethics, solidarity with like-minded international actors and reliance on appropriate international organizations; on the other, a simultaneous commitment to “a strong Greece” (economically, politically, and diplomatically) and to a moderate deterrence.

During Simitis’ premiership (1996-2004), rapprochement with Turkey took pride of place in Greek foreign and security policy. Athens’ détente-building experiment – a clear departure from Andreas Papandreou’s assertive foreign policy style – was stimulated by the Imia shock but was sustained by a series of additional events. Thus, the capture of PKK leader, Abdullah Ocalan, in the Greek Embassy in Kenya in early 1999 was an embarrassment for Athens, even though the actual involvement and responsibility of the Greek *government* was never established. However, one implication of the episode was the resignation of the foreign minister,

Theodoros Pangalos, an intelligent but highly controversial politician with a penchant for melodramatic, narcissistic and provocative rhetoric. His

the Balkans to Afghanistan. Third, it introduced generous support for Greek NGOs and supported foreign-aid campaigns. Fourth, the Simitis government should also be credited with the remarkable European Union Presidency which handled with aplomb the profound EU crisis caused by the American invasion of Iraq. Finally, the Simitis doctrine exhibited additional immediate and/or indirect successes, including Greece's entry in the European Monetary Union; unquestionably higher Greek prestige in Brussels; an impressive number of high-profile Greek officials in EU organs; and even Greece's triumphant 2004 election to the UN Security Council (completed under Karamanlis' premiership). Simitis' cardinal achievements, however, were his government's vital contribution to Cyprus' EU accession, his authentic commitment to Greek-Turkish rapprochement, and his manifold support of Turkey's EU orientation as the best means to establish Greek-Turkish-Cypriot détente and collaboration.

### **Simitis' Flaw**

Such a shining foreign policy record was blemished, in my considered opinion, by Simitis' unfortunate decision to support the "Annan plan". Presumably because of bad counsel or some prior promises by/to UN and/or EU officials or just because of regrettable bad judgement, Simitis openly supported the Annan plan, which is criticised thoroughly in chapter 6. This serious flaw could hurt his place in Greek, and certainly in Greek Cypriot, history: for it might encourage the suspicion that the Republic's rights were being compromised. Having said that, it might also be argued that even his erroneous stance on the Annan plan confirms that Greek-Turkish détente was his cardinal goal.

Upon receiving "Annan I", the Simitis government's officials orchestrated its defence. Ministers and other officials who had long and passionately argued that international law held the key to Cypriot liberation, to the problem's resolution, and therefore, to Greek-Turkish détente, now emerged as fervent supporters of a plan that contradicted international law principles and ethical norms. Arguments to explain this flawed perspective will be provided in the next chapter and are applicable to Simitis and his entourage. Here, let us record that, days before the referenda of 24 April 2004, Simitis attempted to influence the Greek Cypriots' vote. In the form of eight rhetorical questions, he issued the following alarmist warnings about the catastrophic consequences of a Greek Cypriot "No": 1. "Will the Republic of Cyprus be able to continue seeking UN support?" 2. "Will



it be able to appeal to Security Council decisions (resolutions)?” 3. “Will Greece be able to obstruct Turkish accession on account of the Cyprus problem?” 4. “Will the EU accept the non-lifting of trade barriers to the occupied territory?” 5. “Will the international community continue to reject the recognition of the pseudo-state [the secessionist regime]?” 6. “If the partition is made permanent, won’t the plan’s territorial benefits be lost?” 7. “Will a partitioned Cyprus be the source of more dangers or not?” and 8. “Won’t our stance on Cyprus pre-judge negatively the European partners’ stance on other issues?”<sup>112</sup> That none of these “predictions” has since been verified made their rehearsal irresistible.

### Simitis’ Legacy

In chapter 8, we will confirm the falsification of Simitis’ alarmism. Chapter 6 will show that the former PM’s intervention disregarded the Annan plan’s insurmountable problems. And yet, it is true that the difference in degree – albeit not in kind – in the post-1999 Greek-Turkish political climate is one product of the Simitis doctrine. Indeed, bilateral optimism frequently flourishes because of some positive verbal actions, promising exchanges of official visits, expanding “citizens’ diplomacy” and numerous “low politics” agreements in tourism, trade, fighting terrorism, environmental protection, and mutual assistance in natural disasters. Moreover, besides cultivating personal ties – such as Papandreou/Cem and Karamanlis/Erdogan – , tourism and trade between the two neighbours are expanding, while Caspian Sea natural gas will be transported to Western Europe via Turkey and Greece.<sup>113</sup> Presumably, Athens considers appropriate the development of a *modus vivendi* with Ankara, whereby “high politics” issues would be handled far better once capitalization on the accumulated agreements can yield Greco-Turkish peace dividends.

And yet, it is hard to deny that solid détente will evade them as long as Turkey causes dogfights daily in the Aegean by violating the Athens Flight Information Region and Greek airspace, maintains the *casus belli* in the Aegean, entrenches itself in occupied Cyprus, refuses to remove its troops and to recognise *de jure*

Arguably, therefore, Simitis' initiation of the post-1996 foreign policy experiment was reasonable, since the perpetuation of unmitigated Cold War was bound to cause disaster. The strategy of "Europeanizing" the bilateral relationship and the Cyprus problem was certainly rational, given Turkey's entrenched desire to accede to the EU. And yet, if the nature of the bilateral relationship borders on the schizophrenic; since the provocations in the Aegean have been deleterious and unending; and because Ankara's Cyprus policy is offensive to the EU's legal civilization and ethical culture – then, on the question of the validity of Athens' post-1996 strategy the jury is still out. Two additional considerations fortify this answer: first, EU-related developments in mid-2005 have made EU-Turkey relations exceedingly foggy; and second, Turkey's socio-political landscape appears increasingly murky. Moreover, the question of who are, after all, Ankara's *actual* foreign policy decision-makers seems all but unanswerable. In chapter 8, therefore, I will propose substituting "many Ankaras"

(see chapter 2) have proven that the undercurrents of “anti-Americanism” by Greek public opinion spring from disappointment and frustration at Washington’s perpetual errors and sins vis-à-vis post-war Greece.



## 6. *The Annan Plan and Its Discontents*

---

The 24 April twin referendum was meant to endorse or reject the “Annan plan”. It is commonly known that “Annan V” exceeded 9,000 pages. Its convoluted character rendered often incomprehensible even the 181 pages available – at the end – only to English-reading voters. The plan was treated by its defenders as aiming at “the reunification of Cyprus”. In truth, its goals were far more intricate, but serving a variety of exogenous interests and needs. Equally regrettably, it was also “pushed” openly and crudely on the Cypriots as their “last chance before final partition”.

Given its elusive nature, and the haste of its imposition, the world is only recently coming to appreciate how suspiciously defective this plan is. Suffice it to indicate at the outset that the proposed “United Cyprus Republic” contradicted elementary principles and rules of international law, being also at odds with fundamental European norms and values: it literally forgave Turkey for its 1974 invasion and the ongoing, and legally condemned, occupation; it expected the Greek Cypriots – the primary but not exclusive victims of the invasion – to sustain economically the new entity; it called for its demilitarization, but permitted the stationing of foreign troops *ad infinitum*, giving them, moreover, “right of intervention”; it contained experimental constitutional-administrative arrangements, since, beyond the threat of perennial vetoes, it provided that, in all cases of political/economic/legal/etc deadlock, the ultimate decision-making authority was vested in the Supreme Court where the ultimate determining power was vested on three *foreign* judges; and it made, in fact, Turkey a strong

participant in the very running of the UCR, through legitimization of tens of thousands of illegal Turkish settlers.

### Arguments for the “Yes” Side

Even its warmest Greek Cypriot proponents had conceded that the plan was “a painful compromise”. They insisted however that, “assuming good will”, it was bound to improve through EU membership. Also, echoing the plan’s foreign propagators, the Greek Cypriot advocates asserted that the following attributes made its endorsement necessary: (1) “Cypriot reunification” at long last; (2) eventual departure of most Turkish occupation troops; (3) return of about half the refugees to their abandoned homes under Greek Cypriot administration; and (4) eventual, even though partial and controversial, compensation for non-returning properties. Their strongest argument, however, was the constantly articulated “catastrophic consequences” of the “No”.

The proponents’ endorsability claims were sophisticated. They will be exposed below as misleading *petitio principii*. But beginning first with the alarmist threats, it should be stressed that they were massively orchestrated and passionately voiced to intimidate the voters. Therefore, they were morally outrageous. In addition, the “catastrophologists” revealed the submission of some Greek Cypriot elites – from political figures to media personalities to younger academics – to the overt or covert threats by self-serving foreign centres. These threats, echoed by Simitis’ own “predictions”, included alleged “certainties” such as these: after a No vote, Cyprus will be internationally “isolated”; this was “the last plan”; upon rejection of the Annan Plan, Cyprus would be “Euro-partitioned”; and the plan’s rejection would flood the Republic’s free territories with Turkish Cypriots, seeking freedom and human rights, and causing the consequent habitation of the “North” only by Turkish settlers. Thus, instead of protesting at such threats as politically unconscionable and morally unbearable, the plan’s supporters had succumbed to them. Hence, they were perceived as serving ultimately the vested interests of the foreign capitals that wished to attain the Cypriots’ Yes at all costs.

Needless to say, this author does not necessarily share the “fifth column” perception of the entire pro-Yes Greek Cypriot camp. After all, many of them – especially the older generation – were exhausted by the problem. Others could not appreciate the plan’s enormously negative implications. And still others suffered from what may be termed “the

author's complex": for a number of political figures – in Clerides' presidency and George Vassiliou's EDI party – had participated in the plan's drafting during the negotiations. It does not follow, however, that all Greek Cypriot elites were entirely innocent of unfair play. The autumn 2004 revelations concerning UNOPS' and USAID's generous financial support for individuals and groups campaigning for the Yes, both in Cyprus and in Greece, sufficed to expose numerous individuals as not above suspicion.<sup>120</sup>

Turning to the supporters' major material expectations (the return of half the refugees and the property issue), the tragic irony is that for any of these to be fulfilled, two "heroic" assumptions were required: the *existence* of "good will" and, by implication, that the plan *could actually work*. Manifestly, both assumptions were at best unfounded or naive. For if the "UCR" was massively perceived by the Greek Cypriots as unbalanced, unfair and unworkable, it would follow that it was condemned *ab initio* to a brief life. In this case, of course, the implications would be colossal: the Republic of Cyprus would cease to exist whereas the illicitly occupied areas would have attained "legitimacy". It already follows that the entire operation was at best inherently risky and, at worst, deeply suspect.

As regards the remaining "benefits" – i.e., the phased departure of most Turkish troops and eventual "reunification" – far from being generous bonuses attached to a defective text, they are Turkey's manifest legal requirements and political duties. The Greek Cypriots at least do not forget that Turkey's invasion, the illegal occupation, and the massive violation of the fundamental human rights of both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots have been explicitly and repeatedly condemned for over 30 years. Moreover, with Turkey awaiting the EU's December 2004 decision, it seemed scandalous that it could attain its "date" while occupying 37% of an EU member-state's territory. Thus, absent any guarantees whatsoever that this particular plan would work,<sup>121</sup> the attempt to white-wash Turkey's Cyprus aggression was politically, legally and morally offensive. Finally, insult was added to injury by the plan's intention to obliterate Turkey's obligation to compensate the victims of the occupation. Indeed, few analysts mention that the plan included a "Letter to the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe" by the "Co-Presidents", to the effect that all further cases against Turkey in the European Court of Human Rights concerning Cypriot properties should be annulled. After asserting that "domestic remedy" for the solution of "*affected property*" questions is provided in the Foundation Agreement of the plan, the Letter was rendering "the United Cyprus Republic" solely responsible for these matters. It then added:<sup>122</sup>

Moreover, pursuant to Article 37 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, we request the Court to strike out any proceeding currently before it concerning affected property in Cyprus, in order to allow the domestic mechanism, established to solve these cases, to proceed.

Therefore, the plan precluded tens of thousands of refugees from enjoying compensations analogous to Ms Titina Loizidou's. This was assessed by G/Cs and knowledgeable others as a veritable legal and ethical scandal.

### **Some Replies by the “No” Side**



morally forced to submit his opinion to all Cypriots, to the Greek Cypriot

the ordinary citizen's mind. To him/her, the fair resolution of the property issues was the time-honoured and legally sanctioned way of the Western tradition of human rights: return to her/his property, coupled – as in the Loizidou case – with substantial compensation for the violation of the right to enjoy this property.<sup>127</sup>

And fifth, despite disingenuous ambiguities, the plan had endorsed the legitimization of most of the illegal settlers from mainland Turkey. Now, for many reasons, these have long been in serious – social, economic, psychological and political – conflict with the genuine Turkish Cypriots, as noted also by the Jaakko Laakso Report:<sup>128</sup>

The settlers come mainly from the region of Anatolia, one of the less developed regions of Turkey. Their customs and traditions differ in a significant way from those in Cyprus. These differences are the main reason for the tensions and dissatisfaction of the indigenous Turkish Cypriot population who tend to view them as a foreign element.

What is more, considering that all Greek Cypriots know that illegal settlement is an established war crime, suspicion and mistrust could be anticipated *a fortiori* among these settlers and the Greek Cypriots. After all, most of the settlers have occupied and exploited for years the homes and properties of the Republic's legitimate citizens.

There were, however, additional serious problems. So, on 7 June 2004, President Papadopoulos addressed a letter to Kofi Annan, complaining bitterly about the latter's report on his Cyprus mission. He accused it of factual inaccuracies, biased inferences, and numerous counterproductive suggestions. On the crucial issue of functionality, his letter includes this observation:

Functionality covers all the areas of the operation of the state and our concern for functionality was reflected in all of our proposals during the process covering, inter alia, federal legislation and its practical application, the Central Bank, fiscal and monetary policy, the curtailing of the various transitional periods, ensuring conformity with EU obligations, the administrative structure and function of the federal government, the decision-making process at all levels, the territorial aspect and the issue of missing persons.<sup>129</sup>

On most of these issues, Nicosia did ask for substantial changes, which it never received. In fact, exercising his “discretionary power” to fill the plan's remaining gaps at Bürgenstock, Mr Annan endorsed all the demands raised by Turkish PM, Tayyip Erdogan. Given, then, that “Annan V” was even more unfair to the Greek Cypriots but entirely satisfactory to Turkey

and the Turkish Cypriots, the Turkish media were immediately ecstatic and the Turkish Cypriots could not but vote in support for such a plan.

### **Procedural Sins**

The Greek Cypriots might have overlooked some of the plan's substantive defects and anomalies, if they could somehow perceive the entire affair as *ultimately* just or fair. However, feeling manipulated and blackmailed by the whole process and by the very entourage of Mr Annan – especially by supercilious Alvaro de Soto – only deepened their sense of injustice. In this regard, the following data are most notable.

The timetable of the decisions expected on the earlier versions of the plan (until February 2003) was truly asphyxiating. This caused profound discontent. For, while the content of the highly technical plan was nearly incomprehensible to the average citizen, Mr Annan had first demanded agreements, followed by referenda, to be held only days before the Republic of Cyprus was to sign the Treaty of Accession on 16 April 2003.

After that failed effort because of Rauf Denktaş, the last negotiating round began with the 13 February 2004 New York agreement. But this agreement was also reached under unconscionable pressures. This fact solidified the conviction that the UN Secretariat, Washington and London were railroading the plan's unquestioned endorsement. Moreover, the agreement contained another unprecedented provision: that is, should no consensus be reached by the Cypriots themselves by the end of March 2004 – even assisted for a week by Ankara and Athens – the Secretary General himself would “exercise his discretion” and thus “fill in the remaining gaps”... This provision can be accused of violating the limits of the Secretary General's “good offices mission”.

Next, the new referenda were set for 24 April 2004, that is, only days before the Republic's formal EU Accession on May 1! In addition, the UN allowed the settlers to vote, obliterating any distinction between them and the native Turkish Cypriots. This entrenched the suspicion that the plan's authors had actually decided to “legitimize” most settlers by fiat. Finally, and most important, President Papadopoulos' proposals for functional improvements were utterly ignored by Alvaro de Soto.<sup>130</sup>

Thus, some Greek Cypriot commentators and politicians suggested that “Annan V” was so inimical to their community's needs, and so contrary to international and EU principles and norms, that, besides serving alien interests, it was perhaps tailored to secure the Greek Cypriot No. In any

case, the entire procedure amounted to a travesty of a “free and democratic referendum”. Equally important, the UNSG’s invitation of February 2004 had stated explicitly that one No would render the entire affair null and void. Therefore, it is disheartening that, immediately after 24 April 2004, the Republic of Cyprus was subjected to unbearable pressures, while Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots started enjoying unprecedented favours.

### **Further Legal Anomalies**

The Greek Cypriots’ perception of thorough unfairness through manipulation sprung from additional legal errors and sins. As a matter of legal fact, the plan contradicted solid commitments of international law, the European Union’s legal culture, and its defining political values and norms, as the following examples demonstrate.

First, the orchestrated attempt to wipe out Turkey’s guilt and responsibility for the 1974 invasion would constitute serious injury to the EU’s prestige and a pernicious precedent for the global legal culture.

Second, the Greek Cypriots’ human rights were only partially and conditionally satisfied by the plan as regards, for instance, the right of all persons to return to their homes and properties; to be compensated for the loss of property enjoyment; unimpeded residence anywhere on the island; and the right to vote when residing in the Turkish Cypriot constituent state. The partial and curtailed satisfaction of these human rights amounts, in fact, to a violation of those rights and of the EU’s treasured values and norms.

Third, we have recalled repeatedly the ECHR’s historic decisions in the *Loizidou v Turkey* case (1996 and 1998), which forced Ankara to pay, five years later, 1 million EUR to Ms Loizidou (November 2003). The plan, as we have shown, declared that all such cases must be abandoned. Therefore, Turkey would not be obliged to compensate any other of the 180,000 Greek Cypriot refugees for the violation of the selfsame right. It followed that such compensation would have to be provided by the Greek Cypriot constituent state. In other words, the Greek Cypriots were being forced by this plan to compensate themselves!

Fourth, Article 100 (1) of the UN Charter appears violated, since it declares:

In the performance of their duties, the Secretary-General and the staff shall not seek or receive instructions from any government or from any other authority external to the Organization. They shall refrain from any action

which might reflect on their position as international officials responsible only to the Organisation.

Fifth, the unconscionable pressures applied to the Cypriot people and their President regarding both the plan and the referendum seem to constitute a clear violation of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Of immediate relevance here is the spirit and letter of Articles 51 (“Coercion of a representative of a State”); 52 (“Coercion of a State by the threat or use of force”); and 53 (“Treaties conflicting with a peremptory norm of general international law (*jus cogens*)”).

Sixth, while the plan envisaged the demilitarization of the “UCR”, it sanctioned the presence of foreign troops with an “intervention right” in its territory. But it is clear that such a “right” was the root cause of the tragedy of 1974. Any interpretation to the effect that this right entails or permits the use of military force should be illegal *ab initio*, since it clearly contradicts Article 103 of the UN Charter (see again chapter 2). It follows, once again, that this “UN Plan” contradicted fundamental norms of international law, including even cardinal ones of the organisation’s own Charter.

Finally, many legal features of the “UCR” undermine the notion of sovereignty. Therefore, this entity would have amounted to a second or third-rate state and, as some commentators noted, a “satrapy of Turkey”. In any event, this experimentally concocted political entity could not have functioned as a *full*, not to mention an *equal*, EU member-state.

### **On the Authorship of the Annan Plan**

Given the legal anomalies and political and moral contradictions embedded in this plan, the Greek Cypriots concluded that they confronted an apparent trap. Simultaneously, they were wondering precisely who would wish them such a fate and why. A fair answer is that the labyrinthine text was concocted primarily by “experts” serving the current “Cyprus agenda” of the Secretariat; and that they were all influenced or guided by policy-makers and diplomats from Washington and London, Lord David Hannay being a prime example. This was manifest in their open and direct involvement in all stages of this “good offices mission”. The self-regarding interests of these two capitals were – and still are – very hard to hide. They also suffice to explain the furious indignation with which they received the Greek Cypriots’ No.

On London’s part, these interests centre on legitimating the presence in Cyprus of the two British “Sovereign Bases”. Being equivalent to around

3% of the Republic's territory, they are a remnant of the colonial past. The strategic value and multidimensional role of these bases – as British and American listening-posts covering the Middle East and far beyond – are well-known. But the plan attempted to expand Britain's rights to Cyprus' territorial waters and arguably the associated continental shelf. It should therefore be recalled that, three years ago, deposits of petroleum and natural gas were located between Cyprus and Egypt. The authors performed almost surreptitiously their attempt to grant Britain further rights in Cyprus. The textual ambiguity deserves to be quoted in full: <sup>131</sup>

The United Kingdom shall continue to enjoy complete and unimpeded access for any purpose whatsoever to the waters lying between the waters which the United Cyprus Republic shall not claim adjacent to the eastern part of the Dhekelia Sovereign Base Area adjoining the sea (which part is marked on Map A with an area of 16.10 sq.km), and the waters which the United Cyprus Republic shall not claim adjacent to the western part of the Dhekelia Sovereign Base Area adjoining the sea (which is marked on map A with an area of 5.01 sq.km).

The issue of the British bases has always troubled the Cypriot political class and the people. But it was thought, until very recently, that the Republic could not afford “to open another (diplomatic/legal) front” while the struggle for justice was lasting. And yet, upon discovering that the EU Constitutional Treaty had itself included a Declaration to the effect that the bases would be “British Sovereign Areas” *ad infinitum*, the House of Representatives, after voting in favour of the Constitutional Treaty, took another vote. It decided, this time unanimously, to declare that the UK has no sovereignty on the territory of the bases but only the right to use it for particular military purposes; to ask London to fulfill its relevant economic obligations to the Republic; to ask the Government to investigate the proper legal means to receive the rent owed by London; and to seek the final resolution of the issue in the framework of international law. Incidentally, the relevant report in distinguished Athens daily, *Eleftherotypia*, observed that this unanimous vote was certainly affected “by the hostile stance London maintains towards Cyprus in many forums”.<sup>132</sup>

As for Washington, its persistent and manifold pressures on the Greek Cypriots to accept the plan were a causal extension of its long-term regional perceptions and strategic designs. Thus, beyond aiming to contribute to settling the “triangular” disputes of Turkey-Cyprus-Greece, the current US vision looked as follows. First, it aimed to score some “diplomatic victory” on the island, following especially the monumental catastrophe in

Iraq and the growing anti-Americanism especially in the Near – and Middle East. Second, the State Department has long been determined to help Turkey’s EU accession. Therefore, it was necessary to help unload its heavy Cyprus-related legal, political and ethical burden. Third, were a “Cyprus constitutional model” to emerge, it might be “applied” to other countries in the region, in association with the Greater Middle East Project. And fourth, many observers endorse the Machiavellian hypothesis of the Trojan Horse: should Turkey, by ending *inter alia* its “Cyprus malaise”, achieve eventually full EU membership, the US would increase substantially its power and influence over “New Europe” within the EU.

In this respect, few readers may know how Mr Richard Boucher was confronted by a journalist during a May 2004 State Department briefing:<sup>133</sup>

Another disclosure on Cyprus. According to an article written by established Greek-American organization, to be published soon in a very well known American magazine, a full copy of which is in my possession, reveals the following: “Why then the consternation about the rejection of the Annan plan? Because the true purpose was not the claimed goal of reunifying the island, divided since the Turkish invasion of 1974, but the one stated by Mr. Daniel Fried, a senior State Department official. At a public meeting in Washington on June 26, 2003, in the presence of this writer and others, Mr Fried declared: ‘When we were trying to persuade Turkey to allow the passage of our troops through its territory into Northern Iraq, we offered Turkey two incentives, several billion dollars in grants and loans, and Cyprus, in the

however, have looked up to “Europe” as their political vocation and legal-moral salvation.



## 7. *Unfair Consequences, Ambiguous Implications*

---

The unfairness of the Annan plan affair now established, it is also important to illustrate the survival of unfair means and ends against Cyprus *after*

the plan aim only at fair and functional improvements to render reunification solid and therefore viable. However, Talat, like Denktash, is himself entangled in Ankara's antics, as he depends primarily upon it.

Second, from the standpoint of blunt *Realpolitik* it may be understandable that some EU circles, just like the present UN Secretariat, desired to fix a drawn-out international problem in haste. But it is politically and ethically unconscionable that, during the Annan affair, the European Commission tolerated the aforementioned violations of the *acquis communautaire* and the manifest contradictions to cardinal axiological principles of Europe's Constitutional Treaty.

Primarily after Helsinki (December 1999), the EU relied too religiously on the UN's role, presumably counting on the latter's alleged "expertise" on the matter and also because it was eager to usher a "reunited Cyprus" into the Union. But Washington and London's asphyxiating pressures contributed to Brussels' being misled. However, if even parsTi

to recall (a) the errors and sins of the Annan plan and (b) the *actual reasons* given by the Greek Cypriots to explain their vote. As for (2), it banks on the false impression that the Republic of Cyprus has “isolated” its own citizens! But as already explained, the “isolation” results from the embargo imposed by the international community on the secessionist regime of the occupied territory, as necessitated by Turkey’s condemned invasion and occupation. In addition, we have also demonstrated the self-serving grounds of the Turkish Cypriots’ “Yes”. Therefore, it is absurd to hold that they should be “rewarded” for defending their interests – as if they could have done otherwise! Finally, it is crucial here to ask, *whom they are referring to* when they talk of “Turkish Cypriots”? Even though many still try to mislead, it is clear that by “Turkish Cypriots” one should only mean the “indigenous” ones. Otherwise, one ignores or condones the war crime of importing illegal settlers.

The pressures on the Republic tookd by gime

by Washington – was to encourage direct flights from Europe and the US to the illegal airport of the secessionist and unrecognized regime. Once again, such proposals fly in the face of international law and Cypriot sovereignty. To the ethical credit of the European Union, at least during the Luxembourg Presidency, these efforts were opposed and resisted. But credit is also due to the Cyprus government. For, beyond keeping alive (since

Cyprus participate in the meeting under the name “Turkish Cypriot State”, that is, the name proposed by the rejected Annan Plan. While FM Abdullah Gül kept reassuring Brussels that Turkey’s insistence had “nothing to do with recognising” the (illegal) regime, the Dutch presidency was not convinced. Hence it called for the withdrawal of all EU participation in the Forum, causing its cancellation.

On the other hand, the months immediately preceding the December 2004 summit were gratifying for the Republic. Papadopoulos’ visits to numerous capitals of fellow-EU member-states were bearing fruits in tandem with the work of soft-spoken FM Iakovou and his energetic diplomatic staff. Thus, a series of statements and EU decisions about Cyprus falsified the “catastrophology” of the “Annanites”, intensifying optimism that the EU will, after all, honour its principles and norms. President of the European Parliament, Josep Borrell, was among the first who endorsed Papadopoulos’ exposé of Nicosia’s stance. After their Brussels meeting, Mr Borrell stated: “The solution proposed to the Cypriots could not have been that good; hence it was not accepted. We must listen to the Cypriots so as to find another solution, and the European Parliament is intensely involved in this effort.”<sup>142</sup>

Secondly, the Permanent Representatives Committee (COREPER) began debating the Regulation on economic assistance to the Turkish/Cypriot community since April 2004. Nicosia has supported from the outset all such assistance, to help reduce the yawning economic gap between the two sides. Nicosia insists, however, (1) that such assistance cannot bypass the legitimate Government; and (2) that no impression should be given that occupied Cyprus enjoys any “legitimate” authorities. Reportedly, the British representatives have antagonized Nicosia’s arguments persistently. COREPER, however, has been endorsing Nicosia’s theses to date, while Nicosia, in turn, has agreed from the outset to granting the Turkish Cypriots a 259 million Eur aid package.

Third, the Cyprus Government informed its EU interlocutors about the measures taken to “upgrade” the Turkish Cypriots’ quality of life. Since April 2003, in fact, it has extended generous social, medical, educational, economic and trade measures to assist them. It is not widely known, moreover, that, by spring 2005, over 6,000 Turkish Cypriots cross daily the barricades to work in the free territories while 1,000 of them have already joined the (left-wing) labour syndicate, PEO.<sup>143</sup> Additional relevant data (April 2003-March 2005) include the following: the Turkish Cypriots’ wages from the free territory amounted to 107 million Cyprus pounds; the

T/Cs have received from the Republic social security benefits of 18, 8 million CYP; medical coverage in public hospitals has cost an additional 4 million CYP; the Republic has been paying student tuition fees, which by September 2005 will amount to 2,4 million CYP; and since 1974, the Cyprus Electricity Authority has been providing free electricity to the occupied area to the tune of 150 million Cyprus pounds.<sup>144</sup> Thus, by emphasizing that no EU-sponsored measures should bypass the legitimate Cypriot government, Nicosia argues that it must protect the Republic's sovereignty and not strengthen the hand of Turkish Cypriot chauvinists. For, instead of helping reunification, measures that by-pass the Republic would be used to cement the division.

Now, the Commission's October 6 decisions on Turkey generated even contradictory readings of the final form of the EU-Turkey relationship and Cyprus' role in the process. Regarding the latter, Nicosia was displeased by the silence regarding the occupation troops on EU territory and Turkey's associated legal obligations. On the other hand, the recommendation that the accession negotiations take place in an Intergovernmental Conference, where unanimity is required, entailed that Nicosia's votes were becoming a *sine qua non*.

The Commission's proposals caused a fresh public discussion of the Republic's right to veto. This was also encouraged by Ankara's renewed intransigence and by the Turcoskeptic sentiments in some member-states following 6 October.<sup>145</sup> Greek Cypriot analysts and political figures argued openly that the Republic's justified and hard-won EU-status empowered it to claim the elementary rights that no European can doubt. These included the recognition of the Republic by Turkey; the beginning of the end of the occupation; the departure of most settlers; and the speedy start of fair negotiations premised on the European Union's principles, values and norms. Josep Borell's address to the Turkish Parliament provided additional support.<sup>146</sup>

The very process of opening negotiations between the 25 member states and Turkey implies recognition of Cyprus. It is not possible to negotiate with someone that you don't recognise...I would suggest both to you and to the authorities in Nicosia that if the opening of negotiations in itself means recognition of Cyprus by Turkey, then, perhaps, there may be less of a political problem for both governments.

As the December 2004 summit approached, statements by leading political figures and the people's sentiments, captured through repeated opinion polls, favoured the use of Nicosia's veto.<sup>147</sup> As they put it, "if need

be”, the Republic should consider that “the veto is an option”. This, in fact, was the slogan of a popular, public political meeting held in Nicosia only days before the European Council. Given the mounting frustration caused by Ankara’s persistent refusal to recognise the Republic while expecting that Nicosia would vote in favour of Turkey, most people hoped that Cyprus, backed by like-minded member-states, could indeed raise its veto at

until the end”; and its front-page article, “Turkey’s accession will pass



## 8. *Stock-taking and Conclusions*

---

This essay has tried to establish a number of principal theses. First, Turkey's Cyprus policy has been palpably illegal, as demonstrated through the norms of international law and the country's repeated and manifold condemnations by international courts and organizations. Second, Turkey's invasion and occupation of 37% of Cyprus is manifestly immoral. This was shown primarily by its violation of the norms of Just War theory, the incessant violation of the human rights and freedoms of all Cypriots, and the demonstration that Ankara has ignored the relevant international calls in its attempt to keep the Republic hostage to geopolitical – primarily EC/EU-related – ambitions. Third, since the mid-1990s, and certainly since 1999, Greece has been at pains to end the Greek-Turkish Cold War, to cultivate bilateral détente and collaboration and to support Turkey's EU vision by all means. Turkey's reciprocation has been minimal. Fourth, the protracted illegality of the occupation of Cyprus has constituted a thorn in the side of the global, and primarily the EU, legal culture, especially after Turkey's status was raised to that of a candidate for membership. Therefore, this occupation had to end and Cyprus' political probl of a-e gend

illicit secessionist regime of occupied Cyprus. Seventh, the Greek Cypriots, moreover, envisaged that their already locked and hard-won EU membership will perforce engage the Union in resolving the country's problem via the very principles and norms of the EU. By the same token – and in view of the unconscionable threats to which they were exposed – the Greek Cypriots stood up for EU principles and values and should, therefore, be praised and rewarded for this fact. Finally, the European Council of December 2004, after considerable doubts and trepidation, “awarded” Turkey the prospect of starting accession negotiations on 3 October 2005. Applying some stringent terms for the negotiations' outcome while also minimizing the conditions for the negotiations' start, the Union expected that Ankara would extend its Customs Union Protocol so as to cover the Republic of Cyprus, as a necessary step towards “normalizing” the two countries' relations. However, the EU's double crisis of the first half of 2005 (concerning two referenda and the Union's budget) intensified two things: first, some EU elites' doubts about the wisdom of a more speedy expansion and, second, remarkable popular opposition to Turkey's particular accession.

Assuming this is an acceptable summary of this essay's established theses, this last chapter, before considering the emerging EU responses to Turkey, should discuss the latter's probable behaviour towards the Union, Cyprus, and Greece. Methodologically, this requires some insights on the sources and forces behind Turkey's foreign policy-making, in the spirit of Pragmatic Idealism (and even Social Constructivism). Thus, I will summarise characteristic features of Turkey's political culture affecting the principal tendencies of its foreign policy, before moving to predictions and prescriptions. It will transpire that Turkey's peculiar historical, geographic, demographic, socio-economic and cultural characteristics have informed an idiosyncratic political culture marked by a synthesis of contradictory attributes.<sup>154</sup> Inevitably, Turkish foreign policy exhibits analogous features, resulting in some confusing, and often confused, foreign policy behaviour.

Let me emphasize however that, since the November 2002 rise to power of the AKP, Turkey's political culture is undergoing some rapid changes, resulting mainly from sustained efforts at modernization and “Europeani-

recently on EU-Turkey relations and associated issues, the Canada-educated economist concluded:<sup>155</sup>

Turkey has to become a democratic country where the rule of law is respected in domestic and international relations. It has to lucidly address and deal with the injustices committed in the past and stop hiding behind the tactics suggested by short-sighted diplomats and mediocre experts in international relations. I think that a little more *concern for law and morality* would be more useful to promote our long-term interests than crude ideas about national interest. (emphasis added)

Professor Bugra's thesis is deeply gratifying for anyone envisaging its application towards solid Greco-Turkish détente and collaboration and the fair resolution of the Cyprus dispute. Evidently, it is too early to predict the extent and popularity of such earnest and wise "self-criticism". In any event, what follows aims at clarifying Turkey's foreign policy trends. It is also hoped that all well-intended evaluations of its foreign relations serve the substantive improvement of Turkey's relations within the "quartet".

## **A Sketch of Turkish Political Culture**

### *Identity and Belonging.*

early 90s. We have noted the unbounded visions for Turkey's role in the 21<sup>st</sup> century as expressed by Turgut Ozal, Suleyman Demirel, and others. Typical also was Bulent Ecevit and Ismael Cem's declaration in December 1999 that "Turkey will be a full member of the EU in three years."<sup>157</sup> Similarly, Cem's interview in the *TDN* in early 2002 was entitled: "Turkish model is paradigm of civilization."<sup>158</sup>

Besides a long imperial history, probable sources of such boasting are Turkey's powerful military establishment; the over-65 million population; geo-economic prospects and rich natural resources; and the favouritism shown traditionally towards it by Washington, NATO and London. National self-confidence may explain why Turkish reactions to criticism by international actors (EU, UN, INGOs, or prominent individuals) can be vociferous. Turkish elites have tended to ascribe Western criticism to "ignorance", "confusion", and "cultural discrimination". Despite the welcome

Turkey's repeated threats against their installation forced Nicosia to cancel their deployment. Cyprus, of course, is victimised by Turkey's "karadae" policy ever since the 1974 invasion. But it took another direct form when Ankara threatened in June 2002 "to respond without limits" if the EU accepted the Republic as a member. While that threat did not materialize militarily, the Aegean *casus belli* remains in force together with the daily violations of the Athens FIR and Greece's national airspace. Hence Congressman Donald Payne protested recently: "In this geographic neighbourhood of perennial tensions that have lasted over half a century, a major U.S. ally, Turkey, seems always poised to seize every opportunity to cash in on emerging crises and to bully its neighbours."<sup>160</sup>

*Insecurity and Pessimism.* And yet, the aforementioned aggressive features co-habit with bouts of pessimism and undercurrent insecurity. A principal source of the latter is the conviction that antagonists and enemies surround it. Probably associated with the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, it was intensified by their choice of allies in WWI and by Ankara's controversial behaviour during WWII. Besides friction with neighbouring Arab and Muslim countries, Turkey also remembers its tensions and conflicts with Western states. As Professor Deringil noted regarding World War II: "Turkey came under severe criticism for its 'egotistic' foreign policy. The apparent contradiction between the Treaty of Mutual Co-operation with Britain and France (1939) and the Friendship and Non-Aggression Pact signed with Germany in 1941 was seen by the western allies as a sign of Turkey's unreliability. It was *this stigma of unreliability* that Turkey felt obliged to shake off in the post-war years."<sup>161</sup>

Progressively, Turkey's Cold War geopolitical importance minimised the effects of this "stigma". However, the EC's rejection of its application for accession was traumatic to Turkish self-esteem and self-perception, as

protracted. And in 2005, the convoluted crisis in post-Saddam northern Iraq generates ominous fears, since Ankara suspects Washington of tolerating the Iraq-based PKK guerrillas.

Moreover, the pre-Erdogan socio-economic malaise cultivated deep pessimism, resulting in a crisis of political legitimation. The magnitude of the

leaders, the entrenched bureaucracy and some more obscure power-centres – is often in disharmony with the ruling political leadership, especially the newcomers of pro-Islamic AKP. Thus, despite progressive improvements in recent months, the tension between the AKP government and the Kemalist *pashas* cannot (in mid – 2005) possibly be treated as resolved. Similarly, the conflict between “Europhiles” and “Euroskeptics” will survive in the currently uncertain EU climate. In fact, should Turkey’s accession negotiations start in October 2005, this conflict might deepen: for many Turks resent the “sacrifices” demanded by the Union and the negotiations – for an uncertain end – could last for 10-15 years. Furthermore, the ranks of “Kemalist” generals include Europhiles, Euroskeptics, and even improvisers. Thus, although the *pashas* now assert an EU commitment, powerful

of the military, and a confusing foreign policy-making. This, then, contrib-



Cyprus. Ankara had long “threatened” this action. But it was widely hoped that it would abandon such a political and legal absurdity. For it is absurd (because self-contradictory) to refuse to recognize the Republic: first, it is a full member-state of the Union with which Turkey wishes to begin accession negotiations; second, President Papadopoulos had extended in December 2004 the Republic’s endorsement of Turkey’s future negotiations; and third, the Republic will be one of Turkey’s 25 “judges” at every step of the accession negotiations.

Whether due exclusively to deep annoyance at Ankara’s tactics, to Cartesian logic and moral principle, or also because of the popular French concerns over Turkey’s eventual membership, France’s new Prime Minister, Dominique de Villepin, immediately condemned Ankara’s behaviour as “inconceivable”. He then warned Turkey that it *cannot begin* accession negotiations unless it recognizes the Republic. President Jacques Chirac, the French Foreign Minister, and Nicholas Sarkozy all adopted de Villepin’s stance. A few days later, Danish Prime Minister Anders Rasmussen followed suit, accompanied by the leaders of the German CDU and CSU.<sup>170</sup>

All this suggested that Turkey’s (self-inflicted) EU difficulties were mounting again, with the start of its accession negotiations suddenly questioned. It now depended on the considered opinion of many member-states, to be revealed in COREPER discussions in late August and by the EU Foreign Ministers on 1-2 September 2005 near Cardiff. Thus, Turkey was now confronting a novel dilemma: either to be forced to recognize the Republic of Cyprus at least *de facto*; or to see its negotiations postponed *ad infinitum*. Therefore, the EU’s treatment of Turkey will depend, *au fond*, on Turkey’s selection of the most rational horns of its various dilemmas.

### **Turkey’s Dilemmas vis-a-vis the “Quartet”**

Recapitulating Turkey’s relevant dilemmas, we may begin with the Union. The AKP government is clearly committed to full membership, rejecting out of court any other form of association. Simultaneously, it rejects the Republic’s recognition, claiming (1) that it has fulfilled its obligations



Republic's recognition is rendered a must for Ankara, Turkey's future EU status will hinge on numerous additional variables.

As regards Turkey's policies towards Greece, let us first recall their inherent ambiguity. On the one hand, a series of bilateral protocols and agreements continue to be signed; cooperation has expanded primarily in the sectors of tourism, banking and energy;<sup>171</sup> Athens remains committed in its support of Turkey's EU candidacy and has extended Ankara appropriate technical assistance; diplomats from the two countries have pursued over 30 rounds of (inconclusive) bilateral meetings regarding the Aegean dispute; and "citizens' diplomacy" also seems alive and well.<sup>172</sup>

On the other hand, we should recall Ankara's daily violation of the Greek national airspace and the Athens FIR, besides the *casus belli* declaration. Thus, instead of reciprocating for Greece's détente-building and unshakable support in the EU, Turkey is trying to attain its EU membership after revising the Aegean status quo according to its geopolitical desires. Moreover, since Greece is bound to defend the rights of the Republic, it cannot stand idly by while the occupation continues unabated, tens of thousands of new illegal settlers colonize northern Cyprus, and the illicit authorities of the occupied territory encourage the building of new homes on Greek Cypriot properties. In sum, Greek-Turkish détente cannot take reliable roots unless both the Aegean challenge and the Cyprus problem are addressed and resolved rationally and fairly. Here again the European Union's role emerges as potentially catalytic.

### Post-referendum Cyprus Scenarios

Immediately following the twin Cypriot referendum, the aficionados of the Annan plan kept threatening its dramatic return, even without major changes. Washington and UN officials, in fact, insisted that "there is a plan for Cyprus: the Annan plan". Similarly, members of the Blair government kept stressing the same stance. Finally, Ankara and the new Turkish Cypriot leader, Mehmet Ali Talat, tried feverishly to exploit the referendum result – using the *non sequitur* that those who voted "Yes" must be "rewarded" – and insisted that the Annan plan is here to stay.

The change of perceptions and attitudes about the Republic that we recorded earlier has encouraged the production of new scenarios. Here is a schematic review of these ideas in ascending order of rationality and hence desirability.

1. A first scenario flirted with the return of the Annan plan with some, essentially cosmetic, alterations. This “scenario” is being abandoned by its international supporters and, therefore, by its Greek Cypriot friends as well.<sup>173</sup> Given the manifest unpopularity of such an undemocratic idea, few Greek Cypriots would presently stand up in its defence: 18 months after the historic 76% against “Annan V”, even more resounding would be its new rejection.
2. Equally unpopular is another, albeit under-articulated, idea which may not even deserve the honourific term “scenario”. But, at the height of the pain and frustration caused after “Annan V” and the referendum, some Greek Cypriots aired the idea of solving the problem through some exchange of “land for splitting (for ever)”. In other words, exhausted by the dirty tricks of foreign “mediators” and the antics of the Turkish Cypriot political leadership, some people succumbed temporarily to the temptation of a permanent division in exchange for substantial territory. In any event, this idea is also being abandoned, especially after the realization both that the world increasingly appreciates what is here at stake and that the EU seems bound to support the Republic’s rights.
3. A more serious idea for resolution proposes that Greek and Turkish Cypriots should proceed through step-by-step moves or Confidence Building Measures, until the emergence of the right climate. Arguably, this is what is currently underway: more circulation of people across the Green Line, new openings in the latter, more Turkish Cypriots working in the free territories, occasional negotiations about assisting Turkish Cypriot trade under rational conditions, etc. Hence one observer has claimed that this “scenario” has been adopted by the Cypriot President himself.<sup>174</sup> In my view, however, this cannot be what Tassos Papadopoulos “has adopted”, if only because he confronts the provocative demeanour of Mehmet Ali Talat, whose transparent goal is not to resolve the problem and reunite Cyprus but rather to “upgrade the status” of the “TRNC”.<sup>175</sup> Therefore, Papadopoulos keeps cultivating CBMs, but works methodically for the problem’s functional and fair resolution. This, therefore, brings us to the two most promising scenarios.
4. According to the fourth set of ideas, the rational thing to do is to emulate, as it were, the German reunification model. Differences in degree aside, Cyprus could be reunified through the re-absorption of

the Turkish Cypriot community into the Republic's body politic. Needless to say, the reunification should take place with guaranteed human and civil rights for all Cypriots, in conditions of freedom, genuine cooperation and friendship, precluding the errors and sins of the convoluted past. After all, these errors and sins – committed in different ways by many – have taught all Cypriots valuable political, social and psychological lessons. To be sure, while this scenario will be welcomed by many native Turkish Cypriots and maybe most of the EU-oriented Turkish Cypriot youth, it would probably be opposed by their political elites, misled for years into supposing that Turkey will always defend their separatist or con-federal designs. Therefore, and once again, the Gordian knot under review entails that the best manner of untying it is an EU-backed comprehensive manner.

5. One difference between the fourth and the fifth scenarios seems to be that, whereas (4) articulates its cardinal theses, (5) may leave ample room for European Union initiatives. Thus, it is known that numerous Greek Cypriot and non-Cypriot political figures, constitutional experts, diplomats and other professionals have been working towards a viable and fair plan in answer to “Annan V”.<sup>176</sup> On the other hand, the Greek Cypriot majority – including its political elites, statesmen and intellectuals – voted “No” envisaging a “European solution” and what this entails. Therefore, while a Cypriot initiative can appeal to EU institutions and seek their advice and support, an EU initiative addressing Cyprus *in tandem* with the associated problems may be even wiser. This last point brings us to the concluding remarks of this Essay.

### Concluding Observations

As 3 October is approaching, I venture to predict that, at the last minute, Turkey will be forced to withdraw its statement of non-recognition of Cyprus, given the relevant EU consensus being built as these lines are drawn (mid-August 2005). The Erdogan government would then have to persuade Turkish public opinion that its statement was a mere passing ploy and no face will really be lost. For, when all is said and done, (1) the entire world recognises only the Republic of Cyprus, except for Turkey; (2) international law and the principles of the EU regard the secessionist “TRNC” as just illicit, because the 1974 “intervention” was clearly an *invasion* (i.e. by definition an illegal operation); therefore, (3) the European Union will treat

as “inconceivable” – Dominique de Villepin’s term – that a candidate refuses to recognise a member of the club to which it wishes to belong; and (4) in any case, Nicosia can veto Turkey’s negotiations at numerous steps of the way, so better embark at “normalization” at the outset.

To be sure, Ankara will not withdraw the statement unless assured that the negotiations will in fact begin on 3/10. Turkey, I presume, will receive such an assurance. But it would be an assurance with a difference: for all the reasons discussed earlier, the EU will not be able to guarantee Turkey’s full membership, just as it could not on 17 December 2004. In any event, Turkey cannot afford to reject such “a deal”: in fact, this is precisely what

And now some parting words on two last actors. First, much in the above picture assumes that London can be convinced to take a new course vis-à-

immediate benefits for Greek-Turkish collaboration. If this is achieved, the resulting multidimensional triumph would strengthen EU diplomatic credibility and political respectability. At a time of “serious EU crisis” – as universally acknowledged after the June 2005 European Council – a success in Cyprus, by establishing fair play or *Moralpolitik* on the Island, will have positive ripple effects in the Eastern Mediterranean, on the Euro-Mediterranean project, and in Europe’s broader CFSP ambitions. In fact, it will contribute decisively to rendering the Union “the alternative superpower with a moral difference”.<sup>179</sup>



## Notes

---

1. See Presidency Conclusions, Helsinki European Council, December 1999, para. 4 and 9.
2. These issues are discussed in chapters 4-6.
3. The issue is discussed in chapter 5.
4. Arguably, this “Europeanization” began with the 6 March 1995 decision to “exchange” Turkey’s Customs Union with the start of Cyprus’ accession negotiations six months after the completion of the IGC.
5. The Treaty of Accession, signed on 13 April 2003 in Athens, determined that the Republic of Cyprus became one of the ten new EU member-states. Protocol Ten of the Treaty explains that, while the entire Republic is a Member, the occupation of the northern 37% of its territory temporarily suspends the application of the *acquis communautaire* therein until the problem’s resolution.
6. Even Nils Kadritzke, usually informed if not unbiased on Cypriot affairs, fell into hasty and facile pronouncements on the referendum. See his “Cyprus: saying no to the future”, *Le Monde Diplomatique*, May 2004, where he passionately attacked President Papadopoulos and what he called “Greek chauvinism”!
7. The territory of the British “Sovereign Base Areas” is excluded from EU jurisdiction. In essence, an additional 3% of the Island’s territory is also excluded from the application of the *acquis*.
8. See Costas Melakopides, “On the Mediterranean ‘Fuzzy Edge’ of the EU: The Candidacies of Malta, Cyprus and Turkey”, *Journal of European Integration*, Vol.22, 2000, pp. 299-334.
9. See chapter 2 below, for the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in the Loizidou v. Turkey Case.
10. The relevant literature has been expanding by leaps and bounds during the last 30 years. One of the best collections of relevant essays is Terry Nardin and David R. Mapel (eds.), *Traditions of International Ethics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
11. The suggestion was one of Gunnar Myrdal’s wise theses in his classic *Objectivity in Social Research* (London: Duckworth, 1970).

12. I introduced the “doctrine” in the *Journal of European Integration*, op.cit.
13. For a full defence of this “thesis”, see Costas Melakopides, *Pragmatic Idealism: Canadian Foreign Policy, 1945-1995* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1998).
14. This crucial issue will be expanded in chapter 7.
15. Christopher Hitchens’ evidence here is overwhelming. See *Hostage to History: Cyprus from the Ottomans to Kissinger* (London and New York: Verso, 1997). See also Van Coufoudakis, *Essays on the Cyprus Conflict* (New York: Pella Publishing Company, 1976) and B. O’Malley and I. Craig, *The Cyprus Conspiracy: America, Espionage and the Turkish Invasion* (London: I. B. Tauris, 1999).
16. George Ball, *The Past Has Another Pattern* (New York: Norton, 1982), p.342, emphasis added.
17. See *Making Peace in Cyprus*, pp. 16-17, for detailed answers to (a) and (b).
18. The evidence that both were under execution has been provided in Christopher Hitchens, op.cit; Laurence Stern, *The Wrong Horse: The Politics of Intervention and the Failure of American Diplomacy* (New York: Time Books, 1977) and Costas Melakopides, op.cit.
19. The reader is encouraged to consult the balanced and reliable accounts in the aforementioned books by Coufoudakis, Hitchens, O’Malley and Craig, Stern, as well as Monteaegle Stearns, *Entangled Allies: US Policy toward Greece, Turkey and Cyprus* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1992).
20. For a longer quotation of Richard Holbrooke’s statement, see Andreas Theophanous, *The Cyprus Question and the EU: The Challenge and the Promise* (Nicosia: Intercollege Press, 2004), p.169.
21. The first round (25-30 July 2004) was held among the UK, Greece and Turkey as guarantors of Cypriot independence. The 9-14 August round included also the G/Cs and the T/Cs. My previous *Martello* provides relevant details.
22. *The Times*, editorial, 15 August 1974, p.13. See also *Making Peace in Cyprus*, pp.22-23.
23. *The Economist*, 17 August 1974, pp.11-12.
24. The 70% estimate was offered by *Strategic Survey 1974* (London:IISS, 1974), p.82n.
25. Abdullah Gul’s interview with Ms Soula Chatzikyriakou, CyBC Evening News, 11 February 2005.
26. R.St.J. Macdonald, “International Law and the Conflict in Cyprus,” *Canadian Yearbook of International Law*, 1981, p.15.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 22.
28. Ian Brownlie, *International Law and the Use of Force by States* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), as dicussed by Macdonald, op.cit.
29. Rosalyn Higgins, “Intervention and International Law,” in Hedley Bull (ed.), *Inter-*

wrote, "By deciding that the denial of Loizidou's access to her property in northern Cyprus is 'a matter which fell within Turkey's jurisdiction,' the court in effect confirmed that the TRNC is a vassal state by describing it as 'subordinate [to Turkish] local administration.'" *Mediterranean Quarterly*, op. cit., p. 56.

33. See Ch.6 below.
34. *Europe/ Documents*, no. 1589 (Luxembourg-Brussels: Agence Europe, 20 December 1989), p. 3.
35. *Bulletin of the European Communities* 16, no.11 (Brussels: General Secretariat, Commission of the European Communities, 1984): point 2.4.1, 68.
36. See the May 1984, UN SC Resolution 550.
37. Donald M. Payne, "The Cyprus Problem: A Need to Defend Principles," *Mediterranean Quarterly* 9, no. 2 (1998). Mr Payne is Democrat of New Jersey.
38. See Cyprus News Agency, "Turkey responsible for human rights violations, Court confirms", 7 April 2005. The decision is available in the Court's website [www.echr.coe.int](http://www.echr.coe.int)
39. For the most thorough treatment of the Cyprus question from the International Law

54. *Financial Times* (London), 10/11 July 1993.
55. *Financial Times* (London), editorial, 2 February 1995.
56. Among other things, author's personal conversation with Turkish Cypriot businessmen visiting Ledra Palace, the main inter-communal meeting place under UN auspices at the Green Line, 30 May 2003.
57. For detailed accounts of these demonstrations, see Helena Smith, "Cyprus Turks turn against their leader", *The Guardian*, 19 December 2002; and Reuters, "'Enough, nobody believes you...': Turkish Cypriot Rally Calls for Denktash to Quit", 27 December 2002.
58. *Ibid.*, para. 9(b) .
59. Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation Interview, 5 December 2001.
60. On 15 February 2003, *The New York Times* introduced a term that is here to stay: "the World's Second Superpower"...The event has delighted all those who believe that International Ethics is going strong both as theory and as fact.
61. See Annan's Statement of 11 March at The Hague.
62. To be sure, numerous Greek Cypriots have refused to cross the "Green Line", because the occupation regime demands the show of passports or identity cards, expecting to gain... "statehood" via the "recognition" by the Republic's citizens!
63. See the Athens dailies *Eleftherotypia* and *Ta Nea*, 28 March – 3/4 April 2004.
64. Bahri Yilmaz, "Turkey's New Role in International Politics", *Aussenpolitik*, Vol. 45, no. 1, 1994, p.90.
65. Quoted in Costas Melakopides, *Making Peace in Cyprus: Time for A Comprehensive Initiative* (Kingston, Ont.: Queen's Centre for International Relations, 1987), p. 78.
66. Melakopides, *ibid.*
67. *Ibid.*, p. 78.
68. Bahri Yimaz, *Aussenpolitik*, p. 90.
69. Melakopides, *op. cit.*, p. 78.
70. *Ibid.*
71. Yilmaz, *op.cit.*, p. 94.
72. Selim Deringil, "Turkish Foreign Policy since Ataturk", in Clement H. Dodd, ed., *Turkish Foreign Policy: New Prospects* (Huntingdon: The Eothen Press, 1992), p.6.
73. F. Stephen Larrabee and Ian O. Lesser, *Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty*, (Rand, 2003), p. 104.
74. Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Turkey's Relations With the Southern Caucasia States", Online ([www.mfa.gov.tr](http://www.mfa.gov.tr)).
75. Larrabee and Lesser, *op. cit.*, p. 105. They added (*ibid.*) that an Azerbaijani peace-keeping platoon formed part of the Turkish battalion in KFOR.
76. By agreements signed in 2001, Turkey would acquire 2 billion cubic metres of Azeri natural gas in 2004 with increases anticipated up to 2019. Larrabee and Lesser, *op.cit.*, p.105.
77. Bulent Aras, "Turkey's Policy in the Former Soviet South", *Turkish Studies*, Vol.1 No1 (Spring 2000), pp. 36 and 51.
78. *Ibid.*, p. 36.

79. Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Turkey's Relations with the Southern Caucasus States", op. cit., p.3.
80. Ibid.
81. "Turkey's Relations with the Southern Caucasian States", op. cit., p. 2.
82. Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Turkey's Relations with the Central Asian Republics", p. 1.
83. Ibid.
84. Shireen Hunter, "Turkey, Central Asia and Caucasus: Ten Years After Independence", in Thanos Veremis and Thanos Dokos (eds.), *Contemporary Turkey: Society, Economy and Foreign Policy* (Athens: Papazissis, 2002), p. 500 (in Greek, my translation).
85. Bulent Aras describes well this role with its perceptible, if long-term, political implications, and emphasizes the energetic penetration of NGOs which, beyond high schools, have built even universities. Op.cit., pp. 43-50.
86. Bulent Aras, op..cit., p. 43.
87. Ibid., p. 44. As a caustic British observer noted in the mid-1990s, Turkey in Central Asia at the time, looked like the Uncle who, invited for a weekend, stays for over a month...
88. Larrabee and Lesser, op. cit., p. 113.
89. Ibid.
90. Ersin Kalaycioglu, "Turkey's choice: the road away from the European Union?" in Bertil Duner (ed.), *Turkey: the Road Ahead?* (Stockholm: The Swedish Institute of International Affairs, 2002), p. 125.
91. Ibid.
92. See Bulent Aras' perceptive analysis, "Turkish-Iranian-Syrian Relations: Limits of Regional Politics in the Middle East", *PINR Report*, 7 February 2005.
93. "Towards Strengthening Iranian-Tadjikistan Relations", *Macedonian Press Agency* (www.mpa.gr) , 20 June 2003.
94. "Khatami, Karzai Hold Talks", *Iran Daily*, 19 June 2003, p. 1.
95. This issue is treated very satisfactorily in Chris Ioannides, *Realpolitik in the Eastern Mediterranean: From Kissinger and the Cyprus Crisis to Carter and the Lifting of the Turkish Arms Embargo* (New York: Pella Publishing, 2001).
96. Quoted in Oktay Eksi, "The Gordian Knot", *Hurriyet*, (www. TurkishPress. com), 8 June 2005.
97. To be sure, as *The Economist* noted after Colin Powell's visit to Turkey on 2 April 2003, the US government also perceived the Turkish stance as "an attempt to raise the price of Turkish co-operation. Several reports suggested that Turkey wanted an aid package worth \$92 billion, a request which infuriated Americans". "Mending Fences", *The Economist*, 3 April 2003.
98. *The Economist's* own reading (on 3 April 2003) was both that "Turkey could find it has paid a high price for its earlier intransigence" and that "things are unlikely to be the same again". Ibid.
99. Mehmet Ali Birand, "In Washington the Wounds Are Still Open", *Turkish Daily News*, 10 June 2003.

100. For instance AKP MP, Javit Torun, called George W. Bush a “tyrant” in mid-June 2005, while a little earlier his AKP colleague, Mehmet Elkatmis, accused the US of committing “genocide in Iraq like they had done elsewhere in the past”. See “Bush, the Tyrant”, *Eleftherotypia*, 16/6/05.
101. *Eleftherotypia*, 25 June 2005.
102. Bulent Aras, for one, explicitly adopted this option in the aforementioned PINR Report (note 92).
103. Sadet Oruc, “Turkish-Israeli Ties on the Eve of the 21st Century”, *Turkish Daily News*, 2 December 1997.
104. *EuropelDocuments*, no. 1589 (Luxembourg-Brussels: Agence Europe, 20 December 1989, p. 3).
105. See [www.Turkishpress.com](http://www.Turkishpress.com) during late June 2005 for telling editorials.
106. See, for example, the editorials of *Turkish Daily News* during the week after the June 2005 European Council.
107. Suha Bölükbasi, “The Turco-Greek Dispute: Issues, Policies and Prospects”, in *Turkish Foreign Policy: New Prospects*, in Clement H.Dodd, ed. (The Eothen Press, 1992), p. 34.
108. *Ibid.*, p.50, emphasis added
109. Professor Theodore Couloumbis could safely be said to be Greece’s leading academic advocate of (c). He was also an adamant supporter of the Annan plan. However, as he argued in an August 2005 interview with this author, although he could recognise all along the plan’s weaknesses and drawbacks, he expected the plan to work ultimately “within this ‘greenhouse’ of democracy called European Union”.
110. Costas Melakopides, *Journal of European Integration*, op.cit., pp. 329-30.
111. Among the other influences on Costas Simitis’ defence and foreign policy, we must mention the late Yiannos Kranidiotis, Professor Christos Rozakis, Alex Rondos, and Simitis’ confidant, Nikos Themelis. Thus, the Simitis “doctrine” refers primarily to outcomes and not exclusively the sources.
112. Simitis’ rhetorical questions were raised in early April 2002. My translation comes from my article, “Annan Plan: the Achilles Heel of Simitis’ Foreign Policy”, *Phileleftheros* (Nicosia daily), 13 April 2004.
113. See *Macedonian Press Agency*, “The First Quantities of Gas from Turkey will be Delivered to Greece in 2007”, 29 June 2005 ([www.mpa.gr](http://www.mpa.gr))
114. Recent reliable information on the settlers suggested the following: they now number over 160,000; about 40,000 arrived illegally only in 2004; today, the native Turkish Cypriots are estimated at 87,600! See Costas Venizelos’ report, “*Political Sunday*,” *Phileleftheros*, 13 February 2005, p. 5.
115. “The KYSEA discussed National Defense Policy”, *Macedonian Press Agency*, 1 March 2005, [www.mpa.gr](http://www.mpa.gr)
116. The clearest example of this tendency is James Pettifer, *The Turkish Labyrinth: Atatürk and the New Islam* (London and New York: Penguin Books, 1997).
117. A positive exception was Bill Clinton’s support of Athens after the Imia crisis: viz., that it should be settled at the ICJ. Incidentally, the *New York Times* editorial, “Aegean Tantrum” (3 February 1996), praised Simitis’ maturity and rationality and condemned Tansu Ciller’s arrogance and bellicosity exhibited during the crisis.

118. This recognition shocked the Greeks as it took place only hours after the November 2004 Republican electoral victory.
119. Moreover, many European opinion-makers have been noting increasingly the negative implications for the EU itself had the Annan plan been adopted. Inter alia, the T/C “constituent state” would have functioned as Turkey’s “lobby” in EU decision-making. Such a prospect might have found eager imitators in Baltic states’ Russian communities, in the Basque country of Spain, in Corsica, and so forth. I owe this point to Kostas Sasmatzoglou, Secretary of External Relations, European People’s Party, Brussels.
120. See the next chapter for the entire affair that exploded following President Papadopoulos’ statements in October 2004.
121. Left-wing AKEL, identifying a deep division among its members, called on the UN Security Council to offer relevant guarantees, so that it could support the plan. Such guarantees the UN Security Council refused to provide.
122. “Annan V”, Part A, “Foundation Agreement”, Annex IX, Attachment 3, “Letter to

135. This was falsified by the post-April 2003 (conditional) movement of most Cypriots



- prochement”, in ELIAMEP Occasional Papers, no.6, 2002, published also on [www.eliamep.gr](http://www.eliamep.gr)
155. See the interview in Emine Kart, “Opposing EU on grounds of social policies is paradoxical”, *Turkish Daily News*, 26 June 2006.
  156. Cf. Selim Deringil, “Turkish Foreign Policy since Ataturk”, in Clement H. Dodd (ed.), *Turkish Foreign Policy: New Prospects* (Huntingdon: The Eothen Press, 1992), 2-6.
  157. Quoted widely in the Turkish press (e.g. *TDN*) days after the 1999 Helsinki summit.
  158. *Turkish Daily News*, 7 January 2002.
  159. Niazi Kizilyurek, “Mumtaz Soysal: From Kemalism to Neoturkism,” in Couloumbis and Dokos (eds.), *Review of Defense and Foreign Policy 2001: Greece and the World, 2000-2001* (Athens: ELIAMEP-Parateretes, 2001), p. 62 (in Greek).

173. The most fervent proponents here were the G/C opposition parties, DISY and EDI, who were the plan's most vocal supporters from its very inception.
174. Makarios Droushiotis' repeated claim in *Eleftherotypia*, August 2005.
175. Needless to say, Talat acts in cahoots with Ankara, serving faithfully its aforementioned own goals. This fact causes further frustration to Athens, by revealing the two-track policy of the many Ankaras: while rhetorically committed to Greek-Turkish "friendship", they essentially employ maximalist, revisionist, etc. foreign policy tools.
176. Inter alia, these experts have included a group gathered at Athens' Panteion University in early December 2004 to expose the problems of "Annan V".
177. Nicosia's latest disappointments included, first, that Tony Blair's July 2005 apparent "promises" to Tassos Papadopoulos were falsified when Tayyip Erdogan visited London a few days later and, second, London's "understanding" for Ankara's declaration of non-recognition of Cyprus of 29 July.
178. I owe this point to a long conversation with Gen.(ret.) Leonidas Economopoulos, former Deputy Commander of the Cypriot National Guard, in Athens, 18 August 2005.
179. Costas Melakopides, in *Journal of European Integration*, op.cit.