The Roots of Soft Power

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The Trudeau Government, De-NATOization, and Denuclearization, 1967-1970

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Nothing in the world, particularly in politics, is more dangerous than to confuse the small with the great, to be led by the former, and so neglect to put our trust in greatness. It is for this reason that the spirit of reaction has acquired more weight than it would deserve on rational grounds. The arguments presented for and against our new military institutions grasp at so many details, left and right, back and forth, without a firm starting point or a clear conclusion, that no one can reach a final decision. This suits the purpose of the opposition....

Clausewitz, *Historical and Political Writings*

The Martello Papers

The Queen's University Centre for International Relations (QCIR) is pleased to present the latest in its series of studies in security and defence, the *Martello Papers*. Taking their name from the distinctive towers built during the nineteenth century to defend Kingston, Ontario, these papers cover a wide range of topics and issues relevant to contemporary international strategic relations.

Sean Maloney is in the tradition of military historians who pore over the documentary record to correct what they see as perverse and pervasive myths, and to reveal the ancient antecedents of what are often declaimed as innovative ideas. In this paper he takes us back to the late 1960s and early 1970s — the transition from the Pearson to the Trudeau era — to probe the government's debates and decisions over defence policy.

Early in the paper he reminds us of the direct connection between Canada's considerable military commitment to European and North American defence in the early post-war years, and its standing among the powers of the day. Canada was not neutral, and it had nuclear weapons. Part of the payoff from that posture came in the currency of what is now described as "soft power". His depiction of the Pearson government has an eerie familiarity — a minority in Parliament, an agenda driven by domestic priorities including social programmes and anxieties over Quebec, and a resultant urge to divert resources from Canada's military. Here he detects the beginning of the decline of Canada's international presence.

At the core of the analysis, however, is the vigorous debate within the new Trudeau government over Canada's membership of NATO and its implications for

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1. Introduction

The public announcement of a new Canadian national security policy by the Martin government in the spring of 2005 is a significant move away from the dangerous and ineffective 'soft power' policies of the 1990s. Implicit in the new policy documents is the understanding that Canadian global influence has waned and that the role of military power in the calculus of that influence is a critical factor in the projection of Canadian interests. In many ways, the new policy is a refutation of 'soft power' as championed by former Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy and those in the bureaucracy and academic communities who supported him. Indeed, the Axworthy 'soft power' doctrine of the 1990s questioned the utility of military power in general and Canadian military power specifically, particularly outside of the UN context. Implicit in the 'soft power' argument was that Canada had little or no military power, nor should it.[1] Attempts to retroactively recast Axworthian foreign policy concepts to portray them as less anti-military, after the successful employment of Canadian combat forces in and over Kosovo in 1999-2000 and particularly after operations in Afghanistan, have already started.[2]

Though there was a significant draw-down of the Canadian Forces in the 1990s, the dramatic de-emphasis of Canadian military power as a policy tool actually

dramatically weakened Canadian power in almost all of its forms and sought to propel Canada into the "non-aligned" camp during the Cold War.

There is much we can learn from Canada's participation in the Cold War, a period when Canada made significant contributions to the security of the West and wielded unprecedented influence. What do Canadians think of when asked about the Cold War? Most believe the Cold War was something that occurred a long time ago, that it had little impact on Canada or its history. Some even believe that Canada was neutral during the 1945 to 1990 period. This is not surprising given the Canadian cultural elite's tendency to downplay involvement, particularly when it involves Canada's nuclear capability.

Fifty-four years ago, the Canadian government sent a Canadian Army formation to serve with NATO's Integrated Force, a commitment which lasted for forty-two years. 27 Canadian Infantry Brigade Group, its successors and other

advocated obstructionism in NATO's evolving strategy, declined to participate effectively in the Gulf War, and precipitously withdrew our forces and bases from Germany in the 1990s? Influence is built on a solid foundation and over time.

In the 1950s Canadian military leaders were globally respected and wielded significant influence, particularly General Charles Foulkes in NATO circles, Air Marshal Roy Slemon at NORAD, and General E.L.M. 'Tommy' Burns in the UN

killed during the Holocaust. These men and their successors were in charge of the largest army in the world which was equipped with the full range of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. Canada could not just sit back and let others carry the burden, particularly not after losing thousands of men in the fight against Nazi totalitarianism less then ten years before.

Compared to the 12 000 Canadians stationed in West Germany and France from 1951 to 1970, Canada had, in the 1990s, problems sustaining 1200 men in the Balkans. Our troops in Rwanda and Croatia were brushed aside, and Canadian soldiers were taken hostage in Bosnia. None of the adversaries in these conflicts was armed with anything larger than T-72 tanks or AK-47 assault rifles.

During the early part of the Cold War, Canada's military forces were at the cutting edge of doctrinal and technological capabilities. In those days, the cutting edge meant having access to nuclear weapons and the means to use them in the event of war in conjunction with conventional forces. Nuclear weapons were the currency necessary to wield influence at that time. In one case, declassified American records demonstrate that Canadian diplomats and military personnel were able to force the Kennedy Administration away from a dangerous sequence of

2. *The Pearson Government and the Americans*

The changes in Canada's nuclear force structure implemented by the Trudeau government and the debate over Canada's future in NATO were in part the product of a perceived growing anti-American attitude in Canada in addition to the groundwork laid by the Pearson government in 1963. Two of the Pearson govern-

3. *The Debilitating Effects of Unification*

Minister of National Defence Paul Hellyer re-engineered the Canadian defence establishment in 1964, in what became generally known as ‘unification’. The three traditional services were replaced with functional groupings which reported to a Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS), who at that time was General Air Marshal

was responsible for what and to whom? It would take almost six years to sort these problems out.

In 1965 problems with implementing the next phases of unification generated an intense public debate. Up to this point, the three services generally perceived unification to be a jointness project. The Army was "in favour and very enthusiastic;" the RCAF was "neutral with a 'give it a go' approach"; and the Navy was "sceptical to anti."[14] All three services made plans to survive the outright elimination of the services. For example, the Vice Chief of Defence Staff Planning and Coordinating Staff were manned by many former Army Headquarters staff officers and organizationally bore a remarkable likeness to a stripped headquarters. The Navy maintained "an ad hoc naval board", while Air Marshal Annis took it upon himself to act as "an unofficial channel for any personal difficulties" that former RCAF leaders still serving in the system could turn to.[15]

These efforts were not covert enough, and Hellyer made every effort to stamp them out. Some senior Army men (Lieutenant-Generals F.J. Fleury, Robert Moncel, and J.P.E. Bernachetz) were prematurely retired, as was CDS Frank Miller, who Hellyer "firmly believed ...was the leader in not wanting to unify the services and that Moncel, Dyer and Fleury were willing collaborationists."[16] Miller retired because he "exhausted his rapport with Mr. Hellyer, and oft times referred to his Machiavellian tactics."[17] An observer noted that "if Moncel had been CDS, there never would have been unification."[18] Navy personnel were, however, the most reluctant to go along with the new programme.

Hellyer forcibly retired Vice Admiral Jeffry Brock in November 1964. Next, Commander of Maritime Command Rear Admiral William Landymore informed Hellyer in June and July 1966 that unification would irreparably damage Navy morale and that Navy personnel did not accept unification as a policy. He was invited to resign, which he did. The Deputy Command of Maritime Command, Rear Admiral Stirling, retired the same day. Admirals Dyer and R.P. Welland eventually prematurely retired. The media had a field day and dubbed it "the Revolt of the Admirals," which was disingenuous at best. This was "not a co-

Staff and Commander of Mobile Command. Allard was: "more of a natural and courageous leader of men in the field (awarded three DSOs in World War II), and as an effective morale builder, rather than as a staff officer. Prone to be volatile, flexible and an "idea man", possessing much charm, oft-times in a mercurial way, he therefore required strong staff and managerial support."[21]

Allard claims in his autobiography that Hellyer approached him in May 1966 and told him that the Prime Minister said that Hellyer could appoint him as CDS. Allard noted that he was the logical choice since he was the senior general in the Army and had wartime experience.[22]

Allard, a francophone from Quebec, told Hellyer that he would take the job conditionally. If the government supported the bilingualization of the Canadian Armed Forces, the creation of so-called French Language Units, and he was allowed to initiate affirmative action for francophone officers in the organization, he would do it. This fitted with the Pearson government's policy on strengthening the place of Quebec within Confederation, and Allard was subsequently approved as Canada's second CDS later that year when Frank Miller retired.[23]

Allard busied himself in 1966 and 1967 defining the role of the CDS; obtaining absolute control over the former three services by crafting new legislation; constructing new forces; reorganizing the logistics system, and "ensuring Canadian control over the administration of all our troops."[24] In his view, he had to deal with the details of the new construction first before dealing with strategic policy formulation "to support the still uncertain policy goals of the Canadian Government."[25] While Allard was preoccupied with these activities, two items crept by without any professional uniformed opposition.

First, Hellyer issued what he called Defence Planning Guidance (DPG) in November 1966. In it, he asserted that:

> for us to base our required capabilities on the determination of the threat, and the consequent strategic position flowing from the threat, was open to question as far as Canada was concerned....the current threat and the logical strategic concept flowing from this threat really had no bearing on what in the final analysis the Government decided to spend on defence resources. The Government spends what, in their political judgment; they think is a fair share of our resources towards a collective defence arrangement.[26]

4. NATO Strategy Changes

The Canadian national security policy process was undergoing a crisis. At the same time, however, NATO was in upheaval. NATO was in the midst of dealing with the problems imposed by de Gaulle's intransigence. The French challenged American dominance within NATO, were reacting against what they saw as second class treatment after the Skybolt affair (where it was made clear that the United Kingdom received preferential treatment in nuclear matters from the Americans), and were opposed to Flexible Response as a NATO strategy. The French wanted exclusive control over their own nuclear deterrent, and some believed that de Gaulle wanted the ability to "pioneer" some form of detente with the Soviet Union. In 1966 the French finally withdrew from the NATO integrated military structure. NATO HQ and SHAPE moved to Belgium. In addition, there was serious concern among the European NATO members that accepting a new strategy based on the principles of Flexible Response was designed by the Americans to decouple themselves from European defence.[34]

There were three developments during this time which in some way affected Canadian national security policy. The first was the Harmel Report. The ouster of Nikita Khrushchev in 1964 stimulated some thought that a new détente might result. In 1964 Canada pressed for a study on the future status and roles of the alliance. This appears to have resulted from Pearson's long-standing belief that non-military cooperation within NATO should be a foundation of the relationship. This push in part contributed to Belgian Foreign Minister Pierre Harmel volunteering (ostensibly) to assess this and other impacts on the future of NATO. Work started in January 1967. The real aim of the exercise, however, was to ensure continued French participation in the political machinery of NATO. In December 1967, NATO approved the Harmel Report. The report recommended that there be greater consultation amongst NATO members, that some means be discovered to protect NATO interests in the Mediterranean basin and other flank areas against Soviet proxy encroachment, and that NATO members develop proposals to reduce East-West tension.[35]

The second development was related to the first. NATO members clamoured for more input into the nuclear aspects of NATO defence. Formal discussions were initiated in 1965. U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara proposed that working groups be established to facilitate nuclear information flow and confidence building among the NATO members prior to the establishment of a formal body that would carry out this function on a permanent basis.[36] There were three working groups: nuclear planning, communications, and data exchange. The nuclear planning working group consisted of the UK, the US, West Germany, and Italy. Canada lobbied for a slot but was not able to acquire one. Canada was, however, represented on the other two working groups as a compromise. The reasons for and effects of this are unknown.[37]

By 1967, NATO formed the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) and the Nuclear Defence Affairs Committee (NDAC). The NDAC consisted of all NATO members save Luxembourg, Iceland, and France. The NPG had four permanent members (US, UK, Italy, West Germany) plus three rotating members exclusive of France or Iceland.[38] The NPG met twice yearly and consisted of the NATO defence ministers. Canada wanted to be a permanent member of the NPG but

Flexible Response.[45] This was the replacement for MC 14/2 (revised) that had been so long in arriving. Patch-up arrangements established by earlier SACEURs Norstad and Lemnitzer, like the 1962 Athens Guidelines and elements of the defunct MC 100/1 strategy, were no longer necessary. MC 14/3 was, however, a compromise document.[46]

The NATO Defence Planning Committee had accepted the strategic concept on 12 December 1967. The NATO Military Committee formally approved MC 14/3 on 16 January 1968 though they informally accepted it as early as 12 September 1967, in the waning days of the Pearson government. Note that MC 14/3 continued on as NATO's strategy until 1993, and even now forms the basis of the current strategic concept MC 400.

MC 14/3 recognized that the Soviets were responding to NATO security initiatives but that they still had not "renounced the extension of Communist influence throughout the world." They would still use all means, economic, political, propaganda, subversion, and even military, to achieve their aims and to gain an advantage over the West.[47]

MC 14/3 postulated eight means by which the Soviets might initiate actions against NATO:

1) Major nuclear aggression to destroy NATO military potential along with attacks against industry and population.
2) Major conventional aggression supported with chemical and tactical nuclear weapons versus ACE and adjacent sea areas.
3) Major aggression against some NATO land regions without chemical or nuclear support.
4) Nuclear or conventional operations against NATO SLOC's and naval forces.
5) Limited and confined aggression against a single NATO country.
6) Harassment on approaches to or attack against West Berlin.
7) Covert actions, incursions or infiltrations in the NATO area.
8) Politico-military pressures and threats against NATO members (individual or group) involving ultimatums, military demonstrations, deployment of forces, mobilization or related incidents.[48]

NATO therefore had to have the ability to repel any one or any combination of these threats. Notably:

> So long as the forces committed to NATO and the external nuclear forces support-

Consequently, NATO should: "[make] ready and [deploy] reinforcements thus enabling the maximum use to be made of any period of forewarning to demonstrate the cohesion and determination of the Alliance and enhance the credibility of its deterrent posture."[50] In other words, formations like ACE Mobile Force (Land), ACE Mobile Force (Air) and the naval equivalent, Standing Naval Force Atlantic (STANAVFORLANT), all of which Canada contributed to, were critical signalling devices in the context of the strategic concept.

To counter the enemy, MC 14/3 identified three types of defence that NATO would engage in: Direct Defence, Deliberate Escalation, and General Nuclear

In summary, the new NATO strategy differed significantly from earlier NATO strategies. Flexible Response assumed that there would be a lead-up period of tension and even escalation prior to the onset of major conventional and nuclear war. NATO therefore had to have a force structure that could respond to any contingency including limited acts of aggression without immediately resorting to nuclear weapons use. There was, however, sufficient ambiguity in the document to allow broad interpretations. It was this ambiguity which added to the deterrent aspects of Flexible Response as a strategy.

It appears as though Canada was not involved in the process which produced MC 14/3 to the extent that she had been involved in substantially influencing and then implementing NATO strategy from 1954 to 1961. There are a number of possibilities as to why this may be the case.

It was not a question of being excluded from that process. Canada had every right to participate in it given the nature and extent of her military contribution and her past history of constructive criticism. If we take the Harmel Report, NPG, and MC 14/3 as three processes designed to solve the NATO crisis, it appears that Canadian diplomats threw their weight behind the Harmel Report as the solution. As Helga Haftendorf notes in her study, the Harmel Report was less important in the long run in solving NATO problems than MC 14/3 and the creation of the NPG.[55] If this is the case, therefore, Canada selected the wrong venue and passed up opportunities to influence the new NATO strategic concept.

The turmoil within the Canadian defence establishment may also have pre-

Ultimately, the Pearson government sacrificed Canada's ability and willingness to exert influence in NATO by not being intimately involved in the formulation of MC 14/3. This was a serious departure from previous successful times in which she had in the 1940s and 1950s. When the Trudeau government seriously questioned Canada's continued participation in NATO, the first argument that would be deployed against the commitment was a perceived lack of Canadian influence.

5. *Canada and NATO: To Be or Not To Be, 1968-1969*

General Allard, the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), was sceptical about keeping nuclear weapons in the force structure, as he thought the most likely type of conflict that would be fought in the nuclear age was a low intensity conflict in the Third World. Allard also believed, however, that "abandoning our nuclear role was sheer hypocrisy...we would leave the dirty job to the others, thus playing the role of Pontius Pilate."[56] In retrospect he claimed some degree of influence with Trudeau, but it was not as much as he wanted.[57] He felt constrained by shifting domestic political opinion as expressed in the media and within the Trudeau government.

Consequently, Allard thought the first battle was to explain why the military existed before getting into specifics of strategy and influence:

> Will social security always be pursued at the expense of the Forces? This is difficult to say. Here we may find ourselves defending two fronts. On the one front the outright Marxist, the slogan producers and violence-mongers; and on the other, the do-gooder socialists (with a small "s") who will act more for political opportunities than for the good of the people at large. The instability they create will continue to breed doubts in the minds of the unadvised public and create a monumental challenge to us and our supporters.[58]

The CDS had initiated a defence policy study, presumably in response to the Robertson Report, in March 1968, probably because he foresaw a growing need for it. Upon taking over the defence portfolio, Leo Cadieux endorsed the continuing study, which was completed in May 1968. He then sent a synopsis to Trudeau.[59] The document produced, "Rationale for Canadian Defence Forces", was passed on to Cabinet via the PMO and PCO.

The study clearly reflected many of Allard's personal views on Canadian defence. A cognizant document, "Rationale for Canadian Defence Forces" explained

the matter of influence in explicit terms and how it related to Canadian forces stationed in Europe as part of NATO, and in North America as part of NORAD. Canadian influence was significant, the report noted, "only if exaggerated expectations are avoided."[60] Canadian participation in NATO and NORAD allowed Canada to express her views in European and North American defence. Participation counterbalanced the American preponderance of power in the creation of

gations to NATO, NORAD and UN Peacekeeping, such level to be determined jointly by ...[DND] and the Treasury Board."[70] This decision was taken without any professional military input. This was the second time in two years that this had happened to the Canadian Armed Forces. Cabinet also explored, on its own, possible gradual reductions to 4 Brigade and 1 Air Division.

The Trudeau Government's reluctance to spend money on defence was in many ways related to the perceived need to make good on the Pearson government's commitments to the Canadian people regarding social programmes administered and paid for by the federal government. This decision was driven primarily by domestic political factors, as Trudeau did not want to be seen by the electorate to be reneging on a previous Liberal government commitment with a resultant loss of political power. There is also an argument to be made, however, that these social programmes served a national security purpose by buying off the more moderate separatists or uncommitted Quebecois, strengthening the links between that province and the central government, and preventing a slide into revolution. Until better information becomes available, this argument must remain conjectural.[71]

On 20 August 1968, Warsaw Pact forces brutally crushed the moderate Czech government with a multi-national coup de main which included East German and Polish troops. As Soviet tanks drove over wounded civilians in the streets of Prague, NATO forces were not officially alerted. SACEUR, General Lyman Lemnitzer, did, however, implement some low-level preparatory measures as the Soviets reinforced their East Germany-based forces with units brought in from the USSR.[72]

Ottawa's response to the Czech crisis was coloured by Cabinet's plan to present NATO with reductions in Canadian Europe-based forces during the upcoming fall NATO meeting. Cabinet discussions on 28 August 1968 reflected more of a concern about prestige than about an appropriate NATO response to the crisis. If Canada announced cuts in the fall NATO meeting after this violent display of Soviet aggression, Canada's image would be damaged. Therefore, some Cabinet members attempted to assert, with convoluted logic, that Canadian forces could now be reduced, since "the Soviet Bloc had become weaker"[73] as a result of the Czech action. These people also asserted that the Soviet build up was merely for the purpose of keeping the Czechs "sealed" within their own country and posed no danger to NATO. Others believed that Berlin might be threatened next, however, if the Americans responded unilaterally. Ultimately, Trudeau instructed Cabinet members not to mention what were now "possible" cuts to Canada's NATO forces in any forum, especially the media. The Americans were preparing a strong diplomatic statement and Canada would sit back and observe before making any moves.[74]

NATO's assessment of the threat posed by the Czech Crisis was initially dire. The situation was "unstable" and could "lead to upheavals and violence which, should it spread to East Germany, could be very dangerous." SHAPE was particularly concerned about "the forward deployment of Soviet forces in a high state of

support that could be provided to NATO in an emergency were three brigade groups from Mobile Command in Canada, but there was no way to transport them to Europe rapidly.[81]

The Czech Crisis highlighted all of the problems endemic to Canadian national security policy formulation since 1964. Canada's policy emphasized the ability to operate in both nuclear and non-nuclear environments. Execution of that policy dictated certain requirements which could not be fulfilled, since both the Pearson and Trudeau governments declined to spend the necessary funds to provide Canada with the requisite capability. Canada could participate in deterring a nuclear war, could fight a short-term conventional or nuclear ground war in Europe, could rebuild in the aftermath of a nuclear war, and could conduct small-scale Cold War conventional peripheral operations in extremely low intensity environments to reduce tension.

Canada could not, however, respond to a potential protracted conventional war or respond to a crisis in which large-scale conventional forces could contribute to deterrence. By not remaining *au fait* with NATO's strategic policy, by not seriously contributing to alliance policy formulation in 1967, and by not altering her force structure accordingly, Canada could not respond effectively to a crisis involving her closest allies. Rather than assessing the national security problem in these terms and dealing with it properly, the Trudeau government was even more inclined to extract itself from NATO altogether.

Another problem in Cabinet that prevented an adequate Canadian response to the Czech Crisis was the belief, (appeared to have been generated by Postmaster General Eric Kierans) that a prompt increase in Canadian conventional forces in Europe would deleteriously affect the upcoming defence review, a process in which Kierans and others hoped Canada would withdraw from NATO altogether. Even the Prime Minister echoed this sentiment in one Cabinet meeting.[82]

The discussion at the beginning of November then drifted into how symbolic 1 Air Division's CF-104s were. There was a planned reduction from 108 to 88 aircraft on the table (this was related to the across the board defence budget cuts discussed earlier). Kierans amazingly thought it would be a provocative "escalation" to retain the 20 aircraft. Cadieux favoured retaining 108 aircraft. Hellyer, who was Minister of Transport, stated that the CF-104 force was "redundant" since their targets overlapped with other allied nuclear forces. The aircraft were "for show" and "consideration needed to be given to phasing in a conventional response...."[83]

When NATO convened for a special ministerial meeting late in November, Cadieux and Sharp told NATO that Canada would retain 108 aircraft in 1 Air Division for one year, while Canada underwent a defence and foreign policy review. Cadieux reported to Cabinet that "there had been considerable confusion and disquiet concerning the Canadian position. On the one hand there was an impression that Canada might intend to withdraw from NATO; on the other that Canada might be prepared to undertake new commitments."[84]

The Canadian media and the Opposition in the House of Commons interpreted the situation in the worst possible light: that the Trudeau government was actively contemplating withdrawal from Europe, from NATO, or both. Mitchell Sharp was on record stating that Canada had not made up her mind but in his view it "was doubtful that a policy of isolation would serve Canada's national interests."[85]

Allard and Cadieux produced a new version of the rejected 1968 defence policy review. The new version expressly addressed the implications of 'non-alignment', that is, neutrality. Called the "Defence Policy Review" (DPR), it was released to Cabinet in February 1969 and was intended to be read in addition to the report of the Special Task Force on Europe (STAFFEUR) which will be discussed next.

Future Canadian defence policy, the DPR study advised, could follow either a "non-aligned" or an "aligned" path. No matter what path Canadian policy took, the nation would exist in a world which was dominated by stable mutual deterrence between the superpowers. The strategic implications of non-alignment were clear in this situation:

> No power which had not decided to take the supreme risk of launching a surprise nuclear attack on the USA could afford to let Canada remain as a safe haven for the US population and as a reserve of power, food, and resources for use in re-building US strength. Canada's exposure to nuclear attack is not a consequence of its alignment with the USA; if an intercontinental nuclear war broke out between the USA and USSR, Canada's non-alignment would be irrelevant to the combatants....[86]

The military implications of non-alignment were detrimental to Canadian security. If Canada did not defend Canadian territory, the Americans would. If Canada chose to defend Canada with modern weapons all by herself, it would be an extremely expensive proposition, "because no major power would be prepared to furnish its advanced military technology to a non-aligned country."[87] Furthermore, "existing sources of defence information would be drastically curtailed. It is also likely that many of the sources of non-military science and technological information (apart from the open literature) would dry up."[88]

The political implications were not good. Non-alignment "would not assist in solving any of the basic economic, social, or cultural problems posed for the Canadian way of life by the USA and, indeed, would be more likely to exacerbate them."[89] Consequently, "the American public would therefore be inclined to view Canada as a free-loading satellite, meriting treatment as such....Defence of Canadian democratic institution and beliefs would become more complicated...."[90]

If Canada withdrew from NATO, economic and political relations between Canada and the individual countries might also be affected. Additionally,

> Canada would no longer be participating in the formulation of Western policies on such matters as European security and disarmament, and that Western governments would regard Canada as essentially an outsider which no longer saw political interests in common with them....Soviet-bloc governments would welcome Canadian non-alignment as a propaganda defeat for the United States and would treat Canada henceforth with increased cordiality.[91]

This in turn would lead to an increase in Soviet subversion since the fear of backlash from the United States and other allies would not exist.

If Canada chose to go it alone, her force structure would have to dramatically increase if Canada were to provide surveillance for Canadian territory and protect her sovereign interests. At a minimum, the Army would have to double, as would the numbers of long range maritime patrol aircraft (from 40 to 80). Ten interceptor squadrons totalling 200 aircraft would be needed, that is, triple the existing CF-101 force, equipped with a non-existent aircraft that Canada would have to design and build. At sea, at least nine nuclear-powered attack submarines would be required in addition to 30-40 surface ships which would include at least two ASW aircraft carriers/assault ships. There would be huge costs associated with acquiring the technological base to build twin-engine interceptor aircraft and nuclear submarines.[92]

Most importantly, these numbers were predicated on the assumption that the forces would be equipped with nuclear weapons "to significantly increase the capability."[93] Though strategic nuclear weapons were out of the question,

> From a purely military standpoint, defensive nuclear weapons for the air and maritime forces would be most cost-effective, and would enhance considerably the credibility of Canada's defence. Whether the forces should possess these weapons, however, would be primarily a political decision and would involve the denunciation of the non-proliferation treaty and a very expensive nuclear weapons production program.[94]

Without nuclear weapons, the size of the forces might be even greater still. Anything less than these minimum numbers and capabilities would not guarantee Canadian sovereignty.

The Defence Policy Review did not merely explore the non-aligned option: it also presented a number of aligned options. Canada could participate in North American defence; in the defence of Western Europe; or "cooperate in the defence of one or more states in other areas (the Western Pacific, Far East, the Caribbean, or Latin America)" or a combination of these options.[95]

There was "no compelling reason" for Canada to involve herself militarily outside of Europe and North America, as "there are few military measures which Canada could usefully take... which would contribute to the prevention of general war originating in these areas."[96] North America had to be defended in any case. UN peacekeeping operations had "an uncertain future."[97] Therefore, the only area outside North America in which Canada could have any effect and influence was Western Europe:

> Canadian participation in NATO can make a distinct contribution to the prevention

> term solidarity of the Alliance; and NATO's ability to implement its strategy of flexible response would be diminished....Canada would be opting out of a joint endeavour aimed at keeping the peace in favour of obtaining a security by reliance of the good will of its friends and in default of making any contribution to theirs.[98]

Like the earlier "Rationale" paper, the Defence Policy Review also explored the MC 14/3 strategy, why it was important, and why balanced forces deployed in Europe contributed to Canadian objectives in NATO. As for Europe-based forces,

> Canada's objectives can be most fully and effectively achieved if its military cooperation in NATO consists principally of Canadian forces stationed in Europe. There are both political and military reasons for this. Politically, *identifiable* Canadian Forces physically present [in Europe] are the most tangible and, from the European point of view, most acceptable evidence of Canadian [involvement]. Military forces already on the ground...carrying out training on and over the ground where they would be expected to fight, are far more likely to respond quickly and effectively to military contingencies and forces requiring to be deployed from across the Atlantic; moreover, the dispatch of forces from Canada at the onset of the crisis might in some circumstances serve to exacerbate the crisis [emphasis mine].[99]

As for North American defence, the Review explained future technologies and the rationale for continued participation in the air defence system. New technologies, including Over The Horizon (OTH) radar and Airborne Warning and Control (AWACS) radar aircraft, would reduce the manpower and cost requirements for air defence since these systems would be more effective and replace the DEW and other radar lines. The Americans were footing the bill for the ABM system and were considering closing down the BOMARC sites. More emphasis was being placed on space surveillance systems by the Americans. If Canada did not remain part of the air defence system, she would not have access to this information.[100]

The air defence system would be more cost-effective and would be more tailored to the realities of the ICBM age:

> One of the objectives of improving the anti-bomber defence is to discourage the Soviets from building a new generation of bombers, and thus sending the bomber/anti-bomber contest into a new round of expensive escalation. In the face of the heavy threat from Soviet ICBM's, the anti-bomber defence does not claim an important degree of damage limitation.

Naval forces were multi-purpose and thus critical to the conduct of national security policy. There was no conflict between SACLANT and Canadian maritime force commanders as both wanted Canadian forces to operate in the Western Atlantic against Soviet submarines.[101]

If the Trudeau government chose to retain Canadian forces in NATO in the 1970s, there were several options. Air forces could include missile contributions to the NATO air defence system (considered unrewarding by the DPR writers); air superiority and ground support with a common aircraft type; or transport support. A nuclear capability was not discussed in the document.[102]

As for ground forces, the existing commitment consisted of 4 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group in West Germany, and another brigade group (lightly equipped and theoretically air-portable) committed to AMF(L) on the northern and southern flanks. The options here revolved around how much of the forces should be kept in Canada and deployed to Europe in an emergency, and to what extent 4 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group should become an air-portable or air-mobile formation. Nuclear capability for the two brigades was not discussed.[103] The Defence Policy Review was passed on to Cabinet.

Another product of Trudeau's insistence that defence and foreign policy be reviewed was the Special Task Force on Europe or STAFFEUR, which was formed under the auspices of External Affairs. STAFFEUR in part consisted of Paul Tremblay (Ambassador to Belgium), Robert Ford (Ambassador to the Soviet Union), Lieutenant General W.A.B. Anderson, and Brigadier General Henri Tellier.[104] The STAFFEUR report, delivered in January 1969, was a massive document. It moved from the general to the specific and included all aspects of Canada's relationship to Europe. The STAFFEUR report cogently assessed Canada's options. Some aspects warrant detailed analysis here so that readers can see what arguments the Trudeau men either retained and claimed as their own or rejected with cavalier disregard.

STAFFEUR defined five Canadian foreign policy objectives, which were in some ways similar to those objectives established by Pearson during the St Laurent government in 1948. The first was *security.* Canada had to have the ability to contain conflicts which might lead to global war. This included the need to protect the American deterrent, maintenance of stability in Europe, peacekeeping operations, and non-military initiatives like arms control. The second was *national unity*. Canada had to block unilateral Quebec links to emergent francophone nations and prevent French interference in Canadian affairs. At the same time, Canada had to promote the bilingual nature of Canada at home and abroad.[105]

The third objective was *national identity*. Canada had to counteract American cultural influence without resorting to blatant anti-Americanism, which would "be unacceptable to the Canadian people."[106] As for *economic interests*, the objective was to promote economic prosperity by generating an improved world-wide economic environment. This could best be done by improving the Third World with aid and then profiting from the improved cooperation. Finally, there was the objective of *world order*, defined as a "free, stable, independent society based on the rule of law," boosted by collective security.[107]

STAFFEUR attacked the two most popular publicly-discussed foreign policy alternatives to the status quo: the Third World Option and the Non-Aligned Option. The latter option was based on neutralism advocate James Minifie's provocative 1960 book *Peacemaker or Powder-Monkey*?[108], while the former arose in the press and within academia in the early 1960s with the emergence of the decolonizing Third World on the international scene and in UN forums.

The STAFFEUR group recognized that there was a rise in anti-European sentiment in Canada. They ascribed it to four reasons. First, some Canadians wanted

to do something new and dynamic, to break from the status quo merely for the sake of doing so. Second, some people "associated [Europe] with power politics and immoral aspects of international affairs." Third, still others had the impression that Europeans were not interested in Canada, while fourth, there was more interest in the Third World.[109]

The report admitted that Canada could bring some degree of prosperity to the Third World and that there were opportunities for influence and prestige "that would be flattering to the Canadian psyche."[110] There were limits, though. For example, "The idea that instability in the Third World represents a threat to Canadian security comparable to the situation in Europe is...highly questionable." In addition, "The Third World has very little to contribute to or do with the fabric of Canadian life in terms of either trade or culture or tradition or technology...."[111]

As for the non-aligned option, would Canada be more attractive to Latin Americans, Asians, or Africans if she were not part of NATO and NORAD? This again was a doubtful proposition. The cost would be too high, unless Canada chose to be an unarmed neutral. There were, however, no unarmed neutrals. If Canada took this route, she would lose any advantage she possessed with the United States which could affect all aspects of that relationship, including trade. This in turn would have a negative impact on Canadian influence with other nations, since the Third World "value their connection with ...[Canada] in part because we are considered as a NATO member, to be involved in major world problems and to know what the great powers are up to."[112]

The non-aligned option totally ignored the fact that the Soviet Union was an "aggressive and expansionist" threat with an "enormous espionage and subversive" capability. If Canada pulled out of NATO, she would lose access to the valuable intelligence cooperation agreements, and the Soviets "might well step up attempts to meddle surreptitiously in Canadian domestic institutions."[113]

The STAFFEUR group included a summary of MC 14/3 and a lengthy discussion on how the concept was supposed to work, as well as what forces were required to make it work.[114] There were four options other than the existing collective security arrangements in Europe. These included having the Western European Union replace NATO; creating a looser NATO without the committee structures; unilateral Western disarmament; or having the US, UK, and France create a large system and control all. None of these was possible or even acceptable at this time. NATO would continue as it had in the short and even long term.[115]

Canada, in short, could not pull out of NATO. If she tried, there would be widespread repercussions. The strength of the alliance would decrease, since as the group noted the Canadian contribution was militarily significant. Canada "would lose a voice in the councils of the Alliance and any opportunity to influence decisions affecting real issues of war and peace" would be lost. Other interests, including economic ones, would be damaged.[116]

As for the force structure, military forces were necessary so that Canada could contribute effectively to MC 14/3. Canada should, however, keep in mind that

"the formations contributed must be *identifiably Canadian*" [emphasis mine] to

then made the astonishing comment that "our 'ally,' France, is the main external threat to Canadian unity." (This last remark was probably in reference to de Gaulle's visit to Montreal in 1967, and his tacit support of Quebec separatism). Canada did not "have any influence anyway." Kierans noted that "The fact that we had been in Europe in two world wars and were a member of NATO did not influence in the slightest the position of European negotiators in the trade area....Mr. Sharp had not proved to him that a single economic decision was favourably influenced by our NATO membership."[122]

General Allard and Bud Drury shot back that Canada had made a "valid and useful contribution" to Western security, and Sharp noted that Canada would have "no influence on the course of events if we withdrew." Furthermore, Sharp was recorded as saying

> the matter of our influence was the central question...we wanted a voice in the decisions taken.... The influence of individual members of an alliance could not be measured in the same way [that is, strictly on an economic basis]....it depended upon quality and other things. We should focus our attention on the big fellows and bring to bear independent thinking in a larger group....The world is not waiting for Canadian leadership, but that we must not let security be the exclusive preserve of the big powers. He attributed influence to our superior morality....what we were trying to do in NATO was trying to prevent a war. We had to ask ourselves whether NATO was a good thing and do we have a part to play?[123]

Prime Minister Trudeau privately asked for a summary of views on the NATO issue. He was told that Sharp, Cadieux, Allard, Paul Martin (who was at that time minister without portfolio and Leader of the Government in the Senate), Rodolphe Dubé (Minister for Veterans Affairs), Arthur Laing (Minister of Public Works), Bud Drury, Maurice Pépin (Minister of Trade and Commerce), and Paul Hellyer all strongly advocated remaining committed to NATO. The main antagonists to this position were Donald Macdonald, Eric Kierans, James Richardson (another minister without portfolio), and Trudeau's old friend Gérard Pelletier.[124]

Macdonald laid out his arguments for Canadian withdrawal in a proposal to Cabinet. In it he attacked a number of arguments he understood had been made to support continuation in NATO. The first, the "major cockpit theory," revolved around the belief that Europe was the region at the highest risk of nuclear war and that Canada should remain committed there. In Macdonald's view, the Europeans were now capable of defending themselves without Canadian assistance. The second argument, which Macdonald called the "domino theory," suggested that if Canada pulled out, NATO would collapse. Macdonald merely discarded this argument without discussion.[125]

Macdonald next turned to the "influence" argument. He casually asserted that

> in purely military terms, there cannot surely be any serious claim that we have very great influence. Influence in military terms is largely a factor of the amount of power deployed and even with the high quality of our present Armed Forces' contribution

> to Europe, no one can seriously pretend that we are a major military factor to be taken into account.[126]

After discarding this argument, Macdonald then concluded that the reason for Canadian participation in European defence was diplomatic, "which we exercise out of all proportion to our military addition. In this respect I would regard the argument as basically not proven."[127] Macdonald then recommended that Canada withdraw from the North Atlantic Treaty.

Cabinet Secretary Gordon Robertson threw his weight onto the anti-NATO side by directly communicating his views to the Prime Minister. His analysis was seriously marred by such incorrect assertions as "Canada does not maintain armed forces because of the threat of military attack. This is virtually ruled out in the Defence Review...."[128]

Robertson was concerned that Canada's NATO allies were complaining about planned reductions to the Canadian defence budget. He advocated pulling forces out of Europe and then increasing the defence budget by making the Department of National Defence responsible for the following activities:

- control of the long distance phone system
- store and control all government-issue material for other federal departments
- take over marine and air navigation aids from Transport
- assume responsibility for the Coast Guard
- construct, operate, and maintain all civilian airports
- assist in a Community Improvement Program
- take over and administer the Department of Veterans Affairs
- the Armed Forces should participate in "international development" in the Third World.

By padding the defence budget, Canada could then go to NATO and claim that she was contributing at the same rate as other NATO members. Robertson failed to see, however, that converting the Canadian Armed Forces to a national and 'world Peace Corps' would garner no influence with Canada's allies and even less with the Soviet Union.

More importantly, Robertson attacked the concept of Flexible Response, asserting that it was unworkable and that Canada should not participate in it. He then asserted that the concept of nuclear deterrence was also unworkable and that Canada should not participate in it. He derided collective security as a sham and declared that it did not contribute in any way to Canada's economic well-being.[129]

On 27 March 1969, the Cabinet Committee on External Policy and Defence met to make recommendations to Cabinet on NATO participation. Canada was at a crossroads: She could be either aligned or non-aligned. Aligned did not necessarily mean that Canada had to make a military contribution to collective security. It did not imply that Canada had to contribute to defence in North America and/or Europe. In general, the members, led by Sharp, "agreed to support a policy of

military cooperative arrangement between Canada and the United States and a continued contribution under NORAD." The members were unable to reach a consensus on a military contribution in Europe though Canada should continue to be a part of NATO.[130] If Cabinet chose to keep 1 Air Division and 4 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group in Germany, it had to "recognize the need for decision as to... the serious imbalance between present force commitments and the present budgetary limitation of the Department of National Defence...."[131]

PCO personnel, particularly Hume Wright (not to be confused with Hume Wrong), an External man working in the PCO, internally discussed the future nature of the European commitment. They took the aligned policy options presented in the Defence Policy Review and referred to them as the "transitional

an attack on North America, which Head and Carpenter argued could not be defended against. Therefore, the BOMARCs had to go too.[138]

In other words, anything that smacked of offensive action, which militaries needed to deter and then win wars, and anything that was defensive and could limit damage, was labelled 'destabilizing.' This included virtually the entire Canadian Forces except for transport aircraft, which not coincidentally Carpenter had been in charge of during the Congo affair in 1960 and had recommended be used to replace the CF-104s in the air division back in 1961.

Canada and scrapped, while 12 CF-5s would be stationed in Europe. In Canada, the CF-101B Voodoos were to be replaced with some new American interceptor on a one for one basis. The maritime forces would draw down to only 12 destroyers and 16 patrol aircraft.[144]

By the mid-1970s, the Canadian Armed Forces would, if this plan were adopted, be incapable of doing anything save for some internal security, some limited anti-bomber operations, UN transport missions, and minimal coastal protection. The forces in Europe would have no value whatsoever because they were numerically small, were ill-equipped, and had no role. There would be no alliance saliency in this new force structure.

The non-group paper was sprung on Cadieux and Sharp immediately before a 26 March 1969 informal meeting prior to a planned 29 March Cabinet meeting in which the issue of Canadian Forces in Europe was to be discussed. The details of this story have been told elsewhere.[145] When the non-group paper was included in the pre-meeting briefing papers, Mitchell Sharp had to restrain Leo Cadieux to prevent him from resigning immediately. After a tirade *en français* with the Prime Minister, the paper was withdrawn from consideration. The usurpation of the External Affairs and National Defence professional views on the matter was finally brought into focus.

In the formal Cabinet meeting three days later on 29 March, Donald Macdonald immediately attacked the DPR and STAFFEUR process as not being "objective" since it did not reflect his views. The Solicitor General, George McIlraith, was outraged since in his view, "the condemnation of official views had surely gone a little too far. The devaluing of the ability of experts to review past advice was a little excessive." Trudeau finally chimed in and told his Cabinet that "Canada's present military establishment was determined not to impress our enemies but rather to impress our friends." In his view, "The political consequences of our

contribution to the underdeveloped countries of this world." Therefore, the $1.8 billion spent on defence should be deployed there to alleviate suffering. This was a true expression of Canadian values, in his view. Finance Minister Edgar Benson, on the other hand, informed Cabinet that, in his view: "An abrupt withdrawal would tear the Canadian military structure to pieces...." Hellyer supported this view and also reminded Cabinet that a pull-out from NATO might lead to the same conditions that prevailed in 1914 and 1939 since "statesmen prior to those two world wars had not properly assessed the value of an established military deterrent. Korea evidenced for us the real problems of attempting to mobilize quickly in order to withstand an armed conflict." Hellyer agreed with Benson in that "people could not be taken off the streets and immediately transformed into valuable members of the military system....the reduction of troops in Europe would not bail us out of our domestic or international problems."[148]

Sharp's position supported Benson and Hellyer. He was concerned about the American reaction to a Canadian withdrawal. In his view, "until the United States was able to settle the Vietnam issue, the stability of international condition was vitally important. In that context, Cabinet Ministers should not underestimate Canada's influence in contributing to stability." There were economic consequences to a pull-out since "We expect to be treated in a special commercial sense in wheat negotiations, oil transactions, and in the exchange of defence information. The government should not necessarily expect that such treatment would continue." Once again, Cabinet came to no decision on the matter, though Trudeau pledged to produce a compromise document which would debated in Cabinet before he made any public pronouncement on the issues.[149]

The compromise memorandum "rejected the extreme alternative of non-alignment" and articulated the position that Canada should stay in NATO. As for European-based forces, however, a withdrawal would be implemented after NATO was informed in May 1969. Canada's forces had to be able to employ the full range of operations, which had to include domestic deployments, peacekeeping and peace restoration , and collective security. They also would be expected to contribute to "national development programs." Coastal and air surveillance of North America were paramount since this was directly related to sovereignty.[150]

At the next Cabinet meeting on 1 April 1969, Leo Cadieux strenuously opposed the compromise since:

> The Canadian forces...had been continuously reduced and we had just received equipment in order to carry out designated roles outlined for them by previous government policy. Now it was to be decided that the roles were to change and equipment be redesignated....the defence establishment had been seriously hampered by financial restrictions and the forces were suffering serious attrition at present.[151]

The Prime Minister then pulled the compromise position paper and pledged to consult Cadieux and Sharp before making a public statement based on it. In two speeches in April 1969, Trudeau rejected neutrality as an option but also announced that 1 Air Division and 4 CMBG would be slashed in half.[152]

This had an effect on the course of what was referred to as the "Defence Policy Review Phase II," a euphemism for a small PCO working group which would recommend what further cuts could be made to the Canadian Forces. This recommendation amounted to slashing the Forces from 98 000 to 81 000 personnel in addition to cutting 1 Air Division and 4 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group in half.[153]

Some wanted cuts to include the BOMARC system, since there had been rumours that the Americans were thinking about scrapping theirs. National Defence was concerned about this move. Major General Mike Dare, the Deputy Chief of Operations, told Cabinet in a briefing that the CAN$5 million annual saving might be a good economy measure, but that it "would encourage pressure to phase out the CF-101 which was also armed with nuclear weapons." This would unacceptably degrade the air defence system which the Trudeau government was actually emphasizing in its new defence policy.[154]

On 20 May 1969, Cabinet finally agreed that by 1972 4 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group would be cut in half and assigned to ACE Mobile Force (Land). Only two CF-104 squadrons would remain in Europe by this time and these would be restricted to the photo reconnaissance role. No mention was made of nuclear weapons.[155]

Sharp and Cadieux effectively saved the European commitment from elimination. This move did not go un-noticed in Europe, however. SACEUR, who by this time was General Andrew Goodpaster, was furious. In a blistering cable to Cadieux, SACEUR bluntly informed him that if 4 CMBG were pulled out of Northern Army Group, he had no other forces to replace them in the line. If war broke out, Goodpaster told Cadieux, he would be forced to use nuclear weapons *sooner* rather than *later*. This "was the antithesis of the MC 14/3 strategy...."[156]

Goodpaster pleaded with Cadieux to have Canada reconsider the European cuts. NATO's Defence Planning Committee sent a series of communiqués to Mitchell Sharp. NATO was formally protesting the cuts. Eventually, Cadieux and Sharp proceeded to Brussels to brief their counterparts on the Canadian position. In an acrimonious session in which Canada was castigated for turning her back on Europe, Cadieux, in a calm and deliberate voice, reminded the Belgian representative who made this remark that there were several thousand Canadians buried in his country from the First and Second World Wars, and thousands more in France, the Netherlands, Italy, and Germany. Canada, he said, has already paid for the right to do what she wanted with her armed forces with the blood of her fallen. There were no Europeans buried in Canada save for twelve aspiring pilots who crashed during training in the Second World War. What more did Europe want? There were still Canadian forces stationed in Europe and more would come if they were needed in a crisis. There was nothing more to be said on the matter.[157]

In September 1969, Leo Cadieux announced that Canada would divest itself of the Honest Johns by 1970 and the BOMARCs by 1972. The CF-104 force would give up its nuclear weapons also in 1972.

What of Chief of Defence Staff General Allard's input into this process? Citing "intellectual fatigue," Allard requested retirement in July 1969 to become effective in September. In his memoirs, Allard says he "accomplished the bulk of my mission," which, as we will recall, was the creation of recognized French Language Units within the Canadian Forces. He even had input into the selection of his successor, General F.R. Sharp, who pledged to continue with the policy of 'francophonization.'[158] Sharp, however, "was not a Trudeau confidant and they rarely met during Sharp's period in office."[159]

The lack of uniformed dissent on the purely fiscally-based national security policy, let alone denuclearization, should be attributed to several factors. Most importantly, uniformed professionals were steadily being cut out of the national security policy formulation process. Second, the disruption of the staff system and the elimination of internal means of debating defence issues prevented the formation of a unified perspective on the issue within the armed forces. We must not discard the atmosphere of fear prompted by the Hellyer purge, which generated a survival mentality amongst the military's leadership, and its debilitating effects during this period of change.

6. *Defence in the 1970s: Out with a Whimper*

The 1971 White Paper on defence was engineered by Donald Macdonald, who replaced Cadieux as Minister of National Defence in 1970. Cadieux, apparently, was deemed "too compliant to the Department's (of National Defence) views."[160]

Americans had drawn down their components of it partly as a result of the 1972 ABM Treaty and partly because of a nuclear strategy emphasizing finite deterrence. The USAF Air Defence Command fighter force was reduced dramatically

were released by SACEUR and the CENTAG General Defence Plan called for their use. This would only occur once 4 CMBG was deployed to its assembly area or once the battle had started. The Canadian Army therefore retained some semblance of nuclear weapons involvement well into the 1980s.[171]

Similarly, Canadian CF-18 Hornet pilots had a portion of their training curriculum dedicated to nuclear strike operations, though clearly no nuclear weapons of any sort were assigned to CF-18 squadrons either in Europe or North America.[172] This aircraft was obtained in 1985 to replace the aging CF-101 and CF-104s. In American service, the F-18 could carry and deliver two B 57 (Mk. 57) or two B 61 (Mk. 61) nuclear weapons.[173] Fundamentally, however, the changes in NATO strategy by the 1980s precluded a need for Canadian nuclear weapons systems and placed a much greater emphasis on precision conventional capabilities.

7. Conclusions

In the end, the main problem was that the Trudeau government did not replace the nuclear forces with equivalent conventional forces to make up for the firepower shortfall, nor did they restructure the Canadian Forces to fight within the context of MC 14/3, the agreed-to NATO strategic concept. The existing commitments were lacklustre ones and had no real salience within the alliance. They were mundane and increasingly irrelevant as the equipment necessary to implement them deteriorated over time. National prestige, a precursor for other more tangible benefits, not the least being self-respect, does not accrue to a nation indifferently committed. Trudeau was committed to making Canada the largest of the small nations rather than maintaining Canada as the smallest of the large nations. In this he succeeded but at a cost to Canadian influence and long term military capability.

Though attempts were made in the 1980s by the Mulroney government to reverse the Trudeau-era generated "rust out" of Canada's conventional forces and

Canada's national security policy were further highlighted by Canada's commitment to Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, a war fighting mission using 'hard power' where Canadian troops fought alongside American troops in Afghanistan.

The currency of coalition influence in the first half of the Cold War was a combination of nuclear forces and high-quality conventional forces dedicated to deter an enemy attack and fight effectively if deterrence failed. This currency was

Notes

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Appendices

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

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CHAPTER I

CANADA AND COLLECTIVE SECURITY

4. National armed forces are one of the means by which governments are able to further their chosen objectives. The traditional purposes of armed forces are to repel attack, to expand national territory, and to advance national interests abroad. Secondary purposes include carrying out civil works and acting as a source of disaster relief. Armed forces can also provide a focus for national sentiment, and in some countries, their use for the suppression of civil insurrection is of considerable importance.

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8. Because of their relative freedom from security imperatives and external ambitions, Canadian Governments have enjoyed a considerable latitude of choice in their defence policies, at least in peacetime. A few attempts were made to contribute to imperial defence, and major forces were sent overseas in both world wars, but for the balance of its history up to 1939, Canada generally

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11. Canada emerged from World-War II a much stronger nation, in both

Canadian defence, the principal value of peacekeeping, peace-observation, and related activities is that they contribute to international stability and, by limiting and terminating local armed conflicts, reduce the risk of Great Power involvement and hence of confrontation. However, even if one could be sure that the UN would be 100% effective in this regard, it would still remain the case that East-West confrontations - the only direct source of danger to Canada - can arise from causes other than the escalation of conflicts in the "Third World". In the event of such confrontations, there would be no substitute for the existing collective defence arrangements to which Canada is a party.

18. For most of the post-war period, it has been generally accepted in Canada that the decisions to maintain armed forces and accept peacetime military commitments were the right ones in the circumstances. The question that arises is whether the far-reaching changes that have taken place in a number of fields over the past 20 years or so have not affected the general validity of the considerations outlined above. Specifically, to what extent has Canada been able to achieve its objective of obtaining international influence through participation in multilateral organizations, in what sense can the Soviet Union still be described as a threat, and what are the implications of technological changes for Canada's contribution to the defence of the West? These questions are discussed under successive headings below.

The Concept of Influence

19. The validity of the claim that Canada obtains influence through its participation in NATO and its bilateral co-operation with the U.S. can be appreciated only if exaggerated expectations are avoided, both with regard to the amount and the kind of influence that a country such as Canada can have.

20. The conjunction of circumstances prevailing until the latter part of the 1950s placed Canada in a particularly influential position. Europe was relatively weak and acutely conscious of the threat to its security, with the result that Canada's military contribution was widely recognized to be of considerable significance. The U.S. for its part placed great emphasis on the need for a collective approach and, notwithstanding its position as the principal military power in the world, attached importance to obtaining the support of its allies on a wide range of international questions. Moreover, because the West faced not only a military danger but also a threat to its politico-social institutions, there was a perceived requirement for Western allies to extend their co-operation to non-military fields and to avoid actions damaging to each other's interests.

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21. If the implementation of Article 2 of the NATO Treaty had proven practicable, and if NATO had developed into a community of Western countries collectively seeking to promote stability and progress not only among its members but in the world at large, a close co-ordination of external policies among its member countries would have been essential. This would have

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and upon the extent to which Canada proposals can be reconciled with-the

others. The risks taken must however be reasonable ones in terms not of intentions, but of the known capabilities of potentially hostile countries. Unless a country is prepared to place its basic security in jeopardy, it must - whether singly or in concert with others - maintain sufficient military strength to counter at least the principal capabilities that might in some circumstances be used against it.

28. In the context of East-West relations, the principal problem at present is to reconcile the legitimate security concerns of both sides with measures conducive to a relaxation of tensions and a reduction in the risk of war. That the Soviet Union is unlikely to launch an attack against the West is widely accepted. Militarily, it is deterred from doing so by Western collective defence arrangements, including the West's strategic retaliatory forces. Moreover, the fact that these forces cannot be destroyed by a pre-emptive attack, and thus do not need to be launched on the strength of warning that an attack may be imminent, provides a further element of stability in the East-West military equilibrium.

29. If the present state of East-West relations were such that the Soviet Union was clearly being held at bay only by the forces arrayed against it, the West's course would be a relatively straightforward one: to provide as much defence as it could possibly afford. In fact, however, the situation is considerably more complex. For whatever reasons, the general climate of East-West relations, and with it the perception of the threat in the Western democracies, have changed markedly over the past two decades. The mutual hostility and intense suspicion of the late 1940s have given way, not to cordiality, but at least to a certain willingness on both sides to seek mutual accommodations in some areas; concrete examples would include the treaties on Outer Space, Antarctica, Nuclear Testing, and, most recently, the joint tabling

limited to certain specific questions on which the interests of the two sides happen to coincide. On the central issue of a European settlement, there has been virtually no tangible progress; Germany remains divided and Berlin is as vulnerable to Soviet pressure as ever. Moreover, as Europe remains the area of principal interest to the Soviet Union, compromise on European questions is likely to be the most difficult and to take the longest to achieve.

31. Whatever the future course of East-West relations, there will be a continuing requirement for Western defence policies to take account of the military capabilities of the U.S.S.R. and its allies. Despite the decline in East-West tensions, the Warsaw Pact countries still maintain large military forces, and the continuing modernization of their equipment has greatly increased their effectiveness. It is no doubt true that these forces are maintained at least partly for defensive purposes. Nevertheless, the mere fact that powerful Warsaw Pact forces exist, and could be used against Western Europe, North America, or to the detriment of Western security interests in other parts of the world is a sufficient and indeed a compelling reason for the maintenance of effective defences by the Western allies. There is always the risk that circumstances could arise in which the possession of armed forces could be of critical importance to Western security - perhaps as a result of developments unpremeditated by either side, perhaps because a new Soviet leadership decided to pursue a policy of more militant opposition towards the West.

32. This is not to say that there is no alternative to an indefinite extension of the East-West arms race, with each side continuing to strengthen its forces because it must match the capabilities of the other. Such a situation is certainly possible it may even be probable - but it is not inevitable. In a period when tensions are high, and any incident could lead to war, a prudent defence policy will seek to guard against as many contingencies as possible. An improvement in the political climate and an absence of overtly aggressive intentions on either side, on the other hand, can increase the feasibility of mutual arms limitations. Specifically, both sides are more likely to be prepared to take essential first steps such as foregoing those systems that contribute only marginally to their security. The indispensable prerequisite for any general programme for arms limitation is, however, that the programme be reciprocal. It is true that in some circumstances, a step can be taken unilaterally to see if it produces a response, and that force reductions by mutual example are a conceivable alternative to reductions by formal agreement. President Kennedy's offer of a "bonfire of bombers" and the more recent U.S. offer to forego the deployment of an anti-ballistic missile system are examples of the kind of exploratory proposals that can be advanced.

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There is, however, a limit to how far one side can go unless the other responds. The ultimate limitation on unilateral measures is that, instead of reassuring an

principal threat to North America and Western Europe, it was possible - and obviously desirable - to counter them with a strong system of active defences. The scope for such defences is much more limited today, when the main elements in the strategic balance are various kinds of ballistic missiles, supported by highly sophisticated systems such as satellites and over-the-horizon radars, and when the forces on both sides of the Central Front in Europe are equipped with literally thousands of tactical nuclear weapons that could nullify a large force as quickly as a small one.

37. While these developments have had far-reaching implications for Western defence arrangements, they have not eliminated the West's requirement for conventional and non-strategic forces. The primary role of these forces today is to provide a capability of countering hostile acts short of general war, and thus to ensure that the vast nuclear apparatus on both sides is not called into play unless and until it is absolutely necessary to do so.

38. This strategy of flexible response is based on the premise that, as former U.S. Secretary of Defence McNamara repeatedly pointed out, "a credible deterrent cannot be based on an incredible act". The strategic nuclear forces of the U.S. are a credible deterrent only to those actions by the U.S.S.R. that would imperil the vital interests of the U.S.; their use in less serious circumstances would literally be an incredible act, since it would provoke a strategic nuclear response by the U.S.S.R., ending in the destruction of both countries. To a lesser extent, the same limitation applies to tactical nuclear weapons, although there is considered to be at least a theoretical possibility that their use would not necessarily lead to general nuclear war.

39. The West's conventional forces are thus a part of its over-all system of deterrence and, like the strategic deterrent forces, they serve a psychological as well as a military purpose. The knowledge that an attack on any given scale would meet effective armed resistance serves to create uncertainty in the mind of a potential aggressor about the price he might have to pay to achieve a desired objective. This is particularly true when the defending forces have the capability of escalating the hostilities by measures such as a counter-attack in a different area or by invoking tactical nuclear weapons. Thus, by maintaining a broad range of military capabilities, the West is able, not only to ensure that hostile acts fail to achieve their objectives, but also to reduce the risk that they will be attempted.

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40. The strategy of flexible response is commonly thought of in the context of Western Europe. In fact, however, it is equally valid in relation to other aspects of the West's defences. This was most dramatically demonstrated at the time of the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, when the ability to apply the necessary measure of conventional force, backed up by the strategic deterrent, enabled the U.S. to avoid a choice between nuclear war and acquiescence in what it regarded as an intolerable situation. The deployment of conventional forces to a threatened area can also be a useful means of demonstrating resolve, as was the case during the Berlin crisis of 1961. Finally, the presence of conventional forces in a period of acute tension can be an essential means of deterring or containing incidents which otherwise could trigger an outbreak of general hostilities. The risk that situations along the lines of the foregoing examples might arise need not be high. The West's conventional forces would have to prevent thermo-nuclear war only once in order to justify their existence for a very long time.

Conclusions

41. At the present stage of the twentieth century, security in the narrow sense of being effectively defended against attack from any quarter is not a realisable objective of defence policy. There is no way in which a country or any group of countries, however powerful can physically prevent an opponent armed with modern weapons from killing most of their population and destroying their economic infrastructure. What is possible, however, is for countries to employ a combination of measures to reduce the risk that an attack will take place. In addition to strategic nuclear deterrence, these measures include the maintenance of an adequate range of military capabilities to make the initiation of lesser levels of hostilities unprofitable, and diplomatic efforts to find practical ways of reducing international tensions.

42. It is sometimes suggested that, because of the growing sophistication of modern warfare, the maintenance of the strategic balance should be left entirely to the two super-powers, with the allies of the U.S. - and possibly those of the U.S.S.R. as well - in effect becoming bystanders. This would not necessarily involve the formal assumption of neutral status by the allies; they could still remain politically aligned with their protecting power and extend to it such co-operation as it required in the way of, for example, communications and overflight rights. They would not, however, maintain armed forces on any significant scale themselves, nor would they seek to play any role in collective defence arrangements.

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43. An arrangement along these lines would have the advantages of being both practicable and economic. There are, however, two fundamental objections to it. First, it would represent a renunciation of the efforts that have been made to develop a broad, multilateral approach to problems of international peace and security. The relationship between the U.S. and its allies would, in effect, become analogous to that which prevailed in British imperial defence arrangements prior to 1939. As Canada's experience during this period demonstrated, a policy of minimum participation in security arrangements mainly serves to reduce the ability of an individual country to do anything to prevent major conflicts; it does not materially alter the risk of being directly affected by them.

44. Secondly, even if in practice the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. were quite capable of arriving by themselves at understandings over various questions, it cannot be assumed that the terms of these understandings would always be favourable to the interests of the international community as a whole. It is at least possible that in some cases settlements might be reached by the two super-powers to the detriment of their erstwhile allies. This point is perfectly well understood by the major Western European powers, which have no intention of settling for the role of bystanders in relation to East-West security affairs. What the "opting out" line of argument would amount to in practice, therefore, would be that small and middle powers such as Denmark, Belgium, Canada, and perhaps Italy would assume the sort of role in NATO that Iceland has at present, and effectively leave security questions to be settled by their larger allies.

45. Developments over the past decade or so have generally tended to make Canadian defence and foreign policy decisions more rather than less difficult. At the same time, there has probably been some reduction in the scope for Canada to play a constructive international role. The weight of evidence suggests, however, that the general policy course that was set in the immediate post-war period, and particularly the decision to participate actively in collective defence, was one which still serves Canada's interests.

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CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSIONS

235. The purpose of the discussion in this paper has been to determine what national interests are served by the allocation of Canadian resources to defence activities, and whether the nature and scale of Canadian defence activities are appropriate to serve those interests.

236. Up to a point, statements about national interests depend upon interpretations of collective values in a country. In consequence, there are generally fewer pitfalls in speaking of what a country perceives its interests to be, rather than of what they "really" are. This is particularly true of any discussion of the relative importance of various national interests and the means of resolving inconsistencies or conflicts among them. On the other hand, the perception of national interests is conditioned by certain fundamental factors such as geography, history, resources, and cultural links. For the purposes of this paper, the basis on which judgements about Canadian interests have been made is, first, the fundamental factors referred to above as they relate to Canada and, secondly, those policies which have been followed more or less consistently by Canadian Governments, particularly in the period since World War II, and which may therefore be taken to reflect a continuing Canadian consensus concerning certain national objectives.

237. On this basis, the national interests served by the allocation of Canadian resources to defence may be divided into three broad categories. First and most important is Canada's interest in security from outside attack or military intimidation.

238. The security of the West, including Canada, depends on a system of deterrence rather than on defences in the traditional sense of the term. For all practical purposes, the West's strategic deterrent forces are a monopoly of the United States, and decisions about their use must ultimately be taken by the U.S. alone. The function of the West's active defences, and the contributions individual countries make to them, is to reduce the risk that the strategic deterrent would actually have to be used. To the extent that the maintenance of active defences helps to reduce the risk of general war, Canada has an obligation to play its part. This is partly a matter of national self-respect, but it also has a direct bearing on Canadian security, since Canada would suffer as much as any country if the present system of deterrence and defence should fail.

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239. The second category of national interests served by the maintenance of Canadian defence forces comprises those interests that arise out of Canada's existence as a sovereign country. Sovereignty implies that a government is capable of exercising certain capabilities if the need for them should arise. These capabilities include maintaining surveillance of national territory and preventing casual violations of it, of maintaining law and order at the request of the civil authorities, and providing various forms of emergency relief in the event of natural disasters. At the same time, the existence of Canadian armed forces capable of providing a substantial proportion of the active defences of Canadian territory enables Canada to treat with the U.S. as a sovereign country, and to maintain a voice in matters relating to continental defence.

240. Thirdly, Canadian defence activities serve to support Canadian foreign policy, and have a direct bearing on Canada's position in the international community. This point can perhaps be best illustrated by summarizing some of the consequences that could be expected to follow from a major reduction in the Canadian armed forces and expenditures on defence:

a. Canada would in some measure be isolating itself from the group of countries which, by virtue of their common interests and cultural background, are its natural associates. In particular, Canada would forfeit any right to a voice in Western security arrangements;

b. Canada would in effect be abandoning its efforts to promote a multilateral approach to problems of peace and security. It would scarcely be credible for Canada to urge the development of a collective security system under the United Nations - which implies a willingness by member countries to accept international military responsibilities - if it had been demonstrated that Canada for its part was not prepared to contribute to the collective defence arrangements that are currently the basis of Canadian security;

c. Canada's ability to develop special relations with selected countries through the provision of military assistance would at best be extremely limited;

d. Canada's ability to respond to unforeseen external contingencies calling for the use of armed forces would be minimal or non-existent.

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241. The three categories of Canadian interests discussed above - reduction of the risk of war, protection of Canadian sovereignty, and the maintenance of Canada's ability to play a constructive international role - require that Canada continue to maintain armed forces on a sufficient scale to participate in collective defence. The proportion of its resources that Canada allocates to defence at present is smaller than that of virtually all of its allies, and indeed is one of the smallest of any comparable Western country. This situation suggests that Canada's defence expenditures are certainly not excessive at present, and may on the contrary, be very close to or below the minimum consistent with the furtherance of Canada's national and international interests.



PART I

CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO EUROPE

CHAPTER 1

THE FOUNDATIONS OF CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY

A sound and effective foreign policy for Canada, as for any country, must be based on a continuous reassessment of its own domestic requirements and its external environment. The broad lines of present Canadian foreign policy toward Europe were conceived in the immediate post-war period. Even if the world had not changed there would be scope for a general review of Canadian policy after two decades. In that period Canada has experienced a birth of national consciousness and, at the same time, a crisis of self-interrogation such as it has never seen before. There has also been such a broadening of horizons and searching for a role that it is imperative to re-examine the basic premises of Canadian foreign policy. The world around us has also changed enormously. Military power has never been so concentrated and yet, paradoxically, the restraints on its use have never been greater. Material prosperity has reached new heights and yet the gap between rich and poor is wider than ever. Technological advances have brought mankind greater opportunities than ever before but also infinitely greater dangers. Progress in transportation, communications and education have whetted the desire of the common people to participate more in national and international affairs, while middle and smaller powers demand a greater voice in world affairs.

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While the reasons for a review are thus compelling, two essential points should not be overlooked: first, that to a certain extent Canadian policies have been under continuing review and have evolved; and second, that many factors vital to the determination of Canadian policy remain basically the same. In this report we attempt to draw attention to both change and continuity so that the thrust of Canadian policy may accurately reflect both dimensions.

Foreign policy objectives must reflect domestic requirements, while taking into account the relationship with other countries in an increasingly interdependent world. While we shall of course be concerned in this report primarily with Canada's relations with Europe, it may be useful if we set out under the following headings the main areas in which we see Canadian national objectives having important implications for our foreign policy: security; national unity; national identity; economic interests; world order.

Common to the objectives in all these fields is the basic need to protect Canada's national sovereignty in all its aspects. In the modern world national sovereignty is inevitably restricted by the international community but it remains a basic objective to ensure that Canadian sovereignty is delegated only with the consent of the Canadian Government.

Security

A vital objective for Canada, as for any country, is the protection of its national territory against any threat, whether of

overt aggression or subversion. For most countries, contiguous or nearby states pose the greatest threat to their physical security. Canada has a special position in this connection because it has only one neighbour close to its centres of population, the United States, with whom relations are so close that the expectation of military attack is nil. As a result Canada is not concerned with frontier defence, other than in the maintenance of coastal and air space surveillance. On the other hand, technology and the East-West division have created a potential for global nuclear exchange which, by design or accident, could destroy the fabric of Canadian life. Faced with this threat to our security, Canada's objective must be the maintenance of peace, and particularly the containment of conflicts which could lead to global war and a nuclear attack on the North American continent. Policies to achieve this security objective could involve such activities as the protection of the American deterrent, the maintenance of stability in Europe, peacekeeping in other parts of the world or other non-military initiatives to lessen the possibility of conflict.

National Unity

Parallel to the need to protect the national territory is the objective of promoting national unity within the country. Unless a basic level of unity is maintained among different groups, centrifugal forces may either prevent effective government or lead to political separation. Canada is faced with a fundamental problem of

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impede it. Although this problem is essentially domestic, there is also an important external element which is of particular applicability at the present time. In fact, the current problem of identity is a classic example of the interaction of the domestic and international aspects of national life. Inevitably, in our North American way of life, the influence of the United States is widespread and powerful. While accepting and benefiting from this close relationship, it is a Canadian objective to be conscious of, to nurture and take pride in the unique elements of Canadian society. We regard Canadian national identity as a positive objective which can best be fostered by a diversification of Canadian external relations. A policy of anti-Americanism would be counterproductive not only externally but also in terms of the very identity we wish to preserve. It would also be unacceptable to the Canadian people.

If Canadian foreign policy is to give further substance to the domestic objective of national identity, it must therefore broaden and deepen our relations with other countries beyond the North American continent with a view to strengthening the distinctive aspects of our national character.

Having to cope on the domestic scene with an often dissenting

doubt. Conversely, unless there is an effective determination to preserve a Canadian identity which is more than just a reflection of or reaction against our American neighbour, it would seem to be equally doubtful that we could remain united.

Economic Interests

It is also a basic objective to promote the prosperity and well-being of the Canadian people, and for this purpose to seek the most favourable impact on the Canadian economy which can be derived from our external relations in the fields of trade, finance, immigration, science and technology and others related to the economic development of the country. The degree of Canada's dependence on world markets makes it all the more important for it to seek through international economic cooperation to promote the best possible environment for its own economic development. Policies designed to implement these objectives may include aid for less developed parts of the world, where Canada's longer term economic interests are reinforced by humanitarian interests.

World Order

A further basic objective is the maintenance of a free, stable and interdependent society based on the rule of law. Canada naturally associates with other like-minded countries that pursue similar objectives, particularly the Atlantic-community of nations. There are three ways in which foreign relations are connected to this objective:

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the image which Canadians form of themselves. Constructive and imaginative accomplishments abroad help to build up confidence among Canadians in the viability of Canada as a national entity.

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CANADIAN EYES ONLY

CHAPTER 4

BASIC FOREIGN POLICY ALTERNATIVES

There are several reasons why it is desirable to examine not only ways in which Canadian interests are involved in relations with Europe, but also the basic question of whether Europe is more or less important to Canada than other parts of the world, and whether there may be alternative options open to Canada which could be more meaningful in terms of the new realities created by changes both within Canada and in Canada's external environment. One reason is simply the widespread and often unarticulated desire for a "new look", a new role for Canada. Another is that there is a feeling abroad that Europe does not offer as much opportunity as do other regions of the world for Canada to play a distinctive and satisfying role. Partly this seems to be because Europe is associated in people's minds with power politics, military alliances and other "immoral" aspects of international affairs. Partly it may be because there is an impression among Canadians that Europe is not interested in us and therefore that Canadian influence in Europe is insignificant. Still another reason is that Canadians are more aware of and interested in other parts of the world than they used to be and are often attracted by the possibilities of doing good there.

Against this background, there are two basic options which deserve examination. One is what might be called the "Third World option" - that is, concentration on those less fortunate and less

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developed regions of the world such as Latin America, Africa, and Asia, where Canadian money and skills and perhaps even leadership would be warmly welcomed. The other is what might be called the “non-aligned option” - that is, withdrawal from all alliances and military engagements with other countries and pursuit of a politically neutral line in East-West relations. These options are not of course mutually exclusive. They could in fact be adopted individually or in combination. Nor do they cover all possible variations and permutations. But we think they do correspond to the most important basic opportunities that are open to Canadian foreign policy and we shall therefore examine them one after the other.

“Third World Option”

It is in fact a mistake to think of the “Third World option” as an option, in the sense that one has to choose between the Third World and other regions. It is not a case of “either - or” but rather of an order of priorities. A Canadian policy of giving first priority to relations with the Third World might seem at first sight to offer attractive advantages. It would enable Canada to make a significant contribution to alleviating the world’s poverty, to bridging the gap between the “haves” and “have-nots” and thus reducing international instability and tension. In the process, it would bring opportunities for influence and prestige that would be flattering to the Canadian psyche. But there are limits to these advantages that would be quickly reached. Aid appropriations can usefully be increased, but the scale

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of effective aid to the less developed countries, is in the short run at least, often limited by shortages of manpower in the donating countries and even more by lack of organization and skills in the receiving countries. The prestige and influence that might accrue to Canada would have very strict limits and in many cases would be more illusory than real. The Latin Americans and Afro-Asians are no more likely than any others to allow outsiders to intervene in quarrels of vital interest to them (e.g. Nigeria-Biafra) and we, for our part, would have no direct interest in doing so. If we were involved in such quarrels, our energies would be spent on problems that would have no real bearing on Canada's own development.

The idea that instability in the Third World represents a threat to Canada's security comparable to the situation in Europe is also highly questionable. In Korea, in the Suez crisis, the Congo affair, the Vietnam war, India's disputes with its neighbours, and in the current Middle East crisis, the super-powers have demonstrated their resolve not to let peripheral issues lead to a direct clash between them. Europe is the only region of the world in which the super-powers have vital interests at stake - because the world balance of power

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In these terms, therefore, giving first priority to relations with the Third World would make Canadian foreign policy largely irrelevant to Canadian needs. The only relations that really count in these terms are those with the United States and with Europe. The most important effect of our opting for the Third World would be to leave our relations with the United States and Europe outside the purview of the Canadian Government's concern and influence and therefore

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present) on the one hand, and non-alignment (i.e. neutrality) on the other. It should be noted that this choice is often loosely identified in people's minds with another choice - that between a military and a non-military role in the world - and that supporters of the non-military role see advantages in it similar to those described above for the ‘’Third World option". In other words, there is a tendency to think that Canada could play a more attractive and satisfying role if it divorced itself from all alliances and military commitments and devoted itself to the peaceful pursuits of detente, disarmament and UN peacekeeping, with the savings on armaments being put into economic aid. The argument goes that without military commitments to other countries, and particularly to the United States, Canada could be more independent to criticize or reject policies it does not like and to treat international issues on their merits regardless of the view of others.

In examining this argument more closely, it is as well to make an important distinction. It is one thing for a country to be non-aligned or neutral but quite another for it to be unarmed or practically so. If one looks around in Europe, for example, one sees that Sweden, Switzerland and Yugoslavia are as heavily armed as they can afford to be in order to defend their neutrality or non-alignment. Moreover, Yugoslavia's non-alignment was not voluntarily chosen. It was the result of being thrown out of the Soviet Bloc, and the Yugoslavs have simply made a virtue of necessity. Finland and Austria are lightly armed, but then their neutrality is guaranteed by severe limits imposed

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by other powers on their freedom of international action. And none of these countries occupies a strategically vital area. If Canada were to opt for unarmed neutrality, it would be tantamount to making the United States' strategic frontier with the USSR defenceless. The United States would have no alternative but to take whatever measures were necessary to ensure its security and Canadian foreign policy would in the process be subjected to more severe restraints, not fewer.

Effective and credible armed neutrality for Canada would obviously be expensive. Would it be worth it in terms of increased independence and influence? If the purpose is to project Canadian views on detente and arms control more effectively, it is difficult to see how withdrawal from our alliances could serve this end. To begin with, it would deprive us of much of the flow of political, economic and other important information we now receive from the United States and our other allies. It would of course be welcomed by the USSR and its associates, but there is no evidence that they would be more prepared than at present to heed Canadian views on Europe or other international issues. On the contrary, they would know that Canada was no longer privy to the thinking of the major Western governments and no longer in a position to exercise any influence on their policies. It is also doubtful that a non-aligned Canada, with diminished sources of information about the thinking of others, could develop views on disarmament that would gain much greater acceptance than those that we can advance in the ENDC in present circumstances as a member of NATO.

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It is problematical whether non-alignment would enhance Canada's influence with the neutrals in Europe or with countries in the Third World. The Swedes and Yugoslavs are prepared to discuss European problems with us now, despite the fact that we are not a European power, precisely because we are making a contribution to European security. The Latin Americans and Afro-Asians value their connections with us in part because we are considered, as a NATO member, to be involved in major world problems and to know what the great powers are up to. Similarly, there is no evidence to suggest that Canadian influence in the UN has been diminished by Canadian membership in NATO, rather the reverse. Nor has that membership so far inhibited Canada from playing a leading part in UN peacekeeping operations. Compare the real influence of non-aligned countries in the UN or the ENDC and it will be seen that their efforts have had little or no effect on issues where important great-power interests are involved.

Would non-alignment enhance Canada's ability to adopt policies divergent from those of the United States on problems such as Cuba, Vietnam or China? It is true that we have to take account of the interests of the Alliance as a whole, but Canada and other members of NATO exercise considerable freedom in practice in formulating policies on such matters in the light of their own national interests. For example, not a single member of NATO has contributed to the United States military effort in Vietnam despite repeated United

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States attempts to obtain their support. Political consultation in NATO on matters outside the geographic scope of the Alliance has contributed to mutual understanding of differing national policies. Whatever differences may exist, for example over China, they are less abrasive when viewed against the underlying community of interests symbolized by membership in the Alliance.

To sum up, the "non-alignment option", like the "Third World option", might give the impression of greater independence and influence but only at the price of real independence and effective influence. They would prove very expensive economically and the cost would bear little relationship to Canadian realities and needs. They would be risky in terms of protecting the essential base of Canadian foreign policy and would not enable Canada to contribute more to the maintenance of peace in the world. Indeed, there is a serious danger that the end result of either course, with its high cost and meagre fruits, would

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1. This paper has been prepared to provide a basis for decisions by the Canadian Government on the broad choices available to Canada to assure its national security during the coming decade. To assist in reaching these decisions, the paper develops the discussion of strategic and political issues, and

b. refusal to enter into any new military or political arrangements or consultations with other countries which might imply a possible willingness to cooperate with them in the event of war.

c. Refusal to permit Canadian territory, air space or territorial waters to be used for any military purposes by other states.

Alignment

7. A Canadian national security policy based on alignment and military cooperation with other states would involve the following:

a. Recognition by Canada and the states with which it chooses to cooperate that some common threat to their security exists;

b. Agreement by Canada and its allies that a collective response is a more effective and economical way of meeting this agreed threat than individual national efforts;

c. A mutual undertaking by Canada and its allies to come to each other's assistance in the event of an attack upon any of them by the state or states perceived as the source of the common threat;

d. Readiness by Canada and its allies to consider each other's views as to what constitutes an equitable sharing of the burden of defence against the threat, in relation to their respective resources;

e. Readiness by Canada and its allies at least to harmonize their individual policies with respect to the matters and areas covered by their alliance.

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large-scale disarmament is unlikely in the near future, and the Non-Proliferation Treaty will probably not be entirely successful in halting the spread of nuclear weapons.

10. The prospects for an early political settlement of the intractable problem of the division of Europe remain extremely doubtful; while progress toward a detente with the USSR will probably be hindered, although not necessarily arrested, by Soviet unwillingness to permit the weakening of its political control in an increasingly restless Eastern Europe. The Western European nations will continue to advance economically at a rapid rate, but will probably make little progress toward political union in the near future. Until a genuine detente with the USSR is achieved, most West European government are likely to continue to see NATO as the only means available to maintain their own security in combination with the US deterrent, and as the principal mechanism through

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12. The "third world" in general will be marked by continuing economic difficulties, internal strife and political instability, intensified by the social stresses arising from the process of development itself. There is unlikely to be any significant growth in political cohesion among the underdeveloped countries. In various parts of Afro-Asia, Soviet policy, backed by an increasing

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CHAPTER 3

STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF NON-ALIGNMENT

1. The major military threat to its national security, which Canada now faces, is that of a large-scale nuclear attack on North America. Canada is exposed to this threat primarily for reasons of geography. Because it occupies

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the USA from the Arctic ocean and, in relation to its own most populated areas and strategic bases, from its own northern and arctic territories. This strategic depth is available to the USA only with Canada's cooperation, while the USSR has no requirement for the cooperation of Canada or of any other country. Canadian non-alignment would, therefore, impose a strategic penalty on the USA and confer a strategic benefit on the USSR. For this reason, the USA would regard Canadian non-alignment as prejudicial to its security and would react unfavourably to it.

4. At present, access to Canadian territory and air space is indispensable to the USA. The USA relies for its overland communications with Alaska on the North West highway route across Canada and requires the use of Canadian air space for the operations and training of the bombers of its strategic air command. In addition, a variety of military installations vital to the security of the USA against the main strategic threat are located in Canada. These include the rearward communications for the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) against the threat of ICBM attack; the Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS) radio stations against the threat of submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM) attack; the Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line, Pinetree Radar Stations and the facilities at North Bay for command and control of interceptors across the north of the continent against the threat of bomber attack; and the leased bases at Argentia and Goose Bay. (Maps 1 and 2)

5. New systems such as Over the Horizon (OTH) Backscatter Radar and an Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) for early warning and control of interception of strategic bomber attacks; and OTH Forward Scatter Satellite detection systems to give warning of ICBM attacks might to some degree

reduce but would not remove the need for access to Canadian territory for the defence of the USA. The USA would, however, continue to require the use of Canadian air space. Present indications are that access to both Canadian air space and territory will be of value to the full exploitation of the new and technologically advanced systems which are now or may, in future, be envisaged in plans for continental defence.

6. In the unlikely event that it proved possible initially to achieve a policy of non-alignment without prohibitive political or other costs to Canada, the situation could change. The USA could find that the penalty to its security interests was intolerable at any time as a result of change in the strategic balance, unforeseen developments in military technology, or a sharp increase in international tension implying an imminent danger of war.

7. Whether or not the USA eventually accepted that Canadian non-alignment could be compatible with US security requirements, the Americans would in their own self-interest remain profoundly concerned

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Canada's exposure to the indirect threat of foreign subversion. It is uncertain whether the comparatively minor existing threat of armed assistance, perhaps clandestine in nature, by a foreign state to an insurrectionary element in Canada would be increased by Canadian non-alignment. In this instance, the primary defences would remain, firstly, the continuation of Canadian political and social stability and reliance upon constitutional means of effecting change, and secondly the maintenance of adequate internal security forces.

DEFENCE MEASURES AGAINST THE MAJOR THREAT

9. Although defensive measures can significantly increase the proportion of population and resources which would survive, there is not now, nor is there likely to be in the foreseeable future, any means of active or passive defence capable of preventing widespread devastation and heavy casualties resulting from a nuclear attack on North America. The only means, at present, of countering the threat of intercontinental nuclear war is to prevent it from happening.

10. To prevent nuclear war between the great powers in a divided world, it remains necessary to rely principally on the preservation of a stable balance of nuclear forces between the USA and USSR such that each continues to deter the other from launching a nuclear attack; and secondarily on measures to prevent or contain local conflicts arising by miscalculation in areas such as Europe where the vital interests of the Communist and non-Communist worlds are in close confrontation.

11. Adoption by Canada of a non-aligned policy would tend to introduce an element of instability into the strategic nuclear balance, (i) because it would

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IMPLICATIONS OF NON-ALIGNMENT FOR DEFENCE SCIENCE

15. Although the factors contributing to the influence exerted by a country on the international scene are numerous and are not constant with time or country, it is clear that in the modern era the indigenous capability in science and technology stands high. Similarly, while analysis has not yet completely identified all the factors necessary for modern economic progress, it is again clear that an essential ingredient is a good capability in scientific research and technology. A military requirement has often been the stimulus for major advances in both science and technology for both civil and military benefit. The division of the application of science and technology into civil and military spheres grossly over-simplifies the complex, interwoven relationship. In brief, in both the military and civilian spheres, science and technology are of primary importance to national prestige, influence and well-being.

16. Canadian scientific, engineering and technological reputation, both military and civil, is built upon a relative small amount of high quality work which is nourished by a large amount of foreign information. For example of the documents received in the Directorate of Scientific Information Service of the Defence Research Board, 74% come from USA, 11% from UK, 10% are of Canadian origin and only 5% from all other countries. During 1968 Canada has received about 45,000 US defence documents. However, the balance in Canada's favour is currently equated against the value of' Canada as an ally in the broadest sense. If Canada took a non-aligned position, existing sources of defence science information would be drastically curtailed. It is also likely that many of the sources of non-military science and technological information (apart from the open literature) would dry up. As an example, a particularly critical area from both defence and civilian viewpoint is the computer field. The US has exhibited reluctance to allow the most modern

and powerful computers to be exported even to some of her allies. While it might be possible to negotiate arrangements for exchange of information on a limited basis, probably quid pro quo, this is unlikely to be satisfactory and certainly the amount of information received would be very much less than under present circumstances.

17. To keep in the vanguard of the technological age without this help, a much greater percentage of national resources would have to be devoted to research and development. Translated into military terms, defence equipment would have to be largely of Canadian design and production if a modern force with up-to-date weapons were to be maintained. US policy seems to forbid the

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US-Canadian relations which would result from Canadian non-alignment. Even if the US Administration did not consider that fundamental US security interests were so vitally affected as to require the application of massive political or other pressures against Canada, Congress and the American public would be surprised, shocked and probably somewhat angered by the Canadian decision, which might well be regarded in the USA as a deliberate anti-American gesture and as contrary to the dictates of common sense.

4. Against this background, it would be a great deal more difficult for Canada to reach accommodations with the US Administration on problems of mutual concern, even when the US authorities saw advantage to the USA in

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Canada with greater circumspection in order not to encourage a Canadian return to alliance with the USA, but the Russians would probably remain hopeful of eventually stimulating a more pro-Soviet Canadian attitude, and would therefore be reluctant to abandon and might well step up attempts to meddle surreptitiously in Canadian domestic institutions.

PROMOTION OF NATIONAL UNITY

6. The implications of Canadian non-alignment for national unity would depend largely on the short and long-term reactions of Canadian public opinion to the political dissociation from the USA implied by non-alignment. The immediate effect of the adoption of non-alignment could be to strengthen national unity, at least temporarily by providing a clear point of difference and dispute with the USA, particularly if non-alignment led to overt US pressures in defence of their security interests in Canada. As on some previous occasions in Canadian history, such pressures could make English and French Canadians feel that they had to work more closely together. However, if the policy was not equally accepted in all regions of Canada, and in the longer term if strains in US-Canadian relations continued and non-alignment had unpopular practical consequences, serious divisions could occur in Canadian opinion.

7. Changes in Canadian relations with countries other than the USA consequent upon non-alignment could also have certain implications for national unity. The termination of Canadian interest in the security of Western Europe, as expressed by Canada's withdrawal from NATO, would hinder efforts to pursue Canadian interests in individual European countries thus diversifying contacts beyond the predominantly English-speaking North American environment.

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PROMOTION OF CANADIAN ECONOMIC WELL-BEING

8. The special relationship Canada enjoys with the USA is very broadly based. An abrupt withdrawal by Canada from existing defence arrangements would undoubtedly seriously impair this relationship, and this in turn would have direct and indirect consequences for existing and prospective economic co-operation with the USA. To a considerably lesser degree, economic relations with Europe could also be involved.

9. Termination of co-operative defence production arrangements between Canada and the USA would have direct, although not easily measurable effects on Canada's most advanced industries, which depend heavily on technological co-operation with the USA, and on Canada's ability to compete in other foreign markets for trade in technologically advanced defence equipment items. The cancellation of defence production sharing arrangements with Canada's European NATO allies would also affect Canadian ability to compete for such items in world markets.

10. In addition, Canadian non-alignment could involve substantial indirect economic costs, although no precise estimates can be made. The USA could be expected, for example, to review its arrangements for economic and financial co-operation with Canada, including some or all of US imports of oil and natural gas and potential imports of uranium; consultative and co-operative special arrangements in respect of Canadian trade in a number of other commodities with the USA and third countries; US participation in the Automotive Agreement and possible future participation in such special arrangements in other sectors; mutually beneficial special financial arrangements such as the interest equalization tax and the USA's 1968 program of restraints on capital outflows; and the flow of technology and private capital to Canada.

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11. Whether the USA would choose to alter its policy in one or more of these areas would depend on their assessment of the net value to them of these co-operative arrangements, and of course on the tenor of US Congressional and public opinion toward Canada. Canadian vulnerability to developments in the USA and the importance of these special arrangements were demonstrated in the foreign exchange market early in 1968. Any action to narrow the scope of Canadian-US economic co-operation would hurt Canada more immediately and more drastically than it would the USA, even though the longer-term damage to US interests might also be substantial. Such a narrowing of co-operation would not be inconsistent with a long term objective of reducing the present degree of Canadian dependence on the USA as an export market and a source of imports of goods and capital; but in the short run it would be difficult to intensify Canadian trade and investment links with Europe and other industrial areas sufficiently rapidly to maintain Canada's current economic growth rate.

12. In short, while the impact of a policy of non-alignment upon economic relations with Europe might not necessarily be negative, the direct

real question, however, would be whether in this new situation Canada's ability to influence the policies of the leading Western and Soviet-bloc states would be increased or decreased. There is no reason to believe that non-alignment and increased public criticism would enhance Canada's ability to influence positions adopted by the USA; indeed the reverse could be true. Moreover the termination of Canadian defence co-operation with the USA and Western Europe would mean that Canada would no longer be participating in the formulation of Western policies on such matters as European security and disarmament, and that Western governments would regard Canada as essentially an outsider which no longer saw political interests in common with them; the result would be a decline in the hearing which Canada was able to obtain for its views in Western capitals, even if those views, in Canadian eyes, continued to have intrinsic merit.

14. Soviet-bloc governments would welcome Canadian non-alignment as a propaganda defeat for the United States, and would treat Canada henceforth with increased cordiality. However they would not necessarily be more interested in Canadian views on issues of substance, as they would be aware that Canada was no longer privy to the thinking of the major Western governments and no longer in a position to influence Western policies. At the same time they might retain doubts concerning the credibility or permanence of Canadian non-alignment, in view of the unavoidable extent of Canada's day-to-day transactions and connections with the United States.

RELATIONS WITH AFRO-ASIAN AND OTHER NEUTRALIST COUNTRIES

15. Canadian relations with these governments would probably be little affected by Canada's adoption of non-alignment, unless at the same time there were a substantial increase in Canadian economic or military

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assistance to them. On the one hand they might hope it would be somewhat easier to obtain the support of a non-aligned Canada for their views on various political (e.g., anti-colonial) and economic (e.g., aid) subjects at the UN and elsewhere; but on the other hand they might attach less importance to any such Canadian support than they do now, because they would know that Canadian ties with Washington and other leading Western capitals had weakened.

16. Because of the persistence of economic weakness and lack of cohesion among the Afro-Asian countries, their ability to influence the major Western and Communist countries on important international issues is likely to continue to be very limited in practice, despite the impression to the contrary sometimes created by Afro-Asian majority votes at the UN General Assembly. Canada would therefore not find association with the Afro-Asians very useful as an indirect channel of influence on the aligned countries of either bloc.

17. Canada's ability to pursue separate foreign policies of its own affecting relations with Afro-Asian or other countries outside of Canada's present alliances would be little changed under non-alignment. Canadian alignment with the USA and Western Europe has not prevented Canada from pursuing, in its own interest, policies divergent from the USA and other allies on such matters as Cuba, Vietnam, China, Law of the Sea, and UN membership. There will presumably continue to be many such divergences in the future, no matter what national security policy Canada adopts. However as in the case or any nation, the same basic restraints on Canada's effective freedom of action would continue to apply under non-alignment before deciding on any important step in foreign policy, Canada would still

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CHAPTER 8

FORCES FOR SURVEILLANCE AND CONTROL OF CANADA'S NATIONAL TERRITORY UNDER A POLICY OF NON-ALIGNMENT

POLICY ASSUMPTIONS

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is one of the major attributes of an independent and sovereign state. Canada, because of its vast geographical area and long coastlines, extensive territorial waters and offshore rights, and sparse population in many regions, is clearly exposed to a wide variety of potential intrusions by foreigners and foreign states. A non-aligned Canada, which lacked adequate capabilities to control intrusions, would jeopardize its national security and its status as a sovereign state, even though it were not exposed to any specific external threat or military attack.

6. To maintain its national integrity, in addition to providing for internal security, Canada would require military or paramilitary forces to provide the means of policing its national territory in conjunction with the civil agencies having specific responsibilities in this regard. At a minimum, these combined forces must be able to demonstrate that they are capable of detecting persistent or major intrusions by foreign states or nationals, and of dealing effectively with them.

7. To achieve this capability, Canada would have to add to the forces required for internal security, the air and maritime forces needed to provide surveillance and control of its national territory. In assessing the requirement, the Defence Staff has sought to establish a level of forces capable of detecting and identifying frequent or large scale intrusions, but not all random intrusions, and of enforcing compliance of identified intruders with Canadian wishes, if this should prove necessary. The forces presented in this Chapter are not designed to defend Canada against external attack, but would have some capability to provide early warning of such an attack, if it should occur.

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9. Air Forces. Radar coverage equivalent to that provided by the present Pinetree Radar Line (which includes 27 Canadian and 3 US stations) together with its ground control facilities would be needed to provide surveillance and control over Canada's heavily travelled southern air space. A more effective and probably less costly coverage could be provided if this military system were to be fully integrated with the civil air traffic control network. The Pinetree Line provides a good capability of detecting a highflying intruder but a considerably lesser capability against the low flying aircraft.

10. To provide surveillance in the North, the Canadian portion of the DEW Line radars would be needed. This system is, in essence, a static electronic fence placed along the Arctic Circle and designed to provide good early warning against the southbound intruder. However, it provides no surveillance at all over most of Canada's vast northern territory and has a relatively poor capability of detecting low flying aircraft.

11. It would be necessary to maintain eight long range all weather interceptor squadrons (96 aircraft) spread geographically across the country to provide a capability to intercept the majority of intrusions into Canada's southern air space and a very limited capability to deal with intrusions in northern areas. The increase from the level provided today (56 aircraft), would be required to cover both the Prairies and the central Canadian region now covered by US aircraft under joint defence arrangements.

12. Maritime Forces. Sufficient seaward surveillance to give warning of random intrusions into Canadian waters off both coasts and in the Arctic Archipelago is the essential factor in maintaining maritime sovereignty. Without the capability of the SOSUS system, however, which is necessary for initial

detection of potential submarine intruders. Canada would not be able to maintain any worthwhile surveillance of submarines in the waters off our coasts except for chance encounters.

13. On the other hand, limited surveillance of surface ships could be achieved by retention of part of the present maritime forces. On the East Coast, eight helicopter equipped destroyers, supported by one operational support ship and twelve maritime patrol aircraft, would be needed to cover the extensive coastline ranging up to the Arctic islands, while a lesser force of four similar destroyers and four maritime patrol aircraft would be adequate on the West Coast. Preliminary analysis indicates that such forces would provide about a thirty percent chance of detecting random intrusions by surface ships.

14. Ground Forces. The ground forces outlined in Chapter 7 were designed to handle the internal security threat only. To meet the additional requirements for home defence set out in the force planning assumptions, the ground forces would have to be partly restructured, since the lightly equipped internal security forces would not be capable of conducting defensive operations aimed at controlling intrusions in the North as well as on both coasts. Consequently, one of the light infantry battalions in Chapter 7 located on the Prairies would have to be converted into an airborne unit to operate in the North.

15. Similarly, one battalion group in the Maritimes and one in British Columbia would have to be equipped to enable them to conduct defensive operations against small lodgements on either coasts, and one light artillery battery and a squadron of helicopters would have to be added to provide these

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units with the necessary firepower and tactical mobility. This increased capability could be supplemented at a very small cost by forming additional reserve units based on the indigenous or other resident population of the Far North.

16. Support Forces. With the increase in both size and complexity of the forces, the level of support set out in Chapter 6 would have to be significantly increased to provide for the wider command and control required, and the increased scope of the training and logistic activities.

17. Total Force Requirement. On the basis of the above, a total of about 59,600 military and 15,900 civilian personnel would be required and the estimated annual cost of such a force would be about $1,050 million. A more detailed breakout of the force structure and its costs is set out in Table 2.

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

18. Scientific advice to the Department of National Defence, the collection of scientific information and technical intelligence, and operational research would be required, all at a significantly higher level than Chapter 7 because of the broader roles for the Canadian Armed Forces. The minimum research and development effort would be that necessary to evaluate the foreign equipment available and to give advice on the acquisition of technically advanced surveillance and control systems. Taking into consideration that the volume of the available foreign scientific and technological information would be much less than at present, defence research and development at at least the present level would be essential.

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19. If however, the military need was for the most up-to-date equipment which modern technology could devise, such equipments would frequently have to be developed in Canada. The most technically advanced nations are reluctant to supply non-aligned nations with their most modern systems and technology, particularly in areas considered sensitive such as surveillance systems for continental approaches. For example, as a non-aligned nation it is unlikely that we would know of the existence of the Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS), and even less likely that any technical details would have been released to us. The logical result would be an expansion of the defence research and development capability in Canada and in particular costly development of systems in industry. Special attention would probably have to be paid to Arctic research. Because of the strategic position of the Arctic we could not cooperate with either USA or USSR without compromising our non-alignment policy. We would have to resist actively any work by aligned nations in the Canadian area which had military connotations. We would have to go-it-alone in the Canadian Arctic.

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TABLE 2

FORCES FOR SURVEILLANCE AND CONTROL

ALLOCATION OF MANPOWER & COSTS

	MILITARY PERSONNEL	CIVILIAN PERSONNEL	COSTS
			($ MILLION)
OPERATIONAL FORCES			
Air Defence Forces	7,679	1,988	157.6
Maritime Forces	5,206	180	73.7
Ground Forces	22,130	3,050	225.0
Air Transport Force	1,575	25	23.5
OTHER UNITS (Includes Search & Rescue & Band)	755	16	9.3
SUPPORT FORCES			
Command, Control, Administration & Communications	3,025	1,905	48.9
Base Support	6,209	4,195	105.5
Training Support	9,341	361	76.3
Logistics & Maintenance Support	990	3,385	32.0
Reserve Force Administration	390	450	4.2
Miscellaneous Support (Including Terminal Leave)	2,259	335	21.4
TOTAL REGULAR FORCES	59,559	15,890	
RESERVE FORCES	10,000		7.9
CURRENT PENSION COSTS			47.7
TOTAL ANNUAL OPERATING COSTS			833.0
ESTIMATED ANNUAL CAPITAL COSTS			217.0
TOTAL DEFENCE COSTS			$ 1050 M

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CHAPTER 9

FORCES FOR A POLICY OF ALIGNMENT –
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

1. The analysis in the preceding Chapter suggested that Canada can satisfy the requirements of its national security only by military cooperation with other countries; that Canada's major security interests are to be found in North America and in Europe; and that if a national security policy based on alignment is decided to be in Canada's best interests, Canada's defence policy should continue to be based on contributing armed forces to the defence of both North America and Western Europe, under the North Atlantic Treaty.

2. If the foregoing is agreed, the problem remains of deciding what kinds and levels of armed forces it is appropriate for Canada to contribute. Since there

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therefore, no precise equation, leading to a desirable force posture, which can be derived from pure analysis. The strategic system consists of a large number of interacting components, and the balance develops and is maintained through a complex sequence of measures, counter measures, and counter-counter measures in each of the components.

4. Canada has a choice of leaving the maintenance of the strategic balance entirely in the hands of the super-powers, or of participating in it, through collective security arrangements, to the limit that resources will permit. If participation is the preferred policy, the posture that Canada finally adopts will depend upon an examination and judgement of the following principal considerations:

a. Resources: A determination must be made as to what share of its total national resources constitutes a reasonable contribution to Canada's national security. This is primarily a domestic matter although inevitably, in the context of an alliance, the size of Canada's effort in resource terms relative to the efforts of its allies, and allied opinions of it, became factors in the decision.

b. Participation in policy formulation: A determination must be made of the degree to which Canada can and wishes to exercise effective influence on its allies in the development of collective strategic policies and plans and in decisions taken at times of crisis. This involves a need to estimate the reactions of allied governments to any particular military posture adopted by Canada and, especially, the extent to which they will regard Canada's military contribution as representing a fair share of the common burden.

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c. Capability: A determination must be made of the future roles, and thus the types of forces within the framework of alliance strategy best suited to Canada's military experience and to the exploitation of Canada's industrial and manpower resources. These considerations, although in part domestic, involve the relevance to the requirements of allied strategy and plans of any particular roles sought for the Canadian Forces and, therefore, a need for inter-allied consultations on the desired roles.

d. Sovereignty: A determination must be made of the extent to which Canada is prepared to permit the USA access to Canada's territory needed for the purpose of assuring its and Canada's security. This is primarily a domestic matter: it is one of "optics" and of ensuring that a US presence in Canada is properly regulated by the Canadian Government.

5. The discussion which follows in Chapters 10 and 11 seeks to explore the range of choices open to Canada if it decides to cooperate militarily in the defence of North America and Western Europe respectively. In Chapter 12 optional force structures at varying levels of effort are presented, with a summary of the implications of each in terms of the considerations described above, in order to provide a basis for the judgements necessary to reach decisions on Canada's future defence program.



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DEFENCE POLICY REVIEW

ANNEX B

FORCES FOR SELF-DEFENCE UNDER A POLICY OF NON-ALIGNMENT

1. As discussed in Chapter 3, paragraph 13, an assessment was made by the Defence Staff of the forces which might replace the defences available under the present aligned posture and should be adequate to convince both the USA and the USSR of Canada's non-alignment. For this purpose, the requirement for surveillance, control and internal security examined in Chapter 8 was broadened to include the capability to react vigorously to an attack by the armed forces of any foreign power upon Canada. As already noted in Chapter 3, the defensive weapons systems required to make these forces effective probably could not be acquired by a non-aligned Canada, because no major power would be prepared to furnish its advanced military technology to a non-aligned country, in order to establish defences which might be used against it. The independent development and production of the necessary defensive systems by Canada would clearly be beyond its resources. This analysis was only made, therefore, to show the magnitude of the costs which face an unaligned Canada should it decide to produce a credible defence against an external threat.

THE THREAT

2. The discussion in Chapter 3 above leads to the conclusion that the principal threats to the security of a non-aligned Canada would be:

a. The nuclear threat, which would not be diminished and might possibly be increased due to the strategic uncertainty created by Canada's non-alignment.

b. The threat or increased external pressures on Canada because of the power vacuum created by her non-alignment.

c. The threat to Canada's external security, some aspects of which would probably increase from strains resulting from these external pressures.

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FORCE PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS

3. Nuclear Attack. It is evident that a nation of twenty million cannot provide adequate defences against the threat of mass attack. In the face of the nuclear threat, Canada would have two choices. The first, which is largely theoretical, would be for Canada to form its own strategic nuclear force of sufficient size to deter any aggressor. This would involve denouncing the Non-Proliferation Treaty, as well as losing the guarantees against nuclear attack provided to the non-nuclear powers, by the nuclear powers signatory to the Treaty. As this course is both politically and financially improbable it is not considered further. The other choice is for Canada to rely on a continuation of the present state of mutual deterrence and to provide

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8. Tactical Nuclear Weapons. From a purely military standpoint, defensive nuclear weapons for the air and maritime forces would be most cost-effective, and would enhance considerably the credibility of Canada's defence. Whether the forces should possess these weapons, however, would be primarily a political decision and would involve a denunciation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and a very expensive weapons production program.

FORCES REQUIRED

9. Air Defence. To provide adequate warning of incursions and attack, as well as to give the necessary control over our air space, both fixed and mobile air surveillance systems would be required. The minimum acceptable coverage would be that provided by a radar chain across Southern Canada equivalent to today's Pinetree system (30 stations) and the Canadian portion of the present Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line, but augmented by an Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) with a total of at least fifteen AWACS aircraft. Such a level of surveillance would provide good warning of penetration into our vital air spaces from outside continental North America, but only very limited warning of over-flights from the United States. Although this system would appear to meet the requirement effectively, much detailed study would be required to determine the most cost-effective mix of these and other air surveillance systems to satisfy the postulates of this option.

10. Whatever combination of surveillance methods were chosen, however there would be a requirement for a sophisticated command and control system. This would be based on the present NORAD Regional Headquarters at North Bay plus three combat direction centres probably located at Cold Lake, Winnipeg, and Chatham, N.B. To be as effective and economical as possible the air defence warning and control system would be fully integrated with and complementary to the civil air traffic control system.

11. The results of initial examination indicate that ten interceptor squadrons totalling 126 aircraft, together with an operational training unit, would be needed to be able to intercept and destroy intruders from the North and on the approaches to both Coasts, as well as to act as a credible deterrent (in Soviet eyes) to military over-flights from the United States.

12. On the East and West Coasts there would also be a requirement for air strike aircraft to deal with hostile ships in our maritime approaches. It would be considerably more cost-effective to meet this requirement if these strike aircraft were land based, and this is the proposal in this option. Similarly, to be effective and credible, the ground forces would require strike aircraft support. To satisfy these two additional requirements five of the ten interceptor squadrons, which would be those based on the two coasts, would be equipped with dual-purpose aircraft with the capabilities of the Phantom type. These five squadrons would thus have the second task of supporting both the maritime forces and the ground forces in their defence roles.

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18. To provide the credibility specified above and the necessary warning needed for active defence, a series of integrated surveillance systems would be required off the Atlantic and Pacific Coasts and in the Eastern and Western Arctic. These systems would be based on static underwater sound surveillance chains (SOSUS), nuclear powered anti-submarine submarines and continuous maritime air surveillance.

19. In the Atlantic and Eastern Arctic, the areas which would have to be covered by surveillance would include our northern and eastern waters and their main approaches. Some capability for the surveillance of the southern approaches *s.13(1)(a)/s.15(1)*

20. Four SOSUS chains would be required to provide a realistic underwater coverage of this area. As nuclear powered submarines provide the most effective single system at present capable of detecting as well as tracking and killing other nuclear submarines, they have been included in the maritime defence force. To cover the area, and to provide under ice surveillance in the Arctic three such submarines would be needed at sea at any time, requiring a total force of nine.

21. Assuming a deployment of maritime patrol aircraft to Greenwood, Argentia, Goose Bay and Frobisher, six squadrons of 80 aircraft would provide *s.13(1)(a)/s.15(1)*. This capability would include patrols to the Arctic and would meet the requirements for operational training.

22. To cover the Western Arctic approaches, *s.13(1)(a)/15(1)* To meet this requirement, three submarines would have to be added to the proposed force based on the East Coast, since the approach to the Western Arctic is more secure and safer navigationally from the Atlantic than from the Pacific through Bering Strait.

23. On the Pacific Coast, a total of *s13(1)(a) / s.15(1)* two nuclear powered submarines on patrol, requiring a total force of six, and twenty maritime patrol aircraft would provide the necessary level of surveillance of the waters of Canadian interest between Alaska and the Aleutian Islands, and the Western American seaboard.

24. In order to provide the maritime forces as a whole with the balanced anti-submarine attack capability required, and a reasonably quick and sustained concentration of anti-submarine surface forces out to the extremities of the waters of interest to Canada, the kill capability of the maritime patrol aircraft and submarines would need to be augmented by a

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surface force of helicopter equipped destroyers. This surface force, backed up by some larger destroyers armed with anti-surface and anti-aircraft missiles, together with the shore-based intercept/attack aircraft (para 12) above would also provide defence against any surface threat. The total surface force required would be 26 helicopter destroyers and seven large destroyers. Three operational support ships and one fleet maintenance ship would be needed to support these forces.

25. In addition a mine counter-measure force of a minimum of twelve mine-hunters would be needed to deal with the limited mining threat against Canadian harbours and coastal shipping.

26. In determining the size and most effective balance for the maritime forces,



About the Author

Dr. Sean M. Maloney is from Kingston, Ontario and served in Germany as the historian for 4 Canadian Mechanized Brigade, the Canadian Army's contribution to NATO during the Cold War. He is the author of several works dealing with the