CANADA AND THE FUTURE OF COLLECTIVE DEFENCE

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David L. Bashow

Centre for International Relations, Queen's University
Kingston, Ontario, Canada
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The Martello Papers

This monograph, written by LCol David L. Bashow, offers an insider's candid perspective on Canadian defence and security policy at century's end. The author is a Canadian Air Force officer who has been posted as a Visiting Defence Fellow to the Queen's University Centre for International Relations (QCIR) during the 1996-98 academic years. LCol Bashow's analysis of "Canada and the Future of Collective Defence" is the nineteenth in the QCIR's *Martello Papers* series covering a variety of issues in national and international security.

Although there have been several recent studies written on Canada's evolving defence and security policy, this one differs in that its focus is the country's two major collective-defence commitments, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD). Typically, commentators on Canada's policy tend to contrast its collective-defence commitments against other possible security dispensations, whether those be of the ideal type of collective security, or of some conceptual halfway house, such as cooperative security. Not infrequent, of late, have also been discussions of Canadian policy predicated upon such a broadened definition of security as to leave little if any place for the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces in the framing, articulation, and prosecution of that policy.

While sensitive to the fundamental changes that have so affected the international system since the ending of the Cold War, LCol Bashow does not share the view that both of the military arrangements inherited from the collective-defence era have become irrelevant. But he does worry that one of them, NATO, is becoming less useful for Canada due to growing uncertainty about its mandate and, with expansion, its future membership. By contrast, and to a degree unusual in defence circles, he advocates a continued Canadian involvement with NORAD even while arguing that the country's continuing commitment to NATO may require serious reexamination. Typically, those who question the value to Canada of NATO are also likely to raise the same query, *a fortiori*, about NORAD.

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As is the case with all *Martello Papers*, the views expressed are those of the author alone, and do not necessarily reflect the position of the QCIR or any of its supporting agencies.

David G. Haglund
Director QCIR

Joel J. Sokolsky
Senior Fellow QCIR

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1. *Introduction: Past Defence Policies*

Since the end of the Second World War, Canada's defence policy has been primarily founded upon security partnerships for collective defence, notably the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD). As well there have been active military commitments and arms-control initiatives with other world forums, such as the United Nations (UN). Today a world on the brink of the Third Millennium has witnessed significant changes since the collapse of the Soviet Union. While the end of the Cold War has removed the spectre of global thermonuclear annihilation and has also brought closure to various regional conflicts, there can be no doubt that the relative stability of the superpower stand-off has been exchanged for different and equally demanding security challenges. Canada must now decide whether it wants to remain an established and constructive middle power in international security affairs, and if so will need to reaffirm a national defence policy appropriate to its national interests.

It is my aim in this monograph to review briefly previous major trends in Canadian defence policy, articulate the most recent global and regional security challenges within the context of the country's national interests, examine the linkage between foreign policy and defence policy, and review both the NORAD and NATO collective-defence agreements in terms of their relevance to Canada's interests.

Canada is highly regarded as a good international citizen, and with just cause. Over the years, the country has made contributions to international security far beyond what might be logically expected from a state with its population base and its apparent self-interests and economic resources. Historically a militia "citizen-soldier" land for the first 70 years following Confederation, Canada's defence mandate was inextricably linked to that of Great Britain and the British Commonwealth. The generally submissive nature of Canada's relationship to Great Britain would irreversibly change through the carnage of the First World War. It has been said that Canada truly became an independent nation at Vimy Ridge during the period 9-14 April 1917, when more than 10,000 Canadian casualties were suffered and four Victoria Crosses won in battle. With nearly 61,000 war dead overall, the country felt it had justifiably earned the right to relative autonomy from Great Britain in foreign policy decisions. On 11 December 1931, Canada signed the Statute of Westminster, which granted all the former colonies of the "old" empire full legal freedom except in those areas where they chose to remain subordinate. This manifested itself in Canada's independent declaration of war on Germany on 10 September 1939, a full week after Great Britain, and

Canada's location on the flight path of any Soviet bombers intent on attacking the American heartland gave the country a special geostrategic significance and imposed unavoidable responsibilities, especially those associated with the maintenance

environment, which results in a mass exodus from rural areas to urban centres; and a general decline in national competency brought about by external forces, which may include foreign states, interest groups, or such regional economic alliances as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the European Union (EU).

The dissolution of existing states may result in the creation of additional ones (Slovakia, the Czech Republic), the entire disappearance of an existing state structure (Somalia, Lebanon), or concomitant war between disputatious factions, and a migratory shift of refugees (Rwanda, Zaire).[4] Nondemocratic regimes have been a somewhat paradoxical result of the termination of the Cold War. Religious fundamentalism and assertive nationalism are both at core anti-democratic. In countries with a tentative hold on democratic forms of government, demographic, ethnic, social, economic, and environmental problems have all combined to erode dangerously the fragile democratic power structures. The current status of Russian democratic development is particularly worrisome. In many cases the populace, frustrated and embittered by a lack of tangible progress promised by democratic reform, are turning to extremist leadership and solutions. When the state structures survive, the resultant authoritarian controls are often characterized by widespread state terror and human-rights violations, and more conflicts with neighbouring lands.

The Regional-National Situation

What has all this to do with Canada and, more specifically, Canadian defence policy? To seek answers to this question, the University of New Brunswick's Centre for Conflict Studies organized, in October 1995, a broad workshop consisting of academics; regular, reserve, and retired military personnel; civil servants; and graduate students to deliberate on what was perceived as a crisis in command in the Canadian Forces. Discussion involved a number of diverse geopolitical factors within which Canadian civil-military relations are situated in a very complex and turbulent world situation including:

- pressure on the state system, particularly federated states, and parallel rises of tribalism;
- the decline of traditional ideologies, both political and religious;
- the growth of transitional industries and financial institutions;
- the continuing chaos of decolonization;
- seemingly uncontrollable population growth;
- the need to shift from unrestrained energy use to conservation, with parallel demand for cleaner, non-polluting fuels;
- shortages of food and water in many areas;
- deterioration of the world climate;

- the influence of the media in politics, especially through instant coverage of crises;
- the political influence of special interest groups, particularly those with

with very little advance warning. Considering the present mobility and availability of WMDs, such a nightmare script is regrettably not confined to Hollywood. With further respect to specific sources, "terrorism by religious fanatics and groups manipulating religion, especially Islam, for political purposes, continued to dominate international terrorism in 1996. Organized groups such as Hamas and the Palestine Islamic Jihad … remained active and dangerous. And free-lance, transitional terrorists, many of whom were trained in Afghanistan and are backed by international terrorist financiers such as the Saudi dissident Usama Bin Ladin, are a growing factor."[13] The US State Department has said that Iran remains the top state sponsor of terrorism, while Cuba, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria also remain on its list as active state sponsors.[14]

Another enormous dramatic security concern for North America is the burgeoning trade in illegal narcotics, which eats away at the economic well-being

3. *The Case for NORAD*

Historically, Canadian defence policy often seems to have been formed in a vacuum because of a lack of consensus between external and domestic priorities. Furthermore, defence policy appears to be excessively influenced by federal budgets and regional economies, with little regard for long-term fiscal planning and stability. Former Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau often expressed concern vis-à-vis the relative order of foreign and defence policy: "It is a false perspective to have a military alliance determine your foreign policy. It should be your foreign policy which determines your military policy."[1] "In such a situation, there is a risk that foreign policy can become the servant of defence policy, which is not the natural order of policymaking."[2] Foreign and defence policy should, as much as possible, be developed in concert with each other, based upon national interests and concerns. Some elements of defence policy will undoubtedly need to be developed in tandem with foreign policy, but defence policy should *never* be developed in isolation from or in contradiction to foreign policy. However, in fairness, many defence problems have been generated due to unrealistic demands made by foreign affairs decisions or influence. Examples of this include inadequate consultation and awareness by the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) of military requirements and capabilities with respect to UN deployments to Somalia, Bosnia, and most recently, Zaire. Therefore, one might suggest that the onus is upon the government to provide the country with a foreign policy that accurately reflects national interests and concerns, and to resist the temptation to make ill-thought-out wholesale changes, or to accept policy taskings that the country's armed forces cannot realistically enforce. As well, the government should review, for relevance, foreign policies that are either hamstrung by traditional alliances or are at loggerheads with new or emerging national interests.

Background and Current Operations

On 28 March 1996, the US secretary of state and the Canadian minister of foreign affairs signed the most recent iteration of the NORAD agreement, marking the eighth time it has been renewed or extended since its official inception in 1958. This agreement assigns two very broad responsibilities to NORAD: aerospace warning and aerospace control for the North American continent. Today's world is a far different place than that of 1954 when senior military officials from Canada and the United States first met to lay the groundwork for the command. Over the years, NORAD has evolved to meet the changing threat. In the early days, NORAD assumed a purely air-defence mission using thousands of interceptors to counter a massive Soviet manned bomber fleet. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the intercontinental ballistic missile/sea-launched ballistic missile threats assumed primary importance and, in keeping with the new nuclear deterrence objective, the mission priority changed to warning and attack characterization, upon which a retaliatory strike could be based. Subsequently, the reemergence of the air-breathing threat in the form of air- and sea-launched cruise missiles led to sweeping changes under the North American Air Defence Modernization Agreement (NAADM) of 1985. When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, NORAD was quick off the mark to reassess its legitimacy in the new geopolitical situation, to eliminate unnecessary infrastructure wherever possible, and to explore innovative and cost-effective ways to maintain a combat capability geared to rapid regeneration, should circumstances dictate.

responsible for managing air traffic; they do not have the capabilities to *control* intruders. Air sovereignty contributes to deterrence and geopolitical stability, and may simply help identify unknown aircraft; however, it can encompass "times of increased tension and the Command could actually engage in limited conflict under the air sovereignty banner short of defending against a mass attack." Unknown targets "could merely be an aircraft with a flight plan deviation ... it could be an illegal drug trafficker or someone bent on other forms of harm to the continent." A state needs to maintain sovereignty of its airspace. "Our current reduced alert posture provides air sovereignty protection day in and day out, and also maintains the skeleton infrastructure for complete regeneration, should it be

For now, world political, geographical, and technical realities seem to afford us a

de Chastelain, announced that Canada was interested in working with the United States toward some form of regional missile defence, citing the need to protect specific areas from attack by rogue actors as opposed to the old Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) which Canada felt at the time would be destabilizing due to blanket protection of the entire North American continent. Others have echoed the general's sentiments: "The idea now is to protect smaller areas against short-range ballistic missiles such as the Scuds that Iraq used during the war in the Persian Gulf. Patriot missiles had limited success stopping Scuds. The kind of missile now being discussed could be transported to conflict zones and would likely depend on a space-based warning system," notes George Lands of the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies. Further, he maintains that the development of such a weapon would not contravene the ABM treaty. That compact bans interceptors capable of destroying intercontinental ballistic missiles, but not interceptors of shorter-range missiles.[10]

Canadian officials have also expressed some public interest in participating in a missile defence system for North America. Daniel Bon, of the Department of National Defence (DND), stated in 1995 that Canada was actively engaged in dialogue with American, British, French, and Italian antimissile experts with respect to the contribution Canada could make to a North American system. However, he emphasized the embryonic nature of the BMD initiative and that Canadian participation would have to be extremely cost-effective in the areas of surveillance and communications, further suggesting that "the main focus for any Canadian work on such a system would be for potential use with the North American Aerospace Defence (NORAD) system."[11]

The NORAD/USSPACECOM BMD mission is logical and well-articulated, with the highest priority being given to the protection of troops deployed worldwide. Most recently, the Helsinki agreement of 21 March 1997, signed by US President Clinton and President Yeltsin of Russia, recognized the fundamental significance of the ABM treaty in strengthening strategic stability and international security, and agreed to prevent circumvention of it and to enhance its viability. The necessity for having effective theatre missile defence (TMD) systems was emphasized and a basis for reaching agreement on demarcation between ABM systems and TMD systems was found.[12] The statement also affirmed that the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) negotiations on ABM/TMD demarcation had been completed with respect to lower-velocity TMD systems, and the two presidents instructed their experts to reach an agreement as soon as possible on higher-velocity TMD systems. Also, agreement was reached on the most highly critical elements of these systems.[13] This agreement on kinetics represents a major breakthrough and a triumph for diplomacy over confrontational rhetoric, demonstrating promising cooperation — at least in this select area of mutual interest — between the United States and Russia. In another encouraging development, the BMD issue is rapidly becoming more bipartisan within the US

government. On 24 April 1997, Republican Congressman Benjamin Gilman introduced the *European Security Act* of 1997, which promotes not only NATO enlargement but "authorizes a program of ballistic missile defense cooperation with Russia to be carried out by the Department of Defense. This program is authorized to include American-Russian cooperation regarding early warning of ballistic missile launches from such rogue states as Iran and North Korea, and cooperative research, development, testing and production of technology and systems for ballistic missile defense."[14] Collectively, these recent initiatives represent significant progress with respect to the TMD/BMD issue, and NORAD/USSPACECOM is still considered the lead continental agency for the operation and control of such systems.

Bilaterally, this issue is gaining momentum. The suggestion has been made that Canada and the United States could participate in BMD development through

technological foundation for such a system is a proven entity, the existing NORAD-USSPACECOM capability. Expansion and modification to suit global needs are not impossible tasks. In fact, such an initiative has already received tacit recognition in the closing paragraph of the Helsinki Statement:

> The Presidents also agreed that there is considerable scope for cooperation in theater

United States with considerable latitude for unilateral military activity, it tacitly recognizes that the US and Canada have a fundamental difference of opinion in foreign policy with respect to Cuba, and while the two "agree to disagree" on this issue, the relative geographical proximity of the two countries means that the United States needs to be able to take unilateral defensive action as required. Canada possesses under "Canadian Element NORAD" unilateral rights of action in the NORAD agreement as well. However, even in a crisis situation such as that generated by the actions of the Brothers to the Rescue Cuban exile group against the Castro regime on 24 February 1996 and the subsequent shooting down of two of the group's aircraft, the bilateral command relationship remained operationally intact and effective, even though other US military formations were employed in a unilateral manner in the area. That the shared, bilateral nature of the NORAD operation remained constant throughout this event, even though it was subjected to close scrutiny from senior officials of both Canada and the United States, is a resounding endorsement of the wisdom and legitimacy of the current command arrangement.

There are other accrued benefits to both the US and Canada conducting the continental air-defence mission within the framework of NORAD. First, if the command were not to be continued, some form of cooperative working relationship for air defence would have to be entered into, unless the United States wished to maintain a purely autonomous strategic defence capability. If the latter were the case, it would entail providing some form of option, undoubtedly expensive, to replace the Early Warning radars and aircraft Forward Operating Locations (FOLs), which are located for the most part on Canadian soil. It would also entail active manning of the entire 4,000-mile northern frontier of the continental United States, an act made unnecessary by the current agreement. Also likely would be a costly buyout or replacement of extensive Canadian infrastructure investment in the various headquarters and command centres, not to mention termination of the annual Canadian share of the operating costs of the Command in perpetuity. From the Canadian point of view, the infrastructure costs of "going it alone" would be prohibitive.

One of the most highly significant and yet largely intangible benefits achieved by NORAD is the considerable goodwill it generates between the two countries, demonstrating the long-term ability of the United States to live and work harmoniously with a geographical neighbour. It represents a model of cooperation, and the Canada-US border is the world's longest undefended frontier.

Considerable economic benefits arise from the sharing of air-defence technology. Savings can be realized from dividing necessary research tasks between both countries, through efforts "coordinated by NORAD, and then both nations could potentially benefit from the commercialization of such research. Applications include search-and-rescue technology, commercial aviation control, broadcasting, and so forth. Other parts of the Air Defence Initiative[20] that hold commercial promise include rapid information processing and complex systems networking."[21]

Thus, NORAD is one collective-defence arrangement that is very much in Canada's national interests to maintain and nurture. If the command were not continued, other less formal cooperative arrangements might be workable, but they would most certainly be less effective and more costly than the current one. While accounting procedures vary from country to country, NORAD is exceptionally good fiscal value when measured by any economic yardstick. The United States Air National Guard (ANG) is the Department of Defense agency charged with the air defence of the continental United States, a mandate it performs with ten fighter squadrons on an annual budget of US$252 million.[22] Canada contributes roughly C$316 million[23]

Notes

1. Pierre Elliott Trudeau, address to a dinner of the Alberta Liberal Association, Calgary, 12 April 1969.
2. Pierre Elliott Trudeau, "The Strategy of Suffocation," an address delivered in New York, 26 May 1978.
3. Brigadier-General D.W. Bartram, "NORAD Briefing," *National Network News*, 4,1 (1997):27.
4. These command regions are the Canadian NORAD Region (CANR), the Continental United States NORAD Region (CONR), and the Alaskan NORAD Region (ANR).
5. General Joseph W. Ashy, "Testimony to US Senate Armed Services Committee," 23 February 1995, p. 5.
6. Canada, Department of National Defence, *Defence White Paper* (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1994), p. 25.
7. Ibid.
8. Bartram, "NORAD Briefing," p. 28.
9. Ibid., p. 28.
10. *Globe and Mail*, 13 January 1995, p. A3.
11. This Week (editorial), *Defense News* 30 January-5 February 1995, p. 3. (Hereafter cited as Bon editorial.)
12. Specifically, "both sides must have the option to establish and to deploy effective theater missile defense systems. Such activity must not lead to violation or circumvention of the ABM Treaty. Theater missile defense systems may be deployed by each side which (1) will not pose a realistic threat to the strategic nuclear force of the other side and (2) will not be tested to give such systems that capability. Theater missile systems will not be deployed by the sides for use against each other… The scale of deployment — in number and geographic scope — of TMD systems by

18. *Mission - US Element, North America Aerospace Command (USELEMNORAD*). Support the NORAD mission as outlined in the current NORAD agreement and its

4. *NATO: An Alliance Searching for a Raison d'être?*

As a security alliance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's existence was fundamental to the peace and well-being of Western Europe and the transatlantic allies during the Cold War. However, cataclysmic changes have occurred in Europe since 25 December 1991, when the hammer-and-sickle last flew above the Kremlin walls in Moscow. Is the alliance now without purpose, or worse? Is it, in attempting to justify its own existence, recreating a Europe divided into hostile, antagonistic armed camps? The newly articulated policy of membership enlargement has found many zealous supporters, but there are also profound and disturbing questions associated with the policy. The question of enlargement needs to be examined in depth.

Background

In order to appreciate fully NATO's current raison d'être in the emerging international order, it is important to understand the overreaching concept of a united Europe — that is, an indigenous European entity possessing its own "constitution, government, currency, foreign policy and army."[1] Noel Malcolm suggests that the driving force for this united European state originated with a handful of politicians in France and Germany "who decided that a supranational enterprise

within Europe, allowing Germany to "flood member states with its exports" and "giving France an elaborate system of protection for its agriculture." Within the European Union (EU), enormous state subsidies have become common practice, distorting the market in favour of large, established cooperatives, and a "leveling up" process has occurred, in which the standards and costs of industry have been linked to Germany's high levels. These policies damage the economies of poorer countries because high labour costs and industrial products costs are being imposed upon them. Malcolm further argues that this "leveling up" will eventually make European goods uncompetitive on the global market.

> Some of these measures are inspired, no doubt, by concern for the plight of the poorest workers in the Community's southern member states. But the general aim of the policy is clearly to protect the high-labor-cost economies (above all, Germany) from competitors employing cheaper labor. In the short or medium term, this policy will damage the economies of the poorer countries, which will have artificially high labor costs imposed on them. In the long term, it will harm Germany, too, by reducing its incentive to adapt to worldwide competition.

Malcolm views a European parliament as being totally unrealistic, in which *national* politicians will seek to maximize only spending projects that bring benefits to their own countries, and suggests that this is a recipe not only for quantum leaps in spending, but also for extremely muddled policymaking. He then warns that this type of politics fosters growth in political corruption and a revival of nationalist hostilities and sentiments "in a system where power has been taken from national governments and transferred to European bodies in which, by definition, the majority vote will always lie in the hands of foreigners, such nationalist thinking will acquire an undeniable logic."[2] The emerging Eastern European democracies have already grown frustrated by the lack of European markets for their goods, and feel a need to become EU members in order to survive. However, the rules for EU membership are extremely stringent, and are, therefore, at the moment woefully out of reach for these new aspirants. Meanwhile, the established and influential members, such as Germany and France, conversely see the new democracies as rich new markets for themselves.

Notwithstanding the importance of the EU, it is NATO that remains the kingpin of European security. Theoretically now in a mode of cooperation rather than confrontation with its former enemies, these "openings to the east" are embodied in the recently inaugurated Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC),[3] including the former members of the Warsaw Pact and the former Soviet Union, along with the participants in the Partnership for Peace (PfP) — a cooperative military program between NATO and EAPC nations. PfP "is working to expand and intensify political and military cooperation throughout Europe, increase stability, diminish threats to peace, and build strengthened relationships by promoting the spirit of practical cooperation and commitment to democratic principles that underpin the Alliance. It offers participating states the possibility of strengthening

their relations with NATO in accordance with their own individual interests and capabilities."[4] The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) now includes all 54 states of Central, Western, and Eastern Europe, along with the former Soviet Union, the United States, and Canada.[5] It acts as a conflict prevention/resolution agency, particularly within the former Soviet Union, and also as a custodian for core values, such as economic and legal freedoms, and human rights. It is also a self-declared regional security arrangement under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, which actively encourages the establishment of regional security institutions, formally designating NATO as a "peacekeeping and peacemaking arm."[6] The European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI), a French initiative, is

responding to Central and Eastern Europe but ignoring Moscow, or to embrace a collective-security role for the whole of Europe, building on the NACC and in cooperation with the PfP participants, but falling short of NATO membership. “If NATO membership is open to all, how can NATO avoid diluting its capacity for collective defence, but if NATO membership is not open to all, how can it avoid

to join NATO, and consideration for Russia's concerns. Partnership for Peace was thus articulated as a concept at this time by the Pentagon. While this new organization would be formally created by NATO in January 1994, the concept was roundly criticized by powerful and influential opponents at the outset, notably Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski, who both felt that it was an inadequate substitute for enlargement. Also, the Polish American Congress ensured that the White House was bombarded with letters demanding Poland's admission to NATO. Further, the Republicans in Congress found the issue of enlargement a timely vehicle for criticizing the administration's "Russia first" policy.

Meanwhile, in France, reactions to the creation of the NACC had been unenthusiastic. From the outset, the French have been suspicious of American hegemony in Europe and have attempted to develop a distinctively European pillar of defence for Europe, one that would serve as a hedge against future shock, and brusque reversals in US foreign policy.[11] France, therefore, wanted the WEU — not NATO — to be the vehicle of enlargement, citing grave concerns over a watering down of NATO's Article 5 and the resurrection of a bipolar environment in Europe. Furthermore, it did not want to give Russia the pretext of transforming the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) into a competitive, bipolar organization. Defence minister François Léotard was very cryptic in his support of a European security solution: "To knock at NATO's door is to knock at America's, to demand an American guarantee. That may be understandable, but it is not how we see things. We want the demand for security to come to Europe, hence our proposal of association with the WEU."[12]

NATO's Brussels summit of January 1994 established the PfP, seen both to assuage the emerging democracies and enshrine the principle of eventual enlargement eastward, though deadlines for aspiration to future membership were kept vague.[13] PfP and *eventual* enlargement were regarded by France as protracted and low risk, and seemed to hold the promise of a European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI). After this summit, François Mitterrand publicly admitted that the CEE states had the right to join a defensive organization, be it the WEU or NATO. Thus, without public debate or serious study of the issues, the NATO ministers had met and essentially given carte blanche to the emerging democracies for alliance enlargement.

In Canada, this was done without any input from the Special Joint Parliamentary Committee, significant in that the latter constituted a major foreign policy review with the opportunity to present its findings to the government. The committee would ultimately advise *against* supporting enlargement.[14] In the period after the 1994 Brussels summit, the official Canadian position appears to have been to give full backing to enlargement, since reneging on a promise, no matter how ill-advisedly tendered, would appear to constitute unacceptably bad manners of statecraft. However, it should be emphasized that enlargement was still felt by the Canadian and other NATO governments to be a very long-term and low-risk venture, one that was not yet being treated with any degree of concern or urgency by the alliance. That would soon change.

In January 1994, in Prague, Lake urged Clinton to state that the admission of new members to NATO was "no longer a question of whether, but of when and how."[15] That spring, Strobe Talbott, now in the capacity of deputy secretary of state, also commented publicly to this effect. For the benefit of the Republicans in Congress, he tried to blunt the accusation that he was too soft on Russia and thus give the Congressional Republicans cause to use the issue against the president. Essentially contradicting his earlier position, he now declared that he had favoured a gradual enlargement of the alliance right from the outset, but had concerns over what approach should be used. However, the real enlargement catalyst occurred in July, when Clinton visited Warsaw. There he remarked to a journalist that a timetable for NATO membership enlargement was to be formulated, and that Poland was a likely candidate.

This was interpreted by the supporters of enlargement in the administration as the green light for taking concrete steps. Richard Holbrooke, who moved to Washington in September 1994 from Bonn, took up the issue and fostered the discussion. The Defense Department adopted a reserved position. In autumn 1994, these misgivings were taken into account insofar as new members were now expected to be militarily integrated in an appropriate form. A twin-track approach would address the objections of those who feared negative effects on the relationship with Russia. Accordingly, the main aim would be to institutionalize relations between NATO and Russia, for example, in the form of a "Standing Consultative Committee." The about turn of the Clinton administration induced by domestic policy factors came as a surprise for European allies, who had only just adjusted to the PfP.

A Debate over Enlargement Takes Shape

It has been frequently remarked that the Clinton administration does not have a vision with respect to foreign policy, but that is not entirely true. There are certain consistencies, although admittedly there are also glaring inconsistencies. Two common themes have been the president's propensity for playing to domestic constituencies in his foreign policy decisions, and his attempts to open new markets for US industry.[16] However, Clinton's unilateral declaration in Warsaw caught NATO off guard, and appears to have been the starting pistol in a headlong race to enlargement. One reason for Clinton's about face was an attempt to win the votes of Americans whose ethnic roots could be traced to Central Europe. His announcement was s sooEeT* sple,cm 0024 Tc f-af69.5(a)-0.3(rsa)rf guardv at6 Tk.5(Deba)6.1(te)82oJ

> security which we all value as our foremost consideration. But US policies can also serve to open and expand investment opportunities for our products and services, while honoring our commitments to long-term allies, strengthening the ties with our new international partners and promoting our values of democracy, human rights and free markets.… One of the key instruments for advancing these lofty goals is through the US Agency for International Development — USAID.… By the year 2000, four out of five consumers will live in emerging countries. USAID's programs are helping these people become America's next generation of consumers, trading partners and allies.[20]

In fact, ferocious competition between Europe and the US for arms sales could threaten to undermine the military foundation of the alliance, and the concomitant ability of NATO's member states to fight together with compatible weaponry.[21] By mid-April 1997, European NATO members had rallied around a ground-station initial approach to acquire a common airborne ground surveillance (AGS) system for the alliance. If this approach is adopted, it would likely delay a decision on the more expensive airborne portion of the system, allowing the top European competitor time to catch up with the US entry, the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS). "Danish and Dutch officials told *Defense News* their governments are supporting the ground-stations-first option only because they do not want to be pushed into a hasty purchasing decision by Washington."[22]

A cynic could also argue that the whole confrontational dynamic generated by the enlargement issue is nothing more than an attempt to create a definable threat in order to justify a still massive US military infrastructure in general, and the 100,000 soldier commitment to Europe in particular. This may not be so far-fetched, since the Clinton administration has had a great deal of difficulty articulating foreign policy in a world bereft of a cogent, global threat. It is interesting to note that prior to the Warsaw visit, the US public declaration of a position on NATO enlargement was essentially one of indifference. However, the Warsaw declaration, viewed by some as nothing more than partisan politics and an attempt to garner votes by Clinton, dramatically changed the impetus of events in Germany as well. There, by the autumn of 1994, Volker Rühe and Klaus Kinkel were openly at loggerheads over the issue, while Chancellor Kohl generally kept a cautious distance when Rühe staunchly pressed for early enlargement. Kinkel felt that this move would create a new division in Europe, upset Russia, and isolate both Ukraine and the Baltic states. The foreign minister felt that enlargement should be combined with a strengthening of the CSCE and the admittance of new members to the WEU and the EC. With the support of the chancellor, Kinkel included these ideas in agreements the governing parties had to negotiate after the October 1994 federal election. However, "the impact of Kinkel's caution within the federal government was quickly undone by heavy pressure from the Clinton administration."[23]

Bonn quickly decided to back the US perspective, but demanded that Washington accept an "explicit coupling between NATO and EU expansion,"[24] a condition upon which Kohl would later soften. For his part, Rühe seemed to be motivated

by a perceived military vulnerability in Germany's eastern region and a growing disillusionment over Western Europe's ability to take decisive military action on

with considerable disquiet by Moscow, which "emphatically opposed the prospect of a strong military alliance with a potential capability of being directed against Russia advancing to its entire western border."[29]

Germany and France attempted to redress the issue of dependence upon the United States by signing a bilateral agreement on a common defence concept in Nuremberg in December 1996. This brought another interesting dimension to developments, the possibility of German inputs to French nuclear policy. Kohl hastened to qualify that portion of the agreement as pertaining only to "a dialogue over nuclear deterrence in connection with European defense policies … This does not concern possession or having access [to French nuclear weapons]."[30] However, the outspoken Rühe — interviewed on 29 January 1997 by German television — fueled controversy (and perhaps Russian anxiety) by stating that "for the first time, France has signed an agreement in which it gives the priority to the nuclear defence of NATO."[31] In the most basic clause of this agreement, one can sense the fundamental fear of Russia, which still (at least publicly) fuels some NATO actions. With respect to nuclear guarantees, this clause states "that Europe's strategic defence must be guaranteed by NATO, above all, by America. France's own nuclear deterrent, like Britain's, is cast as a supplement, whose role Germany pledges for the first time to discuss with the French."[32]

The arguments in favour of enlargement are well known, but centre around the alliance's ability to promote stability by acting "as a buffer against interstate conflict, intrastate conflict, and social unrest by assisting in the suppression of ethnic disputes and the growth of nationalism, while providing the political, and to a lesser extent, economic assistance required to consolidate democracy, market oriented forces and social stability."[33] In fairness to the proponents of enlargement, the elements of the process, if successfully implemented, will force membership aspirants to: resolve their political differences with neighbouring states prior to joining NATO; rationalize their armed forces, essentially demanding restructuring that emphasizes defensive capabilities and crisis management (i.e., deployment) capabilities; sort out their civil-military relationships; ,7priorv (tion4")]T.28i-andi a2032wcir

the enlargement process is largely being driven by those from whom it has had the most to fear historically.

> Over 70,000 towns and villages were completely laid to waste. Tens of thousands of new industrial projects were totally and irrecoverably destroyed. It can only be estimated how many Russians, soldiers and civilians as well, died on that Eastern Front. It is fairly certain that at least 25 million were killed. All documents point to the fact that nearly 12 percent of the total Soviet population was eliminated.[38]

Though Russia's fears may not be rational, they are profound and deep-rooted.

American scholar Stephen Cimbala notes that Western integration, as viewed by Russians under the present geopolitical circumstances, is not likely to be very transparent. Moscow may well see a darker conspiracy in NATO's actions where none exists. "But Russia's misperceptions of NATO intentions are especially dangerous now, when Russia is militarily weak, democratically insecure, and encumbered by historical *Zeitgeist* of encirclement from north, west, and south."[39]

Part of this lack of understanding on the part of the West is manifested in the roughshod, provocative, and insensitive rhetoric often used by dignitaries when addressing the issue of enlargement. While Western politicians and statesmen have emphasized the need not to humiliate Russia, they have often proceeded to do just that. US secretary of state, Madeleine Albright, appears to have already gone out of her way to assume a confrontational stance with the Russians: "It would not be in our interest to delay or derail enlargement in response to the claims of some Russians that this constitutes an offensive act. Doing so would only encourage the worst political tendencies in Moscow. It would send a message that confrontation with the West pays off."[40] It is not, therefore, surprising that some Russians view Albright with considerable suspicion: "The Moscow press has painted Secretary of State Madeleine Albright 'as a hard-line Cold Warrior determined to keep Russia divided and weak,' ... citing Izvestiya, Rossiyskiye vesti, RIA, and Rossiyskaya Gazeta."[41]

In fairness to NATO and in spite of some alarming inconsistencies in associated rhetoric, the alliance has, by and large, insisted upon a membership-enlargement process and a future *modus operandi* that entails a special and cooperative working relationship with Russia. To that end, the *Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security* between NATO and the Russian federation was signed by President Yeltsin and NATO leaders in Paris on 27 May 1997. This Act "reaffirms the determination of NATO and Russia to give concrete substance to their shared commitment to build a stable, peaceful and undivided Europe, whole and free, to the benefit of all its peoples, and defines the goals and mechanism of consultation, cooperation, joint decision-making and joint action that will constitute the core of the mutual relations between NATO and Russia."[42]

This accord is an encouraging attempt to recognize Russia's importance and to acknowledge its status. Through the Council, Russia will have the opportunity to cooperate with NATO on a wide range of issues, but it *will not* provide Moscow

with a veto, nor will Russia be a full partner of NATO. On the other hand, it will not be shut out of NATO decisions that affect its interests.[43] In the final analysis,

Not that Russian suspicions are inflamed solely by rhetoric and impressions of increasing isolation by the alliance. Russia has a legitimate expectation of respect as a major power, not treatment as a second-class world citizen. These expectations include the honouring of promises made. In an article in 1996, Conrad Namiesniowski argued that it is Moscow's preoccupation with both eighteenth- and nineteenth-century concepts of international balance of power that drives much of the Russian rhetoric with respect to NATO enlargement. The ruling and influ-

and its adjunct missions. Particularly when viewed in the context of the joint and combined operations in Bosnia, PfP has proven able to fill gaps in the inchoate security arrangement in Europe and to soothe the concerns of accession candidates who seek endorsement for their wish to be part of Europe. PfP was the mechanism that facilitated NATO's peace force in Bosnia. PfP has been very effective in achieving a number of its declared objectives. By virtue of enhanced cooperation, the level of transparency to other countries has been greatly increased, and the promotion of interoperability has been markedly successful. This level of interoperability was amply demonstrated in December 1995, with the establishment of the multinational military Implementation Force (IFOR) for Bosnia, under unified command and control and composed of units from both NATO and non-NATO nations, to ensure compliance with the relevant provisions of the Dayton peace agreement. This mission, code-named Operation Joint Endeavour, was NATO-led, under the political direction and control of the North Atlantic Council, and resulted in NATO and PfP forces (including Russia, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Ukraine) working productively and successfully side-by-side in a very complex peacekeeping operation. By 18 February 1996, NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) was able to report the completion of initial IFOR deployment. In all, 32 states had taken part, with approximately 50,000 troops provided by NATO members and 10,000 by others.[57]

In December 1996, it was agreed that a continued international military presence was required in the region, and the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1088, which created a military Stabilization Force (SFOR) to be deployed in Bosnia for an additional 18 months. With an initial strength of 31,000 troops, SFOR would concentrate on stabilizing the environment, deterring or preventing a resumption of hostilities, consolidating IFOR's achievements, and promoting a climate in which the peace process could move forward, as well as providing selective support to civilian organizations.[58] Operation Joint Guard, the SFOR deployment, with just months left in its mandate, has preserved the IFOR achievement but much remains to be done "to create a secure environment for managed refugee returns and for the installation of elected officials in targeted areas, as well as for reconstruction projects."[59] Joint Guard is tangible proof that NATO and PfP forces have the flexibility to be used outside the NATO area for operations directed under the authority of the UN Security Council.

Financial Issues

The alliance has imposed some extremely comprehensive and economically demanding military standardization stipulations for membership, but until very recently NATO has done no comprehensive, realistic cost analysis. This is something that should have been addressed from the outset, particularly given the economic realities of global military downsizing. The most basic questions remain

to be asked, and answered, and this largely appears due to the inability of the alliance's members to agree *specifically* on what should be standardized, beyond vague notions of command and control, search and rescue, air-defence identification, mapping, and logistics. If this illogical sequence of geopolitical problem-solving appears confusing to the lay observer, it is evident as well in the hierarchy of the alliance. Secretary General Javier Solana's remarks to the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London on 19 September 1996 suggest even he is

the costs of enlargement have been produced in, respectively, the United States, the United Kingdom, and by NATO. All are significantly speculative due to the lack of guidance from the alliance itself on specific requirements. The first two (of three) American studies were done by the Rand Corporation and the US Congressional Budget Office, and these put the costs for enlargement over approximately ten years in a very broad range between US$42 billion and US$125 billion. The third American report pegs anticipated enlargement costs at between $27 billion and $35 billion between 1997 and 2009, still not-inconsiderable sums that will have to be shared between existing NATO members and new aspirants. However, the most recent US study needs to be treated with healthy scepticism for a number of reasons:

- the study is an official document prepared by the US administration for the purpose of wooing Congress into supporting NATO enlargement, thus the lower numbers are suspect from the outset;
- the costing figures and the rationale for determining them are vague at best, with even the basic mathematics not standing up to cursory scrutiny;
- the report is not restricted to costing information, but is full of pro-enlargement rhetoric, and the conclusions reached are optimistic at best;
- the analysis is very "US-centric," in that it promotes or touts the American standard as the baseline capability upon which the rest of Europe must model itself, which may well be a rather heavy-handed attempt to legitimize US military marketing downstream; and
- the authors of the report do not commit themselves to stating how many aspirants were being considered for NATO membership, making the funding baseline very suspect.[66]

As mentioned, this report appears to be a "sales pitch" to both the House and the Senate. Approval of the latter will have to be secured prior to overall US approval for new NATO members, by a two-thirds majority. This may prove to be a difficult task, since there are already extremely powerful and influential people in the government vehemently opposed to NATO enlargement, and public debate on the issue is as yet embryonic. Jeremy D. Rosner argues that:

> The first danger sign is that congressional opinion on the issue is still very much in the formative states. In one of the discussions we convened, a group of members of Congress estimated that only five to ten percent of their colleagues had likely thought about the question in great depth. One congressman in our discussion in September said he could not recall which way he had voted on the enlargement resolution in July (he had voted for it). Moreover, participants in these discussions noted that the enlargement resolutions involved only general expressions of support, small amounts of money, and little political risk. They were, in a sense, "free" votes, and some believed that the lopsided tallies on the measures need to be discounted somewhat as a result.[67]

While there is no consensus on enlargement costs in the United States, there are even more divergent opinions on the other side of the Atlantic. The US Department of Defense (DOD) assumes that membership will demand substantial funding from the newcomers for equipment standardization and modernization. Also, the DOD has assumed that NATO will pay for the installation of expensive new command and control links and other common infrastructure elements. "The Report to Congress on Enlargement of NATO said it will cost European allies $12 billion to upgrade their own forces from a posture of static defence to an expeditionary force. That sum does not include another $7 billion the European allies would have to pay into NATO's common infrastructure fund, and a similar contribution of $2 billion from the United States."[68] NATO by contrast has done its own financial study, in which it took a decidedly minimalist approach. This study, made public by Secretary General Solana in Portugal on 29 May 1997, submits that NATO will spend only $5 billion in the first ten years after initial expansion. This figure covers only the direct costs to NATO infrastructure and administrative budgets, and is supported by some but not all NATO members.

Britain is conducting a separate assessment of the costs of expansion, and warns that cost effectiveness will be a major factor in deciding on new members. In Washington, the UK defence secretary, George Robertson, said, "establishing that [it] is not going to be a huge cost is obviously one of the things we in Britain are bothered about."[69]

One of the most tangibly destabilizing effects of the enlargement issue is its potential impact on various arms-control treaties, and concerns for the future of

are in a pathetic state of readiness. This explains why Moscow has rethought its Cold War pledge against first use of nuclear weapons. He said that the declaration "partially (a first-strike concept) connects with the eastward NATO expansion and our (conventional) weakness to stop any serious outside aggression."[72]

This demonstration of divisiveness certainly provides additional grist to the mill of alliance detractors, who maintain that NATO has been in a state of total disarray over the enlargement issue. Furthermore, as the July Madrid summit approached, the rhetoric became more strident and presumptuous from the first tranche countries. The comments of Prime Minister Wodzimierz Cimoszerwicz of Poland to the North Atlantic Council in Brussels on 21 February 1997 provided insight as to Poland's expectations:

> I do not need to conceal that Poland expects to be among nations which in a few months will be invited to begin accession negotiations with NATO. I believe that we have earned the right to openly express this expression. We have earned it through over seven years of intensive efforts to turn Poland into a truly democratic country, to build a working market economy, to base our relations with all our neighbours on the principles of good-neighbourhood and peaceful cooperation, to thoroughly reform our standards. Today, a few months before the Madrid Summit, I am proud to

Yet another potential problem associated with NATO membership enlargement is the further extension of decision by consensus. This process, which often con-

Notes

1. Noel Malcolm, "The Case Against Europe," in *Foreign Affairs Agenda 1996: Critical Issues in Foreign Policy* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1996), p. 147.
2. This and the quotes above are found in ibid., pp. 150, 154, 158.
3. The EAPC, inaugurated at Sintra, Portugal, on 30 May 1997, replaced the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), formed nearly seven years ago, as a forum

the OSCE; developing cooperative military relations with NATO, for the purpose of joint planning, training and exercises in order to strengthen the ability of PfP participants to undertake missions in the fields of peacekeeping, search and rescue, humanitarian operations, and others as may subsequently be agreed; developing, over the longer term, forces that are better able to operate with those of the members of the North Atlantic Alliance." *NATO at a Glance — A Factual Survey of Issues and Challenges Facing the Alliance at the End of the 1990s* (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 1996), p. 33.

14. Paul Buteux, Michel Fortmann, and Pierre Martin, "Canada and the Expansion of NATO: A Study of Élite Attitudes and Public Opinion," in *Will NATO Go East?*, p. 150.

15. Rudolf, "USA and NATO Enlargement," p. 341

22. Brooks Tigner, "Europeans Outmaneuver Americans with AGS Idea," *Defense News* 12,17 (1997):1.
23. Wolf, "Doubtful Mover," p. 204.
24. Ibid.
25. Allen Sens, "United States Security Policy in the 1990s," in *Can America Remain Committed?: U.S. Security Horizons in the 1990s*, ed. David G. Haglund (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), p. 45.
26. Both Kennan and Steel quoted in Stuart, "Symbol and Substance," p. 118.
27. Roman Jakubow, "Canada and Security Concerns in Europe," in *Canada's Strategic Interests in the New Europe*, ed. Jim Hanson and Susan McNish (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1996), p. 35.
28. Study on NATO Enlargement, *PPNN Issue Review*, 10 February 1997, p. 2.
29. Ibid.
30. Giovanni de Briganti, "Franco-German Defense Concept Lacks Substance," *Defense News* 12,5 (1997):26.
31. Ibid., p. 24.
32. *Economist*, 8 February 1997, p. 53.
33. Allen G. Sens, "Saying Yes to Expansion," *International Journal* 50 (Autumn 1995):681.
34. Quoted in Stuart, "Symbol and Substance," p. 136.
35. George F. Kennan, "NATO — A Fateful Error", *New York Times*, 5 February 1997, p. A23.
36. Juliet O'Neill, "Czech PM Wins Canadian Support for NATO Membership Quest," *Ottawa Citizen*, 21 February 1997, p. A7.
37. Alan Freeman, "Hungary Looks to Solidify Identity as Western Nation," *Globe and Mail*, 10 February 1997, p. 24.
38. S.L. Mayer, *The Russian War Machine, 1917-1945* (London: Chartwell, 1977), p. 244.
39. Stephen Cimbala, "Regarding NATO Extension," at sjc2@psu.edu, 2/13/97.
40. Madeleine Albright, "Enlarging NATO — Why Bigger is Better," *Economist*, 15 February 1997, p. 23.
41. J. Michael Waller, "American Foreign Policy Council," *Russia Reform Monitor*, no. 230, 18 February 1997, p. 3.
42. The two signatories pledged to work together to contribute to the establishment in Europe of common and comprehensive security based on allegiance to shared values, commitments and norms of behaviour in the interests of all states, including through the strengthening of the OSCE. Specifically, this means reinforcing its role in preventive diplomacy, conflict prevention, crisis management, post-conflict rehabilitation and regional security cooperation. It clearly reaffirms the subservience of the OSCE as a *regional* security arrangement to the UN Security Council. Relations are to be based on a shared commitment to the following principles: "development, on the basis of transparency, of a strong, stable, enduring and equal partnership and

of cooperation to strengthen security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area; acknowledgment of the vital role that democracy, political pluralism, the rule of law, and respect for human rights and civil liberties and the development of free market economies play in the development of common prosperity and comprehensive security; refraining from the threat or use of force against each other as well as against any other state, its sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence in any

50. "President Clinton has been able to bully the Russians into accepting NATO expansion only because they are too weak even to maintain the rhetoric of obstruction. This, of course, raises the question of why they need to be contained in the first place. All the while, of course, China continues its relentless economic march. …If a great power's potential for trouble is judged on the basis of a combination of its capabilities and intentions, China can only be rated a graver threat than Russia. The United States has virtually no military forces left in the Philippines and has reduced its presence in Japan. Washington diplomats have already begun murmuring that if and when Korean unification takes place, American troops will not be able to stay in Korea, since China will object. Thus if the Clinton Administration's policies are successful, 10 years from now a large, well-equipped American-led force will be in place on the central plains of Europe, fully capable of deterring a paralyzed Russia. Meanwhile, American military power and political influence will have been steadily shrunk in East Asia, the site of the rise of the world's next great power. Perhaps each policy on its own terms might seem plausible, but taken together the two add up to a global grand strategy that is topsy-turvy." Fareed Zakaria, "Let's Get Our Superpowers Straight," *New York Times*, 27 March 1997, p. A21.

51. Ronald D. Asmus and Robert C. Nurick, "NATO Enlargement and the Baltic States," *Survival* 38 (Summer 1996):124.

52. David Briscoe, "Senators Push for Slovenia in NATO," *CNN All Politics*, 12 June 1997, p. 1, http://allpolitics.com/1997/06/12/congress.

53. Jeff Erlich, "Ukraine May Seek NATO Membership," *Defense News* 12,21 (1997):8.

54. "Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Ukraine," *NATO Review* 45 (July-August 1997):5-6.

55. Geoffrey York, "Ukraine to Achieve Full Independence," *Globe and Mail*, 30 May 1997, p. A1.

56. Quoted in Erlich, "Ukraine May Seek NATO Membership," p. 8.

57. NATO/SFOR Fact Sheet, 20 December 1996, scheurwe@hq.NATO.int,12/24/96, p. 3.

58. Canada provided approximately 1,000 troops to IFOR, and an additional 1,200 to SFOR, making the latter Canada's largest peacekeeping commitment, the core of which is an infantry battalion group. "Canada's Largest Peacekeeping Commitment,"

64. Graham Fraser, "Canada Defence Costs to Jump," *Globe and Mail*, 25 February 1997, p. A1.
65. Ibid.
66. US Department of State, "Report to the Congress on the Enlargement of NATO: Rationale, Benefits, Costs and Implications," Washington, 24 February 1997, wdehaar@VNET3.AC.BE, 2/26/97.
67. Jeremy D. Rosner, "Will Congress Back Admitting New Members?" *NATO Review*, January 1997, pp. 12-14.
68. Brooks Tigner, "New NATO Rift Threatens to Erode Support," *Defense News* 12,22 (1997):34.
69. Theresa Hitchens and Charles Miller, "Britain Performs Cost Analysis of NATO Expansion," *Defense News* 12,23 (1997):30.
70. Tigner, "New NATO Rift," p. 34.
71. Michael Gordon, "NATO Deal Could Hurt Russia's Chances for Arms Treaty," *New York Times*, reprinted in the *Victoria Times-Colonist*, 16 May 1997, p. D11.
72. Pyotr Yudin, "Tougher Sergyev Will Face Same Woes as Rodionov," *Defense News* 12,23 (1997):28.
73. Javier Solana, "Shaping NATO for the 21st Century," *NATO Review* 45 (January-February 1997):3.
74. Alan Freeman, "US Position on NATO Rankles European Allies," *Globe and Mail*, 14 June 1997, p. A17.
75. Quoted in ibid.
76. Scheurwe@hq.nato.int 2/21/97.
77. "Hurdles Loom for Reform of NATO's Commands," *Defense News* 12,22 (1997):2.
78. Interview with Capt. (N) E. Lehre, Director of NATO Policy, NDHQ Ottawa, 4 June 1997.

5. *Conclusion: Canada and the Evolving Alliance*

What is Canada's stake in NATO? How important is the alliance to it? It is often claimed that one of the most compelling reasons for Canada's continued support of NATO is its Eurocentrism.[1] But does this remain an accurate reflection of the situation today? When Canada joined the alliance as a founder in 1949, that action was a natural expression of what was then a truly Eurocentric country, based upon disproportionate contributions in two global conflicts, close Commonwealth ties to Britain, a host of trade dealings with the European continent, and what were at the time essentially European demographics of population. However, the demographic nature of the country has changed considerably.

Declining birth rates, coupled with a great deal of immigration from non-European lands, have dramatically changed the ethnic composition of Canada. For example, in 1971, 82 percent of Canadians were of Western European lineage, but by 1991 that figure had dropped to 49 percent. While European immigrants had constituted 46 percent of all arrivals in 1974, they represented only 15 percent of the influx in 1994, Asians constituting 68 percent of the newcomers that year. To take this point even further, close to half of the Canadian population with Western European roots is francophone, a constituency that, in general, has demonstrated no particular or sustained support for European security since Confederation. Furthermore, 70 percent of the Canadian population has been born since 1945, a fact that in its own right is erasing a lot of the collective memory of ties to the European continent.

Economically as well as demographically, the country is changing. With respect to trade and commerce, Canada has long been a North American regional entity, as exemplified by the North American Free Trade Agreement. In fact, Canadian goods and services exported to the United States are 13 times greater than those exported to Europe,[2] while on the other side of the ledger, Canada is embroiled

in significant trade disputes with the EU, particularly over agricultural products. As well, the increasing trade between Canada and the Asia-Pacific region is growing at a rate faster than the Canada-Europe trade, although the economic instabilities that developed in Asia late in 1997 may moderate the tendency for more Canadian trade to occur with that continent.[3]

Nevertheless, support for the alliance remains significant, though recent polls suggest it is far from being widespread. Canadians actually appear to have a rather limited awareness and knowledge about NATO and Canada's role within it, though Canada's membership in the alliance meets with general approval.[4] However, given that only four out of ten could name NATO without prompting, it is highly unlikely that the vast majority of Canadians understand the extremely serious ramifications associated with the extension to additional countries of the Article 5 security guarantees. In another recent survey, Canadians were asked how likely they would be to accept the admission of Eastern European countries into the alliance. Only slightly more than two in five of those polled were in favour (42 percent), nearly as many (38 percent) were neutral about the new admissions, and 14 percent were likely to reject the enlargement initiatives.[5]

Nor do Canada's 1994 defence white paper and downstream departmental planning guidance documents accord NATO operations the high priority they justifiably received during the Cold War years. In fact, the 1996 Canadian Defence Planning Document, the practical policy basis for the planning, programming, and operations of the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces, relegates

overall defence spending, though specific contributions such as the ongoing 1,200-person commitment to SFOR merit noting. Canada ranks sixth and fifth respectively in infrastructure costs contributions and Operations and Maintenance (O&M) spending.[8] It should also be highlighted that these O&M costs do not include those incurred for the defence of North America, such as the annual bill for NORAD and the maritime patrol of sovereign waters, for which both Canada and the United States do not receive adequate recognition in NATO councils. Canada is also the third-largest contributor to the NATO Airborne Early Warning Force (NAEW), which has provided yeoman service in operations ranging from the Persian Gulf War of 1991 to current duties over Bosnia in support of Operation Joint Guard. Certainly Canada is a strong proponent of the crisis management and deployment operations elements of NATO, missions very much in consonance with the country's declared global interests, and in terms of immediate reaction (IR) forces, Canada possesses a degree of credibility enjoyed by very few. In fact, with battalion-size response commitments both to northern Norway and northeastern Turkey, Canada has a more significant deployment commitment than many of the alliance members.

In short, Canada's contributions to the alliance are significant for a country with a substantial debt burden and the attendant need to practice fiscal restraint. It has become apparent that, regardless of which cost-study figures are used, enlargement will imply some cost to Canada and the rest of the current NATO membership. Depending on which cost estimate one uses, Canada's portion would amount to approximately 6 percent of the total, or between $6 million and $59 million a year for 10 years.[9] Naturally, as membership increases further, so too will the incremental costs to Canada. To put the high estimate in practical terms, it equates to an additional purchase for the Air Force of approximately 40 new CF-18 fighter aircraft, a not-inconsiderable investment for *any* country. In terms of potential nonfiscal costs, it may be very difficult for Canadians to rationalize

Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. While this initial expansion may well be a good thing for European security in the long term if handled correctly, in the headlong rush to embrace enlargement members must ensure, through the most stringent scrutiny, that the first tranche fulfill all the mandated prerequisites for membership. This will require ironclad demonstrations of resolve on the part of

efforts in the OSCE."[12] This new forum, working closely with the OSCE, will focus alliance efforts on preventing conflict and shaping common responses to contingency operations, which will occur from time to time. It can build on the work of the NACC by providing an overarching framework for political and security consultations, as well as for enhanced cooperation under PfP.[13]

The success of the partnership has confounded those sceptics who hastily wrote off PfP as a "feeble attempt" to avoid taking tough decisions on NATO enlargement. NATO-led IFOR, involving the active participation of more than a dozen partner states, underscored the validity of a permanent framework for extensive military cooperation with the alliance, and has also served to assuage aspirant members not offered NATO membership as part of the first tranche.

> If the enlargement process is not to undermine the Partnership as a framework for collective military action at "NATO Plus," then some aspects of the programme need to be extended once the selection of candidates begins in earnest. At the same time, cooperation with all partners will have to be deepened substantially. So far as such a deepening could lead to the blurring of the hitherto clear distinction between allies and partners, it is not without risks. However, the importance of an enduring framework of military cooperation for the entire Euro-Atlantic area is great enough to warrant a major evolution in the status and character of the programme. In theatrical terms, PfP is set to move from the understudy of enlargement to its counterpart.[14]

To that end, NATO prepared an advanced version of the partnership, known as PfP Plus, for the Madrid summit. Far from being a consolation prize to enlargement, PfP Plus will probably provide some right of co-decision on "setting general goals for civil-military relations, democratic control of armed forces and defense policy and strategy."[15] It will also be much more specific in setting out objectives for preparation of PfP member armed forces for participation in NATO-led multinational operations, and will delineate conditions for release of classified technical documentation in order "to support the credibility of the envisaged enhancement of PfP."[16] As was the case with PfP itself, the degree and pace of participation

> the idea to establish the Atlantic Partnership Council from the very onset of this initiative. We are eager to work, together with NATO members and Partners, on an early implementation of this initiative. We believe that the Madrid Summit would be a most appropriate forum to launch it. In our view, whatever form the APC eventually assumes, it must provide a rich and diversified menu of both military and political activities, to accommodate the different aspirations and interests of the Partner countries. The diversity of political relations between NATO and its Partners will become a fact of life the very moment Russia and Ukraine — which we hope will join the APC — sign their accords with NATO. We believe that other Partners should also be afforded — in the APC framework — an opportunity to shape their political relations with the Alliance according to their specific needs.[19]

The proposed building upon the success of Partnership for Peace is a very important element. Secretary General Solana recently articulated some ideas for PfP enhancement and reinforcement, which could logically be tailored into the mandate of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. He stated that one of the core elements of PfP is the principle of self-differentiation and that through individual partnership programs (IPPs), the degree of cooperation can be tailored to each country's needs, wishes, and capabilities. However, Solana maintains that enhancing PfP in the political field is a vital initiative, and along with strengthening both dialogue and crisis-management activities, partners need to become more deeply involved in the decisionmaking process in order to gain more individual influence and understanding with respect to specific PfP programs.[20]

Solana has also praised PfP's operations in the area of peace support, as well as related exercise activity and cooperation in training. This element of PfP activities appears to be a good thing, as long as it operates as an *adjunct of* and not a *replacement for* the United Nations. The relative success of both the IFOR and SFOR operations tends to bear this out. However, the peacekeeping element of PfP or a replacement organ needs to be placed within a manageable priority list of activities for the emerging democracies, since such activities can serve as an economic distraction for them if they are not properly managed. Their stability will be secured more quickly and will be more permanent if it is achieved through mutual trade and economic prosperity. In order to help these developing nations along, NATO must not allow them to become heavily burdened with out-of-area operations until they have had a chance to restructure their own national armed forces, and tend properly to their other priority economic needs.

All meritorious initiatives need nurturing, however, and the aforementioned forums are no exception. At present, the EAPC is being viewed as a *parallel* development to NATO membership enlargement. Instead, it should be embraced as a *substitute* for it, with additional expansion of the alliance being shelved indefinitely. Some would argue that this is heresy, since promises have already been made to "second tranche" aspirants. However, the enlargement initiative was an illegitimate birth from the outset, since the planning and approval sequencing has defied all logic and natural order, and it has progressed with seemingly complete disregard for destabilizing consequences. As noted in the previous chapter, George

F. Kennan remarked in late 1996 that the impression was left that NATO would expand right up to Russia's borders. He emphasized that "expanding NATO would be the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-cold-war era."[21]

In many ways, the haste on NATO enlargement is reminiscent of the haste with which German reunification was effected. Though unquestionably an overall success while still in its early stages, many mistakes have also been made, most due to the short-notice collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the former Soviet Union, and the concomitant lack of planning time. No such excuse exists for NATO today. Emerging democracies will be disappointed and may complain if alternatives to enlargement are tabled, but their shift to democratic governance and pluralistic market economies is probably too far advanced for reversal. The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and PfP Plus have the potential to level the playing field among all the emerging democracies, Russia included, and begin again the bridge-building process in Eurasia that has been damaged by the enlargement dialogue

Canada is in a position to provide some credible influence to the enlargement debate as it progresses — through its position as a contributing middle power and a transatlantic member of the alliance that has no serious leadership claim at stake, nor potentially extensive markets for military hardware. There are enough unanswered questions associated with the enlargement initiative to warrant at least a more moderate and reasoned pace of activity. Should NATO continue its impulse in pursuing additional enlargement at any cost, Canada should, at the very least, engage in broad, full-scale public debate to decide if it is still in the Canadian national interests to remain as a full member within the alliance, as opposed to seeking a less-committed member status or even to opt for total withdrawal — an unlikely option and probably not in the country's best interest.

Canada will enter the 21st century with two longstanding collective-defence commitments, of differing importance to it. NORAD is a germane, fiscally responsible undertaking, control of continental airspace being much more effective and efficient when done as a cooperative undertaking. Various areas of mutual interest, such as global warning of ballistic-missile launches, surveillance of space, and research and development of ballistic-missile defence systems represent po-

3. Daryl Copeland, "The Pacific Century: What's in it for Canada?" *Behind the Headlines* 54,3 (1997):2.

4. In one particular survey, seven of ten Canadians reported that Canada's role in NATO is either very important (30 percent) or somewhat important (41 percent). Among Canadians who either had a lot or a fair amount of knowledge on the subject, nearly nine out of ten report that Canada's role in NATO is very important (51 percent) or somewhat important (36 percent). Barbara Waruszynaski, "Canada's Role in NATO and NORAD," in *Defence Matters*, Aug/Sept 1997, at http://www.dnd.Canada/menu/dmatters/public_e.htm

5. Barbara Waruszynaski, "Determining the Canadian Pulse on Defence Matters," in *Defence Matters* 2, 5 (July 1996):15.

6. Canada, Department of National Defence, "Canadian Defence Planning Document," (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1996), p. 1, para 2; p. 3, para 2.1.3.

7. Ibid., p. 4, para 2.1.3.

8. Interview with Capt. (N) E. Lehre, Director of NATO Policy, NDHQ Ottawa, 4 June 1997.

9. Graham Fraser, "Canada's Defence Costs to Jump," *Globe and Mail*, 25 February 1997, p. D7; Brooks Tigner, "U.S. Drops NATO Cost Estimate," *Defense News* 13, 7 (1998):1, 42.

10. "In particular, Canada will seek concerted action with others to influence governments which spend large sums on arms rather than on education and housing for their people. To that end, the Government will offer support for demobilization of military personnel, as well as training for civilian roles such as police activities, in order to assist societies which are committed to reducing military spending and reconstructing civil society." Government of Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Canada in the World* (Ottawa, 1995), p. 33.

11. The financial stability and near-term economic expectations of even the most solvent of the emerging democracies are not that encouraging. Nor has the transition of civil-military relations been smoothly effected; it bears very close downstream scrutiny and further Western assistance in order to ensure success: "The process of establishing civilian control has been further aggravated by a chronic lack of civilian expertise in defence matters and of independent strategic communities in the region. These factors pose a challenge to Western interests in rethinking policies aimed at promoting transparency and civilianisation of defence decision-making in Central Europe.… As the reforms of civil-military relations have been stalled and/or subsequently 'forfeited' to other political considerations, a new wave of Western support focusing on training civilians is urgently required for genuine civilianisation and democratisation of Central European defence policy.… Many of the current reforms in Central Europe are becoming distorted. Establishing truly democratic civil-military relations in Central Europe is clearly at risk in the mid to long term." Réka Szemerkényi, *Central European Civil-Military Reforms At Risk*, Adelphi Paper no. 306 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1996), p. 79.

12. Comments by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, Inaugural Meeting of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, Sintra, Portugal, 30 May 1997, wdehaar@VNET3.VUB.AC.BE, 6/3/97, p. 4.

13. Final communiqué of Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Sintra, Portugal, 29 May 1997, scheurwe@nc3a.NATO.int, 5/29/97, p. 2.
14. Michael Rühle and Nick Williams, "Partnership for Peace after NATO Enlargement," *European Security* 5,4 (1996):527.
15. Brooks Tigner, "Former East Bloc Wants More Say In PfP," *Defense News* 12,13 (1997):4.
16. Ibid., p. 35.
17. Rühle and Williams, "Partnership for Peace after NATO," p. 527.
18. Burger, "Does Canada Support NATO Enlargement?"
19. His Excellency Wodzimierz Cimoszewicz, Prime Minister of the Republic of Poland, Address to the North Atlantic Council, Brussels, 21 February 1997, Scheurwe@hq.nato.int.
20. Javier Solana, "An Open NATO," *NATO Review* 44, 6 (November 1996):15.
21. George F. Kennan, "NATO — A Fateful Error," *New York Times*, 5 February 1997, p. A23.
22. Walter C. Clemens, Jr., "An Alternative to NATO Expansion," *International Journal* 70,2 (1997):357.

David L. Bashow

LCol David L. Bashow is a Canadian Air Force fighter pilot who has held a variety of operational and staff positions during tours of duty in Canada, the United States, and Germany. Since graduating from the University of New Brunswick in 1969, he has served extensively in both NATO and NORAD appointments. David Bashow also graduated with honours from the Canadian Forces Command and Staff College.

Beyond his normal service duties, he has published an extensive number of articles, designed to advance public awareness of Canadian military activities. He has three books on Canadian fighter aviation heritage and history. LCol Bashow was awarded commendations from both the Canadian Forces(1973) and the United States Air Force (1982) for saving aircraft in emergency conditions, and the United States Meritorious Service Medal (1996), for services rendered while at NORAD Headquarters in Colorado Springs.