THE AMERICANIZATION OF PEACEKEEPING

THE AMERICANIZATION OF PEACEKEEPING:
IMPLICATIONS FOR CANADA

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The Martello Papers

The Queen's University Centre for International Relations (QCIR) is pleased to present the seventeenth in its series of security studies, the *Martello Papers*. Taking their name from the distinctive towers built during the nineteenth century to defend Kingston, Ontario, these papers cover a wide range of topics and issues relevant to international strategic relations of today.

Peacekeeping, and the role of both Canada and the United States, has become increasingly more important and controversial. The American determination to "Americanize" UN peacekeeping has profound implications for Canada — a country that has long viewed peacekeeping as the quintessentially Canadian international role. In this *Martello Paper*, Dr. Sokolsky reviews the foreign and security policies of the United States and the impact of these policies on peacekeeping — both for the United Nations and Canada.

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national security policy from the role of Congress to the purposes of the armed forces. The Republicans included criticism of UN peacekeeping in their *Contract With America* and once in the majority in Congress, pressed for funding cut-backs and restrictions on US involvement. They expressed support for the American soldier who was willing to accept a Court Martial rather than wear the UN insignia. In his speech accepting the Republican presidential nomination, Robert Dole assured the American people that "when I am President our men and women in our Armed Forces will know the president is his commander in chief — not Boutros Boutros Ghali, or any other U.N. Secretary General."[5]

Notes

1. Text of president's remarks, *The New York Times*, 28 November 1995, p. A6.

2. *The United States and Peacekeeping: Inertia, Interests and Ideals: US National Security Policy and Multilateralism in the Post-Cold War Era*

American involvement with peacekeeping must be viewed in the context of overall US national security policy and conduct since the end of the Cold War — especially the fact that America did not come home. From the Persian Gulf to Somalia to Haiti and now to Bosnia, the United States has repeatedly used its unassailed military power to intervene in the disorderly world of the new world order. How can this be explained given that, as the world's sole superpower, the United States faces no immediate military threat to its national security?

Three interrelated factors can account for this. First, these interventions are the result of simple superpower inertia. The habits of 50 years are hard to break. No new overarching consensus or organizing principle similar to containment deterrence has emerged to guide Washington in the disorder of the new world order. Meanwhile, the predilection in favour of, and the capability for, intervention remains strong. This is especially the case when other powers and international organizations are unwilling or unable to resolve regional conflicts and turn to Washington for solutions.

Second, the United States does have interests in many parts of the world. Lacking a global challenge, these interests are less vital and more narrowly defined, but they span the globe nonetheless. Moreover, even if individual conflicts do not threaten US economic or military security, a mounting tide of regional instability combined with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction could lead to a general breakdown in world order that would put vital American interests at risk.

Finally, there is the role of American idealism. Inertia and geostrategic interests cannot alone explain American intervention in places like Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia. In attempting to build a domestic consensus in favour of multilateral intervention, both Presidents Bush and Clinton appealed to the deeply-rooted American belief in the uniqueness of the United States and its special responsibility for promoting its ideals around the world. Indeed, Stephen Stedman has complained about the emergence of a new interventionist doctrine driven by moral and humanitarian impulses.[1]

In the media and academic journals, President Clinton and his advisors have been assailed for a lack of consistency, leadership and vision.[2] Because of the administration's early preoccupation with domestic issues and its inexperience, America was allegedly on the verge of losing the "unipolar moment."[3] William Hyland has given the Clinton White House an overall grade of "C," noting that its "dismal" performance would be "enough to warrant a failing grade if it were not

Middle East. During the summer of 1995, Washington assumed a leadership role in Yugoslavia, leading the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in an unprecedented show of force and then bringing about the cease-fire that had thus far eluded the European Community (EC) and United Nations (UN) mediators. By the end of 1995, Washington had brokered a Bosnian peace agreement, which was followed by the deployment of the multinational implementation force under NATO auspices. Richard Ullman has given the president, who "is now awake in class," a grade of "B" and argues that the administration is not being given enough credit for this "late recovery."[10]

The question raised by the plethora of criticisms of the Clinton administration's security policy during its first term is whether, given the current international and domestic realities, strong presidential leadership is possible. Further, will it make a substantive difference in ending the inconsistencies that seem to now attend American national security policy. Is "American defense policy and American leadership in managing international conflicts ... clearly in a state of confusion," as critics in Congress, the media and academe argue, or is it that the public is being lead to believe so by the unrealism of analysts who place too much faith in the ability of Washington to "manage" the disorder of the post-Cold War era?

The character of the domestic environment has only contributed to the difficulty of shaping national security policy. Even before the Republican victory in the 1994 Congressional elections and attempts to carry out the *Contract With America*, the days of "President knows best" in foreign policy and defence were long gone. Without a global threat, and in view of the very tenuous link between US interests and many current conflicts, it takes much lobbying by the White House to obtain Congressional support for any policy or initiative. The present reality is that neither Democrats nor Republicans are prepared to give the Clinton administration the exclusive prerogative of deciding American national security interests. To this extent, Lawrence Korb was perhaps being too optimistic when he argued that: "Unless the candidates for president in 1996 enunciate clearly how and why they plan to deal with conflict in the international system, the confusion and inconsistency will continue." In the run-up to the election, there was little in the way of consensus and a great deal of confusion. Republicans in Congress intensified both their criticisms of the Clinton administration and their efforts to frustrate presidential leadership, particularly since the president had taken the lead by going out on a very shaky limb — the intervention in Bosnia.

Looming behind the Bosnian initiative is Vietnam. Despite the quick and decisive victory in Desert Storm, Americans have not kicked the Vietnam syndrome. As Ronald Spector suggested in his book *After Tet*, "In a world which has recently been made safer for conventional, regional and ethnic wars," Vietnam rather than the Gulf War "may be the pattern of the future."[11] A more vigorous role for the US in dealing with such conflicts, especially those of an internal nature, could lead to the type of quagmire America found itself in in Southeast Asia. As the Somalia experience vividly demonstrated, even the seemingly most selfless of

operations can draw the United States forces into the vortex of the very strife it was supposed to quell, entangling Washington in a series of "savage wars of peace" around the globe.

If US intervention is being viewed through the prism of Vietnam, it is also

advances our values of freedom and democracy and security."[15] As Ullman has observed: "Foreign policy these days is plain hard work. Certainly not in recent decades and arguably not since the early years of the American republic has it been more difficult to formulate and conduct foreign policy."[16]

What seems striking about American interventionism in the post-Cold War era is that given the nature of the international environment, and the domestic scene, it has been as active as it has been. Even before the final collapse of the Soviet Union, Alan Tonelson was arguing that the end of the Cold War would bring about a new version of American isolationism, and predicted "the end of internationalism." The "link between America's well-being and a contented world," previously accepted as a matter of course, was attenuating.[17]

Michael Clough argued that US foreign policy would increasingly respond to the grassroots. The fabled post-World War II foreign policy elite "based in New York, Washington ... and a handful of Eastern seaboard universities," was able "to subdue the isolationist impulses of the hinterland and turn the nation of 'no entangling alliances' into both the world's policeman and its banker," through fear and prosperity. The threat posed by the Soviet Union and the "haunting memory of global depression" were used to "convince the public that it was necessary for the United States to assume the mantle of world leadership," while the "rapid growth and productivity of America's postwar economy convinced them that they could."[18] This is no longer the case. "In the eyes of most Americans the world is no longer so menacing-messy. Bloody and sometimes shockingly brutal yes, but a threat to our security and peace, no."[19]

In his 1992 election campaign Clinton made a direct appeal to the American public's concern with domestic issues, defeating a president whose foreign and defence policy credentials were impeccable. It seemed that US foreign policy would be driven more and more by the domestic economic agenda. In 1993, Christoph Bertram observed that those who "accuse President Bill Clinton of not having a foreign policy," of "inconsistency" and "wavering" over issues such as Somalia and Bosnia "are missing the point." There is a consistent line and it has been there since the beginning: "that there is no longer any distinction between domestic and foreign affairs, that America's international connections must serve America's internal interests and that the primary goal of both is to make America economically competitive again, at home and in the markets of the world."[20] *Engagement and Enlargement* also calls attention to the necessity "to bolster America's economic revitalization," by "promoting prosperity at home." However, while there is little doubt that American foreign policy has placed more emphasis on economic matters, except for the Gulf War, US interventionism in the post-Cold War era has had little to do with dollar diplomacy. Washington has not used its overwhelming military might to blast its way into the markets of the world.

It was unreasonable to expect Americans and their government to simply ignore 50 years of global leadership as if it never happened and retreat into some

mythical era of splendid isolationism. The habits of global leadership are hard to break. This superpower inertia has been reinforced by the nature of both the international and domestic environment and the result has sometimes been US interventions, particularly as a leader of multinational coalitions.

The alleged inconsistency and confusion in Washington is surely not matched by clarity and firm purpose in other world capitals or in the plethora of international organizations that now seem to clutter the diplomatic landscape. There does not appear to be any substantive effort by traditional allies to fill vacuums left by the contraction of American vital interests. In the Gulf War, in Haiti and Somalia, and now in Yugoslavia allies seem willing to await the exercise of American lead-

Despite considerable Congressional opposition, especially after the debacle in Somalia, support for American intervention as part of a UN peacekeeping operation, including the placing of American forces under UN command is surprisingly high. The public is also more willing to support defence spending than it was at the end of the Cold War.[26]

Simply because conditions are favourable for American military intervention when its interests are a risk does not answer the question of what those interests are or when they are sufficiently at risk to warrant the use of armed forces. If the "national interests were clear, then there would be little debate about national security policy. However, in the post-Cold War era the United States is having a difficult time identifying what its "long-run shared interests" are. In part, this accounts for the widely accepted criticism of the Clinton administration. Much of the frustration of now being the world's dominant power, yet being unable to identify which national interests require armed intervention, is being taken out on the current administration.

Nevertheless, it can be argued that a minimal consensus has emerged amongst the public and elites. The sphere of vital US national security interests has been narrowed. American national security policy, however fitfully, has been moving since 1989 in the direction of a more disciplined discretion in foreign and defence policy. Thus, the July 1994 strategic statement notes that "We can and must make the difference through our engagement; but our involvement must be carefully tailored to serve our interests and priorities."[27]

There is general support for the notion that the United States has the "responsibility ... for preventing nuclear war and helping to preserve global stability." There is also an understanding that "a forceful response to regional aggressions, such as Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and its threat to critical oil resources, may still be necessary."[28] America has a long-standing commitment to the security of Israel. The United States still maintains the legitimacy of the Monroe Doctrine and thus the Caribbean, and Central and Latin America will always be of special interest. There are some so-called "rogue" states such as North Korea, Iran, and Libya which pose the threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and/or terrorism.

Yet, in reality, few countries present an immediate or even longer term indirect military threat to American interests and there are fewer areas of the globe where American vital strategic and economic interests are at risk. As a result, the United States now has the luxury of greater choice about when, where, and how it exerts its overwhelming military, diplomatic and, still, economic power. Contrary to what might have been hoped for at the end of the Cold War, this has made decisions about intervention more, not less difficult. As Michael Kramer has observed: "it was easier to justify ... messy interventions during the cold war as part of the ongoing struggle with communism. Today such interventions are a matter of preference rather than need."[29] Many of the inconsistencies associated with the Clinton administration are merely a reflection of the fact that, lacking an overwhelming

engage in combat except in self-defence. These are what may be referred to as "traditional" or "classic" peacekeeping missions.

In theory, these operations are distinguished from those that the Security Council may authorize under Chapter VII of the Charter, "Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression." Article 42 authorizes military measures to "maintain or restore international peace and security." This peace restoration or peace enforcement — as witnessed in Desert Storm — is war, coalition war by another name.

In practice, the last few years have seen operations that fall between Chapters VI and VII. These so-called six-and-half missions have the UN deploying "peacekeeping" forces where there is little or no consent and often no peace to keep. Here the troops find themselves having to assume enforcement duties in order to carry out humanitarian missions. Sometimes this has meant calling upon the support of forces not under UN command when more vigorous military actions are required, in some cases such as UNPROFOR, to protect the peacekeepers themselves.

Another trend is where a coalition of states acts at the request of the Security Council, but not under UN command, to more or less impose a peace, accompanied or followed by a classic UN peacekeeping operation. This was tried in Somalia and now in Haiti. It could be argued that these operations are more properly, and more familiarly called, armed intervention followed by military occupation. For however justified on international legal or humanitarian grounds, the imposition of the will of a group of countries onto another state or faction within that state is foreign armed intervention; and that using military forces to secure a political settlement and maintain internal order is similar to occupation, especially in the way the troops are employed and the duties expected of them — as in now evident in Bosnia.[33] While American troops may have had little experience in the old classic peacekeeping, the United States has had a great deal of Cold War experience in this "new peacekeeping," which explains in part why the UN has

participate." Nevertheless, the DOD Authorizations for FY1996, prohibited "the use of DOD funds to make a financial contribution to pay for any U.S. peacekeeping activity or for any U.S. arrearage to the U.N."[38]

Nearly US$1.2 billion was appropriated in the fall of 1994 covering the period

Headquarters purchased more than US$250 million worth of goods and services from American sources, 36 percent of the total value of all its peacekeeping procurement.[49] The United States is also reimbursed for some of its troop contributions.[50]

As of February 1996 there were 2,399 US military personnel serving with UN missions out of a total of 26,412 in all operations,[51] making the United States one of the largest contributors at that moment even when compared to traditional contributors such as France and Pakistan. Some 1,820 of these were with the UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) and 569 with the UN Preventative Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) in Macedonia.[52] In recent years, the United States has contributed less than 5 percent of the UN peacekeeping troops.

On the surface, the funding and troop contribution figures seem to support the view that the United States is not bearing its fair share of the burden for UN peacekeeping. However, these figures do not take into account the extensive land, sea, and air forces, as well as intelligence support, which Washington has provided United Nations peacekeeping indirectly. There are also the direct involvement of US forces in operations sanctioned by the UN Security Council. In general, funding for these operations is provided through the Department of Defense budget and is separate from the peacekeeping assessment payments made through the State Department.

During 1995, nearly 5,800 US personnel were involved in enforcing the No-Fly zone over Yugoslavia in support of UNPROFOR. Other, (unseen, especially by Congress) US personel were assisting UNPROFOR as NATO headquarters units dispatched to assist the UN operation. That same year, 9,000 were deployed to provide protection for the withdrawal of UN forces from Somalia. Some 16,400 personnel were still involved in enforcing the No-Fly zones and embargo directed at Iraq and providing humanitarian assistance to the Kurds. With UN authorization, 6,000 US troops deployed to Haiti prior to the establishment of the UNMIH. According to a study by the Stimson Center, if the US assessment were calculated on the basis of all direct and indirect support for the UN (as many in Congress wanted to do) "the U.N. would probably owe money to the United States."[53]

Indeed, a March 1996 General Accounting Office Study completed for then Senate Majority Leader Robert Dole, concluded that: "From fiscal years 1992 through 1995, the incremental cost reported by U.S. government agencies for support of U.N. peace operations in Haiti, the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Somalia was over $6.6 billion dollars." Included in this amount is the expenditures for the US share of UN peacekeeping assessments, humanitarian and related assistance, and the cost of participation by the US military. Some $3.4 billion or 51.2 percent was borne by DOD.[54] The United Nations had reimbursed the United States for only $79.4 million of this amount.[55]

Another argument put forth in Congress for deducting at least part of the additional costs borne by the United States from assessments is that much of the assessment funds paid to the UN are used to reimburse major contributing nations

such as the United Kingdom, France, and other better-off Western countries. Some Americans contend that these nations should be assuming more of the burden for maintaining global stability, especially where individual conflicts, such as in Bosnia, are in their regions.

During its first term, the Clinton administration was largely successful in blocking Congressional efforts to include indirect support in calculating US payments to the UN for peacekeeping. The administration has argued that the US "participates in operations to enforce sanctions, provide humanitarian relief and assist

The latter have become more concerned as peacekeeping has started to look a lot like the interventions of the Cold War. Indeed, in 1994, then Senate Minority Leader Robert Dole, (in an interesting theatrical twist on the "War Powers Act"), sponsored a "Peace Powers Act of 1994" to limit the ability of the president to contribute US troops to peacekeeping operations.[57] But participation in peacekeeping is one of those grey areas where the law and the Constitution provide no clear guidance.

Section 7 of the *United Nations Participation Act* (UNPA) of 1945, as amended (PL 79-264) authorizes the president to provide up to 1,000 US service personnel as "observers, guards or in any non-combatant capacity." Prior to the early 1990s, the United States provided goods and services to UN peacekeeping operations and some military personnel, but in small units or individually. However, the UNPA does not constrain the level of US participation in operations authorized under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.[58] Moreover, presidents have also used Section 682 of the *Foreign Assistance Act* of 1961, which allows US military personnel to be detailed or sent to provide "technical, scientific or professional advice or service to any international organization."[59] Most importantly, all presidents have claimed the right as commander in chief to dispatch as many American troops to UN operations as may be necessary.

If it were only a matter of contributing forces to classic UN peacekeeping operations, then the authority of the president might not be seriously questioned. However, as noted below, the United States has been dispatching large numbers of combat forces in support of Security Council resolutions. Here the question of war powers becomes more difficult, since these forces may be expected to engage in hostile actions.

Some US scholars have argued that presidential authority to support the UN in any way derives from the fact that the United States is bound by the UN Charter which it signed and which, as a treaty, becomes the law of the land under the American Constitution. They contend that the Congressional power to declare war and the *War Powers Act*

United Nations or NATO is at stake, is not enough to override the checks and balances of the Constitution.[61]

William Van Alstyne offers a middle ground. His view is that presidents may send US forces to participate in UN and other multilateral operations. However, if it is expected that these forces are likely to be met with armed resistance and become involved in sustained hostile belligerent action, then the president must seek Congressional approval.[62]

In the absence of a conclusive resolution of the Constitutional issue, Congress has tried repeatedly to restrict the ability of the president to support UN operations and to require greater consultation with the legislative branch. For example, a recent House of Representatives resolution called for a restriction of funds for new or expanded operations unless the designated House and Senate committees were notified at least 15 days in advance, "or as emergency conditions permit," of a vote in the Security Council. The president would also have to notify Congress of the source of funding, the length of the mission, what "vital" national interests were at stake and of the "exit strategy." In addition, the resolution noted that the president would have to certify that American businesses where being given opportunities for procurement by the United Nations "equal to those being given to foreign manufacturers and suppliers."[63]

While implicitly acknowledging that the president has the authority to dispatch US troops to UN operations, Congress has nonetheless tried to impose conditions on deployment, particularly with regard to command and control of American forces. Thus, on 1 May 1996, the House National Security Committee approved *The United States Forces Protection Act* of 1966. Overall, the bill sought to bar the use of DOD funds for placement of US armed forces under the operational or tactical control of the United Nations. This prohibition, which would not have applied to then current operations, could be waived if the president certified that the deployment was vital in the national interest. But the president would have been required also to certify, "the extent to which the United States forces will rely on the forces of other countries for security and defense and an assessment of the capability of those other forces to provide adequate security to the United States forces involved." In an emergency, the president could place US forces under UN control before meeting the certification requirement.[64]

Responding to the incident when a US soldier accepted a Court Martial rather than wear the UN insignia, a provision of the bill would have required the certification to Congress on the extent to which United States forces involved in UN activities "will be required to wear, as part of their uniform, any badge, symbol, helmet, headgear or other visible indicia or insignia that indicates affiliation to or with the United Nations."[65]

Ostensibly, these and similar proposals are meant to address Congressional concerns about the command and control of US forces. As one Republican member noted, the United Nations has not proven itself to be a "first class, professional

military organization. By contrast the armed forces of the United States are the best in the world. Under the circumstances, any President ought to have to justify the subordination of U.S. troops to a U.N. commander."[66]

Yet, the underlying motive is one of asserting a greater measure of Congressional control over American participation in UN operations. Despite provisions that provide the president with the ability to override them in an emergency, many of these proposals are viewed even in Congress as straying too far into the presidential powers over foreign and defence policy as commander-in-chief and were dropped as the legislation moved through Congress. Clinton has repeatedly rejected and even vetoed similar measures that would impose legislative restrictions on the president's ability to participate in UN operations. But these moves reflect the continuing tension over presidential prerogatives with regard to peacekeeping and the Clinton White House has been compelled to adjust to Congressional concerns.

UN Peacekeeping: A "Tool" of US Foreign Policy

It is not money, the size of troop contributions, or the constitutionality of US participation that are central to an understanding of American involvement in UN peacekeeping. For it is not so much that Washington does or does not support UN peacekeeping, but that it is selective in its support, providing more funding and assistance to those missions most closely aligned with American interests such as the Middle East. In this, the Clinton administration's approach has not been substantially different from its predecessors' which have long viewed UN peacekeeping as a useful "tool" for promotion of American interests and values abroad.

From 1945 until 1989, the United Nations mounted 18 peacekeeping operations costing nearly $4.8 billion; the United States contributed more than $1.3 billion. During the Cold War, Washington sometimes used peacekeeping to fill a political vacuum and prevent Soviet intervention, to cool any conflicts between allies, to monitor agreements negotiated by US officials, and to serve "U.S. foreign policy goals of the moment."[67] In the climate of the Cold War American troops did not participate directly in these missions in large numbers. Although individual American military personel did take part, beginning with the earliest observer missions in the late 1940s. To this extent the 1,000 troop limit of the *United Nations Participation Act* was not significant, since relatively few US military were involved. But in addition to diplomatic and financial support, the United States supplied logistic support, lift, communications, and intelligence to UN peacekeeping operations.

Nevertheless, UN peacekeeping remained marginal to American global security relations; and between 1978 and 1988 no new missions were mounted. The United Nations in general fell into great disfavour with the Reagan administration as it appeared that the Soviets and Third World nations were using it as a tool

directed against American interests.[68] Significantly, the peacekeeping force which deployed into the Sinai following the US-brokered Camp David Accords, was the non-UN Multilateral Force and Observers.

But with the decline and fall of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, and with the success of the Gulf War, the United States found that the United Nations could again serve American foreign policy interests. President Bush "argued for a more activist role for the United Nations and pushed to pay U.S. dues. He viewed the institution as capable of supporting American interests." [69]

the stronger side win which "is often the most effective option" and "in fact the option the international community has traditionally taken."[72]

But in seeking to use peacekeeping has a tool of American foreign policy, the United States has been concerned with more than its own national interests. In 1992, Ronald Reagan called for a standing UN force supported by the US. This "Army of Conscience," according to Reagan, would be tasked with carving out humanitarian sanctuaries in failed or oppressive states, by force if necessary.[73] In sending forces into Somalia, President Bush was acting in response to humanitarian concerns that had been aroused by media attention to the human suffering in the region. In Yugoslavia each new shelling of a marketplace increased calls for action on the part of Washington.

Yet, with Somalia and the Yugoslavian nightmare, support for traditional peacekeeping also began to erode, certainly within Congress. The United Nations was criticized for its poor financial management and bloated bureaucracies. Blame

The Clinton Administration and PDD-25

In line with the new "pragmatic internationalism," the White Paper set out to review peacekeeping while at the same time sustain domestic support for it by asserting a new leadership role for America in the United Nations in order to make peacekeeping more responsive to American concerns and interests. Such was the advice of former Reagan administration assistance secretary of defense, Richard Armitage, who argued in early 1994 that instead of lecturing the UN and saying "no," the United States had to "bend the UN to our will." Washington had to "make the UN work in accordance with its Charter and in a manner consistent with our national interests." Specifically with regard to peacekeeping, the issue was not whether US forces would participate, but — by exercising US leadership — ensure that "no U.N. peacekeeping operation anywhere should go forward without our explicit approval and guidance."[77]

In May 1994, the White House issued Presidential Decision Directive 25, (PDD-25), *U.S. Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations*. [78] As characterized by Ivo Daalder, the review that led to PDD-25 was a matter of "knowing when to say no." The document

> extended, but did not radically alter the conclusion reached late in the Bush administration. Rather than expanding and strengthening what had initially been portrayed as an essential element of U.S. security policy in the Post-ColdWar era, the objective of the new policy was to promote a "more selective and effective" approach to multilateral peace operations. In public explanations of the new policy, administration officials stressed that UN peace operations were but a limited, though sometimes useful tool, of U.S. foreign policy and that the circumstances under which the United States would participate in such operations would be guided by strict conditions designed to reduce the risk to American forces.[79]

Then American Ambassador to the UN, Madeleine Albright, told a Senate Committee after PDD-25 was released that "Over the past year we have become acutely conscious, both of the value and the limits of U.N. peacekeeping.... We see it as a contributor to, not a centrepiece of, our national security strategy." UN peacekeeping can help prevent or defuse breaches of the peace, "lend legitimacy to efforts to resolve disputes," reduce "unwelcomed interventions by regional powers," and "ensure that the cost and risks of maintaining world order fall less disproportionately upon the United States."

However, Albright also stressed that, "The U.N. has not yet shown a capacity to respond decisively when the risk of combat is high and the level of local cooperation is low. The U.N.'s impartiality can be a key to diplomatic credibility, but is of less help when military credibility is what is required. The U.N.'s resources have been stretched thin. So peacekeeping is no substitute for vigorous alliances and a strong national defense."[80]

In PDD-25, the United States offered assistance for reform and strengthening of the UN's management of peacekeeping operations. At the same time, it confirmed that Washington would seek to reduce the US share of peacekeeping to 25 percent. It also imposed stricter criteria for US support of new peacekeeping operations. While reaffirming the availability of US troops, PDD-25 noted that the greater the anticipated US military role, "the less likely it will be that the U.S. will agree to have a U.N. commander exercise overall operational control over U.S. forces." And any large-scale peace enforcement involving combat "would ordinarily be conducted under U.S. command and operational control or through competent regional organizations such as NATO or ad hoc coalitions."[81] As one National Security Council staff member explained, the meaning of PDD-25: "When force must be used against those who seek war, it is unlikely that America will rely on the United Nations."[82]

The Clinton administration has applied the PDD-25 guidelines, withholding approval for some new operations and the expansion of others because of a scarcity of UN resources, ill-defined mandates, or a lack of progress toward a settlement. When the conflict in Rwanda escalated to genocide there was a delay in the UN response which some critics blamed on the American "hesitancy to endorse the mission or commit troops to the operation."[83] The same hesitancy and desire to subject UN plans to close scrutiny was evident in the American response to Canada's Zaire initiative in late 1996.

Since PDD-25, UN peacekeeping has declined recently, due in part to US policy and the ending of UNPROFOR and because the rapid and extensive expansion of missions in the immediate post-World War era now appears as an anomaly. By mid-1996 there were 14 missions with a total personnel of 26,000, down from the 70,000 of previous years.[84] This is to be compared with the nearly tenfold increase from approximately 8,000 to 80,000 troops in the early 1990s.[85]

At the same time, Washington assumed a direct leadership role in Haiti, intervening to remove the junta and supported the establishment of a follow-on UN peacekeeping mission. In Bosnia, with the credibility of NATO at stake, the Clinton administration took advantage of the Croatian victories in the summer of 1995 and the weakening of the Bosnian Serb position to mount a NATO air campaign in support of Washington's diplomatic initiatives and then brokered a settlement now backed up by the NATO force. Yet, consistent with PDD-25, the United Nations and other multinational agencies continued to operate in the former Yugoslavia, with a new traditional peacekeeping operation in Slovenia and Croatia as well as a new International Police Task Force. And the United States is supporting and participating in a range of initiatives including the rebuilding infastructure and a host of civic programs.

The Clinton administration has placed a high priority on "improving the way the UN does business." It promoted the appointment of an American as undersecretary general for administration and management. It supported the expansion and reorganization of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO),

(USACOM) which, as the "joint force integrator" has the responsibility to prepare and dispatch forces abroad, was specifically tasked with supporting peacekeeping operations.[94] At Fort Polk soldiers train in "simulated peace operations," at the Joint Readiness Training Center. Also used for training is the Combined Arms Manoeuvring Center in Europe. The Clinton administration has especially encouraged Partnership for Peace (PfP) nations to train for peacekeeping operations and in October 1995 US and Russian troops held a joint peacekeeping exercise in the United States.

At the US Army War College a Peacekeeping Institute (PKI) was established in 1993. Staffed by serving and retired officers with peacekeeping experience, the PKI has been involved in preparing US forces for peacekeeping duties, participating in the planning and sending of staff out to brief units prior to deployment.

An Eclectic Policy

The United States has adopted an eclectic, multifaceted approach to UN operations reflecting the uncertainties of the post-Cold War era, the ambiguity of contemporary peacekeeping and, perhaps above all, the unavoidable complexities of American foreign policy.

Nowhere was this often changeable and confusing approach to UN peacekeeping more evident than in the case of Yugoslavia. The Clinton administration supported UNPROFOR by various direct and indirect means, particularly through NATO where US personnel participated in supplying air cover and also helped to operate allied headquarters units assisting the UN. Then there was Operation *Sharp Guard*, the multilateral naval effort to stop the flow of arms into the former Yugoslavia — an effort which the Clinton administration supported and in which US forces initially participated. From 22 November 1992 to 11 January 1996, 66,272 ships were challenged, 5,084 were boarded and inspected, and 1,415 were diverted and inspected in port.

Finally, the Bosnian experience points to the double-edged nature of multilateralism peacekeeping as a political legitimizing tool for the United States. Securing the cooperation of a wide range of countries can enhance the acceptability of US intervention in the eyes of the international community. This "appearance" of broad support is also important if the administration is to secure the backing of the American people and especially of Congress. However, to be fully legitimate in the domestic context, multilateralism must also mean acceptance of US command in the field and policy objectives at the negotiating table by the contributing nations. This was why President Clinton was prepared to offer only limited sup-

more than our size, our wealth and our military might, that makes America a uniquely trusted nation."[102]

The president is not without a measure of domestic support for his approach. As noted above, while public opinion polls show that the American public is wary of foreign entanglements, support for continued American global leadership, particularly at the UN remains surprisingly high. In an April 1995 survey, 89 percent agreed that "when there is a problem in the world that requires the use of military force, it is generally best for the U.S. to address the problem together with other nations working through the U.N. rather than going it alone."[103]

The Clinton administration has been, nevertheless, aware that long-term public and especially Congressional support is dependent upon a change at the UN and an overall reduction in American obligations. It has proposed a "grand bargain," whereby the United States pays off its debt over a five-year period in exchange for the implementation of reform. In the late spring of 1996, administration officials were pointing out that progress had been made. Speaking to a forum sponsored by the United Nations Association of the United States, Richard Clark, Director of Global Affairs for the National Security Council, noted that, "in the past three years, the U.N. Security Council has attempted to control the rapid growth of peacekeeping and has established criteria for evaluating when to start and, as importantly, when to stop peacekeeping operations." During the same meeting Ambassador Albright observed that the changing nature of peacekeeping had led to "an evolution in thinking ... about what was doable," and that these lessons had "been absorbed by the international community." And Vice President Gore, "predicting an increasing debate over US/UN command and control relationships," declared that, "the chain of command is a hallowed line that runs from the President to every serviceman and servicewoman in every unit everywhere in the world, including those who are assigned to service in U.N."[104]

These apprehensions are not without foundation. Member nations must be pre-

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6. Lawrence Korb, "U.S. Defense Policy and the Management of International Conflicts," in *America's Quest for a New Contract with the World*, ed. Charles-Phillipe David and Onnig Beylerian, Notes De Recherches, 4 (Montreal: Centre d'études politiques étranger et de securité, Université du Québec à Montréal, 1995) pp. 49, 56-57. See also, Joel J. Sokolsky, "Comments on Lawrence J. Korb's Paper" in ibid, pp. 59-65.
7. United States, White House, *A National Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1994), p. 1.
8. Anthony Lake, "Confronting Backlash States," *Foreign Affairs* 73 (March/April 1994):45-55.
9. See Stanley Hoffmann, "The Crisis of Liberal Internationalism," *Foreign Policy* 98 (Spring 1995):159-77.
10. Richard H. Ullman, "A Late Recovery," *Foreign Policy* 101 (Winter 1995/96):75-80.
11. Ronald H. Spector, *After Tet: The Bloodiest Year in Vietnam* (New York: Free Press, 1993), pp. 315-16.
12. Victoria Holt, *Briefing Book on Peacekeeping: The U.S. Role in United Nations Peace Operations* (Washington, DC: Council for a Livable World Education Fund, 1994), p.14.
13. John E. Rielly, "The Public Mood at Mid-Decade," *Foreign Policy* 98 (Spring 1995):77, 87.
14. Barry Blechman, "The Intervention Dilemma," *The Washington Quarterly*, 18 (Summer 1985):63, 66.
15. Todd Purdum, "Clinton Cautions Against a Retreat into Isolationism," *The New York Times*, 7 October 1995, p.1.
16. Ullman, "A Late Recovery," p.76.
17. Alan Tonelson, "The End of Internationalism," *New Republic*, 13 February 1989.
18. Michael Clough, "Grass-Roots Policymaking: Say Good-Bye to the 'Wise Men'," *Foreign Affairs* 73 (January/February 1994):3.
19. Ibid., p. 4.
20. Christoph Bertram, "There is a Foreign Policy," *International Herald Tribune*, 17 November 1993, p. 6.
21. Mandelbaum, "Foreign Policy as Social Work," p. 2.
22. Charles Maynes, "Relearning Intervention," *Foreign Policy* 98 (Spring 1995), (*Information Access* reprint), p. 1.
23. Krauthammer, "Unipolar Moment."
24. Jonathan Clark, "Leaders and Followers," *Foreign Policy* 101 (Winter 1995/96):49.
25. Rielly, "The Public Mood," p. 76.

26. Rielly, "The Public Mood," p. 77. See also, Steven Kull, "What the Public Knows that Washington Doesn't," *Foreign Policy* 101 (Winter 1995-96):104-6.
27. White House, *A National Strategy*, p. 1.
28. Jonathan T. Howe, "The United States in Somalia: The Limits of Involvement," *The Washington Quarterly* 18 (Summer 1995), (*Information Access* reprint), p. 1.
29. Michael Kramer, "In Search of the Clinton Doctrine," *Time*, 11 October 1993, p. 33.
30. Rielly, "The Public Mood," p. 86.
31. Howe, "The United States in Somalia," p. 1.
32. Rielly, "The Public Mood," p. 81.
33. The analogy with occupation forces was suggested by Dr. William Durch of the Stimson Center, interview, 11 March 1996, Washington, DC.
34. United States, Government Accounting Office, (GAO), *United Nations: How Assessed Contributions for Peacekeeping Operations are Calculated* GAO/NSID-94-206 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1994), pp. 11-16.
35. Victoria Holt, *Briefing Book on Peacekeeping*, p. 15.
36. Marjorie Ann Browne, "United Nations Peacekeeping: Issues for Congress," *CRS Issue Brief* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 16 February 1996), p. 8.
37. Nina M. Serafino, "Peacekeeping: Issues of U.S. Military Involvement," *CRS Issue Brief* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 15 February 1996), p. 9.
38. Ibid.
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41. Purdum, "Clinton Cautions Against a Retreat into Isolationism," p. 5.
42. *Washington Weekly Report* 22 (19 January 1996), p. 4.
43. Ibid. (26 February 1996), p. 5.
44. Ibid. (9 February 1996), p. 3.
45. Ibid., p. 2; ibid (26 January 1996), pp. 4-5,
46. Ibid. (19 April 1996), p. 1.
47. Ibid. (29 April 1996), p. 1.
48. "UN OKs Slashing Peacekeeping Budget," *Herald Sun*, Durham, NC, 8 June 1996, p. 2.
49. United States, Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on Coalition Defense and Reinforcing Forces, Hearing, *United Nations Peace Operations* (S.Hrg. 103-772)(Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1994), p. 7.
50. White House, *A Time for Peace*, pp. 48-55.

1994), p.i. The members of Congress were: Senator Nancy Kassenbaum (R), Member, Senate Foreign Relations Committee; Representative Lee Hamilton (D), Member, Senate Armed Services Committee; and Representative Harold Rogers (R), Ranking Minority House Member, House Appropriations Committee.

72. Maynes, "Relearning Intervention," p. 8.

73. UN Ambassador Madeleine Albright ensured that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was aware of this in October 1993, during testimony given after the deaths of several American servicemen in Somalia. See *Department of State Dispatch* 4, 46.

74. As John Ruggie notes, the only US troops that were ever under direct operational control of the UN in Somalia was a 3,000-strong logistic component. The Quick Reaction Force (QRF) remained under the command of the Commander-in-Chief, Central Command, "although for the raids on Mohamed Farah Aideed, the QRF come under the "temporary tactical control" of US Major General Montgomery who also served as deputy UN Commander to Lt. General Bir, the Turkish general commanding the UN operation. But the Army Rangers "remained entirely under the direct command of Special Operations in Florida, by-passing both the U.N. Command and control structure and General Montgomery, even in his U.S. role." Neither Montgomery nor Bir were informed of the ill-fated Ranger raid of 3 October 1993 until it was underway. This made it difficult for other peacekeepers to come to the Ranger's assistance. "In short, having U.S. troops in Somalia serve under U.S. command amid a U.N. operation whose own command and control structure was already cumbersome and tangled manifestly contributed to the problem." See John Gerard Ruggie, "Peacekeeping and U.S. Interests," *The Washington Quarterly* 17 (Autumn 1994):181-82.

75. Ibid., p. 175.

76. Donald J. Puchala, "Outsiders, Insiders and U.N. Reform, *The Washington Quarterly* 17 (Autumn 1994):171-72.

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78. United States, White House, Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25), *The U.S. Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations* (unclassified version) (Washington, DC: 6 May 1994).

79. Ivo H. Daalder, "Knowing When to Say No: The Development of U.S. Peacekeeping Policy in the 1990s," *UN Peacekeeping, American Policy and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s*, ed. William Durch (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996).

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82. Holt, *Briefing Book on Peacekeeping*, p. 26.

83. Ibid., pp.18-19.

84. "UN OKs Slashing Peacekeeping Budget."

85. *Washington Weekly Report* 22 (14 June 1996), p. 4.

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95. Interview with Mark Walsh, U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute, Carlisle, Pennsylvania, 22 July 1996.
96. Robert D. Warrington, "The Helmets May Be Blue, but the Blood's Still Red: The Dilemma of U.S. Participation in UN Peace Operations," *Comparative Strategy* 14 (1995):23-34.
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98. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO/SFOR: Fact Sheet CIMIC 20 December, 1996.
99. "NATO/WEU Operation Sharp Guard," *NATO FACT Sheet* 15 January 1996.
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101. Ibid., p. 3.
102. *The New York Times*, 28 November 1995, p. A6.
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3. *Canadian Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era*

Trends in Canadian Defence Policy

Throughout the Cold War, Canadian national security policy rested upon four broad roles: support for NATO; collaboration with the United States in the defence of North America, especially through the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD); national tasks such as sovereignty protection; and peacekeeping. While governments often stress the latter two roles for domestic purposes, the posture and weapons procurement decisions are primarily driven by NATO and NORAD.

A January 1995 government statement by Ottawa emphasized that "direct threats to Canada's territory are diminished" and that future challenges to Canadian security are increasingly likely to be of a nonmilitary nature, that is: economic, environmental and demographic.[1] Drastic cuts have been made to the Canadian forces. By the end of the decade the regular force will drop to 60,000.

Although the NORAD agreement was be renewed in 1996, North American security collaboration — its aerospace and maritime dimensions already a pale reflection of its Cold War manifestations — is likely to slip from marginality to obscurity. With regard to Canada's role in NATO, the Cold War was scarcely over when the Canadian government announced in 1991 that the country's two military bases in Europe, both located in Germany, would be closed and that the Canadian military presence in Europe would be reduced to a token force of 1,100 — to be stationed at a British or US base. A year later, Ottawa abandoned even this political symbolism. Canada's two fighter squadrons and armoured brigade group would be brought home.

Nevertheless, the *1994 Defence White Paper* states that Canada will maintain "multi-purpose, combat capable armed forces able to meet the challenges to

Canada's security both at home and abroad."[2] It will continue to supply naval forces to the alliance, crews for the NATO Airborne Warning and Control aircraft and individual personnel for various allied staff positions. And it will retain in Canada air and ground forces which could be sent to Europe. Despite overall force reductions, some 3,000 personnel will be added to the land forces. In the event of a major overseas contingency, Ottawa would be prepared to send land, sea, and air forces simultaneously and "this could conceivably involve in the order of 10,000 military personnel."[3]

But this reconfiguration entails an even greater Canadian retreat from European defence than many realized. The White Paper does not earmark these potential expeditionary forces for NATO alone. Rather it states that they will be available for contributions to international security in general "within a UN framework, through NATO, or in coalitions of like-minded countries." As the White Paper acknowledges, a major crisis in Europe might find the very hard-pressed and undermanned Canadian forces deployed elsewhere requiring difficult and protracted redeployments.[4]

As the two central elements of the bilateral defence relationship — North American and NATO — diminish, attention is increasingly focused upon Canada-United States security links "out of area." Here there are two broad dimensions to collaboration, regional security arrangements, including ad hoc coalitions formed under US leadership, and United Nations peacekeeping operations. During the Cold War, Canada had very little involvement in American-led regional security efforts. Ottawa did not even join the Organization of American States (OAS) until 1989. Nor did Canada participate in any limited wars or interventions between the Korean War and the Gulf War.

There was, however, an implicit and sometimes explicit collaboration between Canada and the United States in the realm of UN peacekeeping and outside the UN, such as in the case of the MFO in the Sinai. This was based on a compatibility between Canada's desire to use peacekeeping partly as a way to project a more independent identity externally and US national security interests. While Canadians often viewed peacekeeping as a neutral activity in the context of the dominant East-West struggle, Washington welcomed and appreciated Canada's participation precisely because Ottawa was a loyal Western ally.[5]

Since the end of the Cold War the United States and Canada have collaborated in a range of multilateral operations from the peace enforcement of the Gulf War to efforts at peacekeeping in Somalia and Haiti. But it is premature to conclude

through the U.N., through NATO, through a coalition, through a combination of these tools or we may act alone. We will do whatever is necessary to defend the vital interests of the United States."[6]

For Canada, multilateralism has always been viewed as an attractive means to achieve broad foreign policy objectives. Under the current government, the prime Canadian interest abroad is economic, to promote trade and multilateral regimes favourable to its vulnerable, open economy. As one moves away from concrete matters of dollars and cents, Canadian internationalism tends to lack specific focus and simply equates Canada's well-being with broad global stability and the belief that Canadians should help the international community foster that stability. As a recent parliamentary review of foreign policy concluded:

> foreign policy matters to Canadians. They have deep-rooted values that they carry over into the role they want Canada to play—nurturing dialogue and compromise; promoting democracy, human rights, economic and social justice; caring for the environment; safeguarding peace; and easing poverty. And they can offer corresponding skills-mediating disputes; counselling, good governance in a diverse society; helping the less fortunate; and peacekeeping.[7]

support in the Security Council and logistic backing in the field, peacekeeping forces fanned out across the globe and with them, Canadian troops. The government of former Prime Minister Brian Mulroney was particularly anxious to use peacekeeping in order to cut a distinct international figure and to support President Bush. At the end of 1993, Canada had nearly 5,000 peacekeepers in UN operations, nearly half of them in Yugoslavia.

But Canada, like the United States, found the promise of peacekeeping to be far from reality. It too, experienced frustration in Somalia and a scandal when it was found that Canadian forces were discovered to have beaten to death a Somalian youth. In Yugoslavia, Ottawa backed into a quagmire thinking that it would be like other "classic" UN operations in which Canadian forces have been involved and which entailed the deployment of lightly armed multinational forces between combatants who had already stopped fighting. In Croatia and Bosnia, of course, there had been precious little peace to keep. At first, Canadians took pride in the prominent role their blue berets were playing. But as the fighting continued and when Canadian troops were taken hostage, Canadians back home grew increasingly frustrated. It was also frustrating for them to see their country excluded from the high-level contact group of countries attempting to broker a peace. On several occasions, Ottawa resisted the strong temptation to pull out lest it be seen as reneging on a commitment and undermining the United Nations efforts.

For its part, the government of Jean Chrétien, elected in the fall of 1993, was less enthusiastic about the Yugoslavian role. It continually sought to block and then only grudgingly accepted American-sponsored demands that air strikes be used to punish the Serbs for not respecting safe areas. "The pattern has been one of ... seizing every opportunity to reduce the size and exposure of Canadian troops."

This would also have been consistent with the White Paper's call for NATO to take a more active role in peacekeeping.

On the other hand, given defence department budgets and personnel cuts, the heavy peacekeeping commitments of recent years and public opinion, Canada was in no position to send a major force back into Bosnia, particularly one that

the former Yugoslavia and had the authority to defend themselves under the more

expectations of influence. After the experience of the last few years in Yugoslavia and the dominant American role in the NATO initiative, there should now be no illusions in Ottawa about having any influence over the Bosnian peace process or major NATO decisions.

The more the UN's velvet glove takes advantage of NATO's iron fist, there is little doubt whose hand holds the leash on what former Defense Secretary Perry assured Congress would be "the biggest, toughest, the meanest dog in town."[27] United Nations operations that are contracted out to American-led coalitions because they hold the potential for high intensity combat will increasingly be beyond Canada's capacity. Former chief of the defence staff, General Jean Boyle, acknowledged in February 1996 that the Canadian army lacks the equipment to fight in a " high-intensity combat theatre."[28]

Yet, Even as Ottawa was pulling its troops out of Yugoslavia, and hedging on

the Clinton administration has notified the United Nations that while it would not "'earmark' specific forces or units," it would provide "a listing of capabilities potentially available for peace operations." These include strategic airlift and sealift, logistics, communications support, intelligence support, and personnel for headquarters staff functions.[34]

To a certain extent, Canada's proposal for new UN peacekeeping headquarters and vanguard rapid reaction capability could be a source of future problems in Canada-United States relations. The UN would only adopt the proposal with US support. But for Washington to back it, the United States will expect that other countries, including Canada, will not only supply staff to the headquarters but will respond positively, substantially, and quickly to a Security Council resolution calling for the deployment of the vanguard force. Given Washington's influence at the United Nations, and its predilection to use peacekeeping as a tool of American foreign policy when its interests are involved, acceptance of the Canadian proposal could actually reduce rather than enlarge Ottawa's influence in New York. It would, in a sense, be giving the United States, under the cover of supporting the UN, the kind of *a priori* global commitment of troops that Canada had ceased to give to the British Empire after World War I.[35]

At same time, Ottawa remains rightly concerned about the lack of resources allocated to peacekeeping operations. In December 1995, the Security Council unanimously decided to renew the UN mission in Rwanda but to reduce the size of the force. Canada complained that this made it virtually impossible to fulfil the mandate and threatened to withdraw its troops.[36] Unable to change the Council's policy Ottawa announced, in January 1996, the early withdrawal of the remaining 100 Canadians from the Rwandan mission.[37]

Still, there remains a role for classic peacekeeping, and this is where Canada, with declining yet highly skilled forces can continue to make a contribution to regional stability; and where American and Canadian approaches to peacekeeping can continue to mesh. Washington does not need Canada to contribute combat troops to possible Chapter VII-authorized US-led coalition enforcement efforts. It is more in the US interests for Washington to continue to look to Canada to supply more lightly armed troops for traditional peacekeeping. These troops go into areas where all parties consent to the deployment, or where prior American intervention has eliminated opposition by force and ensured that there is a peace to keep.

This is the case in Haiti. At the same time as Ottawa announced its withdrawal from Rwanda, it was responding positively to a request from Washington that Canada assume command and increase the Canadian contingent as US forces withdraw. In this instance, in contrast to Rwanda, the UN peacekeeping mission serves American interests and thus Ottawa was assured by Washington that the resources will be available to implement the mandate.[38] When, however, China threatened to veto the force in the Security Council unless it reduced the size of the force from 1,900 troops and 300 police officers to 1,200 Canadians offered to

dispatch and pay for an additional 700 troops who would not be formally under the UN command. This saved the mission.[39]

The United States will no doubt wish to encourage Canada to sustain its interest in peacekeeping. Canadian support is always welcome in Washington, particularly when multilateralism is needed to secure support for US action within the international community and within Congress. The American military feels comfortable with highly professional and experienced Canadian officers occupying key positions in peacekeeping operations — more than with those from other countries.[40] But in the post-Cold War era many governments can now be called upon to contribute peacekeeping forces. This includes former Warsaw Pact nations and former Soviet republics whose participation might carry more political significance for the United States than Canada's.

All of this should give Ottawa cause to evaluate peacekeeping in a more rigorous way than was done during the recent parliamentary and DND reviews. These essentially reaffirmed the traditional Canadian role in support of the UN operations while calling for UN reform yet left the door wide-open for future involvement on grounds of theats to international peace or humanitarian disasters.

A promising start was made in this direction in a recent report by the auditor general on both Foreign Affairs and DND involvement in peacekeeping. The report noted that the cost of peacekeeping had risen sharply in recent years from CDN$47 million in 1991-92 to CDN$240 million in 1995-96 — an increase of 410 percent. Participation in IFOR and the new Haitian mission will add further to costs.[41] While DND has been able to cope with increased participation in terms of personnel levels, despite force reductions, "peacekeeping duty in the last few years has revealed serious problems in the Land Force's ability to generate multipurpose forces." These included failure to complete normal training plans, lack of proper equipment such as armoured vehicles, and inadequate resources to deploy a field hospital to support Land Force's operational plans. There were also concerns expressed about the suitability of using large numbers of reservists.[42]

The report also criticized the Department of Foreign Affairs for not establishing a procedure to "carry out evaluations or 'lessons learned' exercises in the area of peacekeeping from a foreign policy perspective," thus increasing "the risk of not benefiting fully from previous experience." Echoing the concerns expressed in the US Congress about American participation, the report noted that "informed decisions on peacekeeping matters would be enhanced by greater transparency and accountability." Particular attention was drawn to the amount of money owed Canada by the United Nations, estimated to be CDN$92 million by March 1996. It also drew attention to the "high priority" Canada attaches to reform at the UN.[43]

And, as if in response to those Canadians who chide the United States Congress for its influence on US peacekeeping policy, the auditor general placed special emphasis upon the need to heighten parliamentary oversight of peacekeeping. In particular, it called upon the government to report "annually to Parliament on all important aspects of Canadian participation in peacekeeping." Specifically it called

for information on "all significant costs, implications and benefits to Canada," for "additional ways, if any, that were considered for participation in UN peacekeeping," and for "efforts made toward UN reform related to peacekeeping and the results achieved."[44]

Notes

Parts of this chapter have appeared in Joel J. Sokolsky, *Canada, Getting It Right This Time: The 1994 Defence White Paper* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1995); Joel J. Sokolsky and David Detomasi, "Canadian Defense Policy and the Future of Canada-United States Security Relations," *The American Review of Canadian Studies* 24 (Winter 1994):337-559; Joseph T. Jockel and Joel J. Sokolsky,

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43. Ibid., p. 6-5
44. Ibid., p. 6-29.

their support for collective defence — which made military cooperation with the United States essential — and popular fears that national sovereignty and independence would be compromised by too close an association with the nuclear-armed giant to the south. While polls indicated that most Canadians supported the broad lines of defence policy — with its propositions for containment and deterrence — critics, particularly in English Canada, were sometimes able to combine anti-nuclear sentiment with nationalism by playing upon the fear of "annihilation without representation." Should not Canada's real role in international affairs be that of a "peace-maker" and not a "powder monkey" on the American national security ship of state, and an ally of the weak and not a "partner to a behemoth"?[1] Peacekeeping, however much it was consistent with US interests, offered the perception of an international role separate from containment and deterrence. Nothing could be more Canadian.

The end of the Cold War seemed to bring relief for Canada's international

Glossary

ASEAN	Association of SouthEast Asian Nations
CF	Canadian Forces
CINCSOUTH	Commander-in-Chief South
CIPA	Contributions for International Peacekeeping Activities
CJCIMIC	Combined Joint Civil Military Cooperation
DND	Department of National Defence
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
EC	European Union
IFOR	NATO Implementation Force
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NORAD	North American Aerospace Defence Command
OAS	Organization of American States
PKI	US Army War College Peacekeeping Institute
QRF	Quick Reaction Force
SFOR	NATO Stabilization Force
UN	United Nations
UNMIH	UN Mission in Haiti
UNPA	*United Nations Participation Act* (1945)
UNPREDEP	UN Preventive Deployment Force
UNPROFOR	UN Protection Force
USN	US Navy

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