INFORMING THE BLUE HELMETS

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THE UNITED STATES, UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS, AND THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE

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Of course, the opinions expressed in the paper are mine alone and do not necessarily reflect the views of the US Air Force, the Department of Defense, or the US government.

Robert E. Rehbein
1996

Introduction

Fifty years ago, the victors of the Second World War met in San Francisco. They faced crossroads between peace and war, between new and old ways of thinking; yet, they were hopefully optimistic that they could diverge onto the path less taken, a path that would, in the words of the preamble to the United Nations Charter, "save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind."[1]

Whatever high hopes the Allied nations had in creating an international structure able to meet those lofty goals were soon dashed by the Cold War. Instead of a fully capable diplomatic and military mechanism to halt, if not prevent, haemorrhaging inter-state conflict, the interim bandage fix became peacekeeping. Sometimes the bandage worked, sometimes it failed to stop the bleeding, and other times it could only slow down the bloodshed without addressing the root causes of conflict.

Today, in the post-Cold War world when the barriers to truly effective peacekeeping and other UN peace operations (e.g., humanitarian relief and peace enforcement operations) should have fallen like the Berlin Wall, the fiascoes in Somalia and Bosnia overshadow the successes in Namibia and El Salvador. As a result, many are advocating the abandonment of UN peace operations as an institution, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, etc. as concepts. While they are not panaceas, many of their failures lie not in the *concept* of UN peace operations per se, but in their uneven practice, in the reluctance of the belligerents to strive for peace, and in the inadequate support from the member states of the United Nations.

Argument

It is to the latter area that this paper concerns itself. In the past, member states have failed to give United Nations peace operations (UNPO) adequate financial

support, strong unwavering political backing, and the full resources at their disposal. This paper asks if the United States has, can, and will provide its full resources, specifically intelligence, to UNPOs.

On the surface, intelligence support to peace operations — particularly from the recognized leader in the field of espionage — *appears* to be a resource which can make or break an operation. Conversely, failure to provide such support leads one to recall the admonishment from Rabbi Hillel the Elder: "[I]f I am only for myself, what am I? If not now, then when? If not me, then who?" Thus in *this* perspective, American intelligence can and must be made a supporting player in all ongoing and future UNPOs.

This argument has two components: moral and practical. From the moral side, one can argue that if one is aware of crimes against humanity or serious violations of international law, yet does nothing about it, one becomes an accomplice to the activity. In this viewpoint, there are three levels of such "sins of omission": no response, inadequate response, and silence in the face of evil. For example, to stand by and watch the unfolding horrors in Rwanda and do nothing is unforgiv-

annoying and overdone security classification rules, and "hey, presto!" it would work.

Unfortunately, this is not the case. It is not simply secrecy that limits or prevents such laudable intelligence support. In fact, secrecy is only a minor factor. The key question which must be asked is not could or would the United States provide intelligence, it is whether it *should*. For its part, the United Nations must ask itself whether *it* should accept such products and services. The answer many times is "no" or at most a qualified "maybe."

Although the United Nations has yawning gaps in intelligence gathering and analysis while the United States has a prodigious global intelligence system, there are numerous problems with this "fit," problems which sharply constrict both the intelligence producer and intelligence consumer from sharing and using this information. Intelligence support will not be impossible, just difficult. These problems essentially lie with the mismatch between the American intelligence system on the one hand and the United Nations and UNPOs on the other. Frequently, these two sides of the equation are at odds with one another and *only* when they converge — or at least share enough of a common goal to temporarily set aside differences — can one expect to see national intelligence successfully supporting a UNPO.

In a nutshell, national intelligence has intrinsic weaknesses which hamper both the quality and the applicability of its information to UNPOs. Not only has American intelligence frequently failed its own master, its systemic weaknesses will be increasingly strained when intelligence is provided to a nontraditional consumer operating in nontraditional operations in a nontraditional setting, namely the United Nations in peace operations in the Third World. Additionally, the United Nations typically does not see itself as a collector or user of espionage products. More importantly, the organization has a fundamentally different attitude toward intelligence (or in UN parlance "military information") — particularly in operations — which places it at odds with traditional state views toward such products and services. Finally, UNPOs strive for impartiality, if not always neutrality, at all costs making the collection and use of intelligence problematic. This impartiality/neutrality requirement further limits the extent of foreign intelligence sharing, gathering, analysis, and reporting. Fortunately in UNPOs there are several historical alternatives other than intelligence to gather information, each with its own strengths and limitations. *Only* when all these methods have been tried and failed, should the UN turn to the United States — and by extrapolation other member states — for intelligence support.

In the end, however, intelligence, like peace operations, is not a panacea for deeper systemic problems. In UNPOs, knowledge is not power if there are neither sufficient resources nor the will of both the member states and the belligerents to use that knowledge to achieve a lasting peace. Only when the latter areas are adequate will information and intelligence emerge as a substantive factor. Whether

gathered by American satellites, intelligence will only rarely play a major role in the success of an operation.

Scope and Research Limitations

With the few exceptions noted below, this paper examines all past and current United Nations peace operations, looking for those in which intelligence — or barring that, information — was a noted aspect. It incorporates the opinions and commentaries from a very wide range of scholars, intelligence experts and military officers on UN affairs and intelligence (usually commenting on one of the topics, but only occasionally on both). It also incorporates responses to a series of questions on the subject posed to the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), the US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), American military services, Canada's National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ), and several international peacekeeping training centres. On a more personal note, the author has also included his impressions from more than a decade in the military intelligence profession, especially from his last posting as the Operations Officer, Directorate of Intelligence, Headquarters Combined Task Force, Operation Provide Comfort. There the author saw firsthand the difficulties involved in providing intelligence to a multinational, quasi-UN-sanctioned peacekeeping operation operating in Kurdish-controlled northern Iraq.

In such a broad study, there are the inevitable shortfalls in research, though they are hopefully largely shortfalls in data rather than in logic or presentation. In the paper — for reasons discussed below — there are three crucial assumptions: (i) the limited data on the role of US intelligence in a wide variety of past non-UN peacekeeping/UN peace enforcement operations can still shed some light on how the United States sees intelligence being used in UNPOs in general; (ii) intrinsic problems within intelligence and how the United States has applied that information in war-fighting coalitions will affect the adequacy and applicability of future intelligence support to UNPOs; and, (iii) certain lessons learned and constraints in traditional UN information gathering (e.g., ground observation, aerial surveillance) are applicable to intelligence in an UN operation.

Given the shadowy nature of intelligence and the normal reluctance of the intelligence community and the UN to fully discuss how, or if, an intelligence relationship exists and operates, some facts are simply unavailable. This has two implications: an agency may refuse to make any comment whatsoever, choose not to provide an official response, or not provide full answers to my questions (as did the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Canada's NDHQ and DIA respectively). Secondly, since the author is an American military officer, this research paper has been vetted through the DoD to ensure no classified material is revealed, regardless of whether that information came from the author's own

Notes

1. *Charter of the United Nations and Statue of the International Court of Justice* (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, April 1994), p. 1.
2. Oddly enough, being at a private university, much less one in Canada, the author has been unable to convince the Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC) to send him numerous unclassified reports and theses written by American military intelligence officers attending post-graduate and professional military schools.
3. Access to DTIC materials could have helped in addressing the "how."

1. *Future United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*

This question is obviously the most important to answer. If, after the string of disasters in Angola, Somalia, Bosnia, and Rwanda, the United Nations and/or a host of crucial peacekeeping contributing states (e.g., Canada) and UN Security Council member states sour on the whole concept of peacekeeping, then peacekeeping's tenuous, if long life, will be cut short. The question of intelligence support to UNPOs will then become moot.

Problems With Traditional Peacekeeping

Certainly traditional peacekeeping operations (PKO), characterized by its force's neutrality, acceptance by the belligerents to both the PKO troop presence and to an eventual peace, and having only a limited suite of weaponry and personnel, has sometimes been suspected as being ineffective, inefficient or incompetent. Several authors have pointed to failures in the UN itself and advocate using regional or multinational approaches to peacekeeping. However, their critics in turn argue that there is not much to be gained and much to be lost by such a move.[1] For instance, Paul Diehl has commented that

> [r]egional and multinational peacekeeping operations have the potential to succeed or fail for many of the same reasons that UN operations do ... Yet they also carry with them some unique risks and problems that make their applicability much more limited ... Analysis of most prominently suggested substitutes for UN peacekeeping arrangements reveals that the current system is among the best available. Certainly, the conclusion that other alternatives can systematically substitute or replace UN operations is unfounded.[2]

Other, more recent commentators have gone a step further and suggest that peacekeeping itself is a failed concept, although upon closer reading much of this

criticism revolves around failures in misapplying peacekeeping tools or failures in those who apply the tools themselves rather than a failure in peacekeeping itself.[3]

sovereignty, to the unwillingness of member states to commit themselves in areas where they have little to no national interest.[14]

peace enforcement doomed to failure, but so is the credibility of the UN to perform any future peace operations. But this still does not mean that humanitarian interventions and peace enforcement operations should never again be attempted. Their failures reflect inadequacies in their facilitation, not in their conception. In the end, peacekeeping, humanitarian intervention, and peace enforcement are equally valid yet separate concepts.

The Continuing Need For UN Peace Operations

The future will demand more, not less, UN peace missions, especially in the turbulent Third World. The growing crises there, the collapse of artificial states, the rise of unbridled ethnic and tribal hatreds, the return of genocide as an acceptable and unpunished tool of vengeance, famine, demographic surges, diseases like AIDS and the Ebola virus, and even regionwide mental illnesses resemble the coming of the "four horsemen of the apocalypse"[19] and will all demand interna-

they do not mean that UN peace operations, whether they be termed peacekeeping, humanitarian intervention, or peace enforcement, are *passé*. At the end of the day, as Ingvar Carlsson scolded, we the member states are responsible for the failures of UN peace operations.

> [Criticism about recent UN failures in peacekeeping] is important, but it should be a process informed by the most basic fact about the United Nations — a fact that many governments and most commentators readily forget in their rush to condemn. It is simply that the UN is *us*. It is not a separate entity with a life, will and energies of its own. It is whatever we have given it the ability to be ... [I]t is we who have been a primary cause for the greater part of the UN's shortcomings.[23]

The problem with peacekeeping, humanitarian intervention, or peace enforcement is not in their concepts, but with the deficiencies in member states' will and resources to make those concepts work.

Notes

1. It is interesting to note that despite his reservations, Boutros Boutros-Ghali has consistently spoken out for the benefits of regional and multinational peacekeeping to take the load off the UN. See Barbara Crossette, "U.N. Chief Ponders Future of Peacekeepers," *New York Times*, 3 March 1995, p. A3; and Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda For Peace: 1995*, 2d ed. (New York: United Nations, 1995, p. 15. Taking the opposing viewpoint are numerous scholars and activists including Paul F. Diehl, *International Peacekeeping* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993) and "Institutional Alternatives to Traditional UN Peacekeeping: An Assessment of Regional and Multinational Options," *Armed Forces & Society* 19 (Winter 1993):209-30; Alain Destexhe, "The Third Genocide," *Foreign Policy* 97 (Winter 1994-95):3-17; and S. Neil MacFarlane and Thomas G. Weiss, "The United Nations, Regional Organisations and Human Security," *Third World Quarterly* 15 (June 1994):283.
2. Diehl, "Institutional Alternatives," p. 228.
3. See Diehl, *International Peacekeeping*, pp. 104-05; Richard K. Betts, "The Delusion of Impartial Intervention," *Foreign Affairs* 73 (November/December 1994):22-24; and Alvin and Heidi Toffler, *War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1993), pp. 210, 227-28.
4. Sir Brian Urquhart, quoted by Augustus Richard Norton and Thomas George Weiss, *UN Peacekeepers: Soldiers with a Difference*, Headline Series No. 292, (New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1990), p. 4.
5. Alan James, "The UN Force in Cyprus," *International Affairs* 65 (Summer 1989):500.
6. See Michael Renner, *Critical Juncture: The Future Of Peacekeeping*, Worldwatch Paper no. 114 (Washington, DC: Worldwatch Institute, 1993); William J. Durch, "Paying the Tab," in *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis*, ed. William J. Durch (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), p. 44; and Sir Brian Urquhart, *The Role of the United Nations Peacekeeping in the Post*

2. *The Role of the United States in Future UNPOs*

Of all the UN member states, the United States has in the past and will in the foreseeable future make or break a peace operation, regardless of whether it deploys its formidable combat forces. Particularly now, as the remaining world superpower, the United States can freely choose to apply or withhold its considerable will and vast resources. Fortunately for the United States, the UN, and the world at large, it appears that Washington will not heed calls for a new isolationism or selective disengagement as many, including the Secretary General, have feared.[1]

Rather, in the words of Secretary of State Warren Christopher, the United States is anything but hesitant about remaining engaged. Writing in a recent issue of *Foreign Policy*, Christopher stated:

necessary to review the constraints and limitations which these domestic actors place on American participation in peace operations.

The most notable set of constraints on the American military to date has been the classified Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25 which establishes several guidelines on whether to vote in favour of a UNPO and whether to commit the American military to support a UN operation. According to the Department of State's document entitled *The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations* (apparently an unclassified version of PDD 25), the following factors will be considered:

- UN involvement advances U.S. interests...
- [T]here is a threat to breach of international peace and security...
- [T]here are clear objectives and an understanding of where the mission fits...
- [F]or traditional ... peacekeeping operations, a ceasefire should be in place and the consent of the parties obtained before the force is deployed
- [F]or peace enforcement ... operations, the threat to international peace and security is considered significant; the means to accomplish the mission are available ...; the ... consequences of inaction ... are considered unacceptable; the operation's anticipated duration is tied to clear objectives and realistic criteria for ending the operation...
- [T]he risks to American personnel ... are considered acceptable....
- [P]ersonnel, funds, and other resources are available
- U.S. participation is necessary for the operation's success
- [T]he role of U.S. forces is tied to clear objectives and an endpoint for

can cure a problem and keeping them from being needlessly diverted toward the terminally ill and hopelessly insane patients.

However, even with the administration's reasonable limitations on American involvement in UNPOs in place, Congress — particularly one dominated by the opposition Republican party, a party that has initiated a conservative contract with the American public — will place even further restrictions on any future US combat role in these operations. As S. Neil MacFarlane and Thomas G. Weiss have argued "[t]here simply is no political pay-off for Congressional support for the UN."[11] Moreover, the current Congressional leadership is ill at ease with UN collective security mechanisms such as peacekeeping. At times it even expresses a visceral distrust and hostility toward "international civil servants." In the view of Senator Bob Dole, the United Nations — and by inference peacekeeping — will needlessly jeopardize American lives, weaken American sovereignty, and be the worst of all possible worlds. "International organizations — whether the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, or any others," wrote Senator Dole,

> will not protect American interests ... International organizations will, at best, practice policymaking at the lowest common denominator — finding a course that is the least objectionable to the most members ... The choices facing America are not, as some in the administration would like to portray, doing something multilaterally, doing it alone, or doing nothing. These are false choices. The real choice is whether to allow international organizations to call the shots — as in Somalia or Bosnia — or to make multilateral groupings work for American interests — as in Operation Desert Storm.[12]

The current Congressional leadership has already made its move to implement some of the concerns expressed by Senator Dole. Earlier in 1994, the House recently passed HR 7 (the *National Security Revitalization Act*), the defence portion of the Republican "Contract with America" and has passed it over to the Senate.

In addition, even when vital interests are at stake, the American public prefers a quick clean conflict with easily understood objectives and more easily identifiable villains to caricature. The quick success in the Persian Gulf War only reinforced this latent tendency. Long drawn-out operations in countries most Americans could not find on a map and for which there are no clear "black hats" and "white hats" run counter to the public's tastes and attention span. Michael Mandelbaum stated that:

> The UNOSOM II experiences suggest that the US armed forces may not at present be temperamentally or culturally attuned to the requirements of low-level military operations of the kind required in Somalia and similar operations ... [There is] a distinctive mind-set and approach to low-intensity operations which had been shaped by the American experience during and after Vietnam, and by a deeply entrenched belief in the efficacy of technology and firepower as a means of minimising one's own casualties. It is an approach that was inappropriate to the particular circumstances of Somalia.[21]

However, as with criticism of PDD 25, this notion of a culture clash may be overly exaggerated. There is the strong possibility that US military forces could in fact be acculturated to adopt the less offensive-oriented, more patient approach needed in traditional peacekeeping.[22]

Assuming that the cultural and attitudinal problems are not as serious as believed, or at least can be contained, another problem with using American military forces in UNPKOs revolves around the military's primary mission: high intensity battles against a major regional power. Expending manpower and other resources for a long-term low-intensity peacekeeping operation might not only compromise the military's requirement to meet two simultaneous — or nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts, it may be an inefficient use of such highly-trained soldiers.[23] Others have commented that peacekeeping operations do not play to the strength of US forces, that "the US should play the role of the police SWAT team to the United Nation's cop on the beat."[24] In the final analysis, being able to succeed in peacekeeping operations is only a side benefit of having combat proficient troops, but it is not the purpose or the primary mission of the US military. The current chairman of the joint chief of staff recently came down hard on this matter, arguing that

> The profusion of Operations Other Than War [which includes peacekeeping operations] has elicited a stream of ideas about how to restructure or reorient our forces specifically for this purpose. This would be wrong. *We cannot become confused about the fundamental purpose of our armed forces*. That purpose is their readiness to fight and win our nation's wars. No other purpose is as vital to our security. As we reshape and train our forces, it must be for this purpose above all others. (emphasis in the original)[25]

> Some point out that organizations can only be good at so many things and, as such, we should be cautious about embracing PKOs. Business literature abounds with tales of the pitfalls of rapid product-line diversification by firms that quickly lost their sense of identity and purpose. The analogy is not inappropriate. That participation in peacekeeping operations could have a deleterious impact on the Army's ability to maintain its competitive edge within a very unforgiving world market is beyond doubt.[27]

Combined with budget cutbacks which increase operational tempo, place the deployment burden on fewer shoulders, and offer fewer opportunities for realistic combat training, readiness takes a tremendous hit when forces are asked to perform in nontraditional duties such as peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations.[28]

American Intelligence as an Option

Given the constraints above, does that mean that the United States, despite the Clinton administration's desire to remain engaged, must stay at home and never deploy ground forces in UNPOs? Will it be limited to its Cold War policy of writing the checks and occasionally transporting forces and equipment? While the efforts of the current air operations in support of UNPROFOR are commendable, there is still a vast world of difference in degree and quality of an American commitment between ground troops and the more transient air and sea forces. Are there any possible options other than sending ground combat troops overseas? If the bulk of the United States military is generally ill-suited, reluctant and otherwise engaged, what else can the US do? Perhaps one can moderate the caution expressed by Lt. Col. Eikenberg above by seeking out new markets for a proven product rather than expanding into a new product line. Thus the answer may well lie in providing the United Nations with products and services which it needs, for which the United States has a clear advantage, and for which there will be little to no domestic and military restraints. Intelligence support to UNPOs would seem to fit the bill quite nicely.

In this regard, several scholars and military officers agree that there is a bright future for the provision of classified American intelligence products and services to UN forces. For example, Mats Berdal has stressed that the United States should

Until fairly recently, the very notion that American intelligence would flow to the United Nations would have been considered ludicrous in US military circles. Nowadays it has evoked a great deal of interest at all levels. Senior officers and civilians in the intelligence community have been deeply involved in examining the prospects of serving this new consumer. Intelligence support to peacekeeping (or at least to OOTW of which peacekeeping is a part) has been the main agenda item both for a recent Senior Military Intelligence Officer Conference[31] and a symposium at CIA entitled "Oracle Blue."[32] Joint and US Army doctrine have recently been developed on peacekeeping operations, both of which discuss intelligence support in great detail.[33]

Courses on the subject are also being taught at a number of American military intelligence schools, from a three-day course entitled "Intelligence and Peace Operations" at the Joint Military Intelligence Training Center to an elective course at the master's level entitled "Enhancing the United Nations: Intelligence Issues" taught at the Joint Military Intelligence College (JMIC), both in Washington, DC.[34] In a departure from past practice, second lieutenants undergoing initial intelligence officer training at Goodfellow AFB in Texas are now formally instructed on the provision of intelligence to UN peacekeeping operations.[35] The number of theses and research reports on the subject written by military officers attending professional military schools has skyrocketed and in fact graduate students at the JMIC have had to be dissuaded from adding to what appears to be a glut of reports.[36] Even the Clinton administration and Congress have gotten involved, the former offering to share intelligence with the United Nations as long as it is reimbursed and security precautions are taken while the latter, departing from its harsh and restrictive language in HR 7, is relatively amenable to providing UN PKOs with intelligence (as long as there is adequate security to protect sources and methods).[37]

And it is not just the Americans who are actively pursuing the topic. For example, Canada's Lester B. Pearson Peacekeeping Training Centre in Nova Scotia is currently considering establishing a two-week course on intelligence support to peacekeeping operations. If and when a working group of outside experts in the field determine whether there is enough material to develop a curriculum, if the Centre determines there is a need for such a course, and if money is available from the Canadian government, a course will be established. If the course is held, it will be a first of its kind for an international peacekeeping centre and will be a quantum change from the low-key "low-tech" observation and reporting training held at other international peacekeeping training centres. A good example of this current "low-tech" approach to information/intelligence would be the Finnish UN Training Centre, where students are taught the main features of the armies and the equipment needed in the areas where they will deploy, the English vocabulary related to the equipment, and the reporting procedures.[38]

If this trend continues, it will mark a major sea change in the concept of intelligence, from a carefully guarded national asset to just another product or service

which the United States and other nations can provide. Much as the American strategic airlift offered to past UN operations, intelligence support would soon become a commodity to be traded (albeit to a select group of customers). Hugh Smith had an interesting thought when he wrote of the possibility of intelligence support to the UN as being a money-maker for organizations facing budget cuts.

> These [national intelligence] organisations ... are ... facing the challenge of diminishing resources [with] cuts in intelligence as part of the peace dividend. One consequence may well be less support for the UN, but an alternative response could be a search for new roles. Support for UN peacekeeping might prove an attractive budget-enhancing, or at least, budget-protecting option for national intelligence organisations.[39]

And if the administration has its way it can begin cheerfully charging for services rendered for the cause of peace.[40]

From the UN's perspective, it would like these services, although charging for intelligence may force a "broke" United Nations to drive a hard bargain, settle for less or go without. From all reports, the United Nations, which has traditionally avoided being tainted with the very notion of intelligence, is increasingly interested in acquiring such information from member states.

Boutros Boutros-Ghali in the first edition of *An Agenda for Peace* called upon member states to "provide the Secretary General with detailed information on issues of concern ... needed for effective preventive diplomacy."[41] In two separate statements subsequent to the *Agenda for Peace*'s publication, the president of the

Areas Where US Intelligence May Help UNPOs

In the realm of future UN peace operations, there are five areas where it *appears* that US intelligence can assist and bolster the UN's underdeveloped information collection and analysis mechanisms. First and foremost, it can provide an indications and warning capability before conflicts begin or get too far out of hand. Ingvar Carlsson noted that in addition to the UN developing its own early warning system, "governments with extensive information-gathering capacities should share with the UN information on trends with the potential to cause conflicts or tragedies."[47] Second, once a decision is made to send peacekeeping forces to a country or region, intelligence can assist in pre-deployment planning to select the location of UN field headquarters, access to major transportation routes, status of the belligerents' forces, terrain, etc. In fact, knowledge of where a military force is going to operate was recognized centuries ago by Sun Tzu:

> Generally, the commander must thoroughly acquaint himself beforehand with the maps so that he knows dangerous places for chariots and carts, where the water is too deep for wagons; passes in famous mountains ... [and] the size of cities and towns ... [A]ll these facts the general must store in his mind; only then will he not lose the advantage on the ground.[48]

Interestingly enough, inadequacies in having sufficient information for pre-deployment planning has frequently been acknowledged as one of the United Nation's central weaknesses, a weakness that could be overcome by US intelligence support.[49]

The third area where intelligence may play a role will be the security of the UN force. Once UNPKO forces arrive in country and until the day the last soldier leaves, it is fundamentally necessary that the forces be secure from attack. Obviously if the UN force were engaged in a peace enforcement operation or were in a situation where anarchy prevailed, this requirement would be paramount, but even in a traditional peacekeeping setting, situational awareness of what the hostile parties might do to one's force, either deliberately or accidentally, is every commander's key responsibility.

Fourth, UN forces monitoring ceasefires and disengagement agreements, particularly over large areas of land, may be well served by American intelligence acting as a supplement to their ground and air-based observation missions. Such information will help the forces do their job more effectively and efficiently. As Peter Jones remarked: "[t]he greater the ability of the peacekeepers to detect what is going on around them, the greater their ability to take actions designed to prevent activities in an area from getting out of control."[50] Intelligence information could also be used to shame those belligerents who are cheating the ceasefire to abide by the accords.[51] Finally, if a peacekeeping operation turns sour and slides into the realm of peace enforcement and needs to retreat under fire (such as in Somalia during the pull-out of the remaining 2,500 Pakistani and Bangladeshi

troops from Mogadishu where American photo reconnaissance played a small role, or if a bona fide humanitarian intervention/peace enforcement operation takes offensive action against one or more of the local parties, extensive intelligence information could prove useful in determining status, locations, and intentions of the hostile belligerents.

Case Studies of Past US Intelligence Support

In the past and up to today, the US has occasionally assisted in at least some of these five areas. The few documented instances where there has been American intelligence support to UN peace operations have generally been successful.[52] However, there is a major problem with evidence. For the cases where there is good documentation, all of them are fundamentally different from each other. Conversely, in several other cases which are similar, there is very little documentation.

Specifically, there is in fact only one well-documented case where American intelligence support has been provided to a UNPO: UNOSOM II. Intelligence support to the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) has been quite extensive and backed up with good evidence, but it does not fit the normal pattern of any previous UN operation. Finally, while not a UN peacekeeping mission controlled by the UN, the Sinai mission received a great degree of US intelligence assistance.

On the other hand, while there have been sketchy reports of support to the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), UNPROFOR, UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) and the UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH), for the most part all that is revealed is that intelligence has been supplied, not what the nature, scope, and constraints of such intelligence support were.[53] Falling somewhere between the proper model/documentation dilemma is the recent introduction of American intelligence support to the UN headquarters itself. Despite there be-

support to US-only operations. In joint intelligence doctrine for US-only operations, intelligence would follow a relatively straight course down from the national intelligence community level (e.g., DIA, CIA, NSA and the National Military

There are even more lingering unanswered questions regarding this operation.[59] What form did this intelligence take (e.g., imagery support, analytical reports, SIGINT or HUMINT reports)? Was the UNOSOM II commander satisfied with the intelligence he received in terms of relevance, timeliness, and accuracy? What made the UNOSOM II force change its mind regarding American intelligence? However, the most important question is whether the lessons learned from Somalia can be broadly applicable to those UNPOs where US forces are *not* deployed; this is after all where intelligence is used as a trade-off for an actual US presence. Somalia may very well be an atypical case study. The increasingly volatile nature of the UNOSOM II humanitarian intervention/peace enforcement operation cried out for intelligence support, if anything but to protect the troops from being continually harassed and sniped at by Somali clansmen. The need for intelligence in traditional peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations may be less urgent, more muted.

UNPROFOR

The most pressing UN operation requiring intelligence is, of course, Bosnia. As mentioned earlier, reports of US intelligence support to UNPROFOR are sketchy and incomplete. In addition to the limited DIA and UN DPKO references to American intelligence being provided to UNPROFOR, Misha Glenny in a spring 1995 issue of *Foreign Policy*

UNTAC, UNAMIR, and UNMIH

There is even less documentation on and more speculation regarding intelligence support to the UN operations in Cambodia, Rwanda, and Haiti.[62] What is known is that DIA has been designated by the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) as the American intelligence community's executive agent for intelligence support for these operations, implying that there is in fact operational support. While DIA states that UN headquarters and field commanders are generally pleased with the American intelligence support, the UN indicates that it has been more of a mixed bag. However, it is still not known whether any complaints have been levied against

Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) in the Sinai

The only true peacekeeping mission where there was well-documented American intelligence support was in fact not even a UN mission. During the MFO, the United States flew weekly tactical photo-reconnaissance missions along the UNEF II buffer zone and the Giddi and Mitla passes with the full knowledge and support of the Egyptian and Israeli governments. Additional flights were arranged to verify possible violations. Not only was American reconnaissance openly performed, the results of the missions were freely shared with the Egyptians, the Israelis, and the commander of UN forces in the area.[64]

As a supplement to this airborne imagery collection, the Sinai Field Mission was established with an American defence contractor (E-Systems) operating an electronic surveillance network (including seismic, acoustic, infrared sensors although SIGINT sensors cannot be ruled out judging by the known expertise of the company in the latter field) in the two passes.[65] That the US may have tapped into its satellite assets to cover the area as one author suggests is certainly not surprising, but whether that fact, any data or even imagery from those sources was provided to the non-American forces is only a matter of conjecture.[66]

Here however, it is not known whether US intelligence support was adequate, whether information flowed from national sources and agencies through the UN to the field, and whether there was any other form of intelligence support (e.g., SIGINT or HUMINT).

United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM)

The United States intelligence community has been most deeply and publicly involved in its direct support to UNSCOM. UNSCOM's mandate is "to carry out immediate on-site inspection of Iraq's biological, chemical and missile capabilities, to provide for the elimination of these capabilities," and to assist the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in its inspection of Iraqi nuclear facilities is one which is of critical national interest to the United States.[67] It is also one that cannot be completed without extensive American technical and intelligence expertise in NBC detection.

Through its provision of a U-2 reconnaissance aircraft flying several times a week complete with pilots and ground crew as well as possibly satellite imagery and other intelligence information given to the commission and to the IAEA, the United States can greatly influence the success of UNSCOM's mandate and the IAEA's mission to find and destroy Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program.[68] For example, with the help of the U-2, UNSCOM was able to locate cauldrons associated with the Iraqi electromagnetic isotope separation effort which the Baghdad government had dispersed and buried in remote areas. German-loaned

helicopters, recently equipped with gamma detectors, FLIR sensors, and ground penetrating radar, have also proven to be both a useful tool for UNSCOM and a source of controversy with Baghdad.

Ultimately, such an intrusive intelligence collection, even on behalf of a neutral United Nations, can run into a great deal of hostility by the party being observed. Despite Iraq having been painfully defeated by the Desert Storm coalition, it remained (and remains) defiant toward the United Nations, UNSCOM, and the U-2 and helicopter reconnaissance flights, vociferously complaining that the latter infringed upon its sovereignty by conducting "espionage" and demanding sig-

The process for requesting information appears somewhat cumbersome and sluggish: UN headquarters and field commander requests for information (RFI) are sent to the I&R Unit which taps into its open source references and online public access data services. If more information is needed, I&R has the option of passing the request to the member state mission(s) for assistance. In the case of the US, each of these requests must then be cleared and approved by the State Department before being passed to the US intelligence community with DIA acting as the overseer. Once an appropriate answer is found and downgraded or sanitized to the "UN Restricted" level, the information is then passed to the US UN mission, where it is subsequently forwarded to the I&R Unit. It is unknown whether other member states have been tapped for information and what their bureaucratic procedures entail.

Washington has also sold an intelligence data processing system to the United

peacekeeping forces, but with the belligerents as well. The confidence engendered by the sharing of US tactical reconnaissance products with the Israelis and Egyptians payed handsome dividends in the overall success of the mission.[74] This latter case may pose a serious operational problem if: (i) the belligerent(s) do(es) not permit intelligence activities on its territory, or (ii) the nation providing the intelligence does not permit all UN forces — much less the belligerents — equal access to information. While in a more combat-oriented peace operation (e.g., peace enforcement), the first criteria may be overriden, ignoring the second criteria foolishly sets up several of the UN national contingent for needless danger.

Lastly and most importantly, while the quantity and quality of information is important and the types of communications and computer support often critical to make a "jury rigged" system work, what really ensures the responsive delivery of US intelligence to UNPOs is the on-site presence and personal direct involvement of Americans in peacekeeping. A crude continuum can be deduced — the more Americans there are involved in a UNPO, the closer they are to the field operation and the higher the subsequent possibility of violence and threats to the American forces, the better the US intelligence support. When that presence is absent, dedicated and relevant intelligence support may become doubtful. In answer to the rhetorical question posed earlier in contrast to the situation in UNOSOM II, Lt. Col. Seney commented:

> If the US does not send troops to a PKO, under current circumstances, it is highly unlikely that it will be willing to provide intelligence information to support that operation. (The exception being medical information [e.g., information on infectious diseases in the PKO's area, capability of indigenous medical support]).[75]

From a sheer parochial intelligence perspective, one can drop down from a "Somalia high" to a "Rwanda low."

These are just the initial lessons learned from a limited number of cases using even more limited information. To draw broader lessons for the future, we must now make the second critical assumption: that despite its impressive capabilities, there are intrinsic problems within the US intelligence system and the intelligence process itself. These inadequacies and how the United States has applied intelligence information in war-fighting coalitions will in turn affect the adequacy and applicability of future intelligence support to UNPOs. This will be addressed in the next two chapters.

Notes

3. Steven R. David, "Why the Third World Still Matters," *International Security* 17 (Winter 1992-93):127-59. However, although the US *could* participate in UNPOs there is no guarantee that it *would*.

13. Elaine Sciolino, "G.O.P. Senators Fire Away at Foreign Policy," *New York Times*, 27 January 1995, p. A8.
14. Michael Mandelbaum, "The Reluctance to Intervene," *Foreign Policy* 95 (Summer 1994):16.
15. Mats R. Berdal, "Fateful Encounter: the United States and UN Peacekeeping," *Survival* 36 (Spring 1994):30-50. See also Andrew Kohut and Robert C. Toth, "Arms and the People," *Foreign Affairs* 73 (November/December 1994):61.
16. Mandelbaum, "The Reluctance to Intervene," p. 12.
17. John E. Reilly, "The Public Mood at Mid-Decade," *Foreign Policy* 98 (Spring 1995):76-77.
18. Kohut and Toth, "Arms and the People," p. 47.
19. Rielly, "The Public Mood," pp. 81, 83.
20. See respectively Russell F. Weigley, *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy* (New York: Macmillan Publishers Co., Inc, 1973), xxii; Martin P. Adams, "Peace Enforcement Versus American Strategic Culture," *Strategic Review* 22 (Winter 1995):16; and John F. Hillen III, "UN Collective Security: Chapter Six and a Half," *Parameters* 24:33, 35.

21 Berdal, "Fateful Encounter," pp. 41-42.

22 Adams, "Peace Enforcement," p. 15; and Harvey Sicherman, "Winning the Peace," *Orbis* 38 (Fall 1994):523-44.

23. Stephen J. Cimbala, "Military Persuasion and the American Way of War," *Strategic Review* 22 (Fall 1994):39, 41.
24. Lieutenant Colonel John L. Clarke, "The Enforcement Specialists: US Forces are Best Suited to Peace Enforcement," *Armed Forces Journal International* 132 (February 1995):34.
25. General John M. Shalikashvili, "Lessons Learned," *Policy Letter Digest* (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, March 1995), p. 3.
26. Louis C. Finch, deputy under-secretary of defense for readiness, "Keeping the Force Ready," *Defense* 95, 1 (1995):5. Even Canada, one of the most active participants in UN operations but now undergoing major force drawdowns, has voiced concerns over the combat training issue. See David Pugliese, "Canadian Forces to Stay in Bosnia," *Defense News*, 8-14 May 1995, p. 4.
27. Lieutenant Colonel Karl W. Eikenberg, "The Challenges of Peacekeeping," *Army* 43 (September 1993):15.
28. Mark T. Clark, "Avoid the Fad of 'Collective Security'," *Orbis* 39 (Spring 1995):256-57.
29. Berdal, "Fateful Encounter," p. 47.
30. Clarke, "The Enforcement Specialists," p. 34. See also Hugh Smith, "Intelligence and UN Peacekeeping," *Survival* 36 (Autumn 1994):174-92); James J. Wirtz, "Constraints on Intelligence Collaboration," *Defense Analysis* 8 (1992):247-59); and Loch K. Johnson, "Smart Intelligence," *Foreign Policy* 89 (Winter 1992-93):53-69.
31. Maj. Karen Noss, HQ USAF/INX. 12 May 1995 telephone conversation with author.

32. Maj. Buikema, HQ USMC, Command, Control, Communications, Computer and Intelligence Department. 25 April 1995 E-mail with author.

33. See US Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peacekeeping Operations* (Joint Publication 3-07.3) (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 29 April 1994), the draft *Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations* (Joint Publication 3-16 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 1994); and, *Field Manual 100-23, Peace Operations*, final draft (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 22 September 1994). US military doctrine on PKO has its roots in previous doctrine on low-intensity conflict (LIC) and operations other than war (OOTW) as well as the relatively limited American experience in UN PKOs. With regards to intelligence, PKO doctrine highlights include:

    • the need for an effective and responsive all-source intelligence gathering capability to ensure the protection and security of the force and for monitoring the ceasefire/ disarmament agreement

    • barring being able to bring in such an extensive array of intelligence collection systems, increasing the reliance upon HUMINT collection against local civilians, belligerents, and from one's own forces

    • the fundamental requirement to decompartment and share classified US intelligence with other members of the PKO force

    • a caution against leaking the intelligence about one belligerent to another.

    (NB: There is an ongoing debate whether LIC and OOTW doctrine and experience can be applied to PKO, with Major Brad M. Bergstrand arguing that there is applicability and Charles Dobbie arguing such an approach confuses "pigs with parrots." See Bergstrand, "What Do You Do When There's No Peace to Keep?" *Canadian Defence Quarterly* 23 (Spring 1994):27-29; and, Charles Dobbie, "A Concept for Post-Cold War Peacekeeping," *Survival* 36 (Autumn 1994):142.

    Looking north to Canada, despite its long history of involvement in UN PKOs, it is just now developing doctrine on this subject; there appear to be some similarities d1cs 35 Tw 9.8(her /s j)0(mbe5 LI5gct;8tF(d1cs 35)see.v)22(en9docular)9.6[

"Staff Responsibilities, Duties and Activities." Lt. Col. Alf Gorsjo, Development Section, Swedish Armed Forces International Centre, 9 May 1995 correspondence with author. Conversely, the Danish school apparently provides no training in intelligence or information gathering and analysis, arguing that "it is the basic policy of all UN peacekeeping missions that active intelligence collection is incompatibel [sic] with the role of the UN." Lt. Col. E.B. Dam, Acting Chief Operations, Logistic & Budget Division, Army Operational Command Denmark, 22 May 1995 correspondence with author.

39. Smith, "Intelligence and UN Peacekeeping,"p. 185. It is very difficult to see how the budgetary review process will look favourably upon intelligence support to a UNPKO as ample justification for continuing funding for scarce intelligence manpower, equipment, communications circuits leasing, etc. especially when other American consumers are making demands for those same resources. From a strict accountant's perspective, intelligence support to UNPKOs provides no direct return to the United States and is at best a derivative function of work which is already being done for US consumers. And if the UN is a sole consumer of a certain product or service, it will have to be a high-level political decision to retain it, especially in light of budget cuts.

40. There are several serious difficulties with this approach. Besides the problem of determining the cost of an intelligence estimate or national imagery support, will the United States charge "full price" if it is providing essentially the same information to US forces participating in the PKO, ask for a nominal "shipping and handling fee," or waive the cost altogether? In the event there are no US equities or personnel involved in the operation and the UN needed to make a "special order" for intelligence on an area which the US was not watching, would not the costs of such dedicated intelligence support be even higher? How will the US and UN start initial negotiations on requirements, availability of information and cost? In either event, could the US retain or demand some form of "local copyright protection" in the guise of classification guidelines and restrictive handling instructions for material which the UN "purchased"? Can the UN haggle for a lower price if it feels that quality and timeliness of the product are inadequate? Could the UN attempt to drive prices lower if it openly sought intelligence from other member states and break the American monopoly? What if the UN did not have any funds to purchase such intelligence? What choices does this international "Blanch Dubois in blue" have?

41. Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda For Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping*, p. 14.

42. "Statement by the President of the Security Council," S/25184, 28 January 1993, ibid., pp. 128-29.

43. "Statement by the President of the Security Council," S/25859, 28 May 1993, ibid., pp. 140-41.

44. Resolution of the General Assembly, "An Agenda for Peace: preventative diplomacy and related matters," A/RES/47/120 A, 18 December 1992, ibid., p. 78.

45. Lt. Col. Shirley A. Seney, Chief, Information and Research, DPKO, United Nations, 19 May 1995 correspondence with author.

46. David L. Boren, "The Intelligence Community," *Foreign Affairs* 71 (Summer 1992):57.
47. Ingvar Carlsson, "Roles for the UN in International Security after the Cold War," *Security Dialogue* 26 (March 1995):11. For other discussions on a UN indications and warning function see Michael Renner, *Critical Juncture: The Future of Peacekeeping*, World Watch Paper no. 114 (Washington, DC: Worldwatch Institute, 1993), p. 39; and Sir Brian Urquhart, *The Role of the United Nations Peacekeeping in the Post Cold War World*, Young Memorial Lecture 1993 (Kingston, ON: Royal Military College, 1993), p. 13.
48. Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 104.
49. See Smith, "Intelligence and UN Peacekeeping," p. 176; and Mats R. Berdal, Whither UN Peacekeeping?, Adelphi Paper 281 (London: Brassey's, 1993), p. 65.
50. Peter Jones, "Technology and Peacekeeping," *Peacekeeping and International Relations* 21 (November/December 1992):3.
51. Michael Krepon, "Spying from Space," *Foreign Policy* 75 (Summer 1989):107.
52. Johns, "[b]y and large, the UN PKO leadership and field Commanders [for UNTAC, UNOSOM II, UNPROFOR, UNAMIR, and UNMIH] appear pleased with the qual-

are participating, and the quantity, quality and type of support is unknown. Seney, 19 May 1995 correspondence, p. 1.

59. Additional questions include: Was there any difficulty in either the hand delivery method of sensitive intelligence information or in releasing the information to all members of the UNOSOM II information center, much less the various national forces attached to UNOSOM II? Was there any formal method by which the UNOSOM II national force commanders and the overall UNOSOM II commander could forward requirements for intelligence? What were the "theatre level intelli-

3. *The Capabilities and Limitations of the US Intelligence Community*

From all appearances, it certainly seems that the vast US intelligence community can deliver the goods, that it can easily meet the needs of UNPOs. Many observers of the intelligence business have consistently commented that the sheer size of the American intelligence community, the high-tech wizardry behind its collection and analysis assets, and its seemingly apparent ability to cover instantaneously almost any corner of the globe have given the United States an intelligence organization second to none and, with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, without a close competitor.[1] Over the long run, post-World War II American estimative intelligence has been of good quality and information on foreign weapons development and orders of battle have been very good.[2] Most recently, despite occasional intelligence failures in the Persian Gulf, the official DoD report on the war stated "The Coalition forces' overwhelming military victory against Iraqi armed forces was due in large part to accurate intelligence provided to decision makers, particularly at national and theatre level."[3]

The United States' vast array of satellites, listening posts, airborne and shipborne sensors as well as more esoteric emerging technologies (such as high altitude, stealthy, long-endurance unmanned aerial vehicles that can loiter over battlefields for days and NBC sensors hidden in tree trunks, leaves, rocks and clods of dirt) are a major element in gaining the information advantage over its competitors.[4] This high-tech approach toward collection (some would say technologically obsessed) is supplemented in large part by a network of agents.[5] Together, the technical collection systems for imagery intelligence (IMINT) and signals intelligence (SIGINT) and the human collection "systems" (HUMINT) form a critical triad in trying to determine "what" an enemy is doing, "where" and "how" he will do something, and "why" he is doing it.[6]

No single collection discipline can answer all these questions and there is a need for all three elements of the intelligence collection triad. Yet until recently HUMINT has been a poor cousin to its more expensive, capital-intensive brethren.[7] In conflicts other than between major military powers, in ambiguous situations in the Third World or in peacekeeping operations, it will be HUMINT that will prove to be more beneficial than all the high-tech gadgetry floating in space, flying through the air, or travelling through the seas. In times when an enemy's intentions are more critical than his weaponry, when the scope and nature of deadly

Please note, however, these figures for the annual budget and for individual systems are simply the authors' estimates of classified amounts and cannot be confirmed and may be far off the mark. However, they do give a sense of the high expense associated with operating a first-class worldwide intelligence community, an important caution to those who envision a UN intelligence system dedicated to and controlled by New York (but ultimately funded by member states).

Whatever the costs of operating the US intelligence system, Congress and newspaper editorials are pressing for budget cuts.[13] Whether the cuts are drastic or are crudely applied across the board is a major issue to senior American intelligence officials, but that cuts will come is beyond question or debate. The key question is which intelligence functions are to be eliminated, which analytical redundancies formerly thought necessary to avoid institutional biases are themselves now considered redundant, and which countries and issues will no longer be targeted.[14] No matter how skillful the budgetary butcher, cutting waste and fat eventually involves cutting muscle and bone as well; ideally, there will eventually be a tighter focus on what the intelligence community does and whom it serves.[15] This is hardly the time to look for new products and new (potentially non-paying) consumers.

Past Intelligence Failures

The American intelligence saga is littered with failures in indications and warning (I&W), from North Korea's invasion of South Korea and the subsequent entry of Chinese troops into the fray to the Tet offensive, and from the fall of the Shah to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The most famous I&W failure is Pearl Harbor, a failure best chronicled by Roberta Wohlstetter in her still insightful and unchallenged treatise *Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision*. In it she pins down one of the most frequent causes of I&W failure: a too low signal-to-noise ratio.

> [I]t is apparent that our decisionmakers had at hand an impressive amount of information on the enemy. After the event, of course, a signal is always crystal clear ... But before the event it is obscure and pregnant with conflicting meanings. It comes to the observer embedded in an atmosphere of "noise," i.e., in the company of all sorts of information that is useless and irrelevant for predicting the particular disaster ... [W]e failed to anticipate Pearl Harbor not for want of the relevant materials, but because of a plethora of irrelevant ones.[16]

The intelligence disaster 54 years ago at Pearl Harbor produced widespread repercussions which led in large part to the creation of the CIA and to the structure and procedures of the national intelligence community of today.

Failures can also take on the form of underestimating a potential opponent's force buildup (as we did in the 1970s with North Korea), having incomplete or

Why Intelligence Failures Occur

Rather than continue to list a series of anecdotes about intelligence failures, it would be better to systematize those anecdotes to determine where things can go wrong, specifically during the stages of the intelligence process, from collection and analysis to dissemination. From day to day, while most of these failures do not occur or are corrected in time, there is still the chance that any one or more of the errors listed below can crop up at anytime. While it is highly improbable (and in some cases illogical) that there can be circumstances when all or most of them are set off, chaos theory suggests that a small error, especially one early on in the process and if left unchecked, can seriously skew the final product. It is because of these errors, these intrinsic and in some cases unseen weaknesses that the quality and usability of intelligence is frequently questionable.

Flaws in Intelligence Collection

Turning first to collection, there may be several problems. At the most basic level, a country may simply not be interested in collecting information on that area or issue. This is not due to a lack of intellectual curiosity, but merely one of priorities. Even the dominant intelligence system in the world cannot hope to cover every country to the same depth as it did the USSR, or even cover that country at all. Despite John Hedley's recent contention that "[t]here are no obscure countries and remote regions anymore,"[20] Mark Lowenthal's comment a decade ago that "[w]ithout the expenditure of tremendous sums on intelligence, choices must be made; even with unlimited resources there might still be surprises"

outright since the source was not considered very reliable.[28] In Somalia, UNOSOM II headquarters apparently "displayed initial reluctance to accept intelligence support from the United States, because of the organisation's distrust of military intelligence and of US intelligence in particular."[29] Finally, during Desert Storm, several coalition countries provided intelligence reports to the United States, some of which reached the Pentagon but which many analysts disregarded as uncontrolled reporting of rumour after rumour. If there is no trust in the data, and especially in the reliability and credibility of the source of that data, then it is a waste of both parties' time and effort to continue further. Unfortunately, it might also result in ignoring a critical piece of the intelligence puzzle.

Another area affecting collection of intelligence data is that there may be no overarching authority or common procedures for setting collection requirements in the first place. Given a finite number of collection assets, there must be prioritization of what targets they go after. If an intelligence consumer has no mechanism to present a case for collecting against an item of interest to him or if several collection assets are looking at the same problem, the downstream user either receives no information or gets too much duplication at the expense of other requirements. In UNOSOM II for instance, lack of communication between the US intelligence system and combat forces in Somalia, allied nations' intelligence systems, and the UNOSOM PKO headquarters with regard to coordinating collection wer-0.1(r)6u0 Tw (29)Tj 1044(f) e m023ther req(-3.1g.) 4otcn Sow -ege -14elli-

Descending down to a more practical level where mistakes can hopefully be corrected, an overly restrictive security classification system can hamper full analysis of all available and relevant facts. While there is a need to protect sensitive sources and methods of intelligence collection from disclosure to a hostile power, it is simply ludicrous for analysts, particularly those working on the same issue, to have varying degrees of security clearance. Yet it continues, perhaps out of force of habit, or perhaps out of excessive caution growing out of the possibility of future Aldrich Ames. Michael Handel noted that there may be an innate professional bias of intelligence organizations to "err in the direction of excessive caution and underutilization of information ... yet underused information is ineffective and has repercussions beyond the mere wasting of the collection effort."[30] Limiting access to information which might be the final piece of an intelligence puzzle is nothing short of a self-inflicted wound. It impedes creative analysis. A factor leading to the intelligence failure at Pearl Harbor was a security system, particularly for SIGINT intercepts, which limited the internal distribution of reports, so as "to reduce this group of signals to the point where they were barely heard." Stansfield Turner cautioned that such compartmentation today has left the United States "just as vulnerable to a Pearl Harbor now as in 1941."

Secrecy has its own malignant charm as well; a report that bears a higher classification tends to be considered as being more accurate that those of a lesser or no classification, regardless of whether the former report fits logically with the bulk of other evidence. Alvin and Heidi Toffler quote an unidentified government official who said "[t]here was an enormous cult of secrecy — and secrecy itself became a litmus test as to the validity of ideas."[31] Breaking the grip of the high priests of security would almost be akin to Protestant reformers publishing the Bible in the vernacular for the first time. If anything, increasing internal access to all sorts of intelligence would expand the marketplace of ideas and produce a better product.[32]

Intelligence analysis may also suffer simply due to sloppy thinking and poor quality control. Estimations of a bomber gap in the 1950s relied on questionable assumptions regarding the numbering system of Soviet Bison bombers.[33] The lazy analyst's friend, straight-line extrapolation, led to a vast underestimation of the North Korean military in the early 1970s. Trying to work out a compromise between CIA and DIA estimates on Soviet military spending, as well as problems with the various supporting economic models themselves, resulted in worst-case estimates which were neither "unbiased [nor] objective as possible."[34]

Contributing to such poor analysis may be the pedestrian issue of using young and relatively inexperienced analysts. A former naval intelligence officer noted that the tendency to move analysts from country desk to country desk over a very short time span and the pressure on them to seek greater responsibilities in administration and management, rather than on analysis contributes in large part to "[m]ilitary intelligence estimates [being] made, for the most part, by amateurs in the subject of the study."[35] A solution to the problem of poor quality analysis and

analysts sometimes turns out to be yet another contributor to the problem of intelligence failure. Management review of analytical products can help tighten the sloppy thinking of junior analysts, but it can also stifle creative thought if left to grow beyond its mandate and abilities. Marvin Ott criticized the CIA for going overboard on the number of reviews necessary before a report could leave the headquarters. The end results are frustrated analysts and fuzzy analysis.

> Rather than sharp delineation or risk-taking, the system rewards artful obscurantism and a cover-all-the-bases approach that protects the analyst from being proven wrong but gives the policymaker little useful guidance. It is what General Norman Schwarzkopf referred to as "mush." It is Cheez Whiz rather than sharp Cheddar."[36]

To add insult to injury, there is the tendency of bureaucracies and management oversight structures — intelligence and otherwise — to perpetuate themselves at the expense of line positions and field staff. Perhaps budget cuts and the current "reinvention of government" will reverse that tendency, but one must never underestimate the power of an entrenched bureaucracy to protect its interests.

A second aspect of intelligence bureaucracies is the possibility that they can unwittingly or deliberately foster an institutional bias in their analyses. For example, rivalries between the service intelligence staffs in promoting their views of the Japanese military threat was yet another thorny path which led the way to surprise at Pearl Harbor.[37] The tussle between the USAF on the one hand and the CIA and the other services on the other regarding the Soviet bomber and missile g8cween the8 33-0.006s-6.3(al .00kT1.64n0cgim5(y to)]TJ T* 0.00tre)1ntel3(al .00s168 8(ae

the latter's needs. When those needs are not well understood (which appears to be

The flip side of maintaining a close relationship with intelligence is getting so close that intelligence becomes an advocate of a position rather than a deliverer of the facts. In this case, analysis may be politicized to fit the presumed viewpoints of the intelligence consumer. To put it bluntly, this is deliberate manipulation of the facts and outright lying. The most outrageous case happened during the Reagan years during the debate over trading arms with Iran in return for hostages. A National Intelligence Estimate was changed to argue for the existence of high-level moderate Iranian government officials. Additionally, a channel was set up outside the control of the CIA Director of Intelligence to provide the White House with intelligence on Iran.[47] Fortunately politicization of analysis appears to be as rare an occurrence as a total solar eclipse, but when it happens, it throws a shadow of doubt over the entire intelligence community long after the event has passed.[48] In the end, intelligence must walk a fine line between loyalty and integrity. To once again quote Sherman Kent, "[i]ntelligence must be close enough to policy, plans, and operations to have the greatest amount of guidance, and must not be so close that it loses its objectivity and integrity of judgment."[49]

> [I do not mean to] play down the importance of security regulations and their observance. I am concerned with the point that security is like armor. You can pile on the armor until the man inside is absolutely safe and absolutely useless. Both producers and consumers of intelligence can have their secrets, and in safeguarding them they can so insulate themselves that they are unable to serve their reasons for being.[59]

Failures in the Intelligence Consumer-Producer Relationship and Unique Problems of Multinational Operations

Operating outside of the intelligence system and not an intelligence failure per se is the failure of the operational or policy communities to act upon the intelligence information they have received. This is in part a symptom of the degree of trust and confidence the decisionmakers have in their intelligence support, but it also reflects a deeper absence of their own will and resources. If a senior official has access to the finest intelligence that money can buy, yet has no intention of taking any action, then that intelligence has been wasted. The intelligence analysts then become modern day Cassandras, prophesying doom but not being heard. There are, unfortunately, times when this has happened outside the realm of mythology. For example, Stalin refused to heed Soviet intelligence warnings of a Nazi attack and as a result, millions of Soviets died for his recklessness.[60] The UN's previously mentioned inability or refusal to use its information on Namibia and the Western Sahara in planning for deployment of peacekeeping forces is a lesser example of this same problem.[61]

One may ask, if the UN is unwilling to assign blame for the sniper shooting of a single French soldier for fear of antagonizing the Serbs,[62] what use would it be to provide this organization with intelligence information which can be used to eliminate that particular troop security problem in the future? An unidentified Bosnian looking up at a UN aircraft was once quoted as saying, "There goes the UN — monitoring genocide."[63] And even if intelligence is listened to, it cannot, no matter how good, resurrect a poor policy or a stupid operational move from itself. As the report from the Rockefeller Commission noted: "Good intelligence will not necessarily lead to wise policy choices.[64]

The above mentioned problems are largely intrinsic to the nature of intelligence. There are also self-imposed restrictions on the quality and applicability of intelligence which are a unique subset of the larger intelligence-producer relationship issue discussed earlier. These constraints arise from the need to work in multinational war-fighting coalitions where information and intelligence is shared in varying degrees. On the level of operations, coalition warfare deals with combat and offensive actions designed to destroy an enemy. Thus, its practices are largely inapplicable to many UNPOs. Yet on the level of command, control,

communications and intelligence, certain experiences and problems in coalition warfare can be applicable to multinational UN operations. By their very nature, both UNPOs and war-fighting coalitions are composed of multinational units with different traditions and difficulties in working together. Of concern here are the frequent snags in communicating information, whether that information be orders to advance to a hilltop, operational data like air surveillance tracking information, or warnings and estimates on the "other." A careful sorting of the relevant information reveals further inadequacies in any future American intelligence support to a multinational UNPKO.

Part and parcel of coalition warfare is the sharing of intelligence data to some degree or another. If forces in a coalition are to work together effectively, there should be a common level of understanding about the opponent. Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm would not have been as successful if the coalition had not cooperated on intelligence matters. The trust the United States demonstrated in sharing the "good stuff" with its allies in the desert helped cement the bonds of a common objective.[65] The benefits to all parties in an intelligence-sharing coalition are fairly obvious. The collection and analytical workloads are efficiently divided and intelligence capabilities are shared. Cooperation can also be used to signal a larger trust and confidence in a coalition partner. If a nation in a coalition is unable to provide combat or logistical support, it can offer its intelligence capabilities as an offset.[66]

The more formal such an intelligence relationship is within a coalition, the longer the period of time to work together, and the more frequent the positive experiences of such intelligence support, the stronger the coalition becomes. On the other hand, in hastily cobbled together coalitions, this intelligence relationship may be nonexistent or immaturely developed. One can assume that this would frequently be the case in UN peace operations where there is usually a mixture of "old hand" countries like Canada and Bangladesh and "greenhorns" like Colombia and Switzerland. Eventually some form of "gentleman's agreement" may be developed between a nation and the UN or between national contingents, but these ad hoc intelligence exchanges are fragile as gossamer wings, as long-lived as a mayfly, and can be blown away by a single mishandling of classified intelligence data.[67]

Yet, regardless of whether a war-fighting coalition intelligence relationship is long-established or quickly put together, several problems repeatedly crop up. Whenever the United States regularly passes intelligence to the United Nations or among national contingents, these same issues are certain to manifest themselves. These pitfalls will in turn determine the degree and nature of its intelligence relationship with the UN.

The most obvious problem is one of security. The problems that security imposes on intelligence analysis and dissemination within the US intelligence community are compounded several-fold when dealing with other nations.[68] The most fundamental issue here is whether the United States believes the benefits of

sharing intelligence with a coalition partner(s) outweighs the risks of jeopardizing its intelligence sources and methods.

Information may not be fully shared or even provided to another national contingent. For one, the intelligence may simply not be of interest to the other nation or is not considered necessary for the overall goal of the coalition. An unequal sharing of intelligence information, no matter how cleverly justified can, how-

Notes

1. For example, see Jeffrey T. Richelson, *The U.S. Intelligence Community*, 2d ed. (New York: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1989), p. 11; Mark M. Lowenthal, "The Burdensome Concept of Failure," in *Intelligence — Policy and Process*, ed. Alfred C.

29. Smith, “Intelligence and UN Peacekeeping,” p. 178.

63. Smith, "Intelligence and UN Peacekeeping," p. 181.

64. Commission on CIA Activities within the United States, *Report to the President* (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1975), p. 6.

65. See *Conduct of the Persian Gulf War,* p. 340; and Lieutenant Colonel Marc Michaelis, "The Importance of Communicating in Coalition Warfare," *Military Review* November 1992, pp. 41, 44, 48-49. In other examples, France and Russia, after the end of the Russo-Japanese War of 1905, briefly shared intelligence from the newly emerging field of SIGINT. See Andrew, "The Nature of Intelligence," p. 6. Of course, the most well-known intelligence collaboration in a coalition grew out of the Second World War. The US-UK alliance eventually grew to incorporate Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. Except for the recent exclusion of New Zealand from access to US materials, that coalition is today kept strong and vibrant by the sharing of intelligence. See Jeffrey T. Richelson and Desmond Ball, *The Ties that Bind: Intelligence Cooperation Between the UKUSA Countries – the United Kingdom, the United States of America, Canada, Australia and New Zealand* (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1985), p. 1.

66. See Wirtz, "Constraints", p. 248 and Lt. Col. Martha Maurer, *Coalition Command and Control: Key Considerations* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1994), pp. 34, 86-88.

67. Regarding the last point, UNOSOM II staff allegedly left some sensitive US intelligence material behind in Somalia. While the United States response was that no state secrets were compromised, a Congressional inquiry may be underway. Mr. James Kiras, Pearson Peacekeeping Training Centre, 18 May 1995 telephone conversation with author. While the author has yet to independently verify this incident, a series of UN slip-ups with US intelligence material will almost guarantee this flow being sharply reduced or halted outright.

might to "decompartment" the relevant SCI for release to the French in addition to other initiatives, the French always expressed a nagging suspicion that they were not getting the full story.

70. Maurer, *Coalition Command and Control*, p. 87.

71 Lt. Colonel Karl W. Eikenberg, "The Challenges of Peacekeeping," *Army* 43 (September 1993): 20.

72. Richelson and Ball, *The Ties that Bind*, p. 168.

73. Wirtz, "Constraints," p. 251.

74. Maurer, *Coalition Command and Control*, p. 34.

75. Roy Pateman, "Intelligence Agencies in Africa: A Preliminary Assessment," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 30 (December 1992):576.

76. Naoki Usui, "U.S. Firms Offer Remote Images to Japanese," *Defense News*, 15-21 May 1995, p. 6.

77. Richelson, *The U.S. Intelligence Community*, pp. 270-71.

78. Jean-Pierre Rabault, quoted by Giovanni de Briganti and Peter B. deSelding, "Germany Hesitates on Joint French Space Plans," *Defense News*, 3-9 April 1995, p. 26.

79. Tim Weiner, "More is Told About C.I.A. in Guatemala," *New York Times*, 25 April 1995, p. A6.

80. Andrew, "The Nature of Intelligence," p. 15.

4. *US Intelligence and UN Peace Operations: A Match Made in Heaven or Somewhere Lower and Warmer?*

Recalling the earlier metaphor of peacekeeping, peace enforcement, etc. as tools which, if improperly used or used by the wrong "mechanic," will be ineffective, US intelligence is also a tool which many would like to acquire for UN peace operations. Chapter 3 outlined several caveats against the accuracy, timeliness, and relevancy of the intelligence tool itself, its inability to handle more than a certain amount of "torque" without breaking. Moreover, as with specific types of UNPOs, the intelligence tool may be inappropriate to the task at hand. Sometimes the "fit" will be good and other times it will be akin to using a straight-edge screwdriver to drive in a Phillips head screw. It will not be a perfect fit, but it will make do. But when US intelligence support threatens to undermine the essential characteristics of peacekeeping, it is tantamount to using the same straight-edge screwdriver to drive in a Robinson screw; it will not only be ineffective, it will be counter-productive and "strip the screw."

From one aspect, there is no guarantee that US intelligence support will be adequate for a UNPO. Try as it might to correct itself, the intrinsic and self-imposed weaknesses of the US intelligence system discussed above will be exacerbated when asked to support this non-familiar customer in a non-familiar role in a non-familiar setting. There may also be pr . e awi7Caolemfamilssedml9

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UN. At least in the former case, there may be hope that action could be taken to

the UN for assistance in deploying a peacekeeping force to act as an interpositional force, monitor the ceasefire and disarmament agreements, and assist in rebuilding the destroyed governmental and social structures. But as a former colony of a European power, both the nominally pro-Western government and the Islamic fundamentalist belligerents demand a right to veto the composition, nature and access of the PKO force. Based upon limited reporting from its embassy in Zululand and advice from the State and Defense Departments, the administration agrees that a PKO force could restore the peace, votes for the motion at the Security Council, but elects not to send forces. Rather, it promises funding, airlift and sealift of PKO forces, and intelligence to assist in the predeployment planning and operation of the operation tagged as UN Assistance Mission in Zululand (UNAMIZ). What can possibly go wrong?

First, as intelligence targets go, Zululand is at the bottom of the collection and analysis priority for the United States. The fighting may have gone on for years, but all US intelligence officials know about it is from the occasional embassy reports and even scarcer reports in the press. The last analysis on the fighting in Zululand was five years old from a military reservist given some makework to do during her two-week reserve tour at DIA. There are limited or no IMINT, SIGINT, or HUMINT assets trained against the country. Other higher priorities have prevented that, but as the deployment of PKO forces grows closer, Zululand finally begins to get limited coverage. Additionally, a three-person Zululand working group is created in the NMJIC, using analysts drawn away from other country desks and only one of whom has a working knowledge of African affairs. After a rather rough start, limited intelligence support eventually begins to flow through the UN desk through the US-UN mission and from there to the UN Situation

Nevertheless, the Zululand working group is able to develop several estimates on the situation in the country. These estimates, as well as satellite photography of the ceasefire lines, suspected headquarters of both sides, major roads and ports are sent to the UN soon before the UN force deploys. There is not enough time for the Nepalese field commander to incorporate all their information into his final planning, but he promises to keep the channels open once he arrives in the coun-

these larger Zululand formations and activities, the drought of data now turns into a flood. The working group is doubled and reports go out to the UN three times a day. However, the field commander is unable to get all this information due to the sensitivity of the collection sources. Even what information he receives not only clogs up his one satellite communications link to New York, it also overwhelms his small military information staff who have never before in their lengthy military intelligence service in their various countries had to deal with so much information and who are more culturally attuned to drawing conclusions on far

Nations being forced to rely upon the US and other Western industrial powers for its intelligence services. The UN may find itself dominated by the viewpoints of the Western nations. K.P. Saksena has observed that

> As of now the United States alone ... has the surveillance capability to monitor developments all over the world. If the Secretary-General has to rely on US technology, the United Nations will have to accept the danger that the information would come through a prism with the potential for distortion."[3]

The question of distortion, whether innocently inadvertent as discussed above in

offensive-oriented humanitarian relief and peace enforcement operations, the force's impartiality and neutrality and the full support of the belligerents to the force's presence are considered crucial. Intelligence gathering, no matter how commendable its goals, is looked upon as undermining those two peacekeeping

Admittedly, the classification system has been overused in the past to cover up abuses of power, to wrap up the truly important information in a blanket of trivial classified details, or even to make the product more credible.[15] The comment by William Burrows, "[t]o classify almost everything is to classify almost nothing,[16] is accurate. Thus, the recent Executive Order (EO 12958) signed on 17 April 1995, which sharply limits what can be classified and opens up more historical material to declassification has "established the least secretive policy on Government records since the beginning of the cold war."[17] Yet at the same time, the need to protect the sources and methods of getting the intelligence has never been denied either by the practitioners or the critics of the US intelligence system.[18]

In essence what a classification system does is to set a price on the material, a price that shows not what the article is worth, but what would be lost in terms of sources and methods if the material fell into the wrong hands. While it can act as a hidden cost, making it inaccessible to those who do not have the proper "coin of the realm," its price can be very easily adjusted downward if the United States wishes to share that information with another either in an attempt to have its position accepted or more importantly as a sign of trust.

The release in Spring 1995 of a classified intelligence estimate on Iran's nuclear program to Russia and China was meant to draw a common bond of concern about proliferation of WMD in the unstable Middle East and hopefully encourage those countries to desist from sales that would aid Iran's nuclear ambitions. Such an approach is not always successful but it does show the mutability of security classifications.[19] To a degree, the upper limit of what is released to another nation represents the amount of trust; it is akin to a diamond engagement ring: the bigger the stone, the greater the mutual commitment. Going back to the example of the analysis given to Russia and China, there probably was a great deal of trust that those two countries would not broadcast it outside the proper channels. It may in fact be easier for the US to pass classified material to Russia or China than it is to the UN since the US knows that the former two have at least some form of security apparatus to limit dissemination of the information.

The United Nations has traditionally had a hard time with the concept of deliberately keeping information from other member states or representatives within a UNPO force. It is not in its nature to deal with or keep secrets, at least for very long. Unlike the United States, Russia or China, the UN is built to be open about its activities, candid about its plans. As Hugh Smith wrote:

> The security of UN intelligence — or, more accurately, the lack of security — is a political minefield ... It must be assumed that any information provided to the UN will sooner or later become public knowledge ... The fundamental reason for the openness of UN intelligence is the fact that the organisation is international and its personnel are multinational.[20]

Although Smith goes on to downplay any problems with the inadvertent release of classified intelligence (arguing that most of the material is ephemeral anyway),

this is too cavalier an approach. Perhaps no harm might be done to the unique intelligence assets that gather this information, but irreparable harm can be done to the atmosphere of trust between the UN and the US.

Thus the DCI's guidance to restrict the exchange of information to "the least sensitive to satisfy each requirement ... provide[d] ... to a limited number of individuals" and HR 7's demand that

> before intelligence information is provided by the United States to the United Nations, the President shall ensure that the Director of Central Intelligence ... has established guidelines governing the provision of intelligence information to the United Nations which shall protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure ...[21]

In the end, if the UN cannot adapt some of its policies and procedures to protect the privileged information it receives, then it will probably lose all future access. Trust, unlike security classifications, is not easily mutable; like the UN's neutrality, it is hard to win and easy to lose.

Differing Perceptions of Intelligence and Information

The issues of neutrality and security are symptoms of a greater perceptual divide between the US and the UN. The former sees knowledge as power, power that can be enhanced by withholding it or shared only after there is a quid pro quo given or promised.[22] The efficacy of secret knowledge lies in keeping that information secret. For the US, secrecy is not just a necessary vice, it is at times a virtue. It artificially enhances the value of the product. On the other hand, although the UN also sees knowledge as power, from its viewpoint information's power is enhanced through openly and equally sharing it with all parties. For the latter organization, although it does at times engage in selective self-censorship,[23] for the most part secrecy acts as a corrosive which works away unseen at the very foundations of the United Nations.

As a collection of states acting in the best interests of all and serving the interests of no single nation, the UN fundamentally cannot act like a state when it comes to collecting and controlling information. During the UN Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA) mission, then Secretary-General Pérz de Cuéllar was very reluctant to support expanding the operation's ability to detect violations,

> mainly due to the fact that an international peacekeeping operation cannot undertake the detection of clandestine activities without assuming functions that properly belong to the security forces of the country or countries concerned.[24]

The United Nations may be forced by necessity to adopt temporarily such an unfamiliar role, but there must be special circumstances. A too close identification of the UN with intelligence gathering and with secret knowledge may

ultimately lead to the organization's downfall as a neutral and open arbiter of the world's problems. In essence, the medicine for UNPO problems might cure the disease but kill the doctor.

Notes

1. Seney, 22 May 1995 correspondence.
2. See Bruce D. Berkowitz and Allan E. Goodman, "Why Spy — and How — in the 1990s," *Orbis*

5. *Options for the UN in Lieu of Intelligence*

UNOSOM II, and probably several other UNPOs as well. In a larger sense, the creation of the I&R unit at UN headquarters provides this same function, albeit at a higher level and with a broader focus. What will limit these field and UN HQs intelligence functions will be a combination of insufficient data, inadequate numbers of well-trained personnel, and an overestimation of their capabilities to satisfy UNPO requirements.

Open Sources of Information

There may subsequently be a need to supplement ground observer reports or to develop an initial database in the case of predeployment planning. More data can be derived from the wealth of materials from open sources, whether they be the media, academic and professional journals, reports from NGOs and UN field offices, or other materials found along the information superhighway. In many cases, open sources can substitute for expensive, hard-to-handle classified intelligence. As Heidi and Alvin Toffler recently commented:

> the Third Wave explosion of information and communication means that more and more of what decision makers need to know can be found in "open" sources. Even a great deal of military intelligence can come from the wide-open store next door. To ignore all this and base analysis on closed sources alone is not only expensive but stupid.[10]

The Tofflers join a long list of critics of the US intelligence community who see the greater access of public information driving down the requirements for espionage. Even the newly appointed DCI, John Deutch, has openly advocated an increased reliance upon open sources.[11]

Similarly, there are those who advocate that the UN tap into open sources for its PKO information needs, most recently Hugh Smith.[12] This is what the DPKO's I&R unit is currently doing as a "front-end" process before it turns to the national intelligence communities.[13] In addition to information publicly available, the UN could acquire pertinent information from its worldwide field offices and NGOs. The former possess a vast wealth of expertise and information which may come in handy for a UN peace operation.[14] The latter are familiar with local conditions and are in the field long before a UN force arrives.[15] Being "one of the boys" rather than some ill-considered shadowy national agency HUMINT collector, the UN should be able to receive a great deal of information from these two sources alone. In both cases, the I&R unit is currently involved in "several [UN] interdepartmental projects underway [to share information] that will greatly improve the information data base that will support PKOs."[16] These include establishing an informal electronic database between DPKO, DPA, and DHA on a "country-by-country basis to improve information-sharing interdepartmentally [at the UN]" and tapping into an electronic network to be managed by DHA which will have

information provided by UN agencies, NGOs member governments and academics relating to humanitarian crises. Eventually, PKOs in the field will be able to have access to this latter network.

However, open sources are at best a mixed blessing. While reports from the *New York Times*, the

> don't provide the technical details that are needed on foreign radars, weapons, communications systems, military organizations, and force deployments. Nor do they adequately cover changing military technologies, the diffusion of advanced industrial capabilities, and all the related data required to support intelligence for military operations.[24]

Thus there will be times when the above sources and methods will not meet the UNPO's needs, particularly when human resources or transportation assets are limited, time is of the essence, or the area to be observed is too rugged or too dangerous for a ground patrol to access.

Aerial Surveillance

In these cases, the next step up the information-collection continuum will be aerial surveillance, preferably from a UN-flagged aircraft. As an initial caution, the term "aerial surveillance" is slippery and has been tossed about randomly by academic researchers. To most military officers, it means either an AWACS-type operation or — in the case of peacekeeping — UN observers using just their eyes, binoculars, or at the most, normal hand-held cameras from an aircraft. In these instances, it is better to call it aerial *observation* (i.e., the same funs* 0.0049 5es,

True aerial reconnaissance has been less frequently used in UNPOs and the only documented cases are in the Congo operation when two Swedish S-29C reconnaissance aircraft, along with a Swedish photo analyzing unit and a ground-air surveillance unit, operated from November 1962 to April 1963 and at least when the US Marines redeployed to Mogadishu to assist in the evacuation of the remaining UNOSOM II peacekeepers.[27] Of course the use of imaging and other sensors onboard the U-2 and German-loaned helicopters has been especially critical to UNSCOM's success in finding Iraq's hidden WMD assets.[28] It is important to note that in these three operations, the level of violence was high, access by ground and aerial observers was restricted or inadequate to the task at hand, and the circumstances overrode any UN concern about offending the sensibilities of the

Afghanistan during the UN Good Office Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP) mission and has its situation centre currently ordering such services,[34] SPOT is allegedly also used by nations with less "high- tech" intelligence services.

method of the DPKO I&R unit,[41] although how successful they have been, whether they make a request to only one nation or several at a time, and how they handle differences among various national estimates is unknown.

Typology of Information/Intelligence Requirements for UNPOs

Given all the above strengths and limitations of the alternatives as well as those of the US intelligence system, where can they best be used in the variety of UNPO requirements? The discussion below establishes a crude typology of which asset to use and why.

For indications and warning (prior to a decision to establish a UNPO), open sources are the best bet for availability, low-cost, and sheer mass of information. National intelligence can help provide the details that open sources cannot, but really should be seen as a member state-volunteered addendum to the process as should commercial satellite imagery. During the predeployment planning stage, commercial satellite imagery may take centre stage, with open sources and national intelligence once again playing a role with the same benefits and constraints as with I&W. Obviously, until a UN force is deployed, there will be no observers or field analysis cell.

Which asset is best for the security of the UNPO force once it deploys depends upon a number of factors: likelihood of violence between belligerents and against the troops, limitations of the force's access to the conflict zone, and the belligerents' sensitivities to *bona fide* intelligence gathering. As a general rule, the lesser the likelihood of violence and the fewer the limitations to the blue helmets' presence, the greater advantage lies in ground and aerial observation. Open source material will also be beneficial, although care must be taken to pick out carefully the accurate fast-breaking news. As the violence and limitations on the force increase, it will find itself cut off from some information sources and will have to access open materials, aerial reconnaissance and national intelligence more. However, there is one interesting irony: as the situation gets worse, it is very likely that the belligerents' sensitivity to intelligence collection will increase. When it is not needed, the sensitivity may be low, but when it is needed, the sensitivity will probably be high. Thus, in this situation, the UNPO may have to eschew aerial reconnaissance and instead rely on those national intelligence collection assets which are not overtly noticeable (e.g., satellites), handling the information with extraordinary delicacy. Yet, unless and until the situation gets really out of hand, these national assets may be unable to pick up signals of low-level activities against the force. In any event, an in-place analysis cell is crucial.

open sources. Whether each of these are used largely depends upon the size of the mandate and country versus the size of the force; the greater the ratio, the greater the requirement to access the methods toward the "back end." Again here, as in the "self-protection" mode, the analysis cell will ensure that the UN field commander can react quickly to violations.

4. Karl Th. Birgisson, "United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus," in *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping*, p. 453.

5. Finland for one, while "totally ignor[ing] the word intelligence in UN missions," does teach its peacekeepers the need for each of them to gather information, to attempt some initial analysis, and to report that information upstream. Lt. Col. Pekka Hannukkala, 16 May 1995 correspondence.

6. For example, see draft Canadian doctrine on peacekeeping operations, Chapter 6 "Military Information in Peace Support Operations," p. 6-5 and *Joint Publication 3-07.3*, "Appendix J: Intelligence Support to Peacekeeping Operations", pp. J-1-2 and J-3. The practical importance of local liaison was observed in northern Iraq (where it was performed to the success of the American ground operation) and in south Mogadishu (where circumstances prevented the Pakistani brigade from being able to protect its own forces from local warlords). Lt. Colonel John P. Abizaid, "Lessons for Peacekeepers," *Military Review* 73 (March 1993): 17-18; and Dobbie, "A Concept for Post-Cold War Peacekeeping," *Survival* 36 (Autumn 1994):128 n 17).

7. For instance, Canada and Sweden have at times sent intelligence officers and units respectively to provide UN field commanders with collection and analytical support. Canada's experience has been relatively recent. The Swedes have had only one go at it during the Congo operation when they deployed two reconnaissance aircraft along with a photo analyzing unit and ground-air surveillance units from Nov. 1962 - April 1963. Grant, 11 May 1995 correspondence, p. 1; and Gorsjo, 9 May 1995 correspondence, p. 2.

8. Michael Graham Fry, "The Uses of Intelligence: The UN Confronts the US in the Lebanon Crisis, 1958," *Intelligence and National Security* 10 (January 1995): 71. Also see Mona Ghali, "United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon," p. 173.

9. Rolf Ekeus, "The United Nations Special Commission on Iraq," in *SIPRI Yearbook 1992: World Armaments and Disarmament* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 512.

10. Alvin and Heidi Toffler, *War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1993), p. 60.

11. See S. Turner, "Intelligence for a New World Order," *Foreign Affairs* 70 (Fall 1991):161; Mark M. Lowenthal, *U.S. Intelligence* (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1992), pp. 109-10.; J.T. Richelson, *the US Intelligence Community*, 2d ed. (New York: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1989), p. 252; and Pat Cooper, "Deutsch: CIA Reform Will Bring Greater Pentagon Ties," *Defense News* 5-11 June 1995:14.

12. Smith, "Intelligence and UN Peacekeeping," *Survival* 36 (Autumn 1994):185.

13. Seney, 19 May 1995 correspondence, p. 2.

14. See Smith, "Intelligence and UN Peacekeeping," p. 186; and Michael Renner, *Critical Juncture: The Future of Peacekeeping*, Worldwatch Paper no. 114 (Washington, DC: Worldwatch Institute, 1993), p. 40.

15. Kenneth D. Bush, "Unhappy Marriages of Convenience: Military-NGO Collaboration in Humanitarian Crises," *Security Dialogue* 26 (March 1995):109-10.

16. Seney, 19 May 1995 correspondence, p. 4.

17. Howard W. French, "As Violence Mounts, Liberians Hope for Foreign Help," *New York Times*, 3 May 1995, p. A3.
18. John Stackhouse, "Putting a Head Count on Poverty," *The Globe and Mail*, 14 January 1995, p. D1.
19. John Mackinlay, "Armed Relief," in *Humanitarian Relief: Sustaining Civilians in Times of War*, ed. Thomas G. Weiss and Larry Minera (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993), pp. 85-86, 89.
20. K. Srimal Bhagavad Geeta, "Role of the United Nations in Namibian Independence," *International Studies* 30 (Jan-March 1993):29; and Romeo Dallaire and Bruce Paulin, "Rwanda: From Peace Agreement to Genocide," *Canadian Defence Quarterly* 24 (Spring 1995):10.
21. Walter Goodman, "Although Unrestrained in a Crisis, Television Is a Tie that Binds," *New York Times*, 28 April 1995, p. A27.
22. The same can be said about academia, at least before a paper is published.
23. Alvaro de Soto and Graciana del Castillo, "Obstacles to Peacebuilding," *Foreign Policy* 94 (Spring 1994):74.
24. J.H. Hedley, *Checklist for the Future of Intelligence*, Institute for the Study of Diplomacy Occasional Paper no. 1 (Washington, DC: Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, 1995), pp. 18-19.
25. See Mona Ghali, "United Nations Emergency Force I," in *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping*, p. 123; Alan James, "The UN Force in Cyprus," *International Affairs* 65 (Summer 1989):494; Brian D. Smith, "United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group," in *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping*, p. 252; and, Smith and Durch, "UN Observer Group in Central America," in *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping*, p. 449.
26. See Peter Jones, "Peacekeeping and Aerial Surveillance" (3-4) and "Peacekeeping and Aerial Surveillance II: From Yemen to the End of the Cold War," *Peacekeeping and International Relations* 22 (September/October 1993):3-4; Allen V. Banner, *Overhead Imaging for Verification and Peacekeeping: Three Studies*, Arms Control Verification Occasional Papers no. 6 (Ottawa: External Affairs and International Trade, March 1991), p. 29; Durch, "United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara," in *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping*, p. 425; and, Virgina Page

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and Susan McNish (Toronto: The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1993), pp. 135-36; Banner, *Overhead Imaging for Verification*, p. 38; Mats Berdal, *Whither UN Peacekeeping*? Adelphi Paper 281 (London: Brassey's 1993), pp. 65-66.

31. Michael Krepon and Jeffrey P. Tracey, "'Open Skies' and UN Peace-keeping," *Survival* 32 (May/June 1990):259.

32. Although this may be financially hard for even those well-endowed states who have been very active in UN peacekeeping, are technologically advanced, and are comfortable with (and are part of) the Western intelligence "establishment." Even Canada, according to one report, has serious problems supplying its peacekeepers with basic essentials: "They're tired, ill-equipped and feel betrayed by their own military leaders ... Some of the armored vehicles Canadian soldiers operate in the Balkans, and used on missions in Somalia, were never meant to be used in a war zone ... [P]eacekeepers lined the floor and sides of their armoured cars with sandbags in hopes the added bulk would protect them from bullets and landmines. Handguns used by Canadians soldiers overseas were made during the second World War. The armed forces is hesitant to use the [explosive-sniffing] dogs, say some [combat] engineers, because it doesn't want to upset animal rights groups by putting the canines in danger." David Pugliese, "Troops Tired and Ill-Equipped," *Whig-Standard* (Kingston), 6 May 1995, p. 16. What hope then would it be for Canada to finance or buy an airborne sensor for UN PKOs? Better to take the risk and adopt a low-level posture, or, as the future portends, become far more selective in choosing the easily winnable, low-threat PKOs.

33. Tracey, "The Use of Overhead Surveillance," pp. 135-36, 149. I believe Jeffrey Tracey underestimates the difficulties to find imagery analysts for the UN when he commented "a couple of imagery analysts with some half decent image processing equipment can do quite an adequate job of putting out a report that could be used for ground-based observers." Even the United States had difficulties in finding sufficient numbers for Operation Desert Storm and, at least for some observers, this — and not the imagery dissemination bottleneck — was the cause of the failure of bomb damage assessment.

34. Tracey, "The Use of Overhead Surveillance," p. 129; and Smith, "Intelligence and UN Peacekeeping," p. 185.

35. Peter D. Zimmerman, "The Uses of SPOT for Intelligence Collection: A Quantitative Assessment," in *Commercial Observation Satellites and International Security*, ed. Michael Krepon, Peter D. Zimmerman, Leonard S. Spector and Mary Umberger (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990), p. 77.

36. See Peter deSelding, "France Offers to Sell Spy Satellite," *Defense News* 13-19

Overhead Surveillance," p. 108; and Michael Krepon, "Spying from Space," *Foreign Policy* 75 (Summer 1989):107.

39. See George Bell, "Concluding Remarks," in *The Changing Face of Peacekeeping*, p. 212; Ann Florini, "The Opening Skies: Third-Party Imaging Satellites and U.S. Security," *International Security* 13 (Fall 1988):99; and Tracey, "The Use of Overhead Surveillance," pp. 130-31.

40. Baron de Jomini, *The Art of War*, trans. Capt. G.H. Mendell and Lt. W.P. Craighill (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1977), pp. 273-74.

41. Seney, 19 May 1995 correspondence, pp. 1-2.

the information gathered, it can lead to the UN making easily-correctable mistakes or being made a fool of. In the UN Transition Assistance Group Namibia (UNTAG) for instance, the UN had a wealth of information on Namibia, but failed to put it to good use during the predeployment phase, resulting in numerous logistical and operational gaffes.[2] Worse still, in ONUCA the tardy response of UN observers to complaints of violations gave "ample time for reported transmitters to be dismantled or hideouts to be vacated."[3] If the UN is to be stupid about acting on the information, perhaps it would be better to leave it ignorant.

Rule 3: Ultimately the peace force and the United Nations must back up its right to observe and collect pertinent information on the situation. For the sake of the operation and the future credibility of the UN, it should not long acquiesce to restrictions on this area without declaring the party(ies) in violation of the spirit and letter of the ceasefire and its own mandate. When faced with this situation, the UN should either back up its demands to monitor with implicit force or plan to cancel the entire operation. It should never dither, hoping that the belligerent(s) will come around. This rule applies regardless of whether a UNPO force is invited in by the belligerents or, in the case of a humanitarian intervention/peace enforcement force, is not wanted by one or any of the sides. For example, UNSCOM was able to continue its U-2 and helicopter flights over Iraq only because of the January 1993 attacks against military targets in Iraq.

Rule 5: UN peace operations must have good predeployment information and follow the pattern — if not the method — first set by UNMOGIP's first commander, Lieutenant General Delvois, who "closely inspected both the Pakistani and Indian fronts from 'low-flying planes, as well as by car and by jeep"[10] and by

before the other side discovers it. Purposely blinding a UNPO (or at least distorting its vision) makes it more ineffectual than its limited resources and will would

Rule 10: When all else has failed, when ground and aerial observation are ineffective, when one side is threatening to use force against the UNPO force or a major conflict is brewing which can embroil the UN troops or endanger regional security, *and* the perception of the UN's neutrality is not a major issue or would suffer acceptable damage, then — and only then — should the UN tap into member states' intelligence communities for information. For instance, the unique information requirements of UNSCOM could not be filled by the traditional and less objectionable nontraditional methods of information gathering. As Peter Jones observed, "UNSCOM has a very specific set of technical tasks which call for the use of highly intrusive means not normally required by traditional peacekeeping forces."[23] Conversely, the inability of ONUCA assets to detect violations of Esquipulas II[24] would have benefited greatly from US intelligence support if that support could have been guaranteed to be objective and impartial.[25] This last rule sums up the thrust of chapters 3-5.

Looking back at the guidelines imposed upon information gathering in a UNPO, the guidelines for intelligence developed from the limited American support in UNPOs to date are really no different. The constraints of intelligence as mentioned earlier (i.e., adequacy of support, concern over US domination, fear of losing UN neutrality, and differing perceptions of intelligence) are also confirmed. Some constraints regarding intelligence also appear to affect information as well. If anything, the following constraints affect both overtly collected unclassified UN information and covertly collected classified US information:

1. Relying upon a member state for information may lead to accepting that state's hidden agenda or perspectives.

2. Belligerents will not always act in good faith regarding ceasefire accords, thus necessitating the need for the UN to monitor for any cheating.

3. Belligerents can also delay or restrict information/intelligence gathering; this is fundamentally a symptom of the level of trust which they have in the United Nations force to be truly neutral, if not also support their cause.

4. Information and intelligence may not be fully shared within a UNPO field operation or at UN HQs.

5. Poor information and intelligence can in fact be more dangerous than none at all in that it gives a false sense of confidence that one knows what is really going on when one really does not.

Notes

1. For discussion on the difference between the two, see Ray S. Cline, "An Approach to the History of Military Intelligence," in *The Intelligence Revolution: A Historical Perspective*, ed. Walter T. Hitchcock (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1991), p. 302; and *JP 2-0*, p. II-3.
2. Virginia Page Fortna, "United Nations Transition Assistance Group," in *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping*, ed. Brian D. Smith and William J. Durch (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), p. 363.
3. B. Smith and W. Durch, "UN Observer Group in Central America," in *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping*, p. 453.
4. Rolf Ekeus, "The United Nations Special Commission on Iraq," in *SIPRI Yearbook 1992: World Armaments and Disarmament* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 693-97.
5. W. Durch, "United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara," in *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping*, p. 425.
6. Birgisson, "United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan," in *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping*, pp. 307-8. Brian D. Smith, "United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group," in *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping*, p. 252; and Fortna, "United Nations Angola Verification Mission II," in *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping*, pp. 394, 399.
7. See Birgisson, "United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan," p. 279; and Ekeus, "The United Nations Special Commission," p. 694.
8. Fortna, "United Nations Angola Verification Mission II," p. 398.
9. Birgisson, "United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan," pp. 299, 308; Fortna, "United Nations Angola Verification Mission I," pp. 381, 383, 385; John A. Marcum, "Angola: War Again," *Current History* 92 (May 1993):223; and Craig Etcheson, "The 'Peace' in Cambodia," *Current History* 91 (December 1992):416.
10. Birgisson, "United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan," p. 278.
11. Birgisson, "United Nations Yemen Observation Mission," p. 211.
12. Mats Berdal, *Whither UN Peacekeeping*? Adelphi Paper 281 (London: Brassey's, 1993), p. 44.
13. Smith and Durch, "UN Observer Group in Central America," p. 453.

16. See Ghali, "United Nations Emergency Force I," p. 123; and, Jones, "Peacekeeping and Aerial Surveillance," p. 3-4.
17. Peter Jones, "Technology and Peacekeeping," *Peacekeeping and International Relations* 21 (November/December 1992):3-4.
18. Alan James, "The UN Force in Cyprus," *International Affairs* 65 (Summer 1989):493.
19. Birgisson, "United Nations Yemen Observation Mission," pp. 213-14.
20. William J. Durch, "The Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission," in *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping*, p. 267.
21. David L. Brand, Paul J. Bryson and Alfredo Lopez Jr., "Intelligence Support to the Logistician in Somalia," *Military Intelligence* 20 (October/December 1994):5-7. Also see Major Martin N. Stanton, "TF 2-87, Lessons from Restore Hope," *Military Review* 74 (September 1994):41 where mention is made of using native interpreters to provide information, albeit with some caution if the translator is suspected of having hidden loyalties.
22. Preliminary draft of Canadian doctrine on support to peacekeeping operations, no date, pp. 6-5.
23. Peter Jones, "Peacekeeping and Aerial Surveillance III: The Post Cold War Era," *Peacekeeping and International Relations* 23 (July-August 1994):6.
24. Smith and Durch, "UN Observer Group in Central America," pp. 451-52.
25. Notwithstanding the single piece of evidence (based upon the title of an upcoming JMIC thesis) that the US did play some sort of intelligence role, this support has yet to be independently confirmed and expounded upon.

7. Conclusion

Does intelligence and information ultimately affect a UNPO's success? At the end of the day, when all the risks and benefits are weighed and some degree of the various types of intelligence/ information are collected, etc., for a UNPO, does it all really make a difference? Alluding to the earlier notion of intelligence being a resource akin to strategic airlift which the US can provide to the UN, the lack of airlift would have made deployment of peacekeeping troops problematic, but it has never been cited as a key element leading to the failure or success of a UNPO. Similarly, can it be argued that the lack of intelligence and/or information would slow things down and prevent certain sub-tasks from being performed, but that its absence would not be the root cause of any single operation's failure? If this is true, then the utility of intelligence support is greatly outshined by the need to fix other problems in UN operations. This final chapter looks across the board at UNPOs to attempt an answer to this question.

Several recurring themes regarding the basic necessities for a successful UNPO, specifically traditional PKOs, crop up in the works of a number of noted researchers: prior consent of the parties to either a ceasefire and/or the presence of peacekeepers, impartiality of the peacekeepers, the non-use of force, and support of the Great Powers.[1] While this listing is fairly comprehensive and has been

realization of reality and what it may wish is going on; and the UNPO force is able to observe freely and/or gather information about what is going on in the

The third and fourth requirements grow out of the second: if great power support is wavering, the blue helmets' mandate is likely to be vague, unreasonable, too broad or unenforceable or they won't have sufficient resources to fulfil their mission. Typical of such ill-conceived mandates is that of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), whose mandate was criticized by Mona Ghali for being

> impracticable from the start. In entrusting the force with restoring the authority of the Lebanese government, the Security Council did not give adequate consideration to the fact that the government had lost all its effective authority. The Security Council, in effect, called for UNIFIL to raise a Lazarus.[9]

Other failed and failing PKOs with poor mandates include ONUC, UNYOM, UNOSOM II and UNPROFOR.[10]

Shortages in human resources and equipment, in quantity and/or quality, are a direct reflection of how important the success of the mission is to the great powers and the other UN member states and less one of poor UN logistics systems or other UNPO commitments. Among this rogue's gallery of misfits are ONUCA and many of the usual suspects: ONUC, UNYOM, UNOGIL, UNAMIR, and UNPROFOR.[11]

reluctance to provide sufficient resources or a symptom of the belligerents' lack of support of the operation or the peace process itself. Thus in this perspective, out of all of the many UNPO failures, only ONUC and UNTAC would include information as a contributing requirement, and thus for UNPOs in general, a relatively insignificant one.

However, this line of reasoning is specious. Observing what is going on is a key function of peace forces. While restrictions on this activity may stem in large part from broader problems, the lack of information keeps a UNPO force from acting as an intelligent honest broker between the two sides. It will be placed at an information disadvantage vis-à-vis one or all of the belligerents and will have nothing to confirm violations of ceasefires, threats to its own forces and the like. When all other means have failed or are inadequate, that is where there is still a small yet important niche for US intelligence to fill.

Admittedly, there are no cases where the lack of American intelligence scuttled a UNPO, but that support is still relatively new and such an urgent requirement for it is rare. It can be effectively argued that only in the case of UNSCOM, if there were no American intelligence support, the operation would be hard-pressed to fulfil its mandate. The lack of intelligence in just such a case would do more than just slow things down; it would be the root cause of an operation's failure.

Nations as it was designed to be used than many could ever have predicted."[17] Just a final word of caution: if the UN chooses repeatedly to travel down this particular path, this toll-road of American intelligence support, it must be careful. The woods through which this path travels are full of spooks.

Notes

1 See Paul Diehl, *International Peacekeeping* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), pp. 168-71; William J. Durch, "Introduction,"in *The Evolution of Peacekeeping*, ed. W.J. Durch (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), p. 12; and Adam Roberts, "The Crisis in UN Peacekeeping," *Survival* 36 (Autumn 1994):94.

2. See K. Birgisson, "United Nations Yemen Observation Mission," in *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping*, pp. 206, 215; Mona Ghali, "United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon: 1958," in *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping*, p. 162 and "United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon: 1978-Present," in *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping*, p. 197; W. Durch, "United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara," in *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping*, p. 430; Jonathan Tombes, "Cambodia: Lessons for UN Peacekeepers," *The American Enterprise* 5 (May/June 1994):48; Roger Hill, "Preventive Diplomacy, Peace-Making and Peace-Keeping," in *SIPRI Yearbook 1993: World Armaments and Disarmament* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 55.

3. William J. Durch, "The UN Operation in the Congo: 1960-1964," in *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping*, p. 345.

4. Birgisson, "United Nations Yemen Observation Mission," p. 215; and Durch, "United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara," pp. 406, 430 and "The UN Operation in the Congo," p. 345.

5. John Fenske, "The West and 'The Problem from Hell'," *Current History* 92 (November 1993):353-56; and Lawrence Freedman, "Why the West Failed," *Foreign Policy* 97 (Winter 1994-95):54.

6. Freedman, "Why the West Failed," p. 69.

7. Speech given at "Peacekeeping '94" conference, Washington 14-16 November 1994. See also Alain Destexhe, "The Third Genocide," *Foreign Policy* 97 (Winter 1994/95):3, 9; and Shawn H. McCormick, "The Lessons of Intervention in Africa," *Current History* 94 (April 1995):164.

8. A. John Watson, "How We Botched It in Rwanda," *The Globe and Mail*, 23 December 1994, p. A17.

9. Ghali, "United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon," p. 197.

10. See Durch, "The UN Operation in the Congo," pp. 334-35; Birgisson, "United Nations Yemen Observation Mission," p. 215; McCormick, "The Lessons of Intervention

Observation Mission," p. 215; and Ghali, "United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon," p. 175.

Glossary

AFB	Air Force Base
AWACS	Airborne Warning and Control System
CIA	US Central Intelligence Agency
DCI	Director of Central Intelligence
DIA	US Defense Intelligence Agency
DoD	US Department of Defense
DPKO	UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DTIC	Defense Technical Information Center
HUMINT	Human intelligence “system”
I&R	Information and Research Unit

OOTW	Operations other than War
PDD	Presidential Decision Directive
PKO	Peacekeeping Operation
RFI	Request for information
SAR	Synthetic aperture radar
SIGINT	Signals intelligence
UN	United Nations
UNAMIR	UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda
UNAVEM	UN Angola Verification Mission
UNEF	United Nations Emergency Force
UNFICYP	UN Forces in Cyprus
UNIFIL	UN Interim Force in Lebanon
UNIIMOG	UN Iran/Iraq Military Observer Group
UNIKOM	UN Iraq/Kuwait Observer Mission
UNIPOM	UN India-Pakistan Observation Mission
UNMIH	UN Mission in Haiti
UNMOGIP	UN Military Observer Group India and Pakistan
UNOGIL	UN Observer Group in Lebanon
UNOMIG	UN Observer Mission in Georgia
UNOMIL	UN Observer Mission in Liberia
UNOSOM II	UN Operation in Somalia
UNPO	United Nations Peacekeeping Operations
UNPROFOR	UN Protection Force in the former Yugoslavia
UNSCOM	UN Special Commission
UNTAC	UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia
UNTAG	UN Transitional Group Namibia
UNTSO	UN Truce Supervisory Organization
UNYOM	UN Yemen Observer Mission
USAF	US Air Force
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

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