

The Canadian Page

The Defence Management Studies program, established with the support of the Canadian Department of National Defence (DND), is intended to engage the interest and support of scholars, members of the Canadian

the great defence rebuilding program of the 1950s, the Korean War, the formation of NATO, and the deployment of forces overseas in peacetime. Claxton was unique in Canadian defence politics: he was active, inventive, competent, and wise.

In 1937 then Colonel Maurice Pope wrote a staff paper to prompt the government and the defence and security establishment in Ottawa to look to the state of the “higher direction of national defence.” He found the central apparatus deficient in structure, policies, and procedures and with war on the horizon, he and others were gravely concerned. He acknowledged that war and the use of force was a responsibility of government and, therefore, essentially a political matter. However, he also concluded that there was “one further primary consideration — of a mechanical nature. It is that the machinery we should seek to evolve must be such as will ensure the full coordination of the working parts, not only in the planning stage, but in execution. It must also be flexible, rather than rigid, and so be capable of adaptation to varying circumstances.” By some accounts, Canada is still searching for this ideal mechanism and now needs it more than at any time since the end of the Second World War.

This paper examines this issue again from the premise that foreign and military affairs are two distinct yet inextricably combined aspects of national government. Diplomacy and the use of force are two sides of the same coin which work to further the security goals and policies of a national government. Yet it is often difficult to remember this link, and the existence of two separate departments contributes to a sense of separate worlds and separate tasks. In the Canadian case, the absence of any national security structure reinforces this sense of separateness. The focus here, therefore, is at that level of joint action where the two sides of the coin ought to come together in international and domestic affairs.

It is the thesis of this paper that there is a national security policy gap that needs to be addressed in Canada. The gap in question is not between declared and actual policies, but is rather a functional gap relating to the national security policy-making process and the “machinery of government.” Thus, we return to Pope’s original recurring concern for “a Canadian mechanism for the higher direction of national defence” and security.

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ADM	Assistant Deputy Minister
CDS	Chief of the Defence Staff
CF	Canadian Forces
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
DCDS	Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff
DEA	Department of External Affairs
DFAIT	Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade
DND	Department of National Defence
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
MNFHQ	Multinational Force Headquarters
MoD	Ministry of Defence (UK)
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDHQ	National Defence Headquarters
NORAD	North American Air Defence Command
NSC	National Security Council
ORAE	Operation Research and Analysis
PCO	Privy Council Office
PMO	Prime Minister's Office
RCMP	Royal Canadian Mounted Police
SOPs	Standard Operating Procedures
UNOSOM	United Nations Operation in Somalia

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CHAPTER ONE

THE PROBLEM FACE TO FACE

In mid-November 1996, a Canadian reconnaissance mission made its way to Rwanda in anticipation of Canada leading a multinational operation to facilitate the return of refugees from Zaire to Rwanda and the delivery of humanitarian aid. The advance party was initially diverted from Kigali to Nairobi because they did not have diplomatic clearance to land. When the party finally did reach Kigali there were further problems. "On arrival in Kigali, Rwandan authorities were surprised by the time of arrival of the recce party, its size, the fact personnel were armed, the fact more personnel were on route and the task of the recce party to site a MNFHQ in/near Kigali."¹

When the advance party members were requested by Rwandan officials to surrender their weapons, communications means and transportation means, the reaction of the CF personnel was extreme reluctance and initially they resolved not to cooperate with the Rwandans because the only knowledge they had to base their decisions on was their recollection of what had happened in 1994 to Belgian soldiers who had given up their weapons. Ultimately, after negotiations, a resolution satisfactory to both sides was reached, but not until after a period of time when tensions were high and the situation potentially explosive.²

This example provides a brief illustration of the problems that can arise in the absence of established interdepartmental planning, assessment, decision-making, and coordination procedures. Though dramatic,

however, does not mean, given the nature and extent of the changes in the strategic environment and the Canadian risks and commitments that come with those changes, that it is not worth examining the situation to determine whether or not that is the case. Given the issues at stake and the risks involved, if some improvement is possible, however small, it is surely worth the effort to find out.

The idea that there is something lacking in Canadian national security policy-making is not a new one. In 1986, on the verge of the end of the Cold War, R.B. Byers wrote an Adelphi Paper on the challenges facing Canadian security policy.⁴ Byers argues, in part, that an ongoing lack of interest in security issues by successive Canadian governments contributed to a reliance on the security framework and policies associated with Canada's alliance commitments in NATO and NORAD. This means that there has been little questioning or examination of the basis of Canada's national security policy and that "security policy has not served as a linkage between foreign and defence policy."⁵ In turn, this lack of linkage, and reliance on alliance commitments as a framework for policy, has created a discrepancy between "the security tasks we have set for ourselves and the resources we have been prepared to devote to fulfilling these tasks effectively."⁶ Byers calls this discrepancy the "commitment-capability gap."

The commitment-capability gap description applies equally to today's situation, although now it is the requirements of peace-support operations rather than Cold War commitments that point up the need for attention. In 1992, in an internal Department of National Defence (DND) program evaluation, the evaluation team noted that

for Canada peacekeeping is very much a Canadian political imperative. As such, the Canadian Government has been seen as being generally well disposed to meeting most requests for participation by Canada in both peacekeeping and other conflict-limiting operations. The general perception was that, when it is deemed to be in Canada's political interests to accept a request, the lack of, or competition for available military resources alone will not be an acceptable reason for rejecting participation.⁷

In a prescient observation, the evaluation team then went on to point out that while resource commitments had remained relatively constant until then, a call for a large military contribution or a rash of peacekeeping

commitments could send the basic assumptions behind DND planning procedures “awry.”⁸ Thirteen years later the need to address these issues remains compelling.

EXISTING LITERATURE

Aside from Byers’ 1986 study there is little literature directly focused on Canadian national security policy. And much of the literature that does exist focuses on the nature of the national security policy rather than the policy-making structure itself.⁹ Equally, there is a strong literature base on Canadian foreign policy and Canadian defence policy, though as separate policy issues.¹⁰

There is a variety of government reports on foreign and defence policy, but almost exclusively on the policies as separate issues.¹¹ For example, in 1994, two Special Joint Parliament Committees undertook a review of foreign policy and defence policy.¹²

THE PARAMETERS OF THE STUDY

As mentioned, this paper is not intended to determine what Canadian national security policy should or should not be. Instead, the pur-

security, based on an assessment of threats, vulnerability, and goals, and an associated set of mechanisms (foreign policy and defence) to carry them out. The national security policy functions discussed here, therefore, include policy development and policy implementation. The associated tasks include: short- and long-term planning; ongoing research and assessment (policy information and advice); assessment of lessons learned from previous operations; crisis management; and coordination of the actors involved in implementation of the policy. In Canada's parliamentary system the decision-making role falls to the prime minister and members of the Cabinet. Accordingly, the actual making of decisions is not dealt with in this paper although the national security functions discussed are all geared toward facilitating the best possible decision-making, and ensuring that those decisions are effectively and efficiently carried out. The functions and associated tasks are categorized in Table 1.

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Policy development	Short- and long-term planning/forecasting Based on research, information collection and analysis and ongoing assessment of current and previous situations (lessons learned) Provision of independent (non-departmental) information and advice on issues and problems/ crises
Policy implementation	Coordination of departments and other actors as necessary Crisis management coordination as necessary

It is a fundamental premise of this paper that national security, as a concept, is something that comprises more than defence polic601677necl assitplemcom

sides of the same coin, two different but inextricably linked concepts. In Canada, there is no permanent framework or structure that is used to guide, inform, or monitor this process. This paper seeks to determine whether that matters, and if it does what might be done about it. To do this the paper will examine examples of national security activity that involve both strategic and operational considerations. In the post-Cold War environment this means peace-support operations (peacekeeping and other UN operations) and, now, NATO operations as well.

The paper has three sections. In the first section, the current system of national security practices is examined in order to establish the nature and extent of the problem. To do this, the paper uses the decision-making processes associated with Canadian involvement in peace-support operations as the case material. The second section briefly examines the situation and experiences of other countries. The third section then provides a catalogue of the various proposals that have been made in recent years, through studies and government reports, for different mechanisms and structures to deal with national security issues. The conclusion draws together the various threads of the paper and outlines a series of options that might address the national security gap.

THE CURRENT NATIONAL SECURITY GAP

All forms of policy-making involve both formal and informal processes, the latter being developed over time and on the basis of specific experiences. This is certainly true in the national security decision-making process in Canada. While there is no formalized system for coordinated decision-making before and during peace-support operations there is a basic process, which is

For traditional peacekeeping operations this system has suited the situation very well. Indeed, during the Cold War, when traditional peacekeeping was the primary form of UN activity, Canada established itself as one of the top UN peacekeeping member states, participating in every UN mission until the first UN mission in Angola (UNAVEM I) in 1988. The system, however, was designed or at least developed in response to

the kind of information provided to those making a decision about whether and how Canada should participate in a peacekeeping mission. The Auditor General outlined the criteria it expected Cabinet to consider when making decisions about peacekeeping:

- a clear statement of the nature and extent of participation and the potential for achieving Canadian foreign policy objectives;
- analysis of the political, humanitarian, and military situation in the country/region of conflict;
- an assessment of the physical risks to Canadian personnel and of the probable duration of involvement;
- the financial cost and other implications for Canada;
- an assessment of whether government guidelines for participation are being followed; and
- the different ways in which Canada could participate, and an assessment of the lessons learned from participation in previous missions.¹⁶

The two departments, DND and DFAIT, both have general guidelines for policy decisions enunciated in departmental documents.¹⁷ For DND, the general policy guidelines are found in the 1994 White Paper.

- There be a clear and enforceable mandate.

and international composition of the operation must suit the mandate and the operation must be adequately funded and have a satisfactory logistical structure.

since they received different answers from different people as to the degree to which a decision to participate was weighed against basic policy guidelines in DND.²⁴ Ambassador Robert Fowler and former CDS General John de Chastelin both testified that the guidelines were only used in a very general way.²⁵ But Colonel Bremmer, who was director-general of International Policy at the time, stated that the guidelines were factors that had to be considered in the decision-making process.²⁶

The interdepartmental recommendations made to Cabinet, therefore, may not always take the broader policy implications into account nor match the proposed actions against government criteria for participation. This is where the informal elements of the system come into play. As indicated above, in some instances this may be because of an overwhelming need to participate in an operation, such as in situations of humanitarian emergencies. But in other situations this may reflect an implicit assumption that the decision to participate had already been made at a higher level.

The Somali Inquiry revealed that this was the case in the decision to participate in the UNITAF operation. In this instance there was direct communication between the Canadian CDS, John de Chastelin, and US General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, followed by a telephone conversation between US President George Bush and Prime Minister Brian Mulroney. The decision to participate happened very quickly and Canada announced its participation in the operation on the same day that the United States announced that it would be leading the operation. The Somalia Inquiry found that, in that context, “some planners felt that the decision to participate in UNITAF had already been made, thus reducing their function to justifying the decision.”²⁷

Although the decision to go to Zaire was not totally unexpected in that the government had been considering the possibility of participation in some kind of operation there, the decision to go as coalition leader and to go as quickly as possible was. In the Joint Staff Lessons Learned documents, a planning officer outlines the sequence as follows.

Prior to early November, there was little to no sense that CF involvement would consist of more than token efforts — the DART or a contribution to a multinational airlift. As a result, the only initiative taken was to confirm to the DART HQ that the African Great Lakes region could become a mission area, and as a result, should be a focus of their intelligence monitoring....

Several capability alternatives were identified, however, coordinated contingency planning had only been addressed briefly. The JOPP had been engaged with the issue of a ... planning guidance 7/8 November, however, this was too late, and too limited in the scope of the possible DND participation to be of more than limited use.... The capability alternatives were briefed to the government 9 Nov 96 by the A/CDS.... however, the information presented had been developed in isolation from government intentions. As a result, the very late statement of intention and desire by the government meant that DND was ill-prepared both mentally and organizationally to accept the task that was directed.²⁸

The Auditor General raised questions about the scope and type of information being provided to Cabinet and the fact that a number of key questions were rarely addressed. Those criticisms were in reference to the nature of the information being provided by the departments to Cabinet. Whatever the exact content or type of that information, it is important to remember that its source is a government department. The information, therefore, represents or presents the views of the department doing the providing. At minimum the information is a product of a departmental process of information development and selection. There is nothing inherently wrong with that fact; it is simply important that it be recognized.

This issue arises at two levels. Cabinet members have no alternative body to turn to for “outside” or “independent” information in order to provide a kind of counter-expert source of information to assist in judging the departmental information they are receiving. This is also the case for the ministers of the departments in question. Writing in 1996, General Gerry Thériault, who was CDS in the early 1980s, outlined the problem.

In Canada we have no National Security Council, no Cabinet Committee on Defence. The Minister is responsible to Cabinet and the PM for defence. But unlike his American and British counterparts, a Canadian minister does not have his own ... staff — the emphasis being on the word expert — to advise and assist him in the discharge of his considerable personal responsibilities, especially in developing his own informed assessment of the mass of proposals, opinions, recommendations that come to him from NDHQ. In the present arrangement, the Minister is reliant on

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Department and Canadian Forces staffing and advice provided by the CDS

CHAPTER TWO

that he hoped the Council would act as a “channel for collective advice and information” on national security issues, making it clear, however, that “it is the prerogative of the President to determine such policy and enforce it.”³⁶

An examination of the history of the NSC provides a mixed account of its efforts.³⁷ The extent to which the NSC has been used as a channel for collective advice, or as an alternative source of advice, or as a crisis-management mechanism, has varied from president to president. Each president has used the Council in a different way and a number of them have altered its composition and its duties according to their own personal vision of how US national security interests should be administered. The terms of the *Executive Order* are sufficiently broad to make the Council a fairly malleable instrument. Its effectiveness has varied accordingly.³⁸

Over time, the distinction between the NSC itself and the NSC Staff has become an important one. The NSC is composed of Cabinet-level advisors to the president whose membership changes over time and with changes in the presidency. The NSC Staff, on the other hand, looks after the core tasks associated with administration and coordination. It is a bureaucratic structure, and as such it has an institutional memory and objectives of its own, including establishing its role with respect to other government agencies.

There is no question that the NSC has contributed to bureaucratic tension within US administrations. Initially, other departments resented the NSC’s creation and felt threatened by its presence. In many ways that interdepartmental tension has never fully disappeared. In addition, there has been on-again, off-again tension between the roles of the secretary of state and the national security advisor. In this latter case, whether or not there is a rivalry or competition problem depends a great deal on the personalities involved, including that of the president. Indeed, times when the National Security Council can be said to have worked well and to have been used well, can be attributed, at least in part, to the personalities involved — because the people in question worked well together, because they believed in the value of the Council itself and because they had a clear vision of the Council’s role.³⁹

Since the end of the Cold War, the changes in the strategic environment have prompted a debate about the nature of the national security

needs and policy of the United States. This debate has been accompanied by a debate about whether and how the US national security decision-making structure should be altered in order to adjust to those changes. As with the debate about the future nature of US national security policy, to date the debate about the appropriate structures to address the challenges of the post-Cold War environment has not resulted in any major changes in the national security decision-making framework.⁴⁰

GREAT BRITAIN

Unlike the United States, Great Britain has no structure separate from

the Strategic Defence Review, but we are still awaiting the strategic security review. In a sense, we have received a two-dimensional review of a three-dimensional world. We cannot afford to allow the SDR to be a one-off experiment in inter-departmental cooperation.⁴⁵

AUSTRALIA

As a country whose political system also derives from Great Britain, Australia provides an interesting comparison to the Canadian system. Like Canada, in Australia the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Department of Defence coordinate on peacekeeping issues. There is no separate structure for national security policy discussion or information. Consequently, it is not surprising that some of the same issues relating to peacekeeping policy and decisions have arisen in the Australian context.

In 1993-94, the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade undertook a review of Australia's participation in peacekeeping operations. The review was prompted by the end of the Cold War

Government Organisations, the Defence Industry Committee and private suppliers. The secretariat should be sufficiently flexible to include representatives of other organisations which may come to be involved in peacekeeping.⁴⁸

OTHER COUNTRIES

A review of other countries reveals varied situations.⁴⁹ In France and Finland, for example, the fact that the president plays a strong foreign policy role adds another actor to the interdepartmental mix.⁵⁰ The Netherlands⁵¹ and Scandinavian countries, like Canada, have faced peacekeeping issues and experiences that raised serious questions about when they will participate in such operations and how these operations relate to their countries' goals. None of these countries, however, have created a separate administrative body for peacekeeping or national security issues. To deal with cross-departmental issues, Sweden makes use of interdepartmental committees for policy development.⁵² By contrast, Norway uses a Special Advisor Office as a way of dealing with non-traditional or cross-cutting issues.⁵³

CHAPTER THREE

A number of studies since 1990, both government or government-sponsored and non-government, have touched on this issue. Generally, however, these studies have focused on broader questions, such as the events surrounding Canada's deployment to Somalia or, as in the case of the Auditor General, the efficiency of the government's management of its peacekeeping policy. This section provides a catalogue of various recommendations which have been made with respect to interdepartmental issues between DFAIT and DND on policy questions.

MILITARY REVIEWS

During 1990 and 1991, the Chief Review Services within DND undertook a military review of the participation of Canadian Forces in peacekeeping operations. The aim was to "review the policies, practices

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The scope and depth of the information provided by the inquiry provides considerable insight into how decisions involving the use of Canadian armed forces were made, ostensibly in support of foreign policy goals, and initially on the basis of altruistic impulses (UNOSOM in trouble), but ultimately for reasons that have little to do with the security issue at hand.⁶⁶ In addition, the sequence of events outlined by the commission demonstrates how an ad hoc process occurring in a compressed time frame can contribute to serious problems.

As a result of its study, the commission developed a series of findings and recommendations for changes. On policy issues some of the commission's suggestions echo those in the Auditor General's report as well as other proposals. Although the inquiry was focused primarily on the activities of the Department of National Defence, given the policy questions they were studying the commission inevitably touched on inter-departmental questions. Their findings include the following:

- The effectiveness of the process for applying criteria at the time of the Somalia commitment was problematic.
- There was a lack of clear direction regarding the applicability of the criteria and the manner in which they should receive consideration from DND and the CF. No clear lines of responsibility existed between DND, the CF, and the Department of External Affairs (DEA) as regards assessment of the proposed operation against the criteria.
- No procedure was in place for examining the criteria and formally documenting the results of the review and the basis for any acceptance or rejection of specific criteria.
- New peacekeeping guidelines, updated to reflect the changing nature of peacekeeping, had not been developed or were not in use at the time of planning for the Somalia deployment.
- At the time of planning for the Somalia deployment, there was no written doctrine or checklist relating to planning for traditional peacekeeping or peace enforcement operations, despite previous recommendations that such documents should be produced.
- Notwithstanding defence policy requiring peacekeeping guidelines

- At the time the Government of Canada decided to participate in the UN-authorized US-led peace enforcement operation, no role for the Canadian Forces had been established.⁶⁷

Based on these findings the commission recommended that the government “issue new guidelines and compulsory criteria” for decision-making, that the government “define clearly the respective roles and responsibilities of [DFAIT] and [DND] in the decision-making process” and that the government require that briefings to the government advising on participation in peace-support operations include “a comprehensive statement of how the peace-support operations guidelines and criteria apply to the proposed operation.”⁶⁸

The commission also recommended the creation of a permanent advisory body to coordinate peace-support operations and decision-making.

lead an initiative to create an effective national, interdepartmental lessons learned process.” And that “a high level, interdepartmental assessment capability which can deploy early to potential mission areas and provide strategic assessments and advice is necessary.”⁷⁴

There remains the problem, mentioned earlier in this text, of the government’s decision to undertake, on very short notice, a mission very different in scale and nature from the one originally envisaged. This had a knock-on effect throughout the system, creating a situation in which operational decisions had to be made quickly and in the absence of a full apprehension of the government’s intentions.⁷⁵ In some senses this problem was resolved by the extent to which the situation on the ground in Zaire changed very quickly just as the multinational force arrived, creating what one respondent termed a situation of “mission search” rather than “mission creep.”⁷⁶ Fortunately the changes on the ground brought about a quick end to the operation rather than compounding what were already significant operational problems. Beyond calls for clearer, prompter, and better national direction there are no specific recommendations in the lessons-learned documents on this issue.

The Department of Foreign Affairs undertook its own version of a post-operation analysis of the Zaire operation. The study and accompanying recommendations, however, are primarily geared toward the international rather than the domestic environment and therefore focused on issues relating to the nature of the multinational operation. Of note, however, for the purposes of this study, the DFAIT study made the point that

[b]y taking the lead of the mission without contributing combat troops, Canada was in a weak military and political position. In leading the mission without any significant numbers of combat troops, Canada was dependent on other nations to conduct any significant operations.... Despite deploying a large number of forces to the region, Canada never had available the operational capability that would have enabled it to undertake military missions in Zaire on its own, had it wished to do so.⁷⁷

On a related point, like the DND lessons-learned documents, the DFAIT study indicated that the speed of the decision-making and the consequent absence of pre-operation analysis and planning was a critical factor. The DFAIT study found that “the speed with which the military can deploy was poorly understood by some. Some Government leaders,

humanitarian agencies and reporters demonstrated a fundamental misunderstanding of the speed with which the military can deploy. There was a clear expectation that armies would be fully deployed in theatre almost instantly after a political decision was taken.”⁷⁸

On the question of interdepartmental issues, in contrast to most of the comments in the DND lessons-learned process, the study found that the interdepartmental task force “worked well” and on that basis the study called for the task force idea to be replicated in similar future situations.⁷⁹

EXPERT STUDIES

In 1993-94, a blue ribbon committee, called the Canada 21 Council, undertook an examination of Canada’s international policies and priorities at the end of the Cold War and into the new century. With respect to peacekeeping operations the group recommended that

a unit similar to Operation Research and Analysis (ORAE) be established within the Department of National Defence to review continuously Canada’s experience in peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations and draw appropriate policy and operational conclusions. Such a unit should have strong and continuous input, probably in the form of secondments, from Foreign Affairs and, as appropriate, Elections Canada, CIDA and Environment Canada.⁸⁰

In order to provide ongoing comprehensive and cross-issue collection and analysis of information on the whole range of issues that relate to “common security” the Council found that “[r]egarding its internal operations and links with other governments, the Council urges the Federal Government to create an effective and accountable group to integrate and assess common security issues at the sub-Cabinet level. The purpose of this unit would be to conduct comprehensive long-range assessment and provide early warning.”⁸¹

In 1996, in light of the Somalia inquiry the minister of national defence commissioned three studies to investigate related issues (specific terms) and provide recommendations. In his study, Albert Legault rejected the idea of creating a Canadian equivalent to the National Security Council but did agree that the issue of interdepartmental coordination in times of crisis needs to be addressed. Legault recommended the creation

guaranteed. There are mixed views as to the success of past efforts to create interdepartmental structures for coordination such as the interdepartmental task force established during the Zaire operation.⁸⁴ One of the problems with these efforts is that they are temporary. They are created only after an operation is in motion and come to a close when the operation is over. The Zaire lessons-learned documentation, in conjunction with the other reports, make a compelling case for an ongoing interdepartmental entity of some kind which would be responsible for interdepartmental tasks such as pre-operation reconnaissance and assessments, monitoring ongoing operations, and undertaking interdepartmental lessons-learned studies.

The third theme has to do with information for decision-making. This is a crosscutting theme. In some ways the concern about guidelines is a concern for better informed decision-making. If the government is required to meet guidelines for participation it may have to get more information about resources and risks than it would have done otherwise, and that may prompt it to make a different decision. At least it might ensure that it makes a better informed decision. The calls for better, more permanent, interdepartmental cooperation are, in part, therefore, a call for better information gathering and sharing in order to facilitate better operations.

But in amongst the various proposals is a fairly consistent call for an information source that is independent of the decisionmakers, both at Cabinet level and within the departments. As General Thériault pointed out, the purpose of this is not to undermine the information being generated already but to ensure that decisionmakers receive the most complete information possible. In addition, given the turnover of personnel in both departments and in other agencies as well, and the extent to which individual peace-support operations differ in their nature and requirements, there is inherent value in the idea of an entity whose sole purpose is to research, monitor, and assess Canada's past, current, and possible future operations, on an ongoing basis.

The foregoing analysis affirms the hypothesis that there is a gap that needs to be filled. The analysis reveals some consistent themes. Problems do arise in decision-making about these issues, especially when decisions are taken on short notice. In essence, there is no one entity or group that consistently looks at the national security picture as a single concept and looks at the picture on an ongoing basis — beginning, middle,

and end. This gap has two main elements: a source of research, information, and monitoring existing and possible areas that may require a Canadian response (a think-tank function) that is independent of the departments and policy actors. Second, it acts as a coordinating body that brings together the different departments to discuss and agree on decisions and actions. This function involves research and generic planning for possible future operations, strategic reconnaissance for imminent operations, monitoring existing operations and situations, and facilitating and coordinating crisis management as necessary.

WHAT ARE THE OPTIONS?

A spectrum of possible responses to this problem is available. These responses range from a Canadian version of the American National Security Council to some form of permanent interdepartmental mechanism to doing nothing at all and continuing the current state of affairs.

The NSC option is an unlikely one and not one that particularly suits the Canadian situation. In part, this is a question of scale. While national security issues are important to Canada and while, in the present international environment, Canada does engage in significant operations outside the country, Canadian national security requirements simply do not call for an organization of the size and scope of the NSC. The other NSC-type function, that of providing the prime minister with a personal source of advice, effectively exists. If he or she feels the need to have such a national security advisor, then an advisor or advisors may be appointed to the Prime Minister's Office.

One step down from the NSC is the idea of an interdepartmental secretariat or directorate along the lines of the Australian proposal. Many of the studies and issues examined here suggest the need for some kind of interdepartmental entity to carry out a variety of tasks, including strategic assessment (general and pre-operation); ongoing monitoring and assessment during an operation; and evaluation of lessons learned and incorporation of those lessons into policy framework. These functions resemble those of the NSC Staff, and correspond to the Somalia inquiry recommendation for some form of permanent advisory body.

The third option is to simply proceed on the same basis as in the past. There are a variety of reasons that weigh in favour of doing nothing and staying with the current system. One is the "if it ain't broke, don't fix it" (e9 of.sn

it” argument. This line of thinking would argue that there is nothing wrong with the current system, interdepartmental coordination occurs as necessary, the system has essentially “worked” so far, and there is a certain desirable flexibility involved in having an ad hoc process that allows decisionmakers to be responsive. A corollary to this argument is the assertion that the existing system is a fair reflection of Canada’s national security requirements in that Canada’s political and geographic position and the scale and scope of its foreign and defence policy mean that it does not need a more formal or larger national security apparatus than it has already.

But the problems associated with the operations in Somalia and Zaire suggest that if the system is not broken, it certainly is operating at less than optimum efficiency. The consistent calls for some kind of change in both governmental and non-governmental documents confirm that there is a problem that needs to be addressed. If nothing else, the extent and nature of the changes in international peace-support activity since the Cold War, and the Canadian government’s determination to remain a participant in those activities through the UN and NATO, is itself a compelling argument for changing or at least updating the system accordingly.

How, then, might this be done? From a functional perspective, the preceding analysis has demonstrated that there are two separate but linked national security needs: the need for information and the need for coordination. Two options flow from this assumption. First, that a single entity could fulfil both functions and second, that the two functions are separate enough that two different entities would be best. The first option, that of a single entity in the form of a national security secretariat or staff, would involve both members of the two departments as well as individuals who would fulfil the “expert” role.

The argument for the second option, two separate entities, depends on the assumption that it is desirable to have a real separation between the think-tank role and other institutional affiliations. The basis for this argument is that the very nature of the interdepartmental entity requires that it be “of the departments,” and given that the purpose of the information role is to provide an “outside” source of information, it makes sense to think in terms of two separate entities rather than a single national security entity which would encompass both functions.

Two separate organizational entities, therefore, would involve, first, an interdepartmental organization that would undertake coordination tasks

prior to, during, and after an operation. Its tasks would involve undertaking an interdepartmental strategic reconnaissance when an operation is pending and would monitor the operation while it is ongoing, providing reports to Cabinet as necessary when adjustments are needed to the Canadian commitment or when events on the ground warrant attention. Even in the event there were no ongoing operations this organization would be engaged in considering and undertaking lessons learned from past operations and committing to generic planning for possible future national security tasks. This group could also be responsible for providing, on an annual basis, a consolidated report on national security operations or a “national estimate,” of the type envisaged by the Auditor General.

The second organizational entity’s purpose could be loosely termed the “think-tank” or expert role. This role involves the ongoing collection and analysis of information relating to possible and actual national security roles. This information would be used primarily by decisionmakers at the Cabinet level, providing an “outside” source of information about the risks involved and Canada’s ability to meet all of its obligations with the resources it has available. Such an entity could also provide information to Parliament and other national security actors as required. Some provision would have to be made to allow this organization to draw on information from various departments, including intelligence sources. In order to confirm and ensure its independence, such an organization would be created outside any government departments.

There is always some hesitation about advocating the creation of yet another government structure. In this case, however, we are not exactly

¹Department of National Defence, Army Lessons Learned Centre, -
- - - - - , 2 June 1997, p. 25. Access to Information Request

(Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1969);
Tom Keating, *Defence and the Canadian State* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1993).
On defence policy, see *Defence and the Canadian State*, Vol. 1, *Defence and the Canadian State*, ed.
Douglas L. Bland (Kingston: School of Policy Studies, Queen's University, 1997).

¹¹An excellent detailed overview of the various government reports on these issues since the early 1990s has been done by Natalie Mychajlyszyn for the Canadian Council for International Peace and Security's National Security Policy Project, *Defence and the Canadian State*, December 1998.

¹²*Defence and the Canadian State*, Report of the Joint Parliamentary Committee Reviewing Canada's Defence Policy, October 1994;

¹⁹See, for example, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, "Foreign Affairs Minister André Ouellet at the 50th Session of the United Nations General Assembly," 25-27 September 1995, p. 3.

²⁰Report of the Auditor-General, *Report of the Auditor-General*, pp. 6-15.

²¹*Ibid.*, pp. 6-16-6-17.

²²*Ibid.*, p. 7-10.

²³Somalia inquiry, p. 760.

²⁴*Ibid.*, pp. 712-13.

²⁵*Ibid.* Also, see pp. 237-38 where the inquiry notes that they were told by both Fowler and de Chastelain that the guidelines were "'significantly' flexible, and were taken into account only 'somewhat, not in any particular detail.'"

²⁶*Ibid.*, pp. 712-13.

²⁷*Ibid.*, p. 260.

²⁸Department of National Defence, J3 Lessons Learned 2, 10 January 1997, p. 8.

²⁹General Gerry Thériault, "Civil-Military Relations," *Canadian Military Journal*, 4 (October 1998):2. Also, see Douglas L. Bland, *Confidence in the Military* (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1995), p. 287. Bland states: "Ministers of defence from all parties have complained over the years that they lack confidence in the advice they receive from military officers, or at least they wish for some way to verify and balance such advice."

³⁰See, for example, Flora MacDonald, "The Minister and the Mandarins," *Canadian Military Journal*, September/October 1980, pp. 29-31. Also see Sid Tafler, "How Bureaucrats Beat McKinnon," *Canadian Military Journal*, 27 December 1980.

³¹Evan H. Potter, "'Storming' the Fortress of Canadian Foreign Policy: The Policy Commandos at External Affairs," unpublished paper, 10 July 1992. Howard Balloch and David Angell, "Foreign Policy Planning and Coordination in Canada: The Policy Planning Staff at External Affairs," *Canadian Military Journal*, 35, 4 (1992):449-63.

³²For example, an internal Foreign Affairs appraisal of the Zaire mission was undertaken. The overall results are published in James Appathurai and Ralph Lysyshyn, "Lesson Learned from the Zaire Mission," *Canadian Military Journal*, 5, 2 (1998):93-105.

³³"National Security Act of 1947," Public Law 253, 26 July 1947. The Act also created the position of Secretary of Defense and provided for the three services — the Air Force, Army, and Navy — to be brought into one administrative unit.

³⁴Ibid., sec. 101 (a).

³⁵Ibid., sec. 101 (b).

³⁶As quoted in John Prados, *The Secret Wars: The National Security Council and the Making of the Cold War Alliance* (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1991), p. 30.

³⁷This included the Oliver North episode when the Council was used to facilitate activities that had been forbidden by Congress.

³⁸A good basic overview of the NSC's history is available on the US government Web site. "History of the National Security Council, 1947-1997," <http://www.whitehouse.gov/WH/EOP/NSC/html/History.html>. For other analyses see Carnes Lord, *The National Security Council: A History* (New York: The Free Press, 1988); and Christopher C. Shoemaker, *The National Security Council: A History* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991).

³⁹See, for example, Prados' discussion of President Eisenhower's use of the NSC. Prados, *The Secret Wars*, pp. 57-95. Also see, Lord, *The National Security Council*, pp. 70, 87.

⁴⁰Two related major studies on this issue have been undertaken in the US research community. Stephen Cambone's study proposes the creation of a National Security Directorate and the development of a senior cadre of officials who could function across departmental lines. Stephen A. Cambone, *The National Security Council: A History* (Washington, DC: CSIS, 1998).

The second study puts forward a wide range of recommendations for the conduct of foreign policy. In particular, the report focuses on the potential role of information technology and how it will and should change the policy-making process. John Schall, ed., "Shaping U.S. Engagement Overseas: Future Challenges, Future Opportunities for the Twenty-First Century Advocacy of US Interests Abroad," Concept Paper, Henry L. Stimson Center, January 1998.

⁴¹For example, Prime Minister Thatcher had a policy unit within her Political Office. In September 1999, Prime Minister Blair established a new research unit to provide the prime minister with factual information on key issues. See Alan Travis, "Super Think-Tanker," *The Guardian*, 6 September 1999.

⁴²Michael Clarke, *The National Security Council: A History* (London: Macmillan for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1992), p. 85.

⁴³"Details of Strategic Defence Review," Ministry of Defence Press Release, 28 May 1997.

⁴⁴The White Paper can be found on the MoD Web site, www.mod.uk. Some of the supporting essays for the Strategic Defence Review are also available on the Web site.

⁴⁵United Kingdom, House of Commons, Defence Committee, www.defencecommittee.org.uk, Eighth Report, Vol. 1, www.defencecommittee.org.uk.

⁵⁵Ibid., p. 17.

⁵⁶Ibid., p. 18.

⁵⁷Ibid.

⁵⁸Ibid., p. 38.

⁵⁹Ibid. This recommendation was also proposed by the Somalia Commission.

⁶⁰Ibid.

⁶¹Auditor General, *Report of the Auditor General of Canada*, para. 6.40.

⁶²Ibid., p. 6-30. Emphasis added.

⁶³Ibid., para. 7.29. DND's response to this recommendation indicated that it had changed this situation.

⁶⁴Ibid., para. 6.55.

⁶⁵Ibid.

⁶⁶Somalia inquiry, *Report of the Somalia Inquiry*, ch. 24, especially the summary, pp. 765-67.

⁶⁷Ibid., pp. 763-71.

⁶⁸Ibid., pp. 772-73.

⁶⁹Ibid., p. 774.

⁷⁰DND, *Report of the Somalia Inquiry*, p. 6.

⁷¹Ibid., p. 9.

⁷²See the various lessons-learned documents, but especially NDHQ

Report of the Somalia Inquiry, p. 16.

⁷³Ibid., p. 36.

⁷⁴DND, *Report of the Somalia Inquiry*, Annex A, 3452-12-8 (J3 Lessons Learned 2), November 1997, p. A-9/15.

⁷⁵For example, see the comments in the analysis report, including: "The lack of national direction caused conflicts, confusion and forced subordinate HQs ... to issue direction based on logic and historic precedence. The lack of direction on an informed basis resulted in ... duplicating efforts and wasting valuable staff time," *ibid.*, p. 22.

⁷⁶POR Collection Plan, Phase IV - Employment, p. 2.

⁷⁷Appathurai and Lysyshyn, "Lessons Learned from the Zaire Mission," p. 100.

⁷⁸Ibid.

⁷⁹Ibid., p. 105.

⁸⁰Canada 21 Council, *Report of the Canada 21 Council* (Toronto: Centre for International Studies, 1994), p. 58.

⁸¹Ibid., p. 73.

⁸²Albert Legault, *Report of the Commission of Inquiry on the Management of the Persian Gulf Crisis*, Study done for the Minister of National Defence, March 1997, p. 6. available on DND Website.

⁸³Ibid.

⁸⁴For example, during the Persian Gulf War an interdepartmental task force also had mixed success. See Bland, *Managing the Crisis*, p. 204. For a first-hand discussion of the crisis management centre within the Department of Foreign Affairs, including the experience in the Persian Gulf War, see Michael Shenston, "Foreign Service Crisis Management in the Nineties," in *Managing the Crisis*, ed. Donald C. Story (Toronto: Canadian Scholars' Press, 1993), pp. 73-82.